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Preface
The volume at hand comprises four papers  preceded by a comprehensive introduc-
tion  that are intended to obtain the doctoral degree to be awarded by the Faculty of
Management, Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Cologne. This preface
aims to clarify the publication status of the four papers.
The ﬁrst paper, Teachers' Evaluations and the Social Situation in the Classroom (co-
authored by Klaus Birkelbach) was submitted to Sociology of Education.
An earlier version of the second paper, Intelligence and Academic Achievement as
Contextual-Level Predictors of Teachers' Evaluations: Big-Fish-Little-Pond or Reﬂected-
Glory Eﬀect? (co-authored by Klaus Birkelbach) appeared as a book chapter (Intelligenz
und Schulleistung als Kontextmerkmale: Big-Fish- Little-Pond- oder Reﬂected-Glory-
Eﬀekt? Eine Mehrebenen- analyse von Lehrerurteilen) in Komparative Sozialforschung
(ed. by T. Beckers, K. Birkelbach, J. Hagenah and U. Rosar; Wiesbaden 2010: Springer).
Although the contributions to that edited volume have already been peer-reviewed, the
paper at hand extends its German predecessor both theoretically and empirically.
An earlier draft of the third paper was accepted for presentation as a full conference
paper at both the conference Higher education and beyond  Inequalities regarding
entrance to higher education and educational credentials, July 5-9, 2010, Monte Verita,
and at a RC04 (Research Committee of the International Sociological Association on
Sociology of Education) poster session at the XVII ISA World Congress of Sociology,
July 11-17, 2010, Gothenburg. A revised version was recently accepted at Rationality
and Society. Comments by two anonymous referees of that journal are already considered
in the version at hand.
The fourth paper, Does the Eﬀect of Teachers' Expectations on Students' Educational
Opportunities Decrease over Educational transitions? A Statistical Matching Approach,
was accepted for presentation as a full conference paper both at the RC28 (Research
Committee of the International Sociological Association on Social Stratiﬁcation and
Mobility) Spring Meeting, April 13-16, 2011, Essex, and at the fourth Conference of the
European Survey Research Association (ESRA), July 18-22, 2011, Lausanne. Comments
by participants of both conferences as well as of two anonymous ESRA reviewers have
been considered.
In both co-authored papers, I am ﬁrst and corresponding author.
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I. Causes and Eﬀects of Teachers'
Evaluations: A Theoretical Primer
1 Introduction
This theory design pushes the presentation to unusually high levels of abstraction.
Our ﬂight must take place above the clouds, and we must reckon with a rather thick cloud
cover. We must rely on our instruments. Occasionally, we may catch glimpses below of
a land with roads, towns, rivers, and coastlines that remind us of something familiar, or
glimpses of a larger stretch of landscape with the extinct volcanoes of Marxism. But no
one should fall victim to the illusion that these few points of reference are suﬃcient to
guide our ﬂight (Luhmann, 1995 [1984], foreword to the German edition, p. l).
Since more than half a century, and in both public debates and scientiﬁc discourses,
the idea of meritocracy (Young, 1958) more or less serves as a benchmark according to
which an educational system's justice and eﬀectiveness were to be judged. However,
since several decades, educational sociology unveils both theoretically and empirically
that educational systems are neither perfectly fair (Coleman, 1966; Jencks, 1972; Bloss-
feld and Shavit, 1993), nor the idea of meritocracy is incontestable regarding its moral
implications (Bell, 1972; Goldthorpe, 1996b; Solga, 2005; Becker and Hadjar, 2011).
While in the beginning of educational sociology, inequalities in educational opportu-
nities (IEO) were typically explained by the postulate that the value of education per
se varies by social strata (Hyman, 1953), more recent (and also more parsimonious)
theoretical accounts discard this demanding hypothesis in favor of only assuming the
underlying cost-beneﬁt considerations of an educational transition decision to be class-
variant  while parents' appraisement of education per se (i.e. in an absolute rather
than in a relative sense) could remain constant (Keller and Zavalloni, 1964; Boudon,
1974; Meulemann, 1979; Goldthorpe, 1996a; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996a; Breen and
Goldthorpe, 1997; Esser, 1999).
On the other hand, Wisconsin status attainment theorists (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970)
have already brought up students' signiﬁcant others as an important variable aﬀecting
their educational outcomes including their aspirations (also see Morgan, 2006). One
prominent example of these signiﬁcant others are teachers whose expectations were
shown to aﬀect both student academic self-concept and achievement in various Pyg-
malion and self-fulﬁlling prophecy studies (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Raudenbush,
1984; Jussim, 1986; Madon et al., 1997; Jussim and Harber, 2005).
1
1 Introduction
Yet, Wisconsin status attainment theorists have been seriously criticized for confound-
ing the correlations obtained in their path models with causality (Freedman, 1987; Hed-
ström and Swedberg, 1996; Hedström, 2005; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010). Furthermore,
I see still need for a more thorough theoretical speciﬁcation concerning the generative
processes (Goldthorpe, 2001) of teacher expectancy eﬀects. This is the gap I intend to
close with the volume at hand in general, and by means of its introduction in particular.
This volume comprises two papers analyzing the predictors of teachers' evaluations,
and another two with the latter's outcomes as the crucial objective. Concretely, in the
data at hand (the Cologne High School Panel), teachers had been asked whom of their
10th class students they consider to be able to start academic studies, and whom of
them not. The ﬁrst paper models these evaluations as an outcome of students' cognitive
ability in terms of intelligence scores, their average grades, their parents' social class,
and their aspirations. Using structural equation modeling as the method of analysis, the
paper's proximity to the Wisconsin status attainment tradition and thus the need for a
solid theoretical foundation is evident.
The second paper adds another level of analysis by investigating to what extent teach-
ers' evaluations depend on reference-group eﬀects in the classroom. While the techniques
of multilevel analysis provide a sophisticated statistical framework for testing contextual-
level hypotheses (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Gelman and
Hill, 2007; Hox, 2010), multilevel theory was quite prominent in the early 1970s, then
slowly abated until entirely stagnating since the early 1990s (Hauser, 1970a; Barton,
1970; Hauser, 1970b; Farkas, 1974; Hauser, 1974; Blalock, 1984; Van den Eeden, 1992).
Therefore, I aim to discuss how these theoretical consideration can be connected to
contemporary reference-group eﬀect research on teachers' evaluations.
The third paper asks how self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects of teachers' expectations 
measured by their evaluations  relate to cost-beneﬁt-based theories about social in-
equality in educational opportunities. As mentioned above, in my view, self-fulﬁlling
prophecy research still stands in the duty of a more ﬁne-grained speciﬁcation of how the
implied teacher treatment eﬀect can be assumed to aﬀect student achievement. Below,
I will argue that this eﬀect should be understood as operating via students' subjective
expected probability of educational success, as it is referred to in IEO research (Breen and
Goldthorpe, 1997; Esser, 1999).
And ﬁnally, the fourth paper analyzes to what extent the above self-fulﬁlling prophecy
eﬀect might vary over a sequence of educational transitions. More precisely, this question
condenses to the problem of how students' beliefs in terms of their subjective expected
probability of educational success change via a mechanism of Bayesian updating con-
ditional on having successfully passed a preceding transition (Breen, 1999; Breen and
García-Peñalosa, 2002).
While the title of this volume merely addresses the Determinants and Outcomes of
Teachers' Evaluations, in this introduction, I intend to get closer to the underlying
causes and eﬀects. The theoretical framework whereby this should be accomplished is
the one of social mechanisms (Elster, 1985, 1989; Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, 1998b;
Gambetta, 1998; Hedström, 2005). The crucial objective of this theoretical account
is to get close to an understanding explanation in the Weberian sense by opening the
2
I. Causes and Eﬀects of Teachers' Evaluations: A Theoretical Primer
black box and showing the cogs and wheels of the machinery (Elster, 1985, 1989). It is
argued that both the covering-law tradition (Hempel, 1942; Hempel and Oppenheim,
1948; Hempel, 1965; see Opp, 2005b for a still prominent textbook example) and what
has been referred to as variable sociology (Esser, 1999) or as the robust dependence
tradition (Goldthorpe, 2001) in sociology fall behind this demand: ﬁrst, by overhasty
postulating the existence of general laws in the social sciences without trying to under-
stand actors' motives, beliefs and means; and second, by confounding correlations with
causality without providing a suﬃcient theoretical justiﬁcation for the implied causal
structure. In contrast, mechanism-based explanations build on what Popper (1945a,
1994) called the analysis of actors' social situation, i.e., the reconstruction of both ac-
tors' external restrictions and their motives and beliefs by means of a suitable theory of
action. As I will argue below, there is a surprisingly consistent line of reasoning from
Weber's demand for an understanding explanation (and his concept of Richtigkeits-
rationalität) over Popper's situational logic combined with its rationality principle on
to contemporary mechanism-based explanations distinguishing between desire-mediated,
belief-mediated, and opportunity-mediated social mechanisms (Hedström and Swedberg,
1996, 1998b; Hedström, 2005; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010). These latter dimensions
can also be used as a starting point for a comparatively weak rational action theory.
Hence, this introductory chapter provides a theoretical foundation of the underlying
social mechanisms regarding both IEO research and the determinants and outcomes of
teachers' evaluations analyzed in the four papers of the volume at hand. I will argue that
following the Keller and Zavalloni (1964) and Boudon (1974) tradition of discarding the
assumption of a class-dependent absolute value of education, diﬀerences in educational
aspirations due to diﬀerences in cost-beneﬁt considerations can mainly be accounted for
by belief-mediated mechanisms. The same holds for both teachers' action scripts that
shape their evaluations (cf. paper 1) and teacher expectancy eﬀects (in sense of a self-
fulﬁlling prophecy) that aﬀect students' subjective expected probability of educational
success (cf. papers 3 and 4). In case of reference-group eﬀects on teachers' evaluations,
supplemental opportunity-mediated mechanisms will come into play (cf. paper 2).
The remainder of this introduction will be structured as follows:
In section 2, I will begin with Max Weber's well-known deﬁnition of sociology in order
to use it for a more profound elaboration on the debate on the consecutive prevalence of
either Erklären (explanation) or Verstehen (understanding) as the methodological prin-
ciple in the ﬁeld which is denoted as humanities today. After that, I will outline how this
debate connects to the concept of social mechanisms (Elster, 1985, 1989; Hedström and
Swedberg, 1996, 1998a; Hedström, 2005; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, but also see Opp,
2005a) that tries to bridge the gap between Erklären and Verstehen by the use of middle-
range theories (Merton, 1957; also see Boudon, 1991). It is shown that mechanism-based
explanations do not fall behind the conceptual rigor of deductive-nomological explana-
tions (Hempel, 1942; Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948)  but are superior to them in
understanding actors' particular desires and beliefs (Hedström, 2005) in the context of
their situational opportunities (ibid., also see Coleman, 1990, ch. 1; Esser, 1993a, ch.
6).
In section 3, I will use another statement by Max Weber about individuals' life chances
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as a starting point for ﬁrst sketching the enduring debate about the demand for meri-
tocracy in the educational system; and second, to relate that discourse to ﬁndings about
inequalities in educational opportunities and the social mechanisms behind them. As
I will show, the latter elaborations cast a shadow on theoretical accounts that over-
hasty defend the prevalence of 'merit' (in terms of achievement) over individuals' social
backgrounds in explaining their actual life chances.
In section 4, I will ﬁrst provide a brief summary of the four papers at hand; and
second, I will reconstruct the underlying social mechanisms in all four studies while also
referring to the implied action-theoretical assumptions. Finally, the conclusion in section
5 will oﬀer an outlook for all four papers in particular and for social sciences theory in
general.
2 Historical and Analytical Foundations of Social
Action Theory
At the beginning of his seminal monograph Economy and Society, Max Weber deﬁnes
sociology as follows:
Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here) is
a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order
thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and eﬀects (Weber, 1964, p.
88).
What is translated here as interpretive understanding and causal explanation is what
reads deutend verstehen and ursächlich erklären in the German original.1
By referring to both explanation and understanding as two equally important aims
of sociology, Weber bridges an important gap between two schools of thought that have
been concurrent to each other since the 19th century. In the next subsection, I aim to
sketch the historical conditions that set the stage for Max Weber's deﬁnition of sociology
(and that might also account for the occasionally huge gap between quantitative and
qualitative methodology in the social sciences; e.g. Adorno et al., 1976).
2.1 Historical Developments: Erklären vs. Verstehen
As natural sciences matured to becoming the dominant scientiﬁc discipline in the 19th
century, the humanistic studies had to deal with the issue that now an empiristic
paradigm in favor of practices such as experiment and observation became the gold
standard of scientiﬁc methodology.2 Roughly speaking, this development divided hu-
manities into two camps (von Wright, 1971, p. 3ﬀ.): one holding the view that the
1Soziologie soll heißen: eine Wissenschaft, welche soziales Handeln deutend verstehen und dadurch in
seinem Ablauf und seinen Wirkungen ursächlich erklären will (Weber, 1985, p. 1). Where possible,
I will try to cite available English editions of the German classics, but in some cases  such as the
one here , additional quotations in German are inevitable, or an English edition was not available.
2Positivism has gradually taken possession of the preliminary sciences of Physics and Biology, and in
these the old system no longer prevails (Comte, 1865, p. 12).
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methodological standard of exact natural sciences should also be applied to humanities
 an approach referred to as positivism,  and another, genuinely anti-positivist stand
that rejects positivists' methodological monism and advocates a contrast between natu-
ral sciences and disciplines such as history (for which many of the following arguments
were developed; see Dilthey, 1927) that aim to grasp the individual and unique features
of their objects (von Wright, 1971, p. 5)  usually denoted as hermeneutics.
Historically, sociology was founded as a positivist discipline. Comte (1865) summarizes
the intention of positivist sociology as follows: The primary object, then, of positivism is
twofold: to generalize our scientiﬁc conceptions, and to systematize the art of social life
(p. 3). The latter can be understood as consisting of Thoughts, Feelings, and Action
(p. 8)3, and in his emphasis on invariable laws that he assumes to underlie human
action (p. 10), Comte already anticipates the deductive-nomological paradigm as it will
be later set up by Hempel (1942) and Hempel and Oppenheim (1948).4 Consequently,
Comte denotes Sociology as a physique sociale (Comte, 1839, 46e Leçon) that should
follow the positivist principles developed by the natural sciences.5
However, as a reaction to the methodological adoption of positivism, the hermeneutic
approach engaged in postulating a methodological uniqueness of the humanities. As both
von Wright (1971) and Apel (1979) note, Droysen (1857, p. 11) appears to be the ﬁrst
scholar using the dichotomy of Erklären vs. Verstehen: Nach den Objekten und nach
der Natur des menschlichen Denkens sind die drei möglichen wissenschaftlichen Meth-
oden: die (philosophisch oder theologisch) spekulative, die mathematisch-physikalische,
die historische. Ihr Wesen ist: zu erkennen, zu erklären, zu verstehen (emphasis added).
While the methodological trias proposed by Droysen is less known today, Dilthey's
dichotomy separating the Geisteswissenschaften from the natural sciences became more
prominent. It has been argued elsewhere (von Wright, 1971, p. 173; Apel, 1979, p. 17)
that the term Geisteswissenschaften ﬁrst  i.e. in the plural form  appeared in Jacob H.
W. Schiel's translation of John Stuart Mill's term moral sciences in his System of Logic
(Mill, 1843, 1863). Dilthey might have adopted it from this monograph, but also Hume
(1913) has to be named in this context: Actually, he already uses the terms moral phi-
losophy, the science of human nature, and the moral sciences (Hume, 1913, section I;
section VII, part I) to refer to what is called Geisteswissenschaften today.6 Interestingly,
and although Hume considers mathematics to be far more clear and determinate than the
more ambigue moral sciences, he ﬁnally arrives at the conclusion that their advantages
and disadvantages nearly compensate each other (ibid). This, of course, is an elemen-
3At this point, one could argue that Comte's emphasis on thoughts and feelings also anticipates the
ﬁrst two concepts of the Desires, Belifes, and Opportunities (DBO) action model by Hedström
(2005) that will be described in more detail in section 2.2.
4The importance that we attach to theories which teach the laws of phenomena, and give us the power
of prevision, is chieﬂy due to the fact that they alone can regulate our otherwise blind action upon
the world (Comte, 1865, p. 11). I will come back to the particular epistemological importance of
the term 'blind' in footnote 12.
5After Quetelet (1835, 21ﬀ.) used the term physique sociale to denote the statistical analysis of
social phenomena, Comte switched to the term sociologie (e.g. Comte, 1865, p. 27).
6Ayer (1952) notes that the best part of John Stuart Mill's work consists in a development of the
analyses carried out by Hume (p. 55).
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tary prerequisite for the Kantian uniﬁcation of empiricism and rationalism7, and it also
anticipates Weber's later uniﬁcation of the Erklären and Verstehen camps. Before, how-
ever, beginning with Dilthey's Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Dilthey, 1883,
1984), the triumphant procession of the latter term as a self-reference of the German
humanities was unstoppable.
Whereas the early Dilthey (1880 and earlier; see Dilthey, 1984) did not make use of
Droysen's (1957) distinction between explanation and understanding when already argu-
ing against Comte's positivism, he later sharpens it even more: We explain nature, but
we understand psychic life (as cited in Makreel, 1992, p. 134; original (German) citation
in Dilthey, 1924, p. 144), and We explain through purely intellectual processes, but we
understand through the cooperation of all our psychic powers (as cited in Makreel, 1992,
p. 134; original (German) citation in Dilthey, 1924, p. 172).8 With this distinction,
Dilthey initiates a position that became dominant for the school of Neo-Kantianism in
the late 19th/early 20th century.9
Regarded in this context, it is indeed notable that Weber's deﬁnition of sociology
re-integrates both methodological paradigms again. In doing so, it comes close to the
recent line of arguing of analytical sociology in terms of social mechanisms (see next
subsection). Moreover, becoming aware of the fact that the state-of-the-art methodol-
ogy for the next decade established to be one of (quite mechanistic; cf. Esser, 1996b;
Machamer et al., 2000) universal laws (Hempel, 1942), it is even astonishing (see Apel,
1979, p. 40 for a similar line of arguing).
In his essay On some categories of interpretative sociology, Weber (1922, 1981) speci-
ﬁes the demand for a synthesis of explanation and understanding more concretely. One
the one hand, Weber clearly argues in favor of rationality as an interpretative and by
that means explanatory principle  being the response of sociology in a more and more
rationalized world.10 But on the other hand, Weber explicitly stresses that the 'under-
standing' (Verstehen) of the context must always be veriﬁed, as far as possible, with
the usual methods of causal attribution, before any interpretation, however plausible,
becomes a valid 'intelligible explanation' (Weber, 1981, p. 151). It is characteristic
of such an 'intelligible explanation' that by relying on the principle of instrumental
rationality, even 'irrational' processes such as stock market panics can be explained ad-
equately: In that case, the rational ideal type of action would serve as a benchmark
7In his Prolegomena to any future metaphysics, Kant acknowledges Hume for having interrupted his
own dogmatic slumber (Kant, 1902, Introduction).
8As Giuliani (2003, p. 10) has observed, Apel (1979, p. 18) erroneously attributes the ﬁrst of the two
above-quoted statements by Dilthey to his Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (Dilthey, 1883)
 where, however, the latter author does not elaborate on the dichotomy between explanation and
understanding.
9The Neo-Kantians such as Rickert (1899, 1902) or Windelband (1894) on the one hand built on
Dilthey's distinction between explanation and understanding, but on the other hand, they rejected
his psychologism, as they called it (Apel, 1979, p. 36). For a further discussion of Dilthey's relation
to the Neo-Kantian tradition see Jalbert (2008) and uber (2010).
10For a discussion of the notion of rationalization see Weber's chapter on bureaucracy in his Economy
and Society (Weber, 1978, ch. XI.)
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to determine what would have happened, had actors behaved rationally (p. 154).11 It
becomes evident that for Weber, both concepts appear to be intertwined: Sociology
must reject the assumption that 'understanding' (Verstehen) and causal 'explanation'
have no relationship to one another (p. 157). When Bourdieu (1988, p. 774f.) later
writes, Theory without empirical research is empty, empirical research without theory
is blind12, then he advances an integrative view that suits both the Weberian deﬁnition
of sociology and the mechanism-based stream of research in analytical sociology. But
before I come to Hedström and his (and others') plea for (social) mechanisms (Elster,
1998), I ﬁrst aim to outline the still dominant (e.g. Opp, 2005b) theoretical framework
against which Hedström and his coevals are arguing.
In 1942, Hempel published his seminal paper The function of general laws in history
(Hempel, 1942). The main punchline of this article is the thesis that what has later
been called deductive-nomological explanations have to serve as a methodological prin-
ciple for both the natural and the social sciences. His deﬁnition of such a general law
reads as follows:
By a general law, we shall here understand a statement of universal conditional
form which is capable of being conﬁrmed or disconﬁrmed by suitable empirical
ﬁndings. [...] In every case where an event of a speciﬁed kind C occurs at a certain
place and time, an event of a speciﬁed kind E will occur at a place and time which
is related in a speciﬁed manner to the place and time of the occurrence of the ﬁrst
event (Hempel, 1942, p. 35).
Practically, that means that each explanation consists of a phenomenon to be explained
 the explanandum , a general law from which the conclusion can be derived, and
the actual initial conditions. Opp (2005a, p. 174) provides the following illustrative
example:
Law : If political discontent and perceived personal inﬂuence are relatively
intense, the frequency of participation in demonstrations is high.
Initial conditions : In October 1989 discontent and perceived inﬂuence of
the population of Leipzig increased.
Explanandum: The participation in the demonstrations in Leipzig in-
creased in October 1989.
In deterministic explanations, the event will always occur once the initial conditions
are met and the general law holds. But in contrast to the natural sciences, such a view
11I will come back to the prospects of counterfactual explanations in social sciences in the conclusion
section of this introduction (section 5).
12This, of course, is borrowed by Kant's famous uniﬁcation of empiricism and rationalism: Thoughts
without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to
make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions
intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts (Kant, 1850, p. 46). Note that already Hume
(1913) used similar epistemological metaphors  while presumably both authors are inﬂuenced by
Plato's Allegory of the Cave.
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evidently is too restrictive for the social sciences where general laws are usually not
found. Consequently, Hempel (1942) relaxes the assumption of general laws towards the
type of probability hypotheses (p. 41)  meaning that the prediction of an event can be
asserted only with a high probability.
Nonetheless, and in spite of this limitation, Hempel sticks to the claim that general
laws have quite analogous functions in history and in the natural sciences (Hempel,
1942, p. 35), and that history can 'grasp the unique individuality' of its objects of
study no more and no less than can physics or chemistry (p. 37, orig. emph.).
With this view, Hempel evidently opposes the paradigm of hermeneutics, but also falls
somewhat back behind Max Weber's early synthesis of an understanding explanation13
 especially when claiming together with his co-author, Paul Oppenheim:
But the existence of empathy on the part of the scientist is neither a necessary
nor a suﬃcient condition for the explanation, or the scientiﬁc understanding, of
any human action. It is not necessary, for the behavior of psychotics or of people
belonging to a culture very diﬀerent from that of the scientist may sometimes be
explainable and predictable in terms of general principles even though the scien-
tist who established or applied those principles may not be able to understand
his subjects emphatically. And empathy is not suﬃcient to guarantee a sound
explanation, for a strong feeling of empathy may exist even in cases where we
completely misjudge a given personality (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948, p. 146,
emph. added).
While for Weber, understanding is a necessary part of a scientiﬁc theory in order to
reconstruct individual actors' motives, believes, and means (Balog, 2008, p. 79), this
view is clearly rejected by Hempel. Unfortunately, this 'raw' version of the covering-law
model still prevails in inﬂuential textbooks (e.g. Opp, 2005b).
The early Popper is not only more or less singing from the same hymn sheet as Hempel
and Oppenheim  but even claims to be the originator of the above-described theory
(Popper, 1945a, ch. 25, note 3). In his later writings, however, he only incidentally
refers to the methodological unity of both human and natural sciences (cf. Böhm, 2008,
p. 366; Riedel, 1978, p. 163). Even more, he appears to be quite skeptic about the
reception of the deductive-nomological model (while still claiming ownership for it); and
instead, he sets the ground for later sociological theory by introducing a logic of the
situation that is connected to a rationality principle as the underlying theory of action:
A voluminous literature, which in my opinion has contributed little to the prob-
lem, has sprung from a mistaken criticism of my ideas on historical explanation. In
section 12 of Logik der Forschung I discussed what I called 'causal explanation', or
deductive explanation, a discussion which had been anticipated, without my being
aware of it, by J.S. Mill, though perhaps a bit vaguely (because of his lack of dis-
tinction between an initial condition and a universal law) [...] I did not, however,
13Von Wright (1971, p. 7) describes Weber's approach in the following way: A positivist coloring is
combined with an emphasis on teleology ('zweckrationales Handeln') and empathic understanding
('verstehende Soziologie').
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regard this particular analysis as especially important for historical explanation,
and what I did regard as important needed some further years in which to ma-
ture. It was the problem of rationality (or the 'rationality principle' or the 'zero
method' or the 'logic of the situation'). But for years the unimportant thesis  in
a misinterpreted form  has, under the same name 'the deductive model', helped
to generate a voluminous literature (Popper, 1974, p. 117).14
The latter concepts that Popper here, interestingly, juxtaposes are already introduced
in The Open Society and its Enemies wherein Popper (1945a, ch. 14) sketches a situ-
ational logic which actually comes close to approaches by Coleman (1990) and Esser
(1993a)  models well-known in theoretical sociology today. Similarly to the Neo-
Kantians such as Rickert or Windelband (though Popper would surely be very unhappy
with that comparison), he argues against psychologism that he contrasts with a logic
of the situation that is, in turn, the method of economic analysis (Popper, 1945a, p.
290). In his later writing The Rationality Principle (Popper, 1994 [ﬁrst published in
French 1967; also appeared as Popper, 1985]), the details of this approach are worked
out more concretely. As Nadeau (1993, p. 450) points out, the logic of the situation is
an explanatory scheme that is adequate for the social social sciences as is the deductive-
nomological scheme for the natural sciences. Where in the latter ﬁeld, a natural event
is explained by the coincidence of an initial condition and a general law, in the social
sciences, we have the explanandum of a social event-type that is explained by a scientiﬁc
model or theory conditioning on the rationality principle. By the term 'zero method',
Popper (1994) addresses that he does not claim that every actor at every time acts in a
rational way  but that she acts in a manner which is adequate to the social situation as
she herself sees it (which equals the subjective interpretation of the rationality principle;
see Nadeau, 1993, p. 456). In The Poverty of Historicism III, Popper (1945b) writes:
I refer to the possibility of adopting, in the social sciences, what may be called
the method of logical or rational construction, or perhaps the 'zero method'. By
this I mean the method of constructing a model on the assumption of complete
rationality (and perhaps also on the assumption of the complete possession of in-
formation) on the part of all individuals concerned, and of estimating the deviation
of the actual behavior of people from the model behavior, using the latter as a kind
of zero co-ordinate (Popper, 1945b, p. 82).
Since in most, if not all, social situations there is an element of rationality (ibid.), it is
possible to refer to a kind of ideal type of human behavior as the benchmark for sociolog-
ical analysis. Note that this position remarkably resembles what already Weber (1922,
1981) has put forward in his Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre wherein he
introduces the concept of an objectively correct rationality [Richtigkeitsrationalität ]
(Weber, 1981, p. 154) as an instrument in order to draw inferences about human be-
havior. As mentioned, it distinguishes Weber from Hempel that the former refers to the
14Note, however, that already in the third part of his Poverty of Historicism (Popper, 1944a,b, 1945a),
he wrote: I do not intend to assert that there are no diﬀerences whatever between the methods of
the theoretical natural and the social sciences; such diﬀerences clearly exist (Popper, 1945b, p. 78).
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principle of rationality as an instrument to understand human action; and when Popper
incorporates this approach, he approximates the methodology of social sciences again to
this endeavor.
Koertge (1979) proposed how Popper's situational logic can be quasi-formalized in
analogy to Hempel's covering-law principle. While the latter takes the form (Hempel,
1965, p. 471)
A was in a situation of type C.
A was a rational agent.
In a situation of type C, any rational agent will do x.
Therefore, A did x ,
for Popper, she would propose something like
1. Description of the situation: Agent A was in a situation of type C.
2. Analysis of the situation: In a situation of type C, the appropriate thing to do is
x.
3. Rationality principle: Agents always act appropriately to their situations.
4. Explanandum: (Therefore) A did x (Koertge, 1979, p. 87).
Comparing both statements, a striking diﬀerence is immediately evident: While Hempel
(1965) speaks of a A as a rational agent, in the Popperian re-formulation as formal-
ized by Koertge (1979), such a strong notion of rationality is replaced with A acting
appropriately to her situation. This is not only coming close to Weber's notion of
Richtigkeitsrationalität again, but due to the broader concept of rationality, it is also
in accordance with the well-known Thomas Theorem reading If men deﬁne situations
as real, they are real in their consequences (Thomas and Thomas, 1928, p. 572) 
meaning that it is the actor's subjective deﬁnition of the situation that will create social
reality.15 Note that Popper himself doesn't become tired of highlighting the demand
for an understanding of the actors' motives and beliefs  perhaps most pointed in his
rationality essay: The fundamental problem of both the theoretical and the historical
social sciences is to explain and understand events in terms of human actions and social
situations. The key term here is 'social situation' (Popper, 1994, p. 166; orig. emph.).
Since by this line of reasoning, the methodological principle of social sciences is linked to
the Verstehen tradition again (also see Hedström and Swedberg, 1998a, p. 350), Böhm
(2008, p. 384) explicitly draws a parallel between Popper's situational logic and 18th
century hermeneutics. Thus, on the one hand, in Popper's situational logic, not all peo-
ple are equally rational in terms of a simple behaviorist input-output machinery given a
15I will come back to the Thomas-Theorem when discussing the social mechanisms to be unveiled in a
self-fulﬁlling prophecy explanation.
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particular social situation.16 On the other hand, however, the method of interpretative
sociology should not be simpliﬁed to psychologism; this is what would stand in conﬂict
with Popper's demand for an objective situational logic coinciding with the method of
economics (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998a, p. 347).
Because of the conceptual wideness of his approach, Hedström and Swedberg (1998a,
p. 340) note that Popper argued for a rationality-based analysis long before scholars
such as James Coleman and Gary Becker, who usually are considered to be the intel-
lectual forefathers of contemporary rational choice sociology.17 However, it should not
be ignored that also several authors objected against several statements in Popper's sit-
uation logic. For instance, Nadeau (1993) criticized that the status of the rationality
principle which Popper (1994, p. 169) denotes as being both almost empty as well as
actually false, though a good approximation to truth (p. 177) does not fulﬁll the re-
quirements of falsiﬁcationism as demanded in his Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery (Popper,
1959 [1935]).18 Furthermore, Hedström et al. (1998, p. 354) note that Popper's social
situations appears to be limited to one actor who ﬁnds herself confronted with some
'obstacles' she has to cope with. That is, Popper's social situation does neither really
cover social interaction  nor does it consider actors' interests (Hedström et al., 1998,
p. 354f.).
In order to solve these problems, Hedström et al. (1998, p. 357) propose an extension
of Koertge's (1979) re-formalization of Popper's situational logic:
1. Description of the situation: Agent A was in a situation of type C characterized
by a speciﬁc array of action alternatives, x1 to xn.
2. Description of interests : Agent A wants to attain end E.
16What can be noted for rational action theory in particular also holds for causal mechanisms in general:
[O]ne should not think of mechanisms as exclusively mechanical (push-pull) systems (Machamer
et al., 2000, p. 2).
17As Hedström and Swedberg (1998a, p. 340) point out, the fact that Popper's thoughts on situational
logic and rationality were more or less ignored by sociologists can be explained by the hostility
of sociology towards the notion of rationality during the 1970s and 1980s. A prominent example
might be the following statement from the Dialectic of Enlightenment : With the spread of the
bourgeois commodity economy the dark horizon of myth is illuminated by the sun of calculating
reason, beneath whose icy rays the seeds of the new barbarism are germinating (Horkheimer and
Adorno, 2002, p. 25). Critics of Critical Theory might counter with Mario Bunge's bon mot : [W]hy
is academia destructing itself by producing and diﬀusing 'postmodern' gobbledygook? (Bunge,
1997, p. 413).
18The argument against Popper's rationality principle appears to end up in what is known as the
Münchhausen Trilemma, i.e. the inescapability between a circular argument, an inﬁnite regress,
and an axiomatic argument (cf. Albert, 1985, ch. 1). Despite this, I hold the thesis that for
Popper's notion of rationality as a principle that is almost empty (Popper, 1994, p. 169), a
status applies similar to what Ingeborg Maus denoted as the presuppositionlessness of modernity
when defending John Rawls' (equally criticized) concept of the original position in his Theory of
Justice (Rawls, 1971): Die 'gegenseitige Stützung vieler Erwägungen' nähert sich dem Grundmuster
moderner Begründungen an: diese sind notwendig zirkulär, ohne dass es ihnen erlaubt wäre, in einem
tautologischen Sinn selbstreferentiell zu sein (Maus, 2006, p. 86; orig. emph.). Unfortunately, space
constraints prevent me to elaborate more intensely on this issue.
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3. Description of beliefs : Agent A has reasons to believe that action x1 is the best
way to attain E in situation C.
4. Rationality principle: Agents always act rationally; that is, they choose the course
of action that they believe to be the best way of realizing their interests.
5. Explanandum: (Therefore) A did x1.
Note that this enumeration is not only an extension of Popper's original conception
but already moving a good deal away from it. For instance, apart from considering
actors' interests and beliefs, the form of the rationality principle formulated here has not
much to do anymore with Popper's empty principle which is actually false, though a
good approximation to truth. While Popper did not claim that every actor always acts
rational, according to the fourth principle in the notation by Hedström et al. (1998),
this is evidently the case (though the type of rationality is one of the weak sort).
Summing up their intention, Hedström et al. (1998) attempt to overcome some short-
comings of Popper's situational logic by providing an extended formalization also con-
sidering actors' interests and beliefs. However, the reader should be aware of the fact
that the authors tend to use Popper's situational logic merely as a 'springboard' for their
own action theory consisting of Desires, Beliefs and Opportunities (cf. Hedström, 2005,
ch. 3; also see section 2.2 below). Having arrived at a suitable working deﬁnition of
social mechanisms, this very basic action model will indeed prove useful in illustrating
various types of social mechanisms (cf. section 2.2). Luckily, there are theorists who
note that actors' beliefs and motives are implicitly part of the Popperian social situa-
tion (Nadeau, 1993; Böhm, 2008). Therefore, we are not entirely on the wrong track
in following Hedström et al. (1998) in the above step, but particularly regarding the
upcoming discussion of diﬀerent notions of rational choice theory, we should keep in
mind that Popper (1994) himself might not subscribe to every item in the enumeration
above. Nonetheless, building on the extended deductive-nomological framework on the
one hand ensures the capability of sociology of being both an understanding and an
explaining academic discipline, and on the other hand, it is a valuable starting point for
the following subsection on analytical sociology.
Interim conclusion This subsection has shown how Max Weber's (1964/1985) def-
inition of sociology is deep-rooted in the German Erklären-Verstehen debate of the
19th century. While the deductive-nomological explanation (or covering-law model) by
Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) falls too short for an entire understanding of human ac-
tion in the Weberian sense, Popper's situational logic (Popper, 1944a,b, 1945b) together
with his rationality principle (Popper, 1994) provides a good starting point for an an-
alytical theory of action that lives up to the demand for an understanding explanation
by pointing to more ﬁne-grained social mechanisms (Hedström et al., 1998; Hedström,
2005).
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2.2 Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms
Although Popper's situational logic already sets the ground for later rational-action
based reconstructions of individuals' social situation, for a long time after Popper, a
whole stream of social science tended to reduce causal explanations on detecting signif-
icant correlations without providing a suﬃcient understanding explanation for them.
To given an illustrative example, Popper reports that when another distinguished
scholar (of whom he does not tell us the name) once uttered at a scientiﬁc conference that
science was just measuring and correlating results, he himself replied: I suggested we
should ask for a grant for a project of measuring the length, width, thickness, and weight
of the books in the British Museum  in order to study possible correlations between these
measurements. I predicted that we should be able to ﬁnd strong positive correlations
between the product of the ﬁrst three measurements and the fourth (Popper, 1994, p.
155).
As pointed out by Hedström and Swedberg (1996), a good starting point for the
relevance of this kind of argument for the social sciences is provided by the contro-
versy emerging from Boudon's monograph Education, Opportunity, and Social Inequality
(Boudon, 1974), its review by Hauser (1976), and a rejoinder by Boudon (1976) again.
Hauser (1976) particularly criticizes Boudon's (1974) distinction between statistical
and theoretical models and the idea that the latter should be used in order to explain
what has been computed in the former. Boudon, however, replies that we must go
beyond the statistical relationships to explore the generative mechanisms responsible
for them. This direction has a name: theory. And a goal: understanding (Boudon,
1976, p. 1187). In a later writing, he adds that causal analysis does not explain the
chart. It simply summarizes it [...] Understanding a statistical structure means in many
cases building a generating theory or model [...] that includes the observed empirical
structure as one of its consequences (Boudon, 1979, p. 51f., orig. emph.; also see
Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, p. 292). As the observant reader might have noticed,
the notion of Verstehen is explicitly brought up again in order to overcome a crucial
shortcoming of merely correlational statistical analysis. Referring to von Wright (1971),
Hedström and Swedberg (1996) hold the view that especially covering-law explanations
are nothing more than black-box explanations (p. 297); and one may (and at least I do)
regard the combination of a reductionist covering-law approach followed by short-sighted
statistical analysis (i.e. variable sociology; also see Esser, 1996b) to be a particularly
unholy alliance.
Consequently, Hedström (2005, p. 16) follows early critics of covering-law type ex-
planations (such as Salmon, 1971) when conceding that the former neither go very far,
nor are they generally considered to be acceptable scientiﬁc explanations. Thus, let us
ask with Esser (1996b): What's wrong with variable sociology? As Goldthorpe (2001)
points out, it has something to do with the implied notion of causality. Goldthorpe dis-
tinguishes three traditions of causal modeling in the social sciences: robust dependence,
consequential manipulation, and the generative process account. The 'robust depen-
dence' tradition became most prominent with the Wisconsin model of status attainment
process (Blau and Duncan, 1967) wherein social stratiﬁcation was modeled as a complex
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path structure focusing on the statistical correlations between the variables in the model.
The 'consequential manipulation' tradition can be related to the Holland-Rosenbaum-
Rubin model of a methodological19 counterfactualist treatment-eﬀect approach that eval-
uates the eﬃcacy of a treatment  e.g. a job-training program  against an artiﬁcial
situation wherein individuals had not received the treatment (see Gangl, 2010, for an
excellent review of both the seminal econometric papers and numerous applications of
the relevant methods in both economics and the social sciences). Both traditions may be
subsumed beneath what Esser (1996b) called variable sociology  because in both cases,
statistical techniques are regarded to be a suﬃcient approximation of (if not identical
to) the implied idea of causality. To be precise, both traditions are not explanatory
since the necessary explanatory link between the independent and the dependent vari-
ables is lacking; they are incomplete since the often-applied strategy of adding more
covariates to overcome conceptual shortage will by no means ever be exhaustive; and
they are meaningless since in most cases, a general theory of decision making between
given situational alternatives (Esser, 1996b, p. 163)  entailing additional covariates
that may mediate individual decision-making  is missing.20 The third tradition, and
lucky for us, the tradition that Goldthorpe (2001) regards to be suitable to overcome the
above-described shortcomings is the generative process tradition. The latter, nota bene,
is equivalent to the idea that the association between two variables X and Y is created
by some 'mechanism'  i.e. that the concept of causation is tied to some process existing
in time and space, even if not perhaps directly observable, that actually generates the
causal eﬀect of X on Y and, in so doing, produces the statistical relationship that is
empirically in evidence (Goldthorpe, 2001, p. 9).
Goldthorpe argues that a sociological explanation standing in accordance with the
generative process model should proceed along a three-phase sequence (Goldthorpe,
2001, p. 10):
1. establishing the phenomena that form the explananda
2. hypothesizing generative processes at the level of social action
3. testing the hypotheses.
In the ﬁrst of the three phases (which Goldthorpe borrows from Merton, 1987), the
researcher should unveil the social regularities that she aims to explain (e.g. variation
in individuals' educational transition probabilities). Critique of a naïve use of statistical
causal-modeling techniques should not be equated with a prohibition of inductive and
explorative techniques such as scaling or clustering in order to establish what should be
explained and tested thereafter.
19I denote this approach 'methodological counterfactualism' because it should be distinguished from an
ontological counterfactualism as prominently held by Lewis (1973, 1977, 1979, 1981, also see section
5).
20Note that also Esser uses the term verständlich in this context (Esser, 1996b, p. 163)  unfortunately
without further elaboration.
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In the second phase, the causes for the social regularities have to be unfolded. Con-
sistent with the paradigm of methodological individualism21 before any statistical causal
modeling, actors' reasons within speciﬁc social situations have to be captured. Antici-
pating what will be discussed more precisely in the next paragraph, this step can also
be described with Elster's (1985, 1989) metaphor of opening the black box and show-
ing the cogs and wheels of the machinery. Thus, the second phase is closely related to
mechanism-based explanations.
Finally, the third phase involves the actual test of what has been merely hypothesized
in the second phase. Importantly, this stage is subordinated to the preferably ﬁne-
grained theoretical explanation since it is conceptualized as an empirical examination
of the former stage. Sophisticated statistical techniques as applied in the consequential-
manipulation framework are admitted in this stage, but not as attempts to derive causal
relations directly from data analysis (Goldthorpe, 2001, p. 11).
The focus of this introduction will lay on the second phase described by Goldthorpe
(2001) in terms of unveiling potential causes for both regularities already observed in
preceding studies (e.g. reference-group and teacher expectancy eﬀects) and new hy-
potheses that were deduced from the phenomena already established. To a certain
extent, this endeavor is in line with Coleman's (1990) metatheoretical plea for unveiling
macro-micro hypotheses, action-theoretical assumptions on the micro-level, and micro-
macro hypotheses in order to account for observed macro-level regularities (such as the
Weberian 'Spirit of Capitalism'). However, the understanding of a social mechanism as
defended here goes beyond both Coleman's (1990, p. 5) 'methodological pragmatism'
and his action-theoretical restrictions (p. 18). Also to show this, a suitable working
deﬁnition of a social mechanism will prove particularly helpful  which will be the focus
of the next paragraph.
Deﬁnitions of social mechanisms While the term 'social mechanisms ' evidently
refers to mechanism-based explanations in the social sciences, the more general notion
causal mechanism reveals the crucial demand of this stream of research: getting closer to
the actual causal structure than it is possible merely by means of correlational analysis.
Deﬁnitions of causal mechanisms have been proposed numerously, and therefore, re-
views of these deﬁnitions are necessarily incomplete. Below, I supplement the summaries
of the most important deﬁnitions provided by Gross (2009) as well as Hedström and
Ylikoski (2010).22
21Yet, I tend to follow Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, p. 60) in linking social mechanisms to the slightly
weaker concept of structural individualism. For a review of various approaches towards the notion
of individualism see Udehn (2002).
22When Bunge (2004, p. 191) writes that there are nearly as many systems theories as systems
theorists, one could say the same about deﬁnitions of causal mechanisms  so the (supplemented)
overview below is still not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration.
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Table 1: Deﬁnitions of causal mechanisms
Author Deﬁnition Source
Bechtel & Abra-
hamsen
A mechanism is a structure performing a function by virtue
of its component operations and their organization. The
orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible
for one ore more phenomena.
Bechtel and Abra-
hamsen (2005);
Bechtel (2006,
2008)
Bunge A mechanism is a process in a concrete system that is ca-
pable of bringing about or preventing some change in the
system.
Bunge (1997, 2004)
Glennan A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that pro-
duces that behavior by the interaction of several parts,
where the interactions between parts can be characterized
by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations.
Glennan (2002)
Machamer, Darden
and Craver
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that
they produce regular changes from start to ﬁnish.
Machamer et al.
(2000); Darden
(2006); Craver
(2007)
Elster I A mechanism explains by opening the black box and show-
ing the cogs and wheels of the internal machinery. A
mechanism provides a continuous and contiguous chain of
causal or intentional links between the explanans and the
explanandum.
Elster (1985, 1989)
Elster II Mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recogniz-
able causal patterns that are triggered under generally un-
known conditions.
Elster (1999)
Gambetta Mechanisms have the form, 'Given certain conditions K,
an agent will do x because of M with probability p.' M
refers either to forms of reasoning governing decision mak-
ing (of which rational choice models are a subset) or to
subintentional processes that aﬀect action both directly (as
impulsiveness) or by shaping preferences or beliefs.
Gambetta (1998)
Gross A social mechanism is a more or less general sequence or
set of social events or processes analyzed at a lower order
of complexity or aggregation by which  in certain circum-
stances  some cause X tends to bring about some eﬀect Y
in the realm of human social relations. This sequence or set
may or may not be analytically reducible to the actions of
individuals who enact it, may underwrite formal or substan-
tive causal processes, and may be observed, unobserved, or
in principle be unobservable.
Gross (2009)
Hedström Mechanisms consist of entities (with their properties) and
the activities that these entities engage in, either by them-
selves or in concert with other entities. These activities
bring about change, and the type of change brought about
depends on the properties of the entities and how the enti-
ties are organized spatially and temporally.
Hedström (2005)
Little A causal mechanism is a series of events governed by law-
like regularities that lead from the explanans to the ex-
planandum.
Little (1991)
continued
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Table 1: Deﬁnitions of causal mechanisms
Author Deﬁnition Source
Opp An explanation by mechanisms exists if it can be shown
how a relationship between variables is brought about.
Opp (2005a)
Stinchcombe Mechanism means (1) a piece of scientiﬁc reasoning which
is independently veriﬁable and independently gives rise to
theoretical reasoning, which (2) gives knowledge about a
component process (generally one with units of analysis at
a lower level) of another theory (ordinarily a theory with
units at a diﬀerent higher level), thereby (3) increasing
the suppleness, precision, complexity, elegance, or believ-
ability of the theory at the higher level without excessive
multiplication of entities in that higher-level theory, (4)
without doing too much violence (in the necessary simpli-
ﬁcation at the lower level to make the higher-level theory
go) to what we know as the main facts at the lower level.
Stinchcombe (1991)
Woodward A model for a mechanism (a) describes an organized or
structured set of parts or components, where (b) the behav-
ior of each component is described by a generalization that
is invariant under interventions, and where (c) the general-
izations governing each component are also independently
changeable, and where (d) the representation allows us to
see how, by virtue of (a), (b), (c), the overall output of
the mechanism will vary under manipulation of the input
to each component and changes in the components them-
selves.
Woodward (2002)
Notes: Adopted from Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, p. 51). Deﬁnitions by Gross, Opp, and Stinchcombe
added by myself.
Instead of going through each of these deﬁnitions separately, I rather prefer to review
them systematically regarding their similarities and diﬀerences with respect to a set of
fundamental dimensions. Before I do so, however, let us begin with Elster's pointed
picture of opening the black box and showing the cogs and wheels of the internal
machinery as a starting point. The picture is accurate for the reason that it aptly
describes what is actually lacking in variable sociology. It has something to do with what
Merton (1957) called sociological theories of the middle-range; that is, developing more
ﬁne-grained explanations in order to theoretically account for the social explananda at
hand (also see Boudon, 1991). It also appears to be sort of the least common denominator
of the deﬁnitions at hand.
Going more into detail, conceptions of causal mechanisms appear to diﬀer in at least
3 dimensions: i) observability, ii) law-likeness, and iii) conceptual level of analysis.
i) Observability : While both Mahoney (2001) and Bunge (2004) hold the
view that mechanisms refer to some kind of unobservable variables that ac-
count for the (observable) outcomes, Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) are crit-
ical towards such a restriction. A contrary position was taken by Reskin
(2003) according to whom a mechanism is always observable. Though not
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held overtly, this view is also implied in Opp (2005a) who unfortunately ap-
pears to be led a bit astray when he explicitly reduces social mechanisms
on the quest for intervening variables (also see the critique in Hedström and
Ylikoski, 2010, p. 51f.).23 The view to be held in this introduction is to follow
authors such as Gross (2009) and Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) in refraining
from imposing any restrictions on the observability of social mechanisms. In
methodological terms, while bringing back in individual-level explanations
for simple macro-macro relations might be traceable by means of observable
indicators, when looking for even more ﬁne-grained explanations, we may
sooner or later encounter a level whereon we are unable to operationalize our
concepts within large-scale empirical studies. In epistemological terms, so-
cial mechanisms are of course intended to approximate the underlying causal
structure by means of more ﬁne-grained and partly observable entities  but
as shown by Hume (1913) and Kant (1902), causality itself remains unob-
servable.
ii) Law-likeness : Opp (2005a) and Bunge (2004) very strictly connect so-
cial mechanisms to general laws: No law, no possible mechanism; and no
mechanism, no explanation (Bunge, 2004, p. 207). Opp (2005a) opposes
against Hedström and Swedberg's (1996, 1998b) critique of the covering-law
model (Hempel, 1942; Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948; Hempel, 1965), and
he suggests to complement the H[empel]O[ppenheim]-scheme by a method-
ological postulate referring to explanations by mechanisms (Opp, 2005a, p.
176; addenda in square brackets by myself)  which would, according to Opp
(2005a), be superior to rejecting the whole scheme in lack of a true theoretical
alternative (ibid.).
In contrast, apart from Hedström, also Elster (1998, p. 48) observes a dif-
ference between an explanation with laws and an explanation by mechanisms:
[A] law has the form 'If conditions C1, C2, ..., Cn obtain, then always E.'
[...] [A] statement about mechanisms might be 'If C1, C2, ..., Cn obtain, then
sometimes E (emphasis added by myself). As Opp (2005a, p. 177) correctly
notes, this account of a social mechanism basically does not diﬀer from a sta-
tistical, probabilistic or non-determinist law, so this appears to be the wrong
track. The position taken here is that while the latter critique is obviously
justiﬁed, the claim that mechanism-based explanations are still in line with
the covering-law model since they can be regarded as a simple complement
of them misses, in my view, the point. Relativity theory still relies, to a great
deal, on Newtonian mechanics  but one would abstain from denying it the
status of a unique theoretical approach. Likewise, mechanism-based explana-
tions revealed an important shortcoming of the covering-law model, i.e. the
23As Esser (1996b, p. 160) points out, it is an attribute of variable sociology to add background variables
to quantitative data analysis in an ad hoc and unsystematic manner. This of course falls back behind
the demand of mechanism-based explanations aspiring to unveil the respective generative processes
(Goldthorpe, 2001).
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tendency to neglect what's happening beyond the surface. One could refer
to the 'realist' approach in the philosophy of social sciences (Bhaskar, 1975;
Collier, 1989, 1994) which most overtly holds the view that only by speciﬁca-
tion of mechanisms, scholars move from the empirical domain of correlation
to the actual domain of the generative processes or events, and ﬁnally on to
the real domain wherein the general causal mechanisms are located (Gross,
2009, p. 361; also see Kemp and Holmwood, 2003 and Maxwell, 2004). This
is accomplished by no longer restricting explanations to correlations of single
factors but by specifying the underlying generative processes which can be
split up in smaller entities (Machamer et al., 2000; Mayntz, 2004).24 In a
suchlike understanding of social mechanisms, one would not be satisﬁed with
Coleman's (1990) 'methodological pragmatism' stating that [t]he criterion
is instead pragmatic: The explanation is satisfactory if it is useful for the
particular kinds of intervention for which it is intended (Coleman, 1990, p.
5). Rather, the more ﬁne-grained an explanation is split into smaller entities,
the closer it is able to approximate towards causality. Hence, in the termi-
nology of Lakatos (1978), mechanism-based explanations are a new research
program tackling the protective belt of the reductionist covering-law model.25
iii) Conceptual level of analysis : Proponents of mechanism-based explana-
tions who feel uncomfortable about the non-negligible coincidence of the
former and rational-choice or subjective-expected-utility theories of action
occasionally see the need for proposing a 'new' deﬁnition of social mech-
anisms that overcomes this restriction (e.g. Gross, 2009). However, such a
conclusion is not necessarily true: For instance, Bunge (1997, 2004) proposed
a conceptualization of social mechanisms that is in line with his more general
account of systemism  which is not restricted to methodological individual-
ism. Moreover, also Hedström and Ylikoski (2010)  themselves proposing
the Desires, Beliefs, and Opportunities model (cf. below) to account for
individual-level action  would not like to see mechanism-based explanations
to be restricted to theoretical models of the latter kind. More speciﬁcally,
Hedström and Ylikoski (2010) argue for what has been labeled structural
individualism (Wippler, 1978): As opposed to methodological individualism,
structural individualism explicitly takes potential situational constraints that
24One might object against the ﬁnal step of realist philosophy of science that even when theorizing more
and more ﬁne-grained, 'real' causality will never be reached without divagating into metaphysics
again (see e.g. Glennan, 1996, p. 65).
25Udehn (2002, p. 502) also notes that the current emphasis on social mechanisms [...] may be seen
as a sign of the decreasing importance attached to laws in social sciences, especially sociology.
A Lakatosian account to mechanism-based explanations regarded from a standpoint of scientiﬁc
evolution might be even more justiﬁed in the light of Kelle and Lüdemann's (1995) analogous
approach towards the role of bridge assumptions in rational action theory. Rigid readers of Popper
(1959) might furthermore argue that Stinchcombe (1991) is on the wrong track in his demand for
veriﬁcation of scientiﬁc reasoning.
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may be located on a higher level-of-analysis than the individual level into
account (also see Lindenberg, 1990, p. 737f.). It is therefore compatible
with the Popperian situational logic as well as with more elaborate micro-
macro models proposed by Coleman (1990) and Esser (1993; also see Udehn,
2002).26 Hence, although mechanism-based explanations can basically be re-
lated to diﬀerent analytical approaches (Bunge, 1997, 2004), for the purpose
at hand, the structural version of individualism is the adequate paradigm for
explaining (and understanding!) both the causes and the eﬀects of teachers'
evaluations on diﬀerent conceptual levels of analysis.
Altogether, I follow Gambetta's deﬁnition that social mechanisms have the form, 'Given
certain conditions K, an agent will do x because of M with probability p' (Gambetta,
1998). I amend this deﬁnition by, ﬁrst, assuming that M may either be observed or
unobserved  which ensures that mechanism-based explanations are not reduced to ad
hoc covariate controls. Second, although the probabilistic phrasing appears to point
to the statistical interpretation of the covering-law model, it should be evident that
by considering smaller entities of a generative process instead of correlations of factors,
its distance to causality is lessened  which is why it should not be equated with the
former.27 Hence, the deﬁnition of social mechanisms defended here crucially distinguishes
from the deﬁnitions proposed by Little (1991), Bunge (2004), and Opp (2005a) who
stick to a 'law-like' character also of (social or causal) mechanisms. Also, although
the meta-theoretical macro-micro-macro scheme proposed by Coleman (1990) deﬁnitely
set the ground for the recurring plea for mechanism-based explanations, the latter go
beyond Coleman's (1990, p. 5) 'methodological pragmatism' in aspiring towards more
and more ﬁne-grained explanations in order to get closer to the notion of causality.
Third, I assume that mechanisms may refer to diﬀerent levels of analysis or action theory
paradigms. What should be avoided is to use mechanism deﬁnitions that are restricted
to either individual- or contextual-only level of analysis. For instance, Bunge's (1997,
2004) system-related deﬁnition would not suit an action theory located on the individual
level. As a consequence, a suchlike deﬁnition would necessarily have to remain silent on
mechanisms due to actors' desires or beliefs (see below). On the other hand, as reference-
group eﬀects are one of the topics covered in the volume at hand, structural individualism
(that is also open for context eﬀects) is preferred to simple methodological individualism.
Regarding action theory, it should be emphasized that the second part of Gambetta's
(1998) deﬁnition is notably far-sighted regarding the distinction between more rational
decision-making and the more subintentional processes that precede individual action as
well. In section 4.1 of this introduction, I will build on the assumptions of the M odel of
F rame Selection (MFS; Esser, 1996b, 2010; Esser and Kroneberg, 2010; Kroneberg, 2006;
Kroneberg et al., 2008, 2010; Kroneberg, 2011). This theory synthesizes arguments from
the 'interpretative paradigm' about unconscious automatic processing in everyday life
26This will be of particular importance for also integrating opportunity-mediated mechanisms (see below;
cf. Hedström, 2005, p. 55f.).
27Yet, a probabilistic notation of course facilitates implementation of testable hypotheses deduced from
mechanism-based explanations.
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(Esser, 1993b) and assumptions of rational-choice theory about actors' intentional and
reﬂective cost-beneﬁt weighting especially in high-cost situations. Hence, Gambetta's
(1998) deﬁnition suits these propositions to be speciﬁed later on.
However, while at the beginning of his chapter, Gambetta (1998, p. 104) postulates
that sticking to a rational-choice explanation as the most general mechanism, it will
not only be parsimonious and generalizable; it will also be the end of the story, after
elaborating on the particular social mechanisms in the Italian academic system, indi-
vidual decision mechanisms in education, and several alternative explanations regarding
the relative deprivation theory suggested by Stouﬀer (1950), the author arrives at a
more cautious conclusion: [T]he ﬁndings suggest that something more than a rational
mechanism is at work here and that the mechanisms [..], interesting as they may be in
their own right, are not prima facie as parsimonious as the relative deprivation or emula-
tion mechanisms (Gambetta, 1998, p. 118).28 Therefore, the above deﬁnition provides
only the starting point for an approximation towards the core of a social mechanism 
which might become more evident if particular types of social mechanisms according to
diﬀerent notions of rationality are inspected.
Action theory Hedström (2005) proposes theDesires, Beliefs andOpportunities (hence-
forth DBO) model as a very basic action theory in order to build up mechanism-based
explanations of human action. Also for Hedström (2005), actions imply intentionality
as distinguished from unintentional behavior  a dichotomy well-known from Weber. To
put it brief, beliefs are propositions of the world held to be true, a desire can be described
as a wish or want, and opportunities refer to the 'menu' of action alternatives available
to the actor (Hedström, 2005, p. 38f.). Important beliefs are those held about diﬀer-
ent alternatives of action at hand or about the probability of certain consequences that
may emerge from diﬀerent actions. Taken together, beliefs and desires are a compelling
reason or have a motivational force (Hedström, 2005, p. 39). However, although the
author lays emphasis on the fact that opportunities must always be known to the actors
and thus inﬂuence actions via their beliefs (ibid.), desires and beliefs are not suﬃcient
in explaining human action since opportunities exist independently of them. Hence, the
DBO-model is a good example of a structural-individualist action theory that does not
lose track of 'what's going on on the macro level'.
Since the DBO model assumes that individual action emerges in accordance with
actors' desires and beliefs, given particular situational opportunities, we won't be com-
pletely mistaken in subsuming it under the concept of (weak) rational action models.
More concretely, Hedström (2005) emphasizes that his model does not assume actors
always to act rationally, but they're supposed to act reasonably and intentionally (Hed-
28The emulation mechanism is an alternative explanation for the fact that in the American Military
Police at times of World War II, though occupational opportunities were much lower than in the Air
Corps, soldiers were more satisﬁed with the promotion system there than in the latter. The emulation
mechanism is comparable to what Beck (1986) labeled Fahrstuhlhypothese ['elevator eﬀect'] in his
Risikogesellschaft (Beck, 1986; Engl. Risk Society ; Beck, 1992): that the subjective assessment
that an educational achievement is essential is higher once the number of people in favor of that
achievement is suﬃciently high (also see Gambetta, 1998, p. 117).
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ström, 2005, p. 60f.). This matches Boudon's critique of instrumental rationality and
his plea for a model of cognitive or axiological rationality (Boudon, 1996, 1998, 2003).
Concretely, cognitive rationality confers an observation that Boudon has noted for his-
tory of science in general on the fundamental prerequisites of action theory: that it has
also to deal with evidently false beliefs of individuals29; and that this purpose can be
resolved by assuming that the former can be reasonably reconstructed (Boudon, 2003, p.
12). Complementary to cognitivist rationality, axiological rationality can be understood
in sense of Weber's Wertrationalität  which means, following Boudon (2003, p. 14),
that prescriptive beliefs are grounded in the mind of social actors on systems of reasons
perceived by them as strong (emph. added).
The line of attack of these pleadings are aimed at a too narrow notion of rationality
that can be traced back to neoclassical economics. As Goldthorpe (1998, p. 169) nicely
points out, rational action theories can be distinguished according to whether they
(i) have strong rather than weak rationality requirements;
(ii) focus on situational rather than procedural rationality; and
(iii) claim to provide a general rather [than] a special theory of action.
First, while neoclassical economics holds a very strong notion of rationality assuming
evidently unrealistic axioms such as individuals' perfect information or their strict maxi-
mization of utility (Becker, 1976), less restricted approaches lay emphasis on individuals'
bounded rationality (Simon, 1955, 1957) and consequently demand from sociological ex-
planations also to rationally reconstruct false beliefs (Boudon, 1996, 1998).
Second, in mainstream economics, human action is situationally constrained to such an
extreme degree that in a given market situation, and given individuals' set of preferences,
an actor will always maximize her utility  implying that choice is a result of rather
automatic computation.30 While also Popper's situational logic can be subsumed among
the type of theories imposing strict external constraints on human action (though holding
a much weaker concept of rationality), Simon (1955, 1957), Lindenberg (1985, 1990) and
Lindenberg and Frey (1993) uncouple action from situational constraints by deducing
the idea of subjective rationality from more psychological foundations. The same scheme
applies to Boudon's cognitivist action theory (Boudon, 1996).
Third, some theories such as Gary Becker's economic imperialism (Goldthorpe, 1998,
p. 175) claim that rational action theory (and, in Becker's version, even in a very
strong and mechanistic form) suits for explaining various aspects of social life by means
of consumption theory. In contrast, social science theorists like Coleman (1990) and
Boudon (1996, 1998) are more skeptical in this regard  or, to phrase it diﬀerently, they
are more aware of social science theories' explanatory limits.
29This will be of particular importance concerning a mechanism-based explanation of self-fulﬁlling
prophecies in terms of a teacher treatment eﬀect (cf. section 4.3).
30As Goldthorpe (1998, p. 175) observes in accordance to several other authors, the paradox arises
that the theory of 'rational choice' par excellence turns out to imply that little real choice in fact
exists.
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Goldthorpe (1998) himself pleads for a notion of subjective rationality of intermediate
strength within strong bonds to situational restrictions. He regards rational action
theory to be a privileged theory, [...] that is, not just one theory of action among
others but rather the theory with which attempts at explaining social action should
start and with which they should remain for as long as possible (Goldthorpe, 1998, p.
184). Notably, he does not become tired of stressing that exactly this is the demand
for any verstehende sociology in the sense of Weber: By applying rational action theory
of intermediate strength in order to rationally reconstruct actors' desires and beliefs
within a given situational context, social scientists are neither led astray by simple input-
output types of black box explanations that may empty into causally deﬁcient variable
sociology, nor are they confronted by too restricted psychologism or a too sloppy notion
of rationality that may end up in the tautologism of approving every human behavior
as rational per se.
Not to soften the core of rationality too much is also defended by Lindenberg (1990):
According to his method of decreasing abstraction, theorists should actually start with a
comparably tight notion of rationality that is subsequently amended by bridge assump-
tions in order to account for explanatory blind spots of simple rational choice theory
models (as simple as possible and as complex as necessary; see Lindenberg, 1990, p.
738). To be precise, maintaining a relatively simple core of rational choice theory is
desirable according to the premise of parsimoniousness well-known as Occam's Razor
(Thorburn, 1918; Feuer, 1957; Popper, 1959, ch. 7)  but if the simplicity assumption is
too unrealistic, the (empty) core of rationality can be cautiously widened by more real-
istic auxiliary assumptions. Since it was argued above that the model of man defended
by what has been called economic imperialism is hardly suited even to come close to
an understanding of individual action, a notable extension of the former model will be
inevitable. Concretely, the notion of rationality defended here is one of the broader
type that also strives to reconstruct actors' false beliefs by discarding untenable action-
theoretic axioms (such as the postulate of individuals' perfect information); and it is
further argued that this aim can be achieved best by reasonably reconstructing actors'
beliefs in line with Weber's concept of Wertrationalität. In contrast, we should not loose
sight of the premise of parsimony that will prevent us from becoming too sloppy in
relaxing our rationality assumption.
Having argued for a rational action model that neither defends unrealistic assump-
tions nor stands at risk of getting cut down by Occam's razor, we have of course to
ask how the preceding elaborations relate to the above-deﬁned notion of social mecha-
nisms. At the end of the last paragraph, we ended up in a discussion about whether the
assumption of actors' rational choice would already be the end of a mechanism-based
explanation. What we may conclude now is that at least a too tight notion of rationality
will not suﬃce, but the precise form of rational-choice approach is still not suﬃciently
speciﬁed. The solution to this problem is that following Lindenberg's (1990) method of
decreasing abstraction, we may introduce diﬀerent auxiliary assumptions that approxi-
mate individual behavior depending on the type of social situation. For instance, if not
only the subjective values of some decision alternatives at hand, but also their relative
probabilities are known, maximizing their expected value by weighting the subjective
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value of each alternative by its probability may be a reasonable strategy. If, however,
these probabilities are not known, several decision heuristics  potentially yielding quite
diﬀerent results  have been proposed (Coombs et al., 1970, ch. 5; Lave and March,
1975, pp. 140-143; Thorngate, 1980): There may be optimistic decision rules such as
maximax (Maximize the maximum possible value!), pessimistic decision rules such as
maximin (Maximize the lowest possible value!), minimum-variation decision rules such
as minirange (Minimize surprise!), or minimum-regret decision rules such as minimax
regret (Minimize the maximum regret!). All of them might be very rational in a par-
ticular social situation.31 Hence, without additional auxiliary assumptions that amend
the empty principle of rationality, mechanism-based explanations would stand at risk of
being either theoretically underspeciﬁed and tautological, or unrealistic.
Getting back to Hedström's (2005) very basic DBO model outlined above, the author
lays emphasis on the fact that rational choice theory can be regarded as a speciﬁc type
of DBO theory (Hedström, 2005, p. 41). Hence, I will ﬁrst summarize the author's
presentation of diﬀerent types of social mechanisms along the basic entities of DBO
theory. Where required, however, I will then add the necessary bridge assumptions
in order to reconstruct the implied social mechanisms in the four papers at hand (see
section 4).
Types of social mechanisms While behavioral patterns (to be accounted for by so-
ciological theory) can be split up in environmental eﬀects, selection eﬀects, and social
interaction eﬀects (Hedström, 2005, p. 47), cautious readers of Weber might think of
his famous umbrella example32 whereby he illustratively distinguishes uniform human
behavior from uniform social action and therefore accompany the author in his con-
clusion that only the latter type of pattern will be the one to be accounted for by
social mechanisms.33 Within the pattern of social interaction eﬀects, desire-mediated,
belief-mediated, and opportunity-mediated interaction can be distinguished and form the
dimensions wherein diﬀerent types of social mechanisms can be classiﬁed.
1. The seminal case of a belief-mediated mechanism is Merton's idea of a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy (Merton, 1948) according to which initially false beliefs lead to an out-
come that makes the false beliefs come true. In the example Merton (1948) uses,
he asks the reader to think of a bank that is untruly said to be bankrupt. Once
the rumor is in the world, the bank's clients will all but hurry up to withdraw their
savings  which might then unexpectedly lead to the bank's actual insolvency.
31Below I will brieﬂy discuss how rational-choice-based theories on social inequality in educational
opportunities (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Esser, 1999) relate to particular decision heuristics (cf.
section 3).
32Thus, if at a beginning of a shower a number of people on the street put up their umbrella at the
same time, this would not ordinarily be a case of action mutually oriented to that of each other, but
rather of all reacting in the same way to the like need of protection from the rain (Weber, 1968, p.
23).
33I am not satisﬁed with Hedström's (2005) conclusion to exclude selection eﬀects from mechanism-
based explanations. In the applied part of this introductory chapter (section 4), I will come back to
a mechanism-based reconstruction of potential selection eﬀects in two of the four papers at hand.
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In course of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy, the bank crash might be ampliﬁed by
an additional mechanism of rational imitation: The higher the number of others
perceived by an individual who withdraw their savings, the higher the individual's
own probability to do likewise (cf. Hedström, 2005, p. 48f.). It is evident that the
mechanism of rational imitation strongly hinges on the distribution of individual
thresholds (Granovetter, 1978; Granovetter and Soong, 1983) in that for a more
'jumpy' person, the observation of only a few others withdrawing their savings may
suﬃce to make her join, while a more 'relaxed' coeval might only react if already
a majority of persons participated in the bank run.34
Another very-well known example of a belief-mediated mechanism is Festinger's
(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance.35 The crucial idea behind that particular
type of social mechanism is that if an individual is exposed to two cognitive ele-
ments opposing each other, a mental state of cognitive dissonance occurs. Since
states of cognitive dissonance are costly in psychological terms, the individual
strives to avoid them (also see Hedström, 2005, p. 51). For instance, a person
holding a liberal political position might change her opinion (or at least modify
it) if a signiﬁcant other she interacts with, or the media she is exposed to, hold a
conservative view  and reversely (see e.g. Beck, 1991; Mutz, 2002; Feldman and
Price, 2008). Another option would be to persuade others of one's own opinion
(Hedström, 2005, p. 51)  which might of course be more challenging depending
on the number of people one interacts with.36
2. The second type of social mechanisms are desire-mediated mechanisms. Others
doing A may increase my probability of doing A if i) their doing A inﬂuences
how strongly I desire A; ii) I desire to be like (or unlike) them; or iii) I believe
that doing the same as they do increases (or decreases) my chances of getting B,
which I desire (Hedström, 2005, p. 52). While subtypes i) and ii)  diﬀering from
each other in that in i), actions are causes, and in ii), actions are objects of egos
desires  the actor has a primary desire to act in accordance with others, in iii),
the desire is of a secondary type (ibid). Examples for the diﬀerent subtypes might
be i) the choice of a mobile phone network contract given that same-network calls
are cheaper than others; ii) adoption of fashion (or other) trends from celebrities;
iii) joining a political party in order to increase one's chances to obtain a particular
occupational position.
3. Finally, opportunity-mediated mechanisms occur if individuals' opportunity struc-
ture is the essential cause of their action. In contrast to simple environmental
eﬀects (such as rainfall), opportunity-mediated mechanisms are also the outcome
34Granovetter's threshold model is also a useful tool for specifying the mechanism of imitation regarding
the emergence of social movements (Opp, 1991; Braun, 1995).
35See Heider (1946) for a similar idea published before Festinger (1957).
36Note that the mechanism of dissonance reduction may also be subsumed beneath the concept of a
desire-mediated mechanism when ego does not adjust her beliefs, but her wishes or wants according
to those of her signiﬁcant others.
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of social interaction. For instance, considering the example of rational imitation
given before, in the model of individual thresholds, the number of other people
who have already acted (e.g. withdrawn their earnings, joined a social movement,
etc.) are of course part of ego's opportunity structure  but further exogenous
parameters may inﬂuence both ego's and alter's individual threshold (e.g. global
ﬁnancial crises, or a nation's level of repression).37
Figure 1 is taken from Hedström (2005, p. 59) and summarizes several types of social
mechanisms. The upper half of the ﬁgure has a more illustrative intention in introducing
diﬀerent belief- and desire-mediated mechanisms for a single actor's states of mind. For
instance, in case of wishful thinking, the actor tends to desire what she beliefs. A soccer
fan desperately believing her team to win the next match would be an example. An
example for adaptive desire formation is given by Elster (2007, p. 176): If beautiful
women reject my advances, I may console myself by the thought that by virtue of their
narcissism they are actually the least desirable partners.
The lower half of ﬁgure 1 will provide more useful for the following reconstruction of the
social mechanisms in the four papers of this volume (section 4) in that social mechanisms
invoked by both actors' states of mind and opportunities during social interaction are
addressed. For instance, the mechanism of dissonance reduction takes eﬀect via alter's Aj
inﬂuencing ego's wanting of Ai (while ego's beliefs remain constant). Regarding rational
imitation, Hedström et al. (1998) provides the example of restaurant visitors using the
fact whether a restaurant is crowded as an indicator of the menu quality  which is
why crowded restaurants are desired more. And ﬁnally, the self-fulﬁlling prophecy is
characterized by a concatenation of at least two distinct belief-mediated mechanisms
with constant desires.
Interim conclusion Whereas in variable sociology (cf. Esser, 1996b), causation is con-
founded with signiﬁcant correlations between variables, the generative-process tradition
in sociology strives to approximate causation by uncovering some process that produces
correlations between variables (Goldthorpe, 2001). Proponents of mechanism-based ex-
planations refer to this procedure by invoking the image of opening the black box and
showing the cogs and wheels of the internal machinery (Elster, 1985, p. 5). More
speciﬁc deﬁnitions of social mechanisms diﬀer according to the dimensions of i) observ-
ability; ii) law-likeness; and iii) conceptual level of analysis. Promising (though not
necessary) action theories to be used for mechanism-based explanations are models of
rational action theory which can be distinguished according to whether they i) have
strong rather than weak rationality requirements; ii) focus on situational rather than
procedural rationality; and iii) claim to provide a general rather than a special theory
of action (Goldthorpe, 1998). Social mechanisms as understood here may consist of
37One example given by Hedström (2005, p. 55) concerns the explanation of diﬀerences in social
mobility rates (between nations, or over time) by recurring to diﬀerences in mobility opportunities
in terms of diﬀering occupational or class distributions. I will come back to this issue in the next
section.
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Figure 1: Types of social mechanisms. Taken from Hedström (2005, p. 59).
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smaller entities (with decreasing chance of observability the more ﬁne-grained the mech-
anism; see Machamer et al., 2000; Mayntz, 2004), should therefore not be equated with
the covering-law model but ﬁt within the model of structural individualism (Wippler,
1978; Lindenberg, 1990). The action theory of choice is one of intermediate strength
with strong bonds to situational restrictions (Goldthorpe, 1998). The gold standard
of Occam's Razor suggests to start with a simpliﬁed version that may be extended by
bridge assumptions where found to be unrealistic (Lindenberg, 1990). A very basic de-
sires, beliefs and opportunities model suﬃces to classify the most general types of social
mechanisms such as self-fulﬁlling prophecies, rational imitation or cognitive dissonance
(Hedström, 2005). Before belief- and opportunity-mediated mechanisms will prove use-
ful for approximating the causes and eﬀects of teachers' evaluations in the four papers
of this volume, I will ﬁrst summarize the discourse of whether educational systems are
or should be meritocratic, and I will then contrast this discourse with contemporary
theories of inequality in educational opportunities and their implied social mechanisms.
3 Life Chances, Meritocracy, and Inequality in
Educational Opportunities
Having outlined the above foundations in the philosophy of science, in this section, I will
begin with Max Weber's deﬁnition of social class as shaping individuals' life chances,
and I will then discuss the notion of meritocracy that is still thought to be a justiﬁed
mechanism for the allocation of societal positions. Quite contrarily, theories of social
inequalities in educational opportunities (IEO) keep laying emphasis on the fact that
theoretical accounts simply reducing status attainment processes on individuals' merit
fall too short in neglecting considerable social background eﬀects. This sets the ground
for the subsequent reconstruction of the social mechanisms approximating the causes
and eﬀects of teachers' evaluations as one of students' signiﬁcant others in their status
attainment process (measured here in terms of educational transitions; see section 4).
Life chances Just as in the case of the theoretical foundations of social sciences in
general, let us begin with a well-known quotation of Max Weber. His deﬁnition of social
class reads as follows:
We may speak of a class when (1) a number of people have in common a
speciﬁc causal component of their life chance, insofar as (2) this component is rep-
resented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportu-
nities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity of
labor markets. This is class situation. It is the most elemental economic fact that
the way in which the disposition over material property is distributed among a plu-
rality of people, meeting competitively in the market for the purpose of exchange,
in itself creates speciﬁc life chances (Weber, 2002, p. 33f., orig. quotations, my
italics).
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What becomes evident from this quotation is that Weber regards class situation as
being determined by market situation; that is, people's position in the market itself
(determined by their disposition over property) is the crucial factor for class positions
with their respective life chances. From a methodological point of view, a pleasant
implication of this classiﬁcation is that the analysis of individuals' life chances can be
accomplished by means of economic instruments such as rational action theory, which
will be discussed below. From a normative point of view, the question that of course
arises from Weber's deﬁnition is how society should equip individuals with particular
life chances.
As Davis and Moore (1945, p. 242) have argued, it is inevitable for each society to deal
with two problems: 1) Why do diﬀerent positions carry diﬀerent degrees of prestige, and
2) how do certain individuals get into these positions? Regarding the ﬁrst question, the
answer is that some positions are more agreeable, functionally more important and/or
require more talent than others; and society keeps these positions attractive by diﬀerent
kinds of rewards (sustenance and comfort; humor and diversiﬁcation; self-respect and
ego expansion).
Regarding the second question, the answer to the ﬁrst question already revealed that
individuals' talent is an issue; and therefore, former ascriptive selection mechanisms are
more and more replaced by others that are based on individuals merits :
Already in Plato's Meno (Plato, 2009) we come to know that even a slave who has not
received any form of geometric education before can solve a relatively complex geometric
task38, and also in his Republic, Plato (1991) shows a comparable line of arguing in that
each social position should be ﬁlled by talent and not by social origin (Riesman, 1967).39
Similarly, also Weber (1968, p. 241) observes (also see Becker and Hadjar, 2011, p. 55f.):
Today, the certiﬁcate of education becomes what the test for ancestors has been
in the past, at least where the nobility has remained powerful: a prerequisite for
equality of birth, a qualiﬁcation for a canonship, and for state oﬃce. The devel-
opment of the diploma from universities, and business and engineering colleges,
and the universal clamor for the creation of educational certiﬁcates in all ﬁelds
make for the formation of a privileged stratum in bureaus and in oﬃces (...) When
we hear from all sides the demand for an introduction of regular curricula and
special examinations, the reason behind it is, of course, not a suddenly awakened
`thirst for education' but the desire for restricting the supply for these positions
and their monopolization by the owners of educational certiﬁcates. Today, the
`examination' is the universal means of this monopolization, and therefore, exam-
inations irresistibly advance. As the education prerequisite to the acquisition of
38The task consists of taking a triangle of given size and using it to construct a triangle of double size.
With a little help by Socrates, the slave ﬁnally accomplishes the task (Meno, ch. 16, 17, 19).
39In contrast, the probably most prominent criticism of this line of reasoning in contemporary practical
philosophy is held by Rawls (1971) who understands his second principle of justice  social and
economic inequalities should be of the greatest beneﬁt to the least-advantaged members of society;
and oﬃces and social positions should be open according to conditions of fair equality of opportunity
 as an explicit restriction of oﬃces and social positions merely distributed based on individuals'
merit (also see Rawls, 1974; Daniels, 1978).
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the educational certiﬁcate requires considerable expense and a period of waiting
for, full remuneration, this striving, means a setback for talent (charisma) in favor
of property. For the `intellectual' costs of educational certiﬁcates are always low,
and with the increasing volume of such certiﬁcates, their intellectual costs do not
increase, but rather decrease.
A selection mechanism that is based on individuals' educational certiﬁcates is denoted
as a meritocratic selection. While Weber's analysis of modern credentialism did not ob-
scure its monopolistic implication, until quite recently, the notion of meritocracy usually
had a positive connotation  serving as the benchmark according to which an educa-
tional system were to be judged. However, as the next section may show, the demand
for meritocracy is itself a highly ambiguous concept.
Meritocracy In 1958, the sociologist Michael Young published his satirical novel The
Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870-2033. An Essay on Education and Inequality (Young,
1958). This manuscript pretending to be written in 2033, reports the ﬁnal victory
of the principle of achievement over the principle of ascription. While before individu-
als obtained their positions in society by assignment or inheritance, now positions are
distributed according to individuals' I.Q. and eﬀort. However, while before, talent was
distributed almost equally among diﬀerent groups of society, in the meritocracy, on the
one hand, an 'elite caste' of the talented is created, and on the other hand, the untalented
form an underclass of known inferiors (cf. Bell, 1972, p. 29f.).
Although Young's meritocracy is reported to have broken down in 2034, Bell (1972,
p. 30f.) rightly observes that the post-industrial society is, in its self-conception, a
meritocracy: Educational certiﬁcates as human capital (Becker, 1962) serve as pass-
ports into the most prestigious positions, while ascriptive factors such as heritage are
only an imperfect proxy for an applicant's talent. In this respect, individuals' merit is
conceptualized by their tested competence and ability  which is usually operationalized
as individuals' IQ or their achievement test results (Hoﬀer, 2001). The crucial assump-
tion of meritocratic selection is that there is a close relation between achievement and
intelligence and between intelligence and its measurement on the Intelligence Quotient
scale (Bell, 1972, p. 31). To be precise, talent (I.Q.) and merit (achievement) are re-
quired to be examined together since [t]he lazy genius is not one (Goldthorpe, 1996b,
p. 258), while both concepts are supposed to be measurable by standardized tests. The
I.Q., in turn, is assumed to follow a bell-shaped distribution, and the top achievers in a
particular age category are suspected to be actually the most talented (ibid.).
For about one and a half century, psychometricians have investigated how intelligence
could best be measured. Sir Francis Galton (1869) is said to be the ﬁrst scholar who pos-
tulated a construct of general mental ability; and thanks to progress in the development
of factor analysis, Spearman (1904) was able to extract a general factor called psycho-
metric g. While Spearman followed a more narrow conception of general ability, Galton
understood the general factor more broadly in essentially biological and evolutionary
terms (Jensen, 1986). Jensen himself can be denoted to be a follower of the latter tradi-
tion, believing in a distinct 'reality' of g apart from its psychometric relevance (Jensen,
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1987), and also believing in both the heredity of g and a priori diﬀerences (i.e. that can-
not be explained by environmental factors such as socialization) in intelligence between
ethnicities (Jensen, 1969, 1974; Jensen and Reynolds, 1982; Rushton and Jensen, 2005).
Although the question of test fairness has been an issue discussed for decades (cf.
Thorndike, 1971; Linn, 1973), Jensen's position culminated in a monograph titled The
Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in America (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994)
that addressed the heredity thesis to a broader audience. The book gained a lot of
publicity in the US (and still casts its shadow onto public debates in Germany40)  but
it was also exposed to systematic critique by educational sociologists. While Herrnstein
and Murray (1994) aimed to show that intelligence is a far more important predictor
of occupational success as environmental factors such as parental socioeconomic status
(SES), several authors objected against this conclusion due to several reasons. First,
Daniels et al. (1997) provide critique at the thesis that intelligence is predominantly
determined by genes. As the authors elaborately discuss, the genes that potentially
aﬀect IQ are inherited, while IQ itself is not (p. 47).41 Likewise, the argument implicitly
defended by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) that ethnic diﬀerences in IQ test scores were
due to genetic diﬀerences and not to environmental factors is also revealed as being
untenable (ibid., p. 62f.; also see Loehlin et al., 1973; Tizard, 1974; Scarr et al., 1977).42
Second, Heckman (1995) notes that the g factor was completely overestimated in af-
fecting respondents' social outcomes, and that the view of Herrnstein and Murray (1994)
that intelligence could not be manipulated by educational interventions is erroneous since
intelligence increases with additional years of schooling (Neal and Johnson, 1996). Re-
garding the relative importance of intelligence and social backgrounds, respectively, on
later social outcomes, both Fischer et al. (1996) and Korenman and Winship (2000)
provide extensive re-analyses of the data used by Herrnstein and Murray (1994) and
show that if a more realistic (i.e. richer) set of social background variables is considered,
intelligence is far from being a more important predictor of later social outcomes than
social backgrounds.
Blowing in the same horn as Herrnstein and Murray (1994), Saunders (1997) pos-
tulates that individuals' eﬀort and ability outweigh (social) environmental factors in
predicting National Child Development Study (NCDS) participants' occupational class
at age 33. Furthermore, the fact that in Saunders' (1997) analyses the correlation be-
tween ability and class of destination is higher than the one of ability and the class of
origin is interpreted as that the occupational class system is to some extent selecting
40In 2010, the former state ﬁnance minister of Berlin, Thilo Sarrazin, published a controversial book
wherein he sketches a pessimistic picture of the potential consequences of demographic change, a
growing underclass and increasing migration to Germany from Muslim countries (Sarrazin, 2010).
His discussion about the heredity of intelligence (Sarrazin, 2010, ch. 3) mainly stems from The Bell
Curve (cf. Sarrazin, 2010, p. 419).
41Note that the meta-analysis by Daniels et al. (1997) estimates IQ heritability eﬀects of .34 (in a
stricter test) to .48 by maximum (in a weaker test)  which is a far cry from the values of .5 to .8
as declared by Herrnstein and Murray (1994, and naïvely parroted by Sarrazin, 2010).
42Goldberger and Manski (1995, p. 771) pointedly summarize the discussion in The Bell Curve: To
us, HM's [i.e. Herrnstein & Murray's; DB ] treatment of genetics and race is akin to standing up in
a crowded theater and shouting, 'Let's consider the possibility that there is a FIRE! '
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by ability irrespective of social class origins (Saunders, 1997, p. 281).
In contrast, Breen and Goldthorpe (1999) provide a re-analysis of the NCDS data
used by Saunders (1997) and get to the conclusion that while merit certainly counts in
mobility processes, children of disadvantaged class origins have to display far more merit
than do children of more advantaged origins in order to attain similar class positions
(Breen and Goldthorpe, 1999, p. 21). Controlling for several covariates, to get the same
score on the Hope-Goldthorpe scale of occupational desirability, working-class children
would need to outperform middle-class children by approximately one standard deviation
in their score in the General Ability Test. Hence, just as in case of the Bell Curve
debate, this little discussion also ended in a rejection of the attempt of overemphasizing
the impact of 'merit' in educational mobility.43
In sum, and in the words of Goldthorpe (1996b), the sociological fantasy (p. 255)
of meritocracy, as introduced by Young (1958), has engendered both fears and hopes
(p. 280), but its satirical and critical quality was in fact largely overlooked, or at all
events, discounted (ibid.). From a more critical point of view, one can also call it
philosophically problematic and morally questionable (Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2005,
p. 17).
Solga (2005) characterizes meritocracy as a normative self-deﬁnition of modern soci-
eties in order to legitimize social inequalities  which is accomplished via ﬁve diﬀerent
means (also see Becker and Hadjar, 2011, p. 52-54): i) the 'natural' foundation of social
inequalities on biological diﬀerences in intelligence or talent (e.g. Jensen, 1969; Herrn-
stein and Murray, 1994); ii) the depiction of inequality as a functional prerequisite of
society (e.g. Davis and Moore, 1945); iii) the necessity of organized educational processes
with certiﬁcates as signals of individuals' talent; iv) an understanding of social inequality
as a problem of individual optimization; and v) an emphasis on the objective character
of achievement.
While the ﬁrst point has been extensively discussed above, and items ii) and iii) would
more lead into the ﬁeld of political philosophy, the next section on the social mechanisms
behind the concept of inequality in educational opportunities (IEO) will provide a critical
assessment of the last two points.
Inequality in educational opportunities On the one hand, without considering envi-
ronmental factors, the heritability eﬀect on IQ would be overestimated; and on the other
hand, even heritability itself is environment-dependent (Daniels et al., 1997). Hence, in
this section I will discuss the most inﬂuential theories about eﬀects of individuals' social
environment on their educational opportunities. In the terminology introduced by Mer-
ton (1987) and Goldthorpe (2001), the generative processes of the phenomenon of IEO
have to be outlined.
The Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966) is one of the ﬁrst and still one of the most
important large-scale studies of social inequality in educational opportunities. While
43For additional empirical analyses of the education-based meritocracy hypothesis see Goldthorpe (2003)
and Goldthorpe and Jackson (2008).
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its crucial hypothesis that student socioeconomic status has a higher impact on student
achievement than school diﬀerences  resulting from diﬀerences in resource allocation 
has fostered a viral debate (Cain and Watts, 1968; Bowles and Levin, 1968; Coleman,
1968; Moynihan, 1968; Aigner, 1970; Cain andWatts, 1970; Coleman, 1970; Carver, 1975;
Eysenck, 1975), the fact that students' social backgrounds are an important factor in de-
termining achievement diﬀerences also build a main argument in the Wisconsin model of
status attainment (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970). Its crucial outcome is respondents' occupa-
tional attainment in adulthood, and its explananda are i) respondents' prior educational
attainment, ii) their prior aspirations regarding the prospective occupation in the fu-
ture, iii) their educational aspirations (measured by the intention to attend college), iv)
the inﬂuence of signiﬁcant others such as parents, teachers and friends, v) the quality
of academic performance measured by students' rank in high school class, vi) parental
SES, and vii) respondents' mental ability measured by results of a Henmon-Nelson test
(Sewell et al., 1969, p. 85). In their path model  which was later exposed to consid-
erable critique since it was accused to reduce causality to correlations (Freedman, 1987;
Hedström and Swedberg, 1996)  based on a sample of farm-reared men from Wisconsin
ﬁrst studied in 1957 and re-sampled in 1964, the standardized beta coeﬃcients reveal
that the strongest path is leading from mental ability to educational performance (.62),
but the next two highest coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant others' inﬂuence on both respon-
dents' educational and occupational aspirations (.45 and .42, respectively). Next in size
comes a direct eﬀect of signiﬁcant others' impact on academic performance (.39), a path
of prior educational attainment on later occupational attainment, and a direct eﬀect of
educational aspirations on educational attainment (cf. Sewell et al., 1969, table 3).
Shortly later, Sewell et al. (1970) were able to replicate the main ﬁndings of their
1969 model based on a more general sample of the Wisconsin data since they had just
to add a few more arrows (e.g. from mental ability to signiﬁcant others' inﬂuence) to
adapt the model to the extended sample. Following this revised version of the Wisconsin
model, students' aspirations and expectations became the central mediating variable in
status attainment research (Morgan, 2006, p. 1529). While the spread of Bourdieu's
theory of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1973) in a way counterbalanced the stream of re-
search presuming a direct association between students' aspirations and their educational
attainment (Morgan, 2006), another theory still casts its shadow onto contemporary re-
search on inequality in educational opportunities: Boudon's distinction between primary
and secondary eﬀects of social inequality.
In 1974, Boudon published his monograph about Education, Opportunity, and Social
Inequality: Changing Prospects in a Western Society (Boudon, 1974). While some of
its conclusions regarding the relationship between inequality of educational opportuni-
ties (IEO) and inequality of social opportunities (ISO) were exposed to various critical
remarks (Hauser, 1976; also see Boudon's (1976) reply), Boudon's distinction between
primary and secondary eﬀects of social inequality became one of the most inﬂuential con-
cepts in contemporary quantitatively-oriented IEO research (see e.g. Meulemann, 1979;
Breen and Rottman, 1995; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996a,b; Goldthorpe, 1996a; Breen and
Goldthorpe, 1997; Müller-Benedict, 1999; Becker, 2000; Breen and Jonsson, 2000; Need
and De Jong, 2001; Solga, 2002; Becker, 2003; Erikson et al., 2005; Becker and Schubert,
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2006; Jaeger, 2007; Müller-Benedict, 2007; Pietsch and Stubbe, 2007; Stocké, 2007; Van
De Werfhorst and Van Tubergen, 2007; Maaz et al., 2008; Schneider, 2008; Becker and
Hecken, 2009a,b; Breen et al., 2009; Kloosterman et al., 2009; Erikson and Rudolphi,
2010; Glaesser and Cooper, 2011; Hillmert and Jacob, 2010; Neugebauer, 2010; Schubert
and Becker, 2010; Tolsma et al., 2010; Karlson and Holm, 2011; Morgan, 2011; Modin
et al., 2013; Morgan and Winship, 2012; Hillmert, 2013).44
The primary eﬀect of educational inequality states that the lower educational success
of lower-SES children may be due to their lower capabilities  be they deﬁned as edu-
cational interests, intellectual skills, eﬀort or motivation (Müller-Benedict, 2007). Part
of the primary eﬀect may indeed be genetic in the sense of Jensen (1969) and Herrn-
stein and Murray (1994), but another, presumably greater part of the above-mentioned
characteristics is acquired during socialization (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996a, p. 10f.).45
The secondary eﬀect, contrarily, operates via stratum-speciﬁc diﬀerences in educa-
tional decision making due to diﬀerential opportunity-cost structures, and Boudon's
crucial assumption is that secondary eﬀects still take place once primary eﬀects have
been controlled for (Nash, 2005). In Boudon's (1981, p. 191) words:
The subject's class of origin (or the class to which a family now belongs) will
crucially aﬀect his choices of one or the other option. If their current success is
mediocre, the family unit will consider itself 'satisﬁed' if the child has reached an
academic level enabling him to aspire to a social status equal or higher than his
own, even if this status is not especially high. A well-placed family unit will on
the other hand strive (I ought to add: more often than not) to 'push' the child so
that he doesn't fail (even if he doesn't enjoy a greater success).
As mentioned, the idea that aspirations may vary by social class has not been invented
by Boudon. Actually, already Hyman (1953) postulated that lower-class individuals as-
pire lower aims than higher-class individuals (which he attributes to class-speciﬁc value
systems), and Keller and Zavalloni (1964) respeciﬁed his approach by introducing the
idea of class-speciﬁc relative distances towards particular values. However, while Keller
and Zavalloni (1964, p. 60) on the one hand understand social class as an intervening
variable between individual ambition and social achievement, and on the other hand
do not entirely discard the value-relatedness of aspirations, Boudon (1974) overcomes
this shortcoming by ﬁrst modeling aspirations as a social mechanism that is located be-
tween social class and (educational) achievement; and second, by relating class-speciﬁc
diﬀerences in aspirations to diﬀerences in utility considerations (Erikson and Jonsson,
1996a, p. 13f.).46 Hence, Boudon not only argues against both reductionist covering-law
44For further reviews of the literature see Kristen (1999); Stocké (2010); Becker (2012); Solga and
Becker (2012).
45In contrast, see Lucchini et al. (2013) for a recent contribution that once again strives to take up
the cudgels for a genetic explanation of IEO. Note, however, that their variance decomposition
approach provides nothing more than a black-box explanation (which the authors themselves partly
acknowledge; cf. Lucchini et al., 2013, p. 5) without revealing the particular mechanisms behind.
46Note, however, that Erikson and Jonsson (1996a, p. 28f.) still observe a value assumption in Boudon's
theory, namely that, given the social distance traveled, the negative eﬀect of social demotion on
beneﬁts is higher than the corresponding positive eﬀect on social ascent.
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type variable sociology (Boudon, 1976, 1979) and a too narrow notion of rationality
(Boudon, 1996, 1998, 2003), his own theory on social inequality in educational oppor-
tunities (Boudon, 1974) also is a prominent example of a mechanism-based explanation
opening the black box of social background eﬀects in order to get to a better under-
standing of IEO in the Weberian sense.47
The idea that utility considerations may shape students' (or their parents') educa-
tional decisions was further elaborated by Goldthorpe (1996a).48 Referring to Boudon's
elaborated rational action theory  and, implicitly, also to the maxim of Occam's Razor
(Thorburn, 1918)  Goldthorpe (1996a, p. 490) argues that it is simpler (i.e. more
parsimonious) to assume that there is no class-speciﬁc variation in either aspirations or
in potentially underlying value systems. Instead, Goldthorpe develops the idea of re-
garding education as an investment good the costs and beneﬁts of which vary by social
classes.
Goldthorpe's simple premise is that each family will strive to avoid downward mobility.
Unsurprisingly, for lower-educated parents, this goal will be reached already for lower
educational qualiﬁcations of their children  while for higher-educated parents, a far
higher degree will have to be obtained. Moreover, for the oﬀspring of parents in less
advantageous positions, each failed attempt of trying a higher educational alternative
will be more serious in its consequences concerning both monetary (earnings foregone;
loss of ﬁnancial support) and transactional costs (a loss in itself; the risk of dropping
out of the educational system).
The utility model of students' educational transitions was ﬁrst formalized by Erik-
son and Jonsson (1996a). They introduce a simple 3-parameter model (which heavily
resembles Goldthorpe's theoretical considerations) postulating that students' utility is
aﬀected by educational beneﬁt B, costs of education C, and the expected probability of
educational success P . B can also include prospective beneﬁts during academic studies,
and C comprises of both monetary and psychological costs of education. When in case
of educational success, educational utility consists of educational beneﬁt net of costs,
and in case of failure, only educational costs remain, the utility model reads (Erikson
and Jonsson, 1996a, p. 14):
U = (B − C)P − C(1− P )⇔ U = PB − C. (1)
Thus, a student's utility equals her expected educational beneﬁt times the expected
probability of educational success minus expected costs (ibid.). As the authors empha-
47One could argue that in contrast to Boudon (1974), Herrnstein and Murray (1994) fall back into a
mechanical push-pull explanation (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 2) in terms of a suspected primacy of
heredity.
48Much of what followed with and after Goldthorpe (1996a) was already sketched in Meulemann (1979).
A diﬀerence between Meulemann (1979) and the later models by Goldthorpe (1996a); Erikson and
Jonsson (1996a,b); Breen and Goldthorpe (1997), and Esser (1999) that is crucial for the objective
of theoretical identiﬁcation of self-fulﬁlling prophecies in section 4.3 is ﬁrst that Meulemann (1979)
does not provide a formal theoretical model, and second  and more important , that he explicitly
excludes subjective expected probabilities of success and thus assumes all cost-beneﬁt terms to occur
with a probability of one (Meulemann, 1979, p. 399, footnote 5).
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size, two educational alternatives i and j can yield the same expected educational utility
(PiBi = PjBJ) if Pi < Pj and Bi > Bj. However, a more risk averse person would
always opt for alternative i, notwithstanding the higher expected beneﬁt of alternative
j.
Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) specify the model by Erikson and Jonsson (1996a) more
precisely by introducing three educational outcomes on the one hand and class-speciﬁc
status destinies on the other hand. While a presentation of the exact mathematics of
their model is beyond the scope of this introduction, their main idea should be captured
though: Even if continuing in education was not dependent on the costs of remaining at
school, and if there were no class-speciﬁc ability diﬀerences, service-class students would
still be more likely to continue a high level of education than working-class students.
However, since evidence on primary eﬀects of social inequality reveals class-speciﬁc
diﬀerences in both academic ability and resources, and students' subjective expected
probability of successfully continuing the chosen school track can be assumed to be en-
dogenously inﬂuenced by their academic ability, diﬀerences in transition propensities
between the social classes will be further broadened than a more parsimonious explana-
tion based on simple status-maintaining utility consideration would suggest.
Hartmut Esser (1999) basically builds on several elements of both Erikson and Jon-
sson's (1996a) as well as Breen and Goldthorpe's (1997) respective models, but one
the one hand, he introduces additional parameters (such as the impact of the expected
status decline, once a chosen school track was not ﬁnished with success, on parental
decisions), and on the other hand, he splits up the extended model into two smaller
components, which allows him to get to the following conclusion: A student opts for the
higher educational track if the expected educational motivation  consisting of the ex-
pected educational beneﬁt and the expected status decline (times its impact on parental
decisions)  exceeds the estimated investment risk  deﬁned as the expected costs of
education weighted by the inverse of the subjective probability of educational success.
Whether one favors a more parsimonious model, such as the initial proposition by Erik-
son and Jonsson (1996a), or a more complex explanation as the one by Esser (1999): The
crucial point to be made here is that all of the above theoretical transition models open
the black box by introducing simple utility-based assumptions as the underlying social
mechanisms in order to obtain a better understanding of social inequality in educational
opportunities. In contrast to critique as it had been put forward against the early Wis-
consin status attainment model (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996), signiﬁcant correlations
or regression estimates cannot be confounded with causality since the respective indica-
tors will always have to be linked back to the underlying utility assumptions that should
account for the empirical results.
Dissecting the assumptions of the rational choice (or subjective expected uility =
SEU) model of parental educational decisions according to the terminology introduced
by Hedström (2005) nicely illustrates its advantage regarding parsimoniousness: While
parents' desires, i.e. their absolute educational and occupational aspirations are assumed
to be constant among classes (Keller and Zavalloni, 1964; also see Meulemann, 1979,
398, footnote 4), it is their beliefs about the expected beneﬁt of education, the perceived
amount of status decline, or the subjective expected probability of educational success
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that should be diﬀerent among the social strata. Hence, the above-cited theoretical
accounts all assume a belief-mediated social mechanism to underlie educational transition
decisions.49
Another issue to emphasize at this point is the question of the underlying decision
heuristic. As outlined above, the rationality principle itself is almost empty (Popper,
1994, p. 169), and we have to expect that simply referring to actors' rationality without
giving additional speciﬁcations will not be the end of the story in the development of
a satisfying mechanism-based explanation (also see Gambetta, 1998, p. 118). As it is
already implicitly sketched in Boudon (1974), a bit more overtly supposed by Erikson
and Jonsson (1996a) and Goldthorpe (1996a), and explicitly discussed by Breen and
Goldthorpe (1997) and Esser (1999), a crucial assumption of a utility-based transition
model is actors' relative risk aversion. However, as Esser (1999, p. 274) highlights, we
should not assume that relative risk aversion is a mechanism counterbalancing the 'inner
logic' of an SEU explanation of educational transitions. Contrarily, relative risk aversion
rather follows from straightforward calculus according to the SEU rules as a consequence
of the social situation's opportunity structure. Hence, the underlying decision heuristic
reads Maximize the subjective expected value! equally for all social strata  while, as
outlined, corresponding subjective expected probabilities should of course expected to
vary by social class.50
Still, some controversy remains whether primary or secondary eﬀects are more im-
portant in explaining IEO. By means of simple frequency table analysis, Nash (2005)
questions scholars who emphasize the prevalence of secondary eﬀects, and he himself
concludes that primary eﬀects are the comparably stronger ones. Contrarily, Jackson
et al. (2007) apply the method of counterfactual analysis of primary and secondary ef-
fects that has been introduced by Erikson and Jonsson (1996b) and extended by Erikson
et al. (2005). The crucial idea of this method is that both kind of eﬀects can be dis-
entangled by relating students' achievement distributions and transition propensities,
respectively, to the appropriate linking functions. Concretely, students' class-speciﬁc
academic performance is modeled by the area under its normalized distribution (i.e. the
integration of the standard normal density function with students' class-speciﬁc mean
performance and respective variance as its identifying parameters); and class-speciﬁc
transition propensities are approximated by the area under the respective logistic re-
gression curves (Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2005; Jackson et al., 2007). Both areas mul-
tiplied  which has to be done via numerical integration  allows to estimate, say, the
counterfactual transition rate of the underclass if they had the performance distribution
49Recent evidence by Stocké (2011) aims to challenge the assumption of constant aspirations among
social classes: The author ﬁnds that in working class, the diﬀerence between idealistic (i.e. most
wanted) and realistic (i.e. most probable) aspirations (Gottfredson, 1981) is higher than in service
class (also see Stocké, 2009). However, Stocké's analyses did not follow either one of the above-
reviewed utility frameworks, and I do not see how realistic aspirations should diﬀer from students'
subjective expected probability of successfully completing a given school track  which would still
suite the (more parsimonious) assumption of constant desires and varying beliefs among social strata.
50As opposed to the above-described relatively parsimonious decision heuristic, in the conclusion section
of this introduction, I will propose to investigate the consequences of relaxing Occam's razor in
adding the auxiliary assumption of class-dependent decision heuristics.
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of the salariat, for example.
Decomposing primary and secondary eﬀects in this manner shows that the latter
reinforce the former to a considerable extent in that secondary eﬀects account for at
least a quarter up to a half of the variance of students' actual transitions. Hence,
narrowing the focus merely on primary eﬀects would be both myopic and perhaps lead
to ineﬀective policy conclusions (Jackson et al., 2007, p. 224).
However, Jackson et al. (2007, p. 224) also note that secondary eﬀects of social
inequality may also occur in conjunction, perhaps, with parents, teachers and peers 
which is what the Wisconsin model would have called students' signiﬁcant others (Sewell
et al., 1969, 1970). After a short interim conclusion, the next section will summarize
the four papers providing both theoretical (in terms of mechanism-based explanations)
and empirical evidence (in terms of results from quantitative analyses) that teachers'
evaluations are a factor that may aﬀect students' transition propensities apart from the
parameters of the utility-based theoretical accounts hitherto applied.
Interim conclusion Starting with Weber's (2000) deﬁnition of social class in terms of
life chances, the preceding section ﬁrst discussed the meritocracy thesis (Young, 1958;
Bell, 1972) which states that individuals' social position should depend on their respec-
tive merits  deﬁned as IQ + eﬀort  and its inﬂuence on subsequent discourses about
the heritability of intelligence and its impact on individual achievement compared to so-
cial background factors (Jensen, 1969; Herrnstein and Murray, 1994). Since most of the
supposed evidence on the primacy of intelligence over social backgrounds was revealed to
be both incomplete and misleading (Heckman, 1995; Fischer et al., 1996; Daniels et al.,
1997; Korenman and Winship, 2000), the focus of the remainder of this section lay on
the generative processes (Goldthorpe, 2001) of inequality in students' educational oppor-
tunities (IEO). Following a classic though still inﬂuential educational transition theory
(Boudon, 1974), I distinguished primary eﬀects (partly due to genetics, but mainly
due to social-environmental factors) from secondary eﬀects of social inequality due to
diﬀerent utility considerations regarding educational decisions. In its more recent and
more elaborated versions (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996a; Goldthorpe, 1996a; Breen and
Goldthorpe, 1997; Esser, 1999), more ﬁne-grained bridge assumptions have been added
to the initial transition model that allowed me to reconstruct transition diﬀerences by
social strata as a belief-mediated social mechanism (cf. Hedström, 2005)  while actors'
desires (i.e. their 'idealistic' aspirations; cf. footnote 49) as well as their underlying
decision heuristics  maximize the subjective expected value  are assumed to be invari-
ant among social classes. Now the ground is set for outlining the generative processes
 in terms of social mechanisms  approximating the causes and eﬀects of teachers'
evaluations as one of students' signiﬁcant others in their educational transition process.
4 Applications
In this section, I will try to reconstruct the social mechanisms implied in the four papers
of this volume. The ﬁrst paper, Teachers' Evaluations and the Deﬁnition of the Situation
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in the Classroom (chapter II), provides a path model in the tradition of the classic
Wisconsin status attainment theory  only that we do not cover the longitudinal aspect
and restrict our analyses to the emergence of 10th class teachers' evaluations.51 Here,
I will elaborate more intensely on the Model of Frame Selection that could only be
sketched in the paper's theoretical section.
The second paper, Intelligence and Academic Achievement as Contextual-Level Predic-
tors of Teachers' Evaluations: Big Fish Little Pond or Reﬂected Glory Eﬀect? (chapter
III) places the outcome of teachers' evaluations in the context of reference-group re-
search and asks whether there is a positive or a negative eﬀect of class-level ability and
achievement, respectively, on the fact whether a student obtains a 'good' or a 'bad'
evaluation by her teacher. Some more words have to be said about to what extent the
mechanisms assumed here diﬀer from what is hypothesized in conventional big ﬁsh little
pond research.
The third paper, The Impact of Teachers' Expectations on Students' Educational Op-
portunities in the Life Course (chapter IV), asks if 10th class teachers' evaluations may
induce self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects regarding students' later educational transitions.
Here, I will come back to the idea of secondary eﬀects of social inequality as a belief-
mediated social mechanism in order to identify self-fulﬁlling prophecies by changes in
subjective probabilities of educational success.
Finally, the fourth paper, Does the Eﬀect of Teachers' Expectations on Students' Ed-
ucational Opportunities Decrease Over Educational Transitions? A Statistical Matching
Approach (chapter V) tests whether the phenomenon of decreasing background eﬀects
over educational transitions also holds for teacher expectancy eﬀects. The reconstruc-
tion of self-fulﬁlling prophecies as belief-mediated mechanisms is amended by the idea
of Bayesian learning to account for changes in individual success estimates over time.
4.1 Paper 1: A Frame Selection Model of Teachers' Evaluations
As mentioned above, the structural form of the paper Teachers' Evaluations and the
Deﬁnition of the Situation in the Classroom (chapter II, co-authored by Klaus Birkel-
bach52) is to some degree comparable to the Wisconsin status attainment tradition 
only that one generalized member of the students' signiﬁcant others, i.e. their teachers
(and in particular, teachers' evaluations) is the focus of the analyses. It was already
outlined in section 2.2 that a rather criticizable point of the Wisconsin model (and of
path models in its tradition) is that it stands at risk of mixing up (signiﬁcant) correla-
tions with causality. Although path model luminaries such as Jöreskog (1993) heavily
emphasize that one should only allow for additional path coeﬃcients or covariances that
also make sense from a theoretical point of view, the researcher is often tempted to re-
lax constraints and sacriﬁce methodological rigor for empirical model ﬁt gains (so-called
51Of course, by our theoretical foundation, we also have the demand of not to fall into the trap of
theoretical underspeciﬁcation that has been objected against the Wisconsin path models (Freedman,
1987; Hedström and Swedberg, 1996).
52A great deal of the theoretical considerations in this subsection is also joint work with Klaus Birkel-
bach.
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post-hoc model ﬁtting; also see Byrne et al., 1989).53 Hence, it will be necessary to
outline some more ﬁne-grained explanations of the suspected causal structure than it
was possible in the paper.
The dependent variable of interest are 10th class teachers' evaluations whom of their
students they consider to be able for academic studies  and whom of them not. Teachers
were asked to evaluate their students in the teacher survey of the Cologne High School
Panel (1969), and we make use of additional student and parent questionnaires to explain
how teachers might arrive at a positive or negative judgment of their students.54
In the paper, we argue that in order to arrive at a more systematic action-theoretical
model of teachers' evaluations, it is useful to start with the general model of sociological
explanations (Coleman, 1990; Esser, 1993a) that links the conditions and alternatives of
a social situation on the macro level (the logic of situation) to actors' expectations and
evaluations on the micro level. The latter, in turn, shape individuals' action (which is
referred to as the logic of selection). In a third step, individual actions are aggregated
to a new social situation via transformation rules (the logic of aggregation).55 The
crucial assumption of the logic of selection is that this step operates via a mechanism of
frame selection (Esser, 1993a, 1996b) which assumes that an actor sequentially deﬁnes a
social situation by selecting a particular frame, while she arrives at a concrete action by
recurring to a more speciﬁc script. Whereas Boudon (2003) is critical of the usefulness of
explanations by frame selection theories  regarding them even as equal to introducing
a black box (p. 7) , we here follow Opp (2011, p. 218) who tends to agree that the
MFS might be applicable to explain actors' preferences as well as their beliefs  whereby
it would suit the general framework of mechanism-based explanations (Hedström, 2005).
A second argument for this step comes from the pragmatist theory of mechanisms by
Gross (2009) who virtually aims to oppose against rational choice theory in general
which is too narrow from his point of view. Instead, Gross emphasizes that human
action (...) involves an alternation between habit and creativity. (...) Only when
preexisting habits fail to solve a problem at hand does an action-situation rise to the
forefront of consciousness as problematic (Gross, 2009, p. 366). Grounding on these
considerations, a pragmatist theory of social mechanisms is given as composed of chains
or aggregations of actors confronting problem situations and mobilizing more or less
habitual responses (Gross, 2009, p. 368; orig. emph.). While apart from the use of
analytically imprecise phrasings such as 'chains or aggregations', I would in general
agree that the processes of action they describe are suitable to be subsumed beneath
the concept of social mechanisms, the exempliﬁcations below might show that the idea
53A caveat against path analysis is also held by Freedman (1987) who objects that i) path analysis
usually assumes a linear relationship between the variables of interest  which may be violated ; ii)
the causal ordering of the variables has to be thoroughly deduced from theory before model ﬁtting;
and iii) even in the most complex models, omitted variable bias may still distort the estimates since
speciﬁcation of an exhaustive empirical model will hardly be possible.
54For more detailed information on the data see the respective sections in the four papers.
55See Hedström (2005, ch. 6) as well as Bornmann (2010) for a more elaborate discussion of the
possibilities of agent-based modeling in order to get an intuition about the consequences of diﬀerent
mechanisms of aggregation.
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of an 'alternation between habit and creativity' should not be viewed as standing in
opposition to rational choice theory in general. Instead, it suits the assumption of
variable rationality as hold by the Model of Frame Selection (see below).
In accordance with the literature, we deduce three distinct dimensions that could aﬀect
teachers in shaping their evaluations regarding 10th class students' prospective aptitude
for academic studies: students' academic performance, their cognitive ability, and their
social backgrounds (which are later split up into socioeconomic status and aspirations).
The question is now how these theoretical concepts can be linked to teachers' evaluations
under the assumption that the latter emerge by means of a more or less rational selection
process.
In order to answer that question, it is fruitful to refer to Esser's and Kroneberg's
enhancement of Kahneman and Tversky's (1984) early version of the framing approach
towards a general theory of action (Esser, 1996a, 2010; Esser and Kroneberg, 2010;
Kroneberg, 2005, 2006; Kroneberg et al., 2008, 2010; Kroneberg, 2011; Kroneberg and
Kalter, 2012). TheM odel of F rame Selection (MFS) ﬁrst separates individual action an-
alytically into frame selection, script selection, and action selection. Second, it assumes
that on each level, the selection process may vary between an unconscious automatic-
spontaneous processing, and a 'rational' penetration of the respective selection stage.
By doing so, the MFS synthesizes arguments from both the interpretative paradigm and
rational choice theory to account for what is referred to as actors' variable rationality
(Kroneberg, 2006).
The frame selection refers to actors' individual deﬁnition of the situation. Before
action may take place, an actor has to answer the question, What is going on here?
(Goﬀman, 1974, p. 8). By explicitly considering actors' individual deﬁnition of the
situation, the MFS also builds on assumptions of symbolic interactionism and actors'
Lebenswelt (also see Esser, 1993b) and thus holds the demand to arrive at an understand-
ing explanation (Kroneberg, 2011, p. 120). According to that theory, in most cases, the
actual situation is deﬁned in an automatic-spontaneous mode (as-mode), depending on
the match of the actor's perceptions with internally stored mental models. The match is
determined by (1) the frame's general availability (determined by socialization and life
course experiences) (2) the perceivability of unique situational objects (such as cultural
symbols and gestures), and (3) the mental link between situational objects and a speciﬁc
frame (e.g., Do 20 seconds of silence count for 'communication breakdown'?  which
may be subject to cross-cultural variance; see Kroneberg, 2011, p. 131). Only in cases
without such a match, a reﬂecting-calculating deﬁnition of the situation (rc-mode) is
required.
Once a particular situation has been deﬁned, more concrete scripts of action reduce the
complexity of possible alternatives of actions. Same as frame-selection, script-selection
varies between an automatic activation of available scripts  acquired through the process
of socialization and depending on both the internalization of norms and the habitual-
ization of routines (as-mode)  and a rational reﬂection about the alternatives at hand
(rc-mode) as well.
And ﬁnally, individuals' concrete actions may vary between as-mode and rc-mode pro-
cessing as well  depending on whether a particular script exactly demands a subsequent
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action, or if the consequences of diﬀerent alternatives are explicitly considered. In the
latter case, SEU theory would be an adequate speciﬁcation.56
On each level, the match between the social situation and its mental frame determines
which form of processing is intuitively chosen. If the actor's deﬁnition of a social situation
is without any doubts, and a chosen frame is strongly linked to a particular script,
and this script requires certain action(s), then the as-mode is the adequate since most
eﬃcient coping strategy. However, if there is 'deﬁnitional complexity', a more rational
penetration of the social situation as well as a more conscious selection of scripts and
individual actions might be more conducive. Exactly this is meant with the notion of
actors' variable rationality (Kroneberg, 2005, 2006).57
As regards teachers' evaluations as they had been surveyed in the Cologne High
School Panel (CHiSP), the frame of the underlying social situation should be rather
unambiguous: the demand of an anonymous, non-binding assessment of students' future
academic potential. Thus, teachers should recognize the demands of this situation more
or less automatically (as-mode).
Now the question arises which scripts are at the teachers' disposal in this situation of
a non-binding assessment. The answer given in the paper is that this particular frame
requires a script of professional pedagogic diagnostics. As already sketched above, we
assume that as long as teachers' evaluations are grounded on meritocratic criteria like
students' academic performance; they follow occupational standards that are deeply-
rooted in every teacher's mind. Thus, evaluations which are based on meritocratic
criteria will emerge rather automatically in line with the as-mode. However, though
probably most legitimate, these criteria will be not the only ones determining teachers'
actual evaluations. In total, it is possible to enumerate three diﬀerent types of processing
that might come into play besides meritocracy.58
First, Bourdieu (1986) developed a theory on diﬀerent forms of capital in which upper-
class students' habitus  deﬁned as a system of dispositions (socially acquired schemes
of perception, thought and action that are stable over time)  almost perfectly matches
with the habitus of their teachers who usually originate from the same social stratum
and thus have incorporated a similar system of social dispositions. This positive social
discrimination of upper-class students is twofold: On the one hand, upper-class students
are usually more familiar with codes (or routines) that are necessary to acquire the
cultural goods that are taught in class. On the other hand, these ﬁrst-order codes
depend, in turn, on second-order codes of perception, communication and self-control
56Chess is a good example why it is useful to introduce an analytical separation between script selection
and selection of action: The frame of a chess game should be unambiguously clear (as-mode), so is
the required script of chess rules (as-mode). However, this script still allows a multitude of permitted
maneuvers  which is why the selection of action will take place in rc-mode.
57The mode-selection that decides about the mode of each analytical level is assumed to be a precon-
scious process but uses SEU theory as a heuristic (Esser, 2010; Kroneberg, 2011, p. 144f.).
58In section 3, I critically discussed the fears and hopes (Goldthorpe, 1996b, p. 255) that have been
associated with the idea of meritocracy. Consequently, the idea of the meritocracy-as-mode is not
that the authors of the underlying paper personally favor this mode in normative terms, but that
the idea of a meritocratic evaluation might be regarded as most legitimate by educational decision-
makers (including teachers).
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strategies acquired in socialization that may aﬀect even factors like students' motivation
and aspirations (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990; also see Kroneberg,
2011, p. 105f.). Thus, upper-class students with higher cultural capital will not only
dispose of more knowledge of school-relevant contents, but they will also be more able
to perceive and to communicate according to norms and via symbols that come up to
the expectations of their teachers (also see Dumais, 2006, p. 85f.).59
We do not follow all implications of the habitus concept in the sense of Bourdieu's
original idea. On the one hand, as Lareau and Weininger (2003) have pointed out,
much of the usage of cultural capital as a concept in educational research can be traced
back to an early DiMaggio (1982) paper. As a result of the reception of this paper, a
narrowing of cultural capital operationalization by 'highbrow' culture as well as a distinct
treatment of cultural capital and 'achievement' can be noted  of which both was beyond
Bourdieu's intention. Second, and more important, Goldthorpe (2007) highlights that
Bourdieu's habitus concept cannot be separated from his conﬂict-theoretical approach
towards schooling in general. According to this view, cultural capital per se is arbitrary
and only 'used' by teachers in school in order to maintain the current social structure
by means of a social closing mechanism. Furthermore, a habitus once acquired in family
has to be regarded as stable and cannot be changed by means of schooling interventions
(which would, according to Bourdieu's conﬂict-theoretical approach, not even be aspired
by teachers at all).
Therefore, in the following, the idea of a habitus eﬀect should be understood rather
metaphorically to refer to comparably unconscious, but habitual social status eﬀects
and without the ideological burden initially intended by Bourdieu. While at a ﬁrst
glance, one might ask which conceptual gain would be arrived at compared to Weber's
dictum of class- and status-related conduct of life (ständische Lebensführung) in his
deﬁnition of social class (Weber, 1978, p. 306f.), our argument is that the idea of variable
rationality (Kroneberg, 2005, 2006) is a more general concept that also subsumes status-
related conduct of life. Also to show this, both acquisition and eﬃcacy of potentially
unconscious status-related 'dispositions' should be analyzed within the framework of
the MFS.60 As Kroneberg (2011, p. 104-108) remarks, Bourdieu's thesis that action
appearing to be rational from an observant's point of view can be rooted in unconscious,
long-time dispositions suits the assumption of variable rationality when a 'disposition' in
Bourdieu's sense is detached from action-theoretical determinism. Instead, Kroneberg
(2011, p. 107) argues in line with several other authors (Elster, 1983; Hedström, 2005;
Yaish and Katz-Gerro, 2012) who oﬀer a reading of Bourdieu's habitus that can be
referred to as 'brushed against the grain' (Benjamin, 1968, p. 257) in allowing also more
59Also Erikson and Jonsson (1996a, p. 24) highlight that evidence on the impact of (parental) cultural
resources on (students') diﬀerences in educational transition probabilities between the social strata
is often indirect  which legitimizes the use of habitus-alike processes as an unobserved mechanism.
That is, even if indicators for primary and secondary eﬀects of social inequality are controlled for,
parental socioeconomic status might still reﬂect habitus-related attributes also aﬀecting teachers'
evaluations.
60For an MFS-related account to the above-mentioned 'highbrow' cultural practices of individual actors
see Weingartner (2013).
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conscious reﬂexions given certain status-related action constraints. Kroneberg quotes
Bourdieu's assertion that habitus oﬀers a conditioned and conditional freedom that is
as remote from a creation of unpredictable novelty as it is from a simple mechanical
reproduction of the initial conditionings (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 95).
Transferring this on the emergence of teachers' evaluations, as long as the above-
mentioned match of symbolic codes unconsciously inﬂuences teachers in their evaluations
(as in common-sense habitus reception), this, too, is in line with the as-mode of automatic
processing. As Kroneberg (2006, p. 18) points out (also see Kroneberg, 2011, p. 132f.),
there will be greater activation of an as-mode script
• the higher its general availability,
• the higher its accessibility given the selection of frame, and
• the higher the match of the selected frame.
The availability of a script describes how strongly it is mentally anchored, and its
accessibility represents the degree of mental association between frames and scripts.
In our case, the as-mode prevalence of students' social background criteria in a sense
conventionally referred to as habitus eﬀects will particularly depend on the script's avail-
ability, i.e. how strongly an actor has internalized certain norms or become[s] accus-
tomed to certain routines (Kroneberg, 2006, p. 18). The main point here is that in
accordance with the mode of automatic processing, actors do not have the opportunity
to select between diﬀerent as-mode scripts deliberately; instead, there is always only one
dominant as-mode script  whether it approximates more to the ideal type of meritoc-
racy or more to teachers' habitual recurrence of students' social backgrounds. In sum,
the ﬁrst possible deviance from the as-mode meritocracy model would be a more or
less pronounced (but still unconscious) shift towards teachers' habitual consideration of
students' social backgrounds which presumably anchor the shaping process of teachers'
evaluations as well. To keep a well-established label, but without buying Bourdieu's
conﬂict theory, we refer to this particular script as habitus-as-mode.61Second, however,
and in line with the assumption of actors' variable rationality, the extent to which
teachers' recurrence on student social background criteria merely follows a habitual, i.e.
unconscious automatic selection process (as-mode) may vary as well. Teachers' might
consciously take into account that apart from their current academic achievement, some
students might be more able to both start and successfully complete academic stud-
ies due to their more favourable social backgrounds: On the one hand, teachers might
suppose that students from the higher social strata dispose of characteristics making
them more 'suitable' to higher education. This could be habitus-alike socially acquired
61Another theoretical account that conjoins the eﬃcacy of symbolic codes with models of situational
framing is the one proposed by Bernstein (1971, 1981)  who himself notes a certain theoretical
proximity to Bourdieu's concept of habitus (Bernstein, 1990, p. 3). For a more elaborate discussion
on the similarities and diﬀerences between Bernstein and Bourdieu see Bourdieu (1991, p. 53),
Harker and May (1993) as well as Bernstein's (1995) reply to Harker and May. For an empirical
test of Bernstein's theory see Meulemann (1976).
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schemes of perception, thought and action that match those of their university teachers
 but in contrast to the habitus-as-mode, school teachers more or less consciously re-
ﬂect on this potential later match/mismatch. On the other hand, school teachers might
simply expect that upper-class parents, let's say having an academic background them-
selves, would be more able to support them. Thus, in that case, the dominant script
that follows the as-mode framing of the social situation would be a mixture of an as-
mode assessment of students' academic performance and of a rc-mode evaluation of the
estimated impact of students' social backgrounds on their potential academic success at
university.
Having allowed for variable rationality with regard to the eﬃcacy of social back-
grounds, the question of the acquisition of status-related dispositions  whether taking
eﬀect consciously or unconsciously  remains unanswered. Above, I already followed
Goldthorpe (2007) in criticizing Bourdieu's rather mechanistic understanding of social-
ization. Whereas even the most detailed elaboration of the MFS (Kroneberg, 2011)
remains silent on this issue62, my proposition is to allow for variable rationality also con-
cerning the learning of habits. While early behaviorist learning theories mainly assumed
a simple stimulus-response model of social learning, Bandura (1969) introduced an idea
of social learning that could also be described in terms of the mechanism of rational
imitation (Hedström et al., 1998; for an overview on socialization theories see Maccoby,
1992).
Excursus: Variable rationality of habit learning
As Bandura (1969, p. 220) points out, conditioning theories cannot explain how new re-
sponse patterns are acquired observationally, particularly under conditions where an observer
does not overtly perform the model's responses during the acquisition phase, i.e. the behavior
learned by observing is performed much later. Therefore, he postulates that learning involves
both an imaginal and a verbal representational system that are mentally stored and mediate
future behavior. As these kind of retention processes are, amongst others, reinforced by the
role model's social status, the applicability of Bandura's account on socially acquired schemes
of perception, thought and action such as Bourdieu's habitus is straightforward. Even more,
Bandura (1969) opens the black box of simple conditioning in specifying several mediating
mechanisms of this long-term acquisition process in terms of punishment/reward, peer-group
inﬂuence, social mobility, institutions (e.g., the school system) or even media consumption.
Furthermore, Bandura (1969) objects against simple mimicry learning models in favor of
those open for development of novel patterns of behavior. While doing so, children may keep
those forms of behavior that have proven useful in order to achieve certain goals, and discard
other forms that have not (also see Becker, 2012, p. 56f.). My argument is that Bandura's
speciﬁcation of intervening mechanisms and his demand to account for cost-beneﬁt-related
maintenance of novel forms of behavior transcends simple as-mode socialization theories (as
the one by Bourdieu, 1986) and approximates towards rc-mode forms of rational imitation.
A recent model combining both as- and rc-mode learning was proposed by Sun et al. (2005):
The authors separate the cognitive structure into a 'bottom level' consisting of implicit knowl-
62Although some passages in Esser (1999, ch. 9) touch on the idea of learning by both conditioning
and rational reﬂection, this was before the idea of variable rationality was further elaborated on 
which is why I still see the need for a more thorough speciﬁcation.
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edge responsible for automatic memory-based processing, and a 'top level' consisting of explicit
knowledge responsible for explicit hypothesis testing. Sun et al. (2005) develop a complex for-
mal model on the conditions of implicit and explicit learning that cannot be reviewed here, but
its main idea is straightforward: Analogous to human action, also learning in general (and so-
cialization in particular) may take eﬀect via both unconscious, implicit conditioning (as-mode),
and via conscious, explicit rational imitation or hypothesis testing (rc-mode).
Hence, providing an MFS-related explanation of how students' social backgrounds
might aﬀect teachers in shaping evaluations on their students requires to introduce
variable rationality also in socialization theories. Status-related perceptual schemes
may be acquired both automatic-spontaneously (as-mode) and by means of rational
imitation (rc-mode). In either case, these dispositions may inﬂuence both unconsciously
(habitus-as-mode) and by means of rational reﬂection (habitus-rc-mode) later individual
action.
Apart from social backgrounds, supplemental to an as-mode assessment of students'
academic performance, third, teachers might refer to additional criteria of students'
general academic ability like their (estimated) intelligence or motivation. Apart from
the most visible academic performance of the students (usually operationalized by their
school grades), teachers could ﬁnd rational reasons for diﬀerences in ability that might
aﬀect students' success probabilities but are not reﬂected in grades. Students with
the same grade might diﬀer in cognitive abilities or in the motivation they invested to
achieve this grade, and these diﬀerences might also lead to diﬀerences in their (estimated)
probabilities of university success. Our main point here is that in contrast to the as-
mode assessments of students' academic performance, we assume teachers' additional
considerations about students' ability to be the result of rational reasoning (rc-mode).
These theoretical considerations can be summed up as follows: Teachers' evaluations
as measured in the CHiSP data emerge in a social situation that is framed more or less
automatically (as-mode) by the teachers. In a second step, teachers' actual decisions,
i.e. in DBO terminology their beliefs about certain students, will be formed according
to a speciﬁc script of action which may vary between an automatic (as-mode) and a
rational (rc-mode) pole of information processing. In the most probable script of action,
teachers intuitively ground their evaluations on students' actual academic performance
(meritocracy-as-mode). However, besides this meritocratic criterion, the dominant script
may gradually contain three other types of information: i) an automatic consideration of
students' backgrounds (habitus-as-mode), ii) a more rational consideration of students'
backgrounds (habitus-rc-mode), and iii) a rational consideration of additional criteria of
students' academic success apart from their actual performance (meritocracy-rc-mode).
Our main point is that on the individual level there is always one dominant script, but
according to our multidimensional and gradual explanation of the emergence of teachers'
evaluations, the conditions under which these evaluations are shaped may vary. Hence,
according to the MFS, teachers' script selection can be understood as a belief-mediated
mechanism in order to explain diﬀerent determinants of teachers' evaluations.63
63In other contexts, one could object that the concept of habitus might also be understood as a desire-
mediated mechanism: e.g. in sense of the desire for certain aesthetic standards (but also see Stigler
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Results The question in the CHiSP data asking teachers to evaluate their students'
prospective academic aptitude was phrased open-ended. Thus, teachers could either
report a certain student to be able for academic studies, or to be not able from her
point of view. This also means that we are confronted with a third category of students
who were neither reported in one of the two other categories. Before the more com-
plex structural model was estimated, we had to clarify whether this 'neutral' category
could be regarded as an implicit 'middle' category  which was done via a conventional
multinomial regression comparing the eﬀect sizes of the predictors of interest for each
of the two possible pairs. Since results indicated that the parameter estimates for the
contrast able vs. not able are indeed remarkably larger than for the contrast able vs.
not mentioned, we ﬁnally computed an ordered outcome variable with three categories
(1 'not able'; 2 'not mentioned'; 3 'able').
In the structural model estimated based on a matrix of polychoric correlations (Ols-
son, 1979; Muthén, 1984; Aish and Jöreskog, 1990; Jöreskog, 1994) to account for the
categorical measurement level of both our predictor variables and the outcome, we ﬁnd
signiﬁcant eﬀects on teachers' evaluations for each of the predictors deduced from the
frame-selection model proposed above. However, eﬀects for the indicators that had
been linked to the idea of meritocracy (intelligence and average grade) are by far larger
than for students' social backgrounds  which indicates that teachers' evaluations are
largely accurate. Nonetheless, perfect accuracy would be realized only if the eﬀects of
students' social backgrounds were partialed out once analyses provide comprehensive
controls for students' ability and achievement. One could argue that this is not the
case in the model below, and that the teachers dispose of private information reﬂecting
actual achievement and/or ability diﬀerences that correlate with the social background
variables in our model. However, in survey data, comprehensive control for all possible
indicators of a concept is hardly possible, which is why the alternative interpretation
of remaining social background eﬀects even having controlled for measures of both stu-
dents' ability and achievement as a hint of residual inaccuracy of teachers' evaluations
cannot be rejected, too.
One interesting result of our structural model deserving attention is that cognizant of
all concerns for post-hoc model ﬁtting, we could improve our model by endorsing separate
regression paths for the analogy sub-score of intelligence64 on both average grade and
teachers' evaluations. This could either reﬂect a particular form of meritocracy-rc-mode
processing in a sense that teachers consider students' aptitude for drawing analogy-
and Becker, 1977), or even for the (absolute) value of education per se. Indeed, cultural capital
theory expects students' aspirations to vary among the social strata (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu and
Passeron, 1990; also see Dumais, 2006). This is another major diﬃculty of Bourdieu's theory as
the assumption of class-invariant 'absolute' or 'idealistic' aspirations (Keller and Zavalloni, 1964;
Boudon, 1974; but also see Stocké, 2011) would be violated. However, in our frame-theoretical
account presented above, we understand students' knowledge of the symbolic codes demanded in
the classroom as one anchor potentially shaping teachers' evaluations in terms of their beliefs about
their students  which is why both the assumption of invariant desires and the interpretation of the
impact of habitus as a belief-mediated mechanism can be defended.
64Intelligence was measured by an intelligence structure test (Amthauer, 1957) consisting of four dif-
ferent dimensions: i) analogy test, ii) word test, iii) number test, and iv) cube test.
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based inferences as particularly relevant to arrive at well-founded both current (average
grade) and prospective evaluations. However, as we argue in our conclusion, due to
measurement error, it could well be that distinct eﬀects of the verbal dimension of
intelligence on both teachers' evaluations and students' average grade  being itself an
aggregate of various teacher assessments  could imply a dimension of students' habitus
that is not reﬂected in one of the indicators used in our structural model. In the outlook
of this introduction (section 5), I again discuss the proposition made in the paper how
this ambiguity could be addressed empirically.
4.2 Reference-Group Eﬀects
The second paper is an example of applied reference-group research  but in contrast to
what is conveniently known under the label of Big Fish Little Pond Eﬀects (BFLPE ;
Marsh and Parker, 1984; Trautwein and Lüdtke, 2005; Dai and Rinn, 2008; Dijkstra
et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2008) or Reﬂected-Glory Eﬀects (RGE ; Cialdini et al., 1976;
Marsh, 1987), respectively, the study in the volume at hand does not aim to explain
students' self-concept as an outcome. Instead, the focus here is, as in the study pre-
viously described, on 10th class teachers' evaluations. In the theoretical section of the
paper, we deduce both class-average achievement and socioeconomic status as potential
contextual-level determinants of teachers' evaluations, and we hypothesize that their ef-
fects  whatever sign their coeﬃcient may obtain (which will be clariﬁed below)  could
vary by individual student achievement or teachers' grading concepts.
Since most of the research on reference-group eﬀects in general and on BFLPE and
RGE in particular has been invested by social psychologists, little eﬀort has been made
to link the respective theoretical assumptions to the underlying social mechanisms. How-
ever, classic multilevel theory provides a useful starting point for this endeavor.
In general, while multilevel techniques have made a lot of progress during the last
decades (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992; Goldstein, 1995; Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Gel-
man and Hill, 2007; Hox, 2010), I do not see that many of the critical theoretical remarks
that have been opposed towards contextual eﬀect research already beginning from the
1970s were addressed with similar eﬀort.
Beginning with Davis (1966), reference-group eﬀect research broadened the focus of
educational sociology and its explanations of students' educational outcomes. While a
brief summary of this and the following studies is given in section 2.1 of the paper, the
crucial point to be made here is that about at the same time, a critical discussion emerged
about how contextual-level eﬀects can be thought to operate in terms of underlying
mechanisms (Hauser, 1970a; Barton, 1970; Hauser, 1970b; Farkas, 1974; Hauser, 1974;
Blalock, 1984; Van den Eeden, 1992). Following what had been called ecological fallacy
(Robinson, 1950) regarding pure macro-level models, Hauser (1970a) introduced the
term contextual fallacy in order to address theoretical identiﬁcation problems in testing
macro-to-micro hypotheses:
The contextual fallacy occurs when residual diﬀerences among a set of so-
cial groups, which remain after the eﬀects of one or more individual attributes
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have been partialed out, are interpreted in terms of social or psychological
mechanisms correlated with group levels of one of the individual attributes
(Hauser, 1970a, p. 659).
Precisely, aforehand to carrying out applied contextual-level analyses, it is of utmost
importance (and probably even more important than in 'straightforward' individual-level
models) that [t]he exact meaning of 'group eﬀect' needs speciﬁcation in each research
situation (Hauser, 1970a, p. 661). Otherwise, the researcher can never rule out that
individual (e.g. student-level) composition eﬀects could be responsible for the suspected
contextual-level eﬀect. Therefore, after it has been ensured that a complete and correct
individual-level model that is satisfying in both theoretical and empirical terms has been
formulated, speciﬁcation of convincing macro-to-micro mechanisms is inevitable:
Indeed, the greatest weakness of contextual analysis is the vagueness with
which its causal mechanisms are usually speciﬁed. This vagueness seems to
be the reason that many of its proponents slip into the contextual fallacy
(Farkas, 1974, p. 357).
Since the interpretation of contextual-level eﬀects stands at risk of invalid social psy-
chological assumptions for the former may represent a variety of mechanisms (Hauser,
1974; Blalock, 1984), major concern of contextual eﬀect research in educational set-
tings should be to isolate eﬀects of, say, an intellectual climate in the classroom that
is not mediated by or represents something more than interpersonal processes among
students (Rigsby and McDill, 1972, p. 315), and that is susceptible to unambiguous
and distinctively sociological interpretation (Hauser, 1974, p. 369).
Apart from what is usually denoted as 'main eﬀects' (although this term is somehow
misleading; see Friedrich, 1982; Brambor et al., 2006), special concern should also be
devoted to cross-level interaction eﬀects since already Kendall (1951, 189) noted that
[s]igniﬁcant interactions do not necessarily imply interaction in any real sense. They
may arise from heterogeneity in the data. Therefore, it is even more important to control
for individual-level heterogeneity as much as possible before interpreting interaction
eﬀects.
Regarding reference-group eﬀect research analyzing the impact of class-level achieve-
ment on students' self-concept, it has already been noted by Blalock (1984) that (neg-
ative) frog-pond eﬀects (i.e. the BFLPE ) and positive normative or climate eﬀects (i.e.
the RGE ) may be additive, and in that case, they could not be separated. However,
building on the preceding considerations, given a more elaborate understanding (in terms
of social mechanisms) of the comparison processes involved, and given an adequate op-
erationalization of indicators on both levels, it should be possible to approximate the
social situation in the classroom.
A useful starting point for a mechanism-based explanation of contextual eﬀects could
again be the DBO model by Hedström (2005).65 In that framework, it should conse-
quently be the opportunity structure that forms the crucial link between social context
65For sure, other theoretical approaches to social mechanisms would be equally suitable to explicitly
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in the classroom and social action on the individual level. Concretely, interaction should
be understood as a form of social contact with a 'generalized other' (cf. Hedström, 2005,
p. 44) that may inﬂuence ego's action as could every single-person alter.
The original BFLP hypothesis postulates that independently of a student's individual
ability, she will dispose of a worse academic self-concept when she ﬁnds herself in a high-
ability class compared to being surrounded by classmates with lower ability on average.
While the explanation suggested for this phenomenon  which yielded a great deal of
supporting studies (Marsh and Parker, 1984; Marsh, 1987; McFarland and Buehler, 1995;
Zeidner and Schleyer, 1998; Lüdtke et al., 2005; Rindermann and Heller, 2005; Trautwein
et al., 2006; Seaton et al., 2010; Thijs et al., 2010)  usually refers to contrast eﬀects
resulting from upward comparisons (Collins, 1996), the implied social mechanism is one
of relative deprivation (Davis, 1966): In DBO terminology, the opportunity structure
in the classroom in terms of average ability alters students' beliefs in terms of their
academic self-concept. Importantly, we should not assume this to be the result of social
telepathy, but of an endogenous feedback structure among students (Erbring and Young,
1979).
On the other hand, some studies found empirical support for a RGE that is deﬁned
as a positive impact of school- or class-level achievement on students' academic self-
concept. While in the name-giving study by Cialdini et al. (1976), the study focus
lay on players' identiﬁcation with more successful football teams, simply denoting the
empirical observation found in educational settings by the term 'assimilation' eﬀect may
be criticized to be a theoretical underspeciﬁcation  particularly since school status was
also found to exert positive eﬀects on students' aspirations.
The latter eﬀect may be reconstructed as a mechanism of rational imitation (Hed-
ström, 2005, p. 49): In high status and/or ability environments, it is reasonable for a
student to upward-adjust both aspirations and educational eﬀort since otherwise, eﬀects
of deprivation would be even more disappointing.66 A positive eﬀect of school status
or school achievement on students' academic self-concept could then be the result of
realistic assessments regarding the increase in eﬀort exerted (even apart from student
GPA, as this variable is occasionally controlled for).
Although Marsh et al. (2000) were able to empirically juxtapose a positive eﬀect of
school status and a negative eﬀect of class-level achievement on student academic self-
concept, respectively, the theoretical question why both eﬀects should be expected (and
can be observed) to operate simultaneously still remains unresolved in BFLPE research.
Clariﬁcation in that respect is provided in terms of the analytical distinction proposed by
Manski (1993, p. 31; orig. emph.) who separates four diﬀerent types of contextual-level
eﬀects (in a broader sense) from each other:
incorporate contextual eﬀects. Particularly, Mario Bunge's integration of social mechanisms into his
more abstract theory of systemism aims to bridge the gap between pure macro-level (i.e. holistic)
and pure micro-level (i.e. individualistic) explanations (Bunge, 1997, 2004). However, since the DBO
model is more close  though not necessarily glued  to rational-choice or subjective-expected-utility
related action theories, it is the preferred conceptual framework also for the second paper.
66This mechanism corresponds to one possible explanation for the self-fulﬁlling prophecy to come true
(Biggs, 2009, p. 309).
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Endogenous eﬀects, wherein the propensity of an individual to behave in some
way varies with the prevalence of that behavior in some reference group.
Contextual eﬀects, wherein the propensity of an individual to behave in some
way varies with the distribution of background characteristics in the reference
group.
Ecological eﬀects, wherein individuals in the same reference group tend to behave
similarly because they face similar institutional environments.
Correlated individual eﬀects, wherein individuals in the same reference group
tend to behave similarly because they have similar individual characteristics.
While the term endogenous eﬀects is used to refer to endogenous feedback eﬀects in
the sense of Erbring and Young (1979), contextual and ecological eﬀects are exogenous
in terms of a distinct impact on individual behavior apart from individual-level char-
acteristics or interaction. The four diﬀerent types can be illustrated by the example of
school achievement eﬀects (Manski, 1993, p. 31f.; emph. added):
There is an endogenous eﬀect if, all else being equal, individual achievement
tends to vary with the average achievement of the students in the youth's high
school or ethnic group, or in another reference group. There is a contextual eﬀect
if achievement tends to vary with, say, the socioeconomic composition of the ref-
erence group. There is an ecological eﬀect if students in the same school tend to
achieve similarly because they are taught by the same teachers. There are corre-
lated individual eﬀects if students in the same school tend to have similar family
backgrounds and these background characteristics tend to aﬀect achievement.
Now it becomes understandable why the empirically observable negative BFLPE is
one net of the RGE, and how it is analytically possible that both eﬀects may operate
simultaneously: The negative BFLPE is an endogenous feedback eﬀect as a result of
between-student interaction  inducing the belief-mediated mechanism of relative de-
privation. The positive RGE, contrarily, is an exogenous contextual eﬀect in terms of
a school's student composition  inducing the belief-mediated mechanism of rational
imitation.
But how can these considerations be related to teachers' evaluations? To be sure,
naïvely transferring exactly the same mechanisms on a diﬀerent outcome, even if the
contextual-level variables are the same, would lead us astray. Instead, in case of (sim-
ple) reference-group (main) eﬀects, we hypothesize an opportunity-mediated mechanism
since it is the social situation in the classroom that is supposed to mediate teachers'
evaluation practices.
Similarly to conventional BFLPE and RGE research, in the paper we use evidence
from preceding analyses to deduce 'main eﬀect' hypotheses opposing to each other: A
negative eﬀect of class-level achievement on a teacher's evaluation net of all individual-
level covariates could be expected if she simply adjusts her reference standards according
to the achievement level she observes in the classroom. In that case, teachers' beliefs and
desires would remain constant while a 'pure' opportunity-mediated mechanism directly
alters teachers' action in terms of assigning a speciﬁc evaluation to a student.
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Contrarily, we also ﬁnd arguments supporting a positive relationship between class-
level achievement and teachers' evaluations: First, teachers' might adjust their evalua-
tions according to a mechanism of regression to the mean (Galton, 1886; also see Healy
and Goldstein, 1978)  which would also be a pure opportunity-based mechanism.67
Furthermore, this eﬀect might be ampliﬁed by a concatenation of an opportunity- and a
belief-mediated mechanism: For instance, the belief-mediated mechanism of dissonance
reduction could come into play in that teachers follow an implicit decision rule of the
type, a member of that bright class can't be that dull (and reversely). This is what
is conveniently denoted as a Halo eﬀect (Thorndike, 1920).68 Similarly, a comparable
belief-mediated mechanism can be expected to hold for the implied eﬀect of class-level
socioeconomic status on teachers' evaluations in that teachers suspect parents in high-
SES classes to be equipped with comparably higher educational aspirations which they
also project onto students with comparably lower social backgrounds.
Having outlined the social mechanisms of our 'main eﬀect' hypotheses, the former,
however, are silent about teachers' action scripts as they have been described in the
preceding section.
While one can assume that simple reference-group eﬀects do not aﬀect the operating
mode of teachers' action scripts, this is not the case in the event of interaction eﬀects.
Given that student-level heterogeneity has been suﬃciently controlled for (cf. Kendall,
1951), we hypothesize a negative interaction eﬀect between class-level achievement and
student achievement both as predictors of teachers' evaluations.
As commonly known, an interaction eﬀect of the type y = β0+β1x1+β2x2+β3x1 ∗x2
can be interpreted in two substantial ways: as an eﬀect of x1 on y varying with levels
of x2, or as an eﬀect of x2 on y varying with levels of x1 (Friedrich, 1982; Brambor
et al., 2006). For the interaction eﬀect speciﬁed above, on the one hand, it is possible to
assume the contextual-level eﬀect of class-level achievement on teachers' evaluations to
vary with levels of student ability  but on the other hand, it would be equally imaginable
to hypothesize the eﬀect of student-level achievement on teachers' evaluations to vary
with levels of class-level achievement.
Providing a mechanism-based explanation for both readings, concerning the former,
the 'pure' opportunity-mediated mechanisms of reference-standard adjustment (in case
of a negative contextual-level eﬀect) or regression to the mean (in case of a positive
67I should loose some more words on this. While Galton (1886) by origin referred to changes in a
particular measurement from one generation to the next (such as body size), the psychological
literature is usually talking about the fact that an observation with an extreme value in the ﬁrst
measurement can be expected to show a less extreme value in the second measurement (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1974; Healy and Goldstein, 1978). Here, however, the idea is that teachers adjust
their reference standards according to an observable mean (i.e. class-average achievement).
68Whereas the mechanism of dissonance reduction is usually applied to in-group member selection (e.g.
Rigsby and McDill, 1972), its application onto the Halo eﬀect is straightforward: One standard
interpretation of the latter is the one of a discrepancy between a rater's observed and the true
correlation of two characteristics (Murphy et al., 1993), in our case between classroom achievement
 or social status  and a student's achievement nested in the respective classroom. This (positive)
diﬀerence is due to a mechanism of dissonance reduction in order to minimize cognitive transaction
costs in terms of unbalanced cognitive structures (Heider, 1946; Festinger, 1957).
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contextual-level eﬀect; see Galton, 1886; Healy and Goldstein, 1978) taken alone could
be responsible for lower-achievement students to be more aﬀected by the respective
eﬀect since in both cases, the high-achievers would serve as the foil all lower groups are
compared to.69
Regarding the latter, a mechanism-based reconstruction can easily be incorporated
in the frame-selection approach as outlined in the preceding subsection: If an attribute
is all too common, it might forfeit its nimbus of distinctiveness. Hence, teachers in
high-achievement environments could tend to leave their meritocracy script routine (in
whatever mode operating) and switch to alternative (e.g. status-based) criteria in order
to arrive at an evaluation. Hence, the opportunity-mediated mechanism of a reference-
group eﬀect would itself mediate the belief-mediated mechanism of script selection at
the teacher level.
Finally, we hypothesize that the relationship between class-level achievement and
teachers' evaluations varies by teachers' reported grade concepts. Concretely, we have
in mind that teachers who report to follow more individualist grading concepts might
be less aﬀectable for reference standard adjustments due to contextual-level eﬀects in
terms of class-level achievement than teachers who report more relational grading con-
cepts. In terms of social mechanisms, an opportunity-based mechanism would in turn
be mediated by teachers' beliefs.
Results By means of a series of cross-classiﬁed multilevel models wherein the outcome
of teachers' evaluations70 is nested in both student and teacher contexts with school
classes as the highest unit of analysis, we found that in contrast to both conventional
BFLPE research and reference-group studies with German primary school teachers'
transition recommendations as an outcome, teachers' evaluations are positively aﬀected
by both class-mean intelligence and class-mean grade point average (GPA). This is inter-
preted in sense of a Halo eﬀect (Thorndike, 1920)  which I have just reconstructed as a
concatenation of an opportunity- and a belief-mediated mechanism. To be sure, the al-
ternative interpretation of a regression to the mean (Galton, 1886; Healy and Goldstein,
1978)  a pure opportunity-based mechanism  cannot be rejected either. The particu-
lar social composition of our sample (Gymnasium, i.e. German highest-track secondary
school students only), the lower extent of obligation associated with non-binding, anony-
mous assessments, and their comparably later point in time of measurement may explain
why our results also diﬀer from reference-group eﬀect studies based on primary school
teachers' recommendations. Still, model ﬁt criteria (in terms of pseudo R-squared) re-
veal that individual-level achievement is a much more important predictor of teachers'
evaluations than respective contextual-level indicators.
69It has been observed that halo eﬀects seem to be stronger for ratees less familiar to the rater (Kozlowski
and Kirsch, 1987). Low-achievement students might be less noticeable in the classroom due to their
lesser class contribution.
70Here we only analyzed whether a teacher assessed her student to be 'able' vs. to be 'not able'. For a
multilevel analysis of the contrast 'able' vs. 'not mentioned' based on the same data see Becker and
Birkelbach (2010).
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While a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between class-average and student-level intel-
ligence could not be detected, it was noted that the eﬀect of class-average GPA on
teachers' evaluations signiﬁcantly increases with better student marks. This contradicts
our hypothesis which expected this eﬀect to be negative. Also, comparing the marginal
eﬀects of both readings of this interaction term suggests that the eﬀect of class-level GPA
on teachers' evaluations does vary more strongly with student-level GPA than does the
eﬀect of student-level GPA with class-level GPA. Hence, results suggest that the sig-
niﬁcant interaction term is indeed due to an opportunity-mediated mechanism that is
itself mediated by a belief-mediated mechanism on the teacher level rather than due to
a belief-mediated mechanism of script selection mediated by the opportunity-mediated
mechanism of a reference-group eﬀect.
What we did not ﬁnd is statistically solid evidence of class-average achievement eﬀects
to vary by teachers' grading concepts. Although simple graphical insight in the respective
marginal eﬀects tends in the direction of weaker contextual-level eﬀects for teachers
with more individualist grading concepts, and stronger eﬀects for teachers with more
relational grading concepts  which would challenge both our theoretical explanation
given in terms of a concatenation of an opportunity- and a belief-mediated mechanism
as well as assumptions in already existing studies (Rheinberg, 1980; McFarland and
Buehler, 1995; Marsh et al., 2001; Lüdtke et al., 2005; Seaton et al., 2009)  we caution
against overhasty accepting this result since conventional statistical signiﬁcance levels
were not reached.
4.3 A Formal Model of Self-Fulﬁlling Teacher Expectancy Eﬀects
The idea of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy can be said to be one of the most prominent examples
of a social mechanism. The original idea is ascribed to Robert Merton (1948)71 who
illustrates how a potentially mislead rumor of a bank's illiquidity might nonetheless
cause the bank's bankruptcy: Alienated by the rumor, the ﬁrst customers will withdraw
their savings  which will in a second step move other costumers to follow suit. In the
end, panicky withdrawals might in fact lead to the bank's breakdown  although the
initial rumor did not necessarily correspond to the bank's initial ﬁnancial situation.
This seminal description of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy was convincingly reconstructed
by Hedström (2005, p. 48) as a belief-mediated mechanism: The beliefs of the ﬁrst
depositors who withdraw their savings aﬀect the beliefs of the remainders who now have
good reasons to assume that there might actually be something wrong with the bank
and thus also withdraw their savings. Or phrased more analytically (Biggs, 2009, p.
71Actually, before also Popper (1944a, p. 89) referred to [t]he idea that predictions may inﬂuence
predicted events. In the monograph The Poverty of Historicism, he labeled this idea Oedipus
eﬀect (Popper, 1957, p. 11). However, Popper might have got familiar with the idea by Merton's
(1936) paper wherein he just brieﬂy sketched the idea of how a prediction might change a course of
development by altering an actor's social situation (also see Birkelbach, 2011, p. 134). Even earlier,
Thomas and Thomas (1928, p. 572) accurately verbalized, If men deﬁne situations as real, they are
real in their consequences  a statement well-known as the Thomas Theorem which Merton (1948,
p. 193) also discusses at the beginning of his more famous paper.
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295):
(1) X beliefs that 'Y is p'.
(2) X therefore does b.
(3) Because of (2), Y becomes p.
The above self-fulﬁlling prophecy should be distinguished from the inductively-derived
prophecy which can be reconstructed as follows (Biggs, 2009, p. 296):
(0) Y is p.
(1) Because of (0), X beliefs that 'Y is p'.
(2) X therefore does b.
(3) Because of (0), Y manifests p.
In the ﬁrst case, it is an actor's inaccurate belief about the social situation that makes
the diﬀerence, while in the second case, it is the social situation that causes an accurate
belief  which can be illustrated by imposing counterfactuals on the respective ﬁrst
condition: If in the ﬁrst case, X were to belief that 'Y is q ', X would do c instead of
b and thereby cause Y to be p  while in the second case, if Y really were p, X falsely
believing Y to be q would not make a diﬀerence (Biggs, 2009, p. 296).72
In educational sciences, the notion of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy is conveniently used
to refer to what has been labeled the Pygmalion eﬀect. In 1968, Rosenthal and Ja-
cobson (1968) published an inﬂuential study named Pygmalion in the Classroom. In a
quasi-experimental design, the authors ﬁrst administered a non-verbal intelligence test
to elementary school children. Towards the teachers, the authors pretended that their
study was aimed at the identiﬁcation of so-called late bloomers  students who can
be expected to show a sudden intellectual spurt in course of the upcoming term. How-
ever, when communicating students' test results to the teachers, the authors named a
randomly-chosen set of students to be the late bloomers  which had nothing to do
with their actual test results. In a follow-up achievement test one year after, though,
the artiﬁcially-created group of late bloomers scored signiﬁcantly higher than the con-
trol group. Hence, the authors concluded that just as the Cypriot sculptor Pygmalion in
Ovid's Metamorphoses created a statue so beautiful that he fell in love with it, and due
to his caress, invoked it to life, a particular teacher treatment eﬀect invoked by a plus of
(false) information may yield actual changes in student behavior and related outcomes.
72The self-fulﬁlling prophecy should also be distinguished from the Matthew-Eﬀect of cumulative ad-
vantage that operates via an opportunity-mediated mechanism (DiPrete and Eirich, 2006; also see
Birkelbach, 2011, p. 137).
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Theoretical identiﬁcation of SFP's While the initial Pygmalion in the Classroom was
set up in a quasi-experimental design, most of what followed in teacher expectancy eﬀects
research relied on survey data (see overviews by Jussim, 1986; Jussim et al., 1996; Jussim
and Harber, 2005). Regarding isolation of a causal eﬀect, survey data are always inferior
to a true experimental design (Biggs, 2009)  though econometricians have developed
sophisticated methods to get rid of a great deal of heterogeneity in the data that would
not be equally problematic in an experimental setting (Gangl, 2010, also see below).
What survey research can do, though, is to approximate the social mechanisms that
stand behind the causal eﬀect  leading to a better understanding of the phenomenon
to be isolated by means of methods. In other words, a crucial prerequisite of empirical
identiﬁcation of a teacher treatment eﬀect is a thoroughly-speciﬁed theoretical model
with preferably ﬁne-grained bridge assumptions.
To be precise, survey data research faces both the burden and the beneﬁt of a par-
ticular speciﬁcation problem  which in the case of self-fulﬁlling prophecies translates
into the following questions: 1) To what extent are teachers' initial beliefs about their
students accurate; 2) how are initial teacher perceptions aﬀected by subsequent stu-
dent behavior; and 3) in what manner do inaccurate teacher perceptions aﬀect students'
educational outcomes? The beneﬁcial part of that requirement lies in the chance to
get closer to the social mechanisms that operate beneath the surface of a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy. So let's now treat all three questions systematically.
To what extent are teachers' initial beliefs about their students accurate? A major
objection against self-fulﬁlling prophecy research from the very beginning is the argu-
ment that teacher expectancy eﬀects on student achievement reﬂect accurate beliefs of
teachers that correspond to unobserved student characteristics. Jussim (1986) distin-
guishes between a strong and a weak form of the accuracy argument. The strong form
of the argument claims that teachers' expectations based on stereotyping will always be
inaccurate, but teachers' expectations based on direct observation of their students will
always and necessarily be accurate. In its weak form, the argument does not make the
claim of absoluteness but only postulates that direct observation of student behavior
will be more accurate than expectancy formation based on stereotyping.
Following Jussim (1986, p. 431), it is hard to test the accuracy of teachers' expecta-
tions just because they may invoke self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects. However, as Jussim
et al. (1996, p. 288) summarize the existing research up to that point, a large degree of
teacher expectancy eﬀects can be attributed to the fact that they are accurate  a conclu-
sion that is maintained in a more recent review by Jussim and Harber (2005).73 However,
a current study by Ready and Wright (2011) could show that holding between-group
achievement diﬀerences constant, teachers are especially error-prone in lower socioeco-
nomic and lower achievement classroom contexts. Regarding teachers' expectations as
measured by teachers' evaluations in the data at hand, the ﬁrst two papers in this vol-
ume demonstrate their vulnerability from both social background and reference-group
eﬀects apart from students' intelligence and grade point average  which might be a hint
of inaccuracy to some extent.
73Prediction without causation is exactly how we deﬁne accuracy (Jussim and Harber, 2005, p. 141).
56
I. Causes and Eﬀects of Teachers' Evaluations: A Theoretical Primer
How are initial teacher perceptions aﬀected by subsequent student behavior? Jussim
(1986) summarizes evidence that teachers may maintain their expectations even though
they are biased and teachers are confronted with contradicting information. In contrast
to teachers with more ﬂexible expectations, it's the teachers with rigid expectations
that are suspected to generate self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects since the former can be
expected to change their opinion when confronted with disconﬁrming evidence. A social
mechanism that may explain rigid expectations is the belief-mediated mechanism of
dissonance theory (Jussim, 1986, p. 430): When expectancy-consistent information is
more likely to be remembered, evidence about a good performance of a presumably
bad student has less chance to change teachers' beliefs than a good performance of a
presumably good student to maintain teachers' beliefs. Moreover, teachers may perceive
students' behavior as consistent with their expectations because of perceptual biases
(Jussim et al., 1996, p. 286).74
In what manner do inaccurate teacher perceptions aﬀect students' educational out-
comes? Unsurprisingly, the answer to that question is closely related to the argument of
accuracy. Only if inaccurate teacher expectations can be identiﬁed, it can be ruled out
that teacher perceptions are valid predictions of unobserved characteristics that actually
cause student achievement.
But even if inaccurate teacher expectations can be identiﬁed empirically (see below),
it has still to be clariﬁed how diﬀerent teacher expectations cause diﬀerent student out-
comes. As Jussim (1986, p. 435) notes, teacher treatment eﬀects are supposed to occur
when teachers provide more emotional support, clearer and more favorable feedback to
high expectancy students, pay more attention, and teach more (and also more diﬃcult)
material to the highs.75 While most (if not all) self-fulﬁlling prophecy studies tested for
teacher expectancy eﬀects of subsequent student achievement, in the paper, I develop a
theoretical model to explain how teachers' expectations may aﬀect students' educational
transitions. It is beyond the scope of this introduction to replicate the mathematics
again, but the model's crucial idea should be elaborated on notwithstanding: As de-
scribed above, the model of relative risk aversion by Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) and
a conceptual similar model by Esser (1999) explain students' educational transitions by
a multiple parameter model covering both subjective costs as well as expected beneﬁts
of education. In both models  as well as in a theoretical predecessor proposed by Erik-
son and Jonsson (1996a) , the subjective expected probability of educational success
is a crucial parameter and is assumed to vary with preceding educational performance
74While a self-fulﬁlling prophecy is deﬁned as the eﬀect of a teacher's inaccurate expectation on student
achievement, and rigid teacher expectations may emerge because dissonant information is ignored,
I wish to argue here that perceptual biases can also be reconstructed by a mechanism of dissonance
reduction: In a trivariate relation between ego (a teacher), alter (a student), and a state-of-aﬀairs
(e.g. school performance), it would be rational for ego to form beliefs of alter 's behavior consistent
with ego's preceding beliefs in order to avoid cognitive dissonance  regardless of whether the beliefs
actual correspond to alter 's behavior. For teachers, it might be eﬃcient to ignore 'dissonant' student
behavior due to a strategy of satisﬁcing (Simon, 1957).
75Following (Biggs, 2009, p. 308f.), teachers providing more emotional support would aﬀect students'
beliefs, while teachers providing more challenging material to higher-achievers would alter their
opportunity structure.
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(Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997, 285; Esser, 1999, p. 272).
Recalling what has been said about the impact of a teacher treatment eﬀect, the
eﬃcacy of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy can be modeled in terms of a student's subjective
expected probability of educational success which is a function of preceding expected
educational success, actual performance, and a teacher treatment component consisting
of factors such as classroom praise, bilateral encouragement, etc. Moreover, I follow the
literature by assuming that inaccurate teacher expectations can be deﬁned as teachers'
over- and underestimations of their students compared to a set of student background
variables (also see below).
If all other model parameters are restricted to be constant, an overestimated student
would expect a higher utility from continuing on a higher educational track than an
underestimated student due to her higher subjective expected probability of educational
success. This can be attributed to actual achievement diﬀerences on the one hand, and
residual diﬀerences in motivation and self-concept (cf. Jussim, 1989; Gill and Reynolds,
1999; Muller et al., 1999; Mechtenberg, 2009; Mistry et al., 2009) on the other hand.
By relating the eﬀect of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy to diﬀerences in the subjective ex-
pected probabilities of educational success of over- and underestimated students, re-
spectively, the underlying teacher treatment eﬀect is reconstructed as a concatenation of
belief-mediated mechanisms : As outlined above, teachers ﬁrst form initial beliefs about
a student's academic performance, and although these beliefs are largely accurate, a
residual share of inaccuracy was shown to remain (Ready and Wright, 2011). By a
mechanism of dissonance reduction, teachers might ignore positive information about
negative students (and reversely) and thereby form rigid expectations that are prone to
induce a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. Thus, the latter can be deﬁned as the impact of inac-
curate teachers' expectations on students' beliefs in terms of their subjective expected
probability of educational success  caused by both achievement diﬀerences and direct
eﬀects of teacher treatment on students' motivation and self-concept  inducing diﬀer-
ences in the utility that is attached to a higher educational outcome between over- and
underestimated students.76 Hence, by linking a convenient SEU explanation of social
inequality in educational opportunities (Esser, 1999) to self-fulﬁlling prophecy research
dealing with inaccurate teacher beliefs, we now see the importance of Boudon's demand
for an action theory that has to deal with evidently false beliefs (Boudon, 1996, 1998,
2003).
Empirical identiﬁcation of SFP's As just described, it is crucial to arrive at an
empirical identiﬁcation of inaccurate teachers' expectations since otherwise, it cannot
be ruled out that teachers predict rather than cause subsequent student achievement.
In contemporary self-fulﬁlling prophecy research, this is accomplished by regressing the
76While all cost-beneﬁt models of educational transitions assume that desires (i.e. the absolute value
of education) are constant between the social strata, it might well be possible that additional
opportunity-mediated mechanisms  e.g. of classroom context  aﬀect the utilities attached to
educational transitions in general and the eﬀect of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy as described above in
particular (Blalock and Wilken, 1979). Though certainly promising, this is beyond the scope of both
the underlying paper and this section.
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available measure of teachers' expectations on a set of student background variables and
by then storing the residuals of that regression as teachers' over- and underestimations
compared to the respective background characteristics. As predictors, both student
achievement and motivation are usually considered to isolate a residual component in a
teacher's expectation that might reﬂect inaccuracy (Madon et al., 1997, 2006).
Unfortunately, with the CHiSP data, I am not able to operationalize indicators for all
parameters in the theoretical model at each point in time. The data entails measures for
student cost-beneﬁt assessments and teachers' expectations measured at the same time
 which might be problematic for the empirical identiﬁcation of self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
However, I assume that by regressing teachers' evaluations  the measure of teachers'
expectations in the CHiSP data  on suitable indicators of students' performance and
motivation, respectively, and by isolating the residual terms resulting from these regres-
sions, diﬀerences in students' subjective expected success estimates that are not reﬂected
in actual performance or motivation diﬀerences can at least be approximated. Once a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the residual terms on students' educational transitions is found  as
it holds for students' probability of passing German Abitur  following good falsiﬁca-
tionist practices (Popper, 1959), it is up to future studies to reject the assumption that
this eﬀect is not due to a belief-mediated mechanism of a teacher treatment eﬀect.
The statistical approaches in the paper are aimed at providing conservative (i.e. lower-
bound) estimates of self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects (also see Biggs, 2009, p. 300) by also
trying to control for unobserved heterogeneity. To be precise, it might still be the case
that teachers dispose of something like private information (Cunha et al., 2005; Cunha
and Heckman, 2007) that is not reﬂected in measures of either student motivation or
performance, but aﬀects their transition propensities (either directly, or indirectly via
cost-beneﬁt considerations77). This is, admittedly, an identiﬁcation problem of social
mechanisms based on survey data: Under non-experimental conditions we can see only
what that mechanism in conjunction with other factors makes it do (Collier, 1994, p.
33). To avoid potential biases as accurately as possible, I apply two diﬀerent methods
of controlling for potential unobserved but confounding variables  a so-called Heckman
model (Heckman, 1979) on the one hand, and a sensitivity analysis (Buis, 2007, 2010,
2011) on the other hand. Both approaches suggest that at least teacher treatment eﬀects
on students' probability of passing Abitur are not aﬀected by unobserved heterogeneity
(see below).
Results Analyses in this and the following paper diﬀer from the two preceding ones in
that teachers' evaluations are used to construct predictors rather than the outcome. In
order to arrive at a satisfactory empirical identiﬁcation of self-fulﬁlling prophecies, teach-
ers' evaluations are regressed on measures of both student performance and motivation.
77If students from diﬀerent social strata would have diﬀerent desires with regard to the absolute value
of education per se  which would contradict theoretical approaches in the tradition of Keller and
Zavalloni (1964) as well as Boudon (1974) , and if diﬀerences in these desires would have an impact
on students' transition decisions, and if teachers could observe these diﬀerences and would ground
their expectations upon them, this private information needs not necessarily be reﬂected in students'
cost-beneﬁt considerations.
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Regarding performance, regressors concerned student intelligence as measured by the in-
telligence structure test (Amthauer, 1957) and student grade point average (GPA). As re-
gards motivation, indicators of student homework eﬀort, their self-assessment of relative
school performance compared to classmates, and general self-conﬁdence are considered.
Results of these analyses show that indicators of performance are much more important
predictors of teachers' evaluations than indicators of student motivation (whereupon the
eﬀect of student self-assessment of relative school performance is highest).
Separate residual terms for each of the performance model, the motivation model, and
a full model comprising predictors of both concepts are stored in the data and used to
predict i) students' probability to pass Abitur (i.e. German highest secondary-school
track exam) on the ﬁrst try, and ii) students' propensity to start academic studies
within two years after high school graduation.78 All models control for indicators of
all subjective-expected-utility (SEU) concepts conventionally used to predict students'
educational transitions. These comprise controls for the expected educational beneﬁt,
the subjective expected probability of educational success79, the expected status decline,
its expected inﬂuence on actual transition decisions as well as the expected costs of
education. Additionally, the models account for potential heterogeneity bias that may
arise due to unobserved variance of both the SEU indicators80 and the residual terms
used to approximate teacher treatment eﬀects in terms of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy, as
well as for selection bias following from the fact that we can only estimate university
entrance transition probabilities for those students who successfully graduated from high
school. This is accomplished by means of a so-called Heckman correction (Heckman,
1979) that has already been applied on educational transition models (Becker, 2000,
2003). Following this approach (and extending it to account for potential heterogeneity
bias also among the indicators used to identify self-fulﬁlling prophecies), all cost-beneﬁt
indicators as well as the residuals obtained to identify diﬀerences in subjective expected
probability estimates net of actual motivation and performance are regressed on parental
social class. When the results of the respective probit regressions are stored as Inverse
Mill's Ratios and then entered as control terms in the equation of primary interest (i.e.
predicting students' transition probabilities), it is possible to control for class-related
diﬀerences that might enter the educational utility function (for a description of the
particular mathematics of this approach see e.g. Heckman, 1979; Winship and Mare,
78See sections 3.1 and 4.1 of the respective papers for more details on the cut-oﬀs used for the dependent
variables.
79Note that due to data constraints, I do not dispose of an appropriate measure of students' subjective
expected probability of educational success  which would certainly be a better measure in this
stage of students' educational life course (also see the paragraph on the waning coeﬃcients pattern
in section 2.2 of paper 4)  than parental assessments. However, the respective bridge assumption
in this context is that parents have good knowledge of their children's probability estimates and
that the extent of these approximations does not vary between the social strata. Also note that this
measure is analytically distinct from the concept used for theoretical identiﬁcation of self-fulﬁlling
prophecies as outlined above.
80One could argue that the identiﬁcation assumption that the degree of accuracy regarding parental
assessments of their children's subjective expected probability of educational success must not vary
by parental social class is relaxed in models with heterogeneity bias correction.
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1992; Breen, 1996; Briggs, 2004). As an alternative, I also apply a procedure to control
for unobserved heterogeneity which was proposed by Buis (2007, 2010, 2011): A random
variable with zero mean and both varying standard deviation and varying correlation
with the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals is used to approximate a potential mediator of
these residuals that might not be associated with parental social class. The advantage
of that latter method is that is does not rely on the identifying assumption that parental
social class as the crucial predictor in the selection equation is not associated with the
dependent variables in the outcome equations  which might be an objection against the
models applying the Heckman correction method.81
In particular, I found that self-fulﬁlling prophecies in terms of a teacher treatment
eﬀect  that was identiﬁed by residualized teachers' expectations  have a distinct eﬀect
for all three variants of the estimated residual terms (performance model, motivation
model, and a full model consisting of indicators for both of these concepts) on both
students' probability of passing Abitur as well as on their propensity to start academic
studies apart from all indicators for the SEU predictors conventionally used in educa-
tional transition research.
Regarding corrections for selection bias, results remains stable in case of high school
graduation (Abitur)  but not in case of students' propensities to start academic studies.
The ﬁrst result indicates that the belief-mediated mechanism of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy
in terms of a teacher treatment eﬀect is not aﬀected by heterogeneity in beliefs that
could be accounted for in terms of social class. The second result is an illustration of
path dependency eﬀects of self-fulﬁlling prophecies, but it also indicates that there is
no distinct belief-mediated mechanism operating that aﬀects university transitions once
homogeneity in beliefs conditional on having successfully graduated from high school
has been taken into account.82
Regarding sensitivity analyses, private information of the teachers that might be asso-
ciated with either student beliefs of educational success or their educational transitions
which can not be accounted for by means of parental social class should only be an issue
distorting the robustness of the results if an appropriate indicator would correlate un-
reasonably high with both the residual terms that were used for empirical identiﬁcation
of self-fulﬁlling prophecies as well as with students' educational transitions.
Hence, I conclude that the belief-mediated teacher treatment eﬀect in terms of a
self-fulﬁlling prophecy predicts students' high school graduations robustly regarding i)
heterogeneity of student beliefs according to social class, and ii) reasonable degrees of
teachers' private information. Contrarily, once homogeneity of student beliefs in terms of
81Note that Birkelbach (2011) also tests for self-fulﬁlling prophecies in terms of a belief-mediated mech-
anism based on CHiSP data. However, although referring to the SEU explanation of educational
decisions (Esser, 1999), he does not provide a formal model in SEU terminology. Furthermore,
(in my view) less precise indicators of self-fulﬁlling prophecies without controls for endogeneity or
selection bias are used  which is why I still consider my contribution to be of distinct scientiﬁc
relevance.
82Given the stability of the indicator used to operationalize students' subjective expected probability
of educational success, one could argue that relaxing the assumption that the proximity of this
(parental) measure to students' own beliefs must not vary by social class is permissible from an
empirical point of view.
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a selection bias  arising conditional on having successfully graduated from high school
 has been controlled for, we do not ﬁnd anything more than path dependency eﬀects.
4.4 Changes of Self-Fulﬁlling Teacher Expectancy Eﬀects Over
Time
The fourth paper asks, Does the eﬀect of teachers' expectations on students' educational
opportunities decrease over educational transitions? A statistical matching approach.
Conceptually, I use the same framework for identiﬁcation of a teacher treatment eﬀect
in terms of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy as in the third paper. However, in addition to the
latter article, I also test for potential changes of this eﬀect over students' educational
life course.
Evidence from educational transition research Starting with conventional IEO re-
search, several theoretical approaches postulate decreasing social background eﬀects over
students' educational transitions. First, according to the l ife course perspective (LCP;
Müller and Karle, 1993), the more students make their way through secondary socializa-
tion, the less strong parental treatment eﬀects may inﬂuence students in their academic
outcomes. Second, maximally maintained inequality (MMI; Raftery and Hout, 1993)
suggests that decreasing social background eﬀects at later educational transitions are
in turn sensitive to the progress of educational expansion that aﬀects enrollment rates.
Third, relative r isk aversion (RRA; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) assumes that homo-
geneity in ability among working-class students increases with subsequent transitions;
and once a particular transition has been passed, the risk of status decline for working-
class parents is lower than for the preceding decision since the critical level of status
maintenance is already reached. Fourth, eﬀectively maintained inequality (EMI; Lu-
cas, 2001, 2009) additionally accounts for the fact that educational systems may be
tracked. Lucas (2001) ﬁnds persisting residual class diﬀerences between diﬀerent edu-
cational tracks also at a higher transition  which rejects LCP and also challenges the
assumption of MMI that class diﬀerences in educational transition probabilities diminish
once a certain level of education has become universal due to educational expansion.
Formal evaluation of all propositions As LCP could already be rejected since results
are more in favor of MMI (Lucas, 2001), in his formal analysis, Lucas (2009) only
compares the implications of MMI, RRA and EMI. As he notes, only one of the three
proposals, namely RRA, has already been written down in formal terms. Thus, Lucas'
objective is ﬁrst to provide a formal notation of both MMR and EMI, and second, to test
which of the three proposals suﬀer from the logical threats tautology, self-contradiction
and evaluative infeasibility.
According to Lucas (2009), the statement of MMI that transition rates and inequal-
ity (as measured by odds ratios) remain constant unless forced to change by increasing
enrollments (Raftery and Hout, 1993, p. 42) can be understood in two ways: First, tran-
sitions by class odds-ratios ω1 are a function of the eﬀect of social origins on education
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demand, β, and the change in this eﬀect over time, γ:
ω1 = h(β + γ) (2)
Concluding that unless forced, odds-ratios will not change, implies that γ = 0 (Lucas,
2009, p. 466). Second, however, if transition rates are forced to change by increasing
enrollments, according to Lucas (2009), the only conceivable way that margin-free odds-
ratios could be forced to change would have to read
ω2 = h((β + γ), (α + λ)) (3)
 where α denotes the eﬀect of population size on educational demand, and λ again
the change in this eﬀect over time. Hence, a change in the eﬀect of population size on
educational demand could force to change the transition odds-ratios without any change
in the origin eﬀect.
By plotting the results of an analysis of the main MMI statement in a logistic regression
framework, Lucas (2009) can show that i) odds-ratio ω2 is not margin-contaminated, as
MMI would require; and ii) ω1 is not forced down if high-origin transition probabilities
increase towards 1. Thus, MMI is either contradictory (in case of ω2) or evaluatively
infeasible (in case of ω1).
Regarding RRA and EMI, both proposals stand the test of being non-tautological,
non-contradictory and evaluatively feasible. As both RRA and EMI share a lot of com-
mon statements with yet a number of considerable diﬀerences, Lucas (2009) is unable to
get to a ﬁnal statement whether the two theories relate to each other in a complementary
(or even nested?) manner.
What is common among all theoretical accounts presented above is that by origin,
they are not aimed at explaining changes in background eﬀects over educational tran-
sitions  but over student cohorts. This phenomenon has already been reconstructed
as an opportunity-mediated social mechanism by Hedström (2005, p. 55): Diﬀerences
in social mobility rates between diﬀerent nations or between diﬀerent points in time
are explained by reference to diﬀerences in mobility opportunities due to diﬀerences
in occupational or class distributions. This is approximately true for MMI (though
formally rejected) since population growth is supposed to aﬀect individual transition
ratios. However, reading EMI more closely reveals that what it actually postulates
should be reconstructed more accurately as a concatenation of an opportunity- and a
desire-mediated mechanism since MMI also supposes population size to aﬀect educational
demand (captured by parameter α in Lucas' formal evaluation).
Regarding RRA, its strong anchoring on students' beliefs was already carved out
 which reﬂects that a simple opportunity-mediated mechanism would fall too short.
Finally, one could conclude that just as MMI, also EMI challenges RRA's assumption
of constant desires among the social strata since it postulates that classes diﬀer in
their placement on available educational tracks (academic vs. vocational)  which may
thoroughly be due to class-speciﬁc diﬀerences in educational desires.
However, for the objective of the present study, the particular applicability of RRA
stems from the fact that it explicitly links students' ability to their subjective expected
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probability of educational success (while EMI is agnostic on this relationship; see Lucas,
2009, p. 502). As this is the crucial link the formal model of self-fulﬁlling prophecies
presented in the third paper points to, RRA might be more suitable for deducing waning-
coeﬃcient hypotheses in this regard.
Bayesian belief updating This is especially true since in later writings, Breen (1999)
and Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002) propose the mechanism of Bayesian learning to
account for student belief updating conditional on having passed an educational tran-
sition. In social mechanism theory, learning theory in general can be regarded as a
speciﬁc type of DBO theory that is applicable when actors use information about the
past to decide what to do in the future  (Hedström, 2005, p. 41).
The core idea of the reasoning followed in the paper is that students update their
beliefs while following the Bayesian rule, which is illustrated in ﬁgure 2 (cf. Lynch, 2007,
p. 10f.). Let us say that p(A|B) denotes the area consisting only of A while assuming
that B is already true. (The '|' is read as 'given', so p(A|B) means the probability of
A given B.) If we know that B is true, then the total sample space from the entire
rectangle is reduced to the circle B only. Given this reduced space B, p(A) is in turn
reduced to (A,B)  which is given by the A ∩ B region. If A and B were independent,
p(A,B) = p(A) · p(B). Thus, knowing that B is already true, it follows that
p(A|B) = p(A,B)
p(B)
(4)
Figure 2: A Venn diagram illustrating the Bayesian rule. Source: Lynch (2007, p. 11).
Breen (1999) and Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002) proposed to model students'
belief updating mechanisms  having passed a given transition  in a way of Bayesian
learning that follows the above-shown rule. If θ′ denotes a state wherein eﬀort has a
stronger impact on the probability of success than ability, and θ a state wherein it would
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be just the opposite, and AH a student's choice of a high educational career path, then
the posterior belief of a student about θ′ (i.e. the belief about θ′ conditional on having
succeeded in the high educational career path AH) reads (Breen and García-Peñalosa,
2002, p. 909):
Pr(θ′|AH) = Pr(AH|θ
′)Pr(θ′)
Pr(AH|θ′)Pr(θ′) + Pr(AH|θ)Pr(θ) (5)
Hence, students' posterior belief about θ′ is a function of their prior belief about θ′
times the prior belief about their success in the higher academic track given that θ′ is
true (i.e. that eﬀort is more important than ability)  divided by the term just described
plus the prior belief that θ is true (i.e. ability is more important than eﬀort) times the
prior belief about their success in the higher academic track given that θ is true.
Grounding on these theoretical considerations, in the paper I use the mechanism of
Bayesian learning proposed by Breen (1999) and Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002) to
account for students' belief updating in course of their educational transitions. Admit-
tedly, I do not present a comprehensive Bayesian model of educational transitions 
which would go beyond the scope of a primarily empirical contribution. Notwithstand-
ing this issue, the theoretical speciﬁcation should hopefully become clear even though:
Recall that according to what has been postulated regarding the theoretical speciﬁ-
cation of a teacher treatment eﬀect on students' educational transitions in sense of a
self-fulﬁlling prophecy, the subjective expected probability of educational success of a
student who has been overestimated should be higher than the respective self-estimate
of a student who had been underestimated by her teacher. Now the crucial assumption
is that given an educational transition was successfully passed, this belief is updated
upwardly. Due to this mechanism of belief updating conditional on having successfully
passed the preceding transition, in the paper, it is illustratively sketched that variation
in student beliefs should become more homogeneous  leading to decreasing self-fulﬁlling
prophecy eﬀects over time.
This rationale is then used to deduce testable hypotheses. Apart from the 'baseline'
assumption (which is also tested in the third paper) that self-fulﬁlling prophecies in terms
of a teacher treatment eﬀect may have an impact on students' transition probabilities
(which is here tested by means of diﬀerent data; see below), two diﬀerent hypotheses
address potential changes of this eﬀect over time: First, I postulate that the eﬀect of
a teacher's expectation which is measured before the ﬁrst transition point on the ﬁrst
transition is larger than the eﬀect of a teacher's expectation which is measured before
the second transition point on the second transition. Second, I hypothesize that the
long-term eﬀect of a teacher's expectation measured before the ﬁrst transition point
on the second transition is smaller than the two possible short term eﬀects. I expect
both phenomena to occur due to a mechanism of Bayesian updating of student beliefs
conditional on having successfully passed the ﬁrst transition.
Results To evaluate all hypotheses that were deduced above, measures of teachers'
expectations at two diﬀerent points in time as well as two diﬀerent transition points
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 idealiter temporarily closely following upon such a measure  have to be observed.
Unfortunately, the CHiSP only entails indicators of teachers' expectations measured in
students' 10th class, and nothing more. This is why other data sources have to be taken
into account.
Since I did not ﬁnd data that satisﬁes the above conditions and also entails accurate
indicators of students' cost-beneﬁt considerations in sense of Esser's (1999) SEU model
of educational transitions, I make use of the technique of statistical matching (Rubin,
1986; D'Orazio et al., 2006) in order to arrive at an artiﬁcial longitudinal data ﬁle by
means of linking distinct student data ﬁles according to a distance function.
Concretely, apart from CHiSP, I rely on a data set named Elternhaus und Bil-
dungschancen (Parental H ome and Educational Opportunities; henceforth abbreviated
as PHEO) which was surveyed at about the same time (1968) as the former data. The
measure of teachers' expectations available here are primary school teachers' transition
recommendations regarding whether or not a given student should better attend German
highest track school (Gymnasium)  or a lower form.83 Consequently, the correspond-
ing educational transition taken from PHEO are students' transitions from primary to
secondary school (here also simpliﬁed to the question whether or not students made it
to Gymnasium). Additionally, comparable variables in order to operationalize students'
cost-beneﬁt considerations as well as controls for parental social class could be derived.
As in CHiSP, teachers' expectations are residualized by using appropriate indicators of
students' performance and motivation, respectively, in order to arrive at an empirical
identiﬁcation of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy in terms of a teacher treatment eﬀect by iso-
lating the inaccurate part in teachers' expectations.84 Both data are linked in order
to arrive at an artiﬁcial longitudinal data set by means of statistical matching. Con-
cretely, a vector of variables X from ﬁle A and another vector of variables Z from ﬁle
B  with each of them missing in the other ﬁle, respectively  can be combined based
on a vector of variables Y common to both ﬁles as long as X and Z are independent
conditional on Y. This conditional independence assumption cannot be tested empir-
ically but only evaluated theoretically. As it is outlined in more detail in paper 4, I
expect both teachers' evaluations and students' transition recommendations in primary
(X) and secondary school (Z) to be independent of each other conditional on a vector
of students' cost-beneﬁt considerations Y.
Having identiﬁed students' expected beneﬁt, their expected amount of status decline
and their subjective expected probability of educational success as suitable matching
indicators in both data sources, the two ﬁles are linked by means of the Gower distance
function which accounts for mixed binary and categorical measurement levels and is
available in the StatMatch package in R (D'Orazio, 2009). Descriptive analyses do not
indicate any occurrence of severe bias in the matched ﬁle.
83The precise alternatives were a recommendation for an intermediate track (Realschule) or the lower
track (Hauptschule), but for statistical matching purposes, this variable is dichotomized.
84In contrast to CHiSP, PHEO did not test for students' intelligence test scores  which is why only
grades were used for residualization purposes in both data sets regarding the performance dimen-
sion. Similarly, residuals are not net of students' self-assessment regarding their relative school
performance due to lack of measurement in PHEO.
66
I. Causes and Eﬀects of Teachers' Evaluations: A Theoretical Primer
Using transition information from both sources, in the synthetic ﬁle, a dependent
variable of subsequent educational transitions is computed measuring i) whether or not
students made it to Gymnasium, ii) whether or not the remaining students passed Abitur
on the ﬁrst try, and iii) whether or not the remaining students started academic studies
within 2 years. Comparing signiﬁcance statistics for the prediction of transitions from
primary to upper secondary school (Gymnasium) between original PHEO data on the
one hand and the synthetic ﬁle on the other hand, results indicate potential overesti-
mations of the eﬀect of students' subjective expected probability of educational success,
and also of the eﬀect of subjective costs in the synthetic ﬁle. However, relatively sim-
ilar values in both eﬀect sizes and signiﬁcance statistics can be observed for the three
residuals that were used to identify self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
Comparing the impact of the residual terms on students' later educational transitions,
I ﬁnd signiﬁcant but somewhat smaller eﬀects on students' probability of passing Abitur
 but insigniﬁcant estimates for students' propensity to start academic studies. Hence,
based on the synthetic ﬁle, the general self-fulﬁlling prophecy hypothesis only holds for
the ﬁrst two transitions but has to be rejected for the third one.
Evaluating predicted probabilities for the comprehensive educational transition mod-
els obtained from sequential logit modeling, i) diﬀerences in predicted transition proba-
bilities between students with primary school over- and underestimations, respectively,
become smaller from transition 1 (+/- Gymnasium) to transition 2 (+/- Abitur); ii)
diﬀerences between students with secondary school over- and underestimations, respec-
tively, become smaller from transition 2 to transition 3 (+/- university transition); and
iii) the predicted probabilities of students who have been overestimated at secondary
school to make the transition to university are still higher than the predicted probabil-
ities of students who had been overestimated at primary school. Observation i) and ii)
give support for the hypothesis postulating decreasing teacher expectancy eﬀects due to
diﬀerent treatments onto an immediately occurring educational transition over students'
educational life course, and observation iii) gives support for the hypothesis postulating
short-time teacher treatment eﬀects to be larger than long-time eﬀects.
Regarding robustness analyses, a comparison of the results obtained from the synthetic
ﬁle with 'real' Panel data in terms of the British Cohort Study (BCS )85 suggests that in
the latter data, the same trend of diﬀerences in predicted probabilities can be observed.
Additional sensitivity analyses (Buis, 2007, 2010, 2011) indicate that an unobserved but
nonetheless confounding variable could be an issue of distortion particularly at later
educational transition points. Notwithstanding this potential source of bias, I hold the
view that in sum, results tend to support the assumption of a belief-mediated mechanism
of Bayesian updating in a sequence of educational transitions.
85Although the BCS contains measures for both students' multiple educational transitions and multiple
teachers' evaluations, its measures for student cost-beneﬁt considerations are a far cry from being
optimal. Hence, I still regard the results as obtained from statistical matching to be of distinct
scientiﬁc value.
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Summary Starting with Max Weber's deﬁnition of sociology as a scientiﬁc discipline
that strives for both an interpretive understanding, and  by means of that  a causal
explanation of its subject matter (Weber, 1964, p. 88), I ﬁrst discussed how Weber
attempts to unify the Geisteswissenschaften and positivism as two lines of thoughts
that had separated from each other at the end of the 19th century. In this context, I
also highlighted that as regards the claim for a comprehensive understanding, Hempel's
deductive-nomological explanations or covering-law model  that still prevails as the
dominant paradigm in certain sociological textbooks (e.g. Opp, 2005b)  unfortunately
falls behind both Weber's understanding explanation and Popper's situational logic en-
tailing a relatively broad notion of rationality well-equipped to fulﬁll the demand of
understanding social action.
Overcoming the methodological myopia of the covering-law model is also a crucial
objective of recent social-mechanism approaches in analytical sociology. While it was
shown that the existing multitude of deﬁnitions can be distinguished along the dimen-
sions of i) their observability, ii) their law-likeness, and iii) their level of analysis, their
general aims can best be described by Elster's metaphor of opening the black box and
showing the cogs and wheels of the internal machinery (Elster, 1985, p. 5). In con-
junction with a notion of subjective rationality of intermediate strength within strong
bonds to situational restrictions (Goldthorpe, 1998) such as the desires, beliefs, and op-
portunities model proposed by Hedström (2005), desire-mediated, belief-mediated and
opportunity-mediated mechanisms can be distinguished. Within that framework, follow-
ing the maxim of Occam's Razor (Thorburn, 1918), a parsimonious theory of action
should be preferred which may be amended by additional bridge assumptions where the
simpliﬁed version is found to be unrealistic (Lindenberg, 1990). I postulated that this
framework would also prove useful in approximating the causes and eﬀects of teachers'
evaluations by means of mechanism-based explanations in sense of a Weberian under-
standing explanation.
Having outlined these more abstract theoretical foundations, I then continued by link-
ing Max Weber's (2000) deﬁnition of social class in terms of life chances to the thesis of
meritocracy (Young, 1958; Bell, 1972) positing that individuals' social position should
depend on their respective merits which are deﬁned as the sum of individual IQ and
eﬀort. Having rejected the postulate of some authors (Jensen, 1969; Herrnstein and
Murray, 1994) about the primacy of the heritability of intelligence and its impact on in-
dividual achievement compared to social background variables (Heckman, 1995; Fischer
et al., 1996; Daniels et al., 1997; Korenman and Winship, 2000), I focused on both clas-
sic and recent theoretical approaches accounting for student inequality in educational
opportunities (IEO). Grounding on a still inﬂuential distinction by Boudon (1974), social
inequality in educational transitions can be decomposed into primary eﬀects  mainly
due to social-environmental factors  and secondary eﬀects of social inequality  mainly
due to varying utility considerations attached to a particular educational transition by
parents of diﬀerent social strata. To be precise, even if primary eﬀects of social inequal-
ity in terms of performance diﬀerences between the social strata were accounted for,
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their educational transition propensities would still diﬀer because of a belief-mediated
mechanism of relative risk aversion (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997): The higher parents'
socioeconomic status, i) the higher their eﬀort necessary to ensure their oﬀspring would
at least be equal oﬀ in terms of educational qualiﬁcation; ii) the higher the expected
beneﬁt of higher education; iii) the higher the subjective expected probability of educa-
tional success (even apart from actual performance diﬀerences); and iv) the lower both
monetary and transactional costs are perceived. This set the ground for the following
analysis of teachers' evaluations as one of students' signiﬁcant others aﬀecting their life
chances in terms of educational transition probabilities.
Finally, I tried to recapitulate the main ﬁndings of my four papers in this volume
by using the theoretical toolbox discussed above. Focus of all four papers are teachers'
evaluations of students' prospective academic aptitude as measured in the Cologne High
School Panel (CHiSP). While the ﬁrst two papers consider these evaluations as an out-
come, papers three and four use residualized teachers' evaluations  aimed to identify
self-fulﬁlling prophecies in terms of a teacher treatment eﬀect  as a predictor of the
students' later educational transitions. Hence, in the 'applied' part of this introduction,
I initially focused on the underlying mechanisms of the teacher side of the social situa-
tion as regards their formation of evaluations, and thereafter, on teachers' expectations
 again measured in terms of their evaluations  as an intervening variable for students'
cost-beneﬁt considerations.
In the ﬁrst paper, it is proposed that the formation of teachers' evaluations as mea-
sured in CHiSP can generally be reconstructed by frame-selection theory. The latter
assumes that when individual actors are exposed to a social situation, at ﬁrst, a cer-
tain frame of this situation will be activated either automatically, if unquestioned; or
by means of more penetrative rational reﬂection, if problematic. While the frame of
teachers' social situation  a survey question asking for a nonbinding evaluation of their
students  will be unproblematic, and therefore, automatically activated, the scripts of
action invoked in the second step might well vary between automatic processing and
rational reﬂection. Most probably, teachers' beliefs about their students may be the
result of an automatically-driven meritocratic assessment grounding on students' grades
(meritocracy-as-mode). Perhaps less legitimate, but equally understandable might be
teachers' automatic shaping of their evaluations based on student social background
criteria, of which unconscious habitus-related match/mismatch considerations would be
a prominent example. Complementary, both meritocratic criteria (such as students'
intelligence apart from school grades) as well as social backgrounds (such as parental
socioeconomic status as a perceived indicator for parents' ability to provide academic
support) could also serve as rationally-driven motives of teachers' formation of beliefs
about their students. Although empirical analyses based on CHiSP data are not suited
to decompose automatically-driven and rationally-driven ways of teachers' belief forma-
tions, results indicate that meritocratic criteria such as student grades and intelligence
are more important predictors of teachers' evaluations than parental socioeconomic sta-
tus or student aspirations (as an indicator of what is usually referred to as an academic
habitus)  though the latter variables are still signiﬁcant. This could be interpreted in
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that teachers' evaluations are for the most part, though not perfectly, accurate beliefs
of students' actual achievement.
The second paper asks to what extent teachers' evaluations would be subject to
reference-group eﬀects. Some arguments referred to what is conventionally known as
Big-Fish-Little-Pond Eﬀect (BFLPE) research (with students' academic self-concept as
an outcome and class-level achievement as a contextual-level predictor), but since teach-
ers' evaluations as an outcome are very distinct from the former dependent variable, also
diﬀerent social mechanisms had to be unfolded. While I argued that the conventional
negative BFLPE of class-level achievement on students' academic self-concept is one net
of a counterbalancing positive Reﬂected-Glory Eﬀect (RGE) of school-level social status
(Marsh et al., 2000) since two diﬀerent social mechanisms are at work simultaneously (an
endogenous feedback eﬀect in case of the BFLPE, and an exogenous contextual eﬀect in
case of the RGE ; see Manski, 1993, p. 31f.), a negative eﬀect of class-level achievement
on teachers' evaluations could be due to an opportunity-mediated mechanism in terms
of teachers' adjustment of their reference standards independently of their beliefs about
their students. Contrarily, either the opportunity-mediated mechanism of regression to
the mean or the belief-mediated mechanism of dissonance reduction  conveniently also
called Halo eﬀect  could instead lead to a positive eﬀect of class-level achievement
on teachers' evaluations. In addition to these 'main eﬀect' hypotheses, concatenations
of opportunity- and belief-mediated mechanisms could account for interaction eﬀects
of class-level achievement with student-level achievement on the one hand, and with
teachers' reported grading concepts on the other hand. Regarding results, multilevel
analyses supported the hypotheses of a Halo eﬀect caused by the concatenation of an
opportunity- and belief-mediated mechanism of dissonance reduction  leading to a pos-
itive eﬀect of class-mean achievement on teachers' evaluations. Concerning interaction
eﬀects, the coeﬃcient of class-level aggregated student grade point average (GPA) sig-
niﬁcantly increases with better individual student marks.
Since results of the ﬁrst two papers indicate that there is a residual part of inac-
curacy in teachers' expectations as measured by teachers' evaluations, the third paper
investigates to what extent this inaccuracy net of suitable measures of both student
motivation and achievement could account for diﬀerences in students' educational tran-
sition propensities net of indicators of student (or parent) cost-beneﬁt considerations
regarding these transitions. The underlying mechanism of this hypothesized eﬀect is
one of student belief-mediation in terms of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy (Merton, 1948) due
to a teacher treatment eﬀect which has also been called the Pygmalion eﬀect (Rosen-
thal and Jacobson, 1968). Theoretically, I assume this mechanism to operate via an
unobserved eﬀect of teacher 'caress' on students' later subjective expected probability
of educational success that leads to diﬀerences in transition rates between students who
have been overestimated and students who have been underestimated by their teacher.
Empirically, this eﬀect is identiﬁed by residualizing teachers' expectations (measured
by their evaluations) on indicators of student achievement such as intelligence or grade
point average as well as of motivation and academic self-concept. These residuals are
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found to signiﬁcantly predict students' propensity to pass Abitur (German high school
degree qualifying for academic studies) net of controls for expected beneﬁt of education,
the motive of status maintenance, subjective expected probability of educational success,
and perceived costs of education. Furthermore, this eﬀect is robust against two distinct
approaches accounting for unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman, 1979; Buis, 2007, 2010,
2011). In contrast, no robust signiﬁcant eﬀect can be noted regarding students' univer-
sity transitions  indicating that self-fulﬁlling prophecies in terms of a teacher treatment
eﬀect might diminish over time.
Exactly this is the crucial question of the fourth paper. In its theoretical section,
ﬁrst, several approaches from inequality in educational opportunity research suggest-
ing decreasing eﬀects of students' social backgrounds in their educational course of life
 Life Course Perspective (Müller and Karle, 1993); Maximally Maintained Inequality
(Raftery and Hout, 1993); Relative Risk Aversion (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997); and
Eﬀectively Maintained Inequality (Lucas, 2001, 2009)  are discussed. Since on the one
hand, Relative Risk Aversion is one of the two theories not rejected by Lucas (2009),
and on the other hand, it explicitly links students' ability to their beliefs (in terms of
subjective expected probabilities of educational success), it is considered to be the most
promising candidate among the theories discussed in order to develop the argument for
the hypothesis of decreasing self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects over time. Indeed, Breen and
Goldthorpe (1999) and Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002) propose a belief-mediated
mechanism of Bayesian updating that could well account for decreasing teacher treat-
ment eﬀects on students' beliefs about their expectations of success (as proposed for
theoretical identiﬁcation of self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects in paper 3). The diﬀerence in
upward belief adjustment between students who have been overestimated and students
who have been underestimated by their teachers  conditional on having successfully
passed a transition, respectively  can be assumed to be positive. Therefore, I postulate
i) that the eﬀect of a teacher's expectation which is measured before the ﬁrst transition
point on the ﬁrst transition is larger than the eﬀect of a teacher's expectation which is
measured before the second transition point on the second transition; and ii) that the
long-term eﬀect of a teacher's expectation measured before the ﬁrst transition point on
the second transition is smaller than the two possible short-term eﬀects. Due to lack
of suitable data, a synthetic ﬁle is created by means of statistical matching (D'Orazio
et al., 2006) of the CHiSP one the one hand, and a panel survey named 'Elternhaus und
Bildungschancen' (Parental Home and Educational Opportunities; PHEO) on the other
hand  with PHEO comprising of measures of teachers' expectations, student achieve-
ment and motivation indicators, parent cost-beneﬁt considerations in primary school;
and CHiSP measuring respective variables in secondary school. Based on the resulting
synthetic ﬁle observing artiﬁcial student transitions from primary to secondary school
until starting academic studies, it is observed that i) diﬀerences in predicted transition
probabilities between students with primary school over- and underestimations, respec-
tively, become smaller from transition 1 (+/- Gymnasium) to transition 2 (+/- Abitur);
ii) diﬀerences between students with secondary school over- and underestimations, re-
spectively, become smaller from transition 2 to transition 3 (+/- university transition);
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and iii) the predicted probabilities of students who had been overestimated at secondary
school to make the transition to university are still higher than the predicted probabil-
ities of students who had been overestimated at primary school. A set of robustness
analyses indicates that these results are stable against a variety of statistical checks.
For illustrating purposes, ﬁgure 5 provides an overview of the crucial social mech-
anisms hypothesized for the four papers of the volume at hand. In the ﬁrst paper,
student characteristics As (such as achievement or social backgrounds) aﬀect teachers'
evaluations At passed on a belief-mediated mechanism Bt: For each of the constructs
meritocracy and habitus, teachers' variable rationality Kroneberg (2005, 2006) is con-
sidered by assuming script selection either based on habitual routines and automatic
processing (as-mode) or on rational reﬂection (rc-mode). At the current stage, the the-
oretical model remains silent on assumptions regarding potential variation in teachers'
desires or their opportunity context.
This opportunity structure is explicitly considered in the second paper. Concretely,
the classroom context Ot may directly 'lift' teachers' evaluations At in terms of reference-
standard adjustments (opportunity-mediated mechanism), or also indirectly by means of
an additional belief-mediated mechanism Bt when teachers project higher class mean
achievement also on low-achievement students. Moreover, the classroom opportunity
structure also moderates the belief-mediated mechanism of teachers' script selection:
The higher school class' average achievement, counterintuitively, the more important
achievement-related criteria become. Again, no assumptions are made regarding varia-
tion in teachers' desires.
In the third paper, the idea of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy in the educational system is
reconstructed as a concatenation of belief-mediated mechanisms. First, student charac-
teristics As1 (such as social backgrounds, cf. Ready and Wright, 2011) invoke teachers'
sometimes more positive, sometimes more negative beliefs Bt about their students.86
According to the Thomas theorem (Thomas and Thomas, 1928), these beliefs may man-
ifest in teacher treatment eﬀects A′t
87 such as classroom praise, bilateral encouragement,
etc. The teacher treatment eﬀect, in turn, has consequences for students' beliefs Bs2 in
terms of their subjective expected probability of educational success (pep). Well in line
with the logic of Esser's (1999) SEU model, the self-fulﬁlling prophecy has consequences
for students' educational transition propensities (here denoted as As2). As in paper one,
I am agnostic about potential variation in both teachers' desires and opportunities.
The fourth paper entails only one change compared to the third one: Conditional on
having passed a preceding transition As2 or not, students upwardly or downwardly adjust
their beliefs Bs3 in terms of their subjected expected probability of educational success.
According to Esser's (1999) SEU model, this aﬀects students' subsequent transition
propensities As3.
86In line with the paper's methodological speciﬁcation, it is important to note that these are beliefs
apart from both student achievement and motivation.
87I use the 'tick' in A′t to clarify that the teacher treatment eﬀect is analytically distinct from teachers'
evaluations analyzed in papers 1 and 2 (though the same variable is used for empirical identiﬁcation
strategies).
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Figure 3: Summary of social mechanisms in the present volume.
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Outlook Having set the ground for the papers included in this volume, ﬁnally, palpa-
ble limitations and resulting propositions for follow-up studies should be summarized.
In paper one, a notable limitation is that due to data restrictions, we are not able to
empirically identify the conditions of which mode of information-processing (automatic
as-mode or rational rc-mode) is used by teachers. Hence, an urgent advice for future
studies would be to develop even more ﬁne-grained mechanism-based explanations in
search of intervening opportunity structures or teacher belief sets that might account for
diﬀerences in information processing. Idealiter, these new explanations should be tested
by means of appropriate indicators leading to a better understanding of the information-
processing side of teachers' expectancy formation. Methodologically, considering indi-
cators on the teacher level would imply to extend our method of analysis towards a
multilevel structural equation model (Muthén, 1994; Bauer, 2003) where teachers' eval-
uations of their students are nested in teacher contexts.
Another limitation of the ﬁrst paper is that although a structural model is used as
method of analysis, controls for measurement error may be regarded to be insuﬃcient.
This becomes particularly an issue concerning the operationalization of unconscious
forms of symbolic communication between teachers and students usually referred to as
eﬀects of habitus : As indicated in the last section of this introduction, in the paper
we found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the analogy sub-dimension of intelligence on both stu-
dents' average grade and teachers' evaluations. Within our framework distinguishing
between as-mode and rc-mode processing on the one hand and meritocracy- and social-
background-related predictors on the other hand, this could either be understood as a
manifestation of a meritocracy-rc-mode type of processing (in terms of a particular im-
portance of analogy-based inferences to the teachers). But on the other hand, since we
do not dispose of a suﬃciently high number of indicators in order to minimize measure-
ment error, we cannot reject the alternative interpretation that teachers' appreciation
of the verbal dimension of intelligence relates to habitual forms of student behavior that
is valued by teachers in both their evaluations and grade assignments. Furthermore, on
the one hand, the latter are also an aggregate form of teachers' evaluations (and could in
turn be the result of habitus-related criteria); and on the other hand, students' objective
academic performance could be understood as a latent variable which is only imperfectly
measured by their average grades. For instance, teachers might refrain from considering
students' class contribution all too much in their grading assignment (though one would
expect a considerable correlation between the two), but class contribution might aﬀect
how teachers arrive at a more general evaluation of students' prospective aptitude for
academic studies. Students' class contribution would now be a probable candidate to
incorporate both habitus-related characteristics and to be responsible for the separate
regression path of both students' average grades and teachers' evaluations on the verbal
dimension of students' intelligence in terms of the analogy sub-score.
Regarding the latent variable of academic performance, a conventional ﬁrst-order fac-
tor model will already be an improvement to current manifest approaches. Concerning
measurement of a latent variable of habitual background-related forms of student be-
havior and symbolic communication, however, we would encourage future studies of
teachers' evaluations to make use of a second-order factor model (Chen et al., 2005;
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Rindskopf and Rose, 1988) wherein students' so-called habitus is the higher-order factor
which is measured by lower-level factors such as parental SES, parental cultural capital
(including cultural practices) and maybe also students' aspirations (but cf. footnote 63)
 each of them ideally operationalized by a variety of appropriate indicators.
Regarding paper two, there is still work left concerning the theoretical justiﬁcation
of both 'main' and interaction eﬀect hypotheses in the paper as well as with respect
to their mechanism-based explanation in this introductory chapter. Thus, a more ﬁne-
grained analysis of the social mechanisms behind teacher-level variables such as their
frames of reference as potential moderators of reference-group eﬀects on teachers' eval-
uations will be inevitable. Following Hauser (1970a, p. 659), a thorough speciﬁcation
of the individual-level situation is of utmost importance before research can arrive at a
comprehensive understanding also of contextual-level eﬀects. Therefore, more research
on the conditions of teachers' active mode of information-processing (as-mode vs. rc-
mode) as demanded for the analysis of teachers' social situation in the classroom (paper
1) is also needed as a theoretical prerequisite for the analysis of contextual-level eﬀects
on teachers' evaluations and their interaction with teacher-level variables.
In this context, at least from my point of view, it is really astonishing that since Blalock
and Wilken (1979), no eﬀort has been invested in the analysis of opportunity-mediated
mechanisms of individual cost-beneﬁt considerations. From the more methodological
literature (Friedrich, 1982; Brambor et al., 2006) we know that cross-level interaction
eﬀects can either be understood as as a contextual-level eﬀect varying with an individual-
level predictor, or as an individual-level eﬀect varying with a contextual-level predictor
 and the same, of course, applies for the social mechanisms behind. Hence, of course,
the relative importance of student characteristics for a teacher to arrive at an evaluation
may vary with class-average achievement  even if in our study, marginal eﬀects of the
complementary reading indicated relatively higher eﬀects. Since an important limitation
of our study is the selectivity of our data, we would not see the former reading to be
rejected at all.
Even if the theoretical approach intentionally chosen here follows a very soft action-
theoretical framework, future studies might wish to ground reference-group eﬀect hy-
potheses  irrespectively of the outcome at hand  on more elaborate cost-beneﬁt re-
lated social mechanisms. Nota bene, Blalock and Wilken (1979) already observed that
contextual variables may aﬀect either subjective probabilities (expectancies) or utili-
ties (values) and thereby produce either additive or multiplicative contextual terms (p.
360). Since I do not see that sociologists have advanced in this respect in general, I
recommend scholars to invest more theoretical eﬀort in the speciﬁcation of potentially
opportunity-mediated mechanisms of social actors' utility considerations.
Furthermore, conventional BFLPE research found student gender composition in the
classroom to be a moderator of class-level achievement eﬀects on students' academic
self-concept (Thijs et al., 2010). This eﬀect can be explained by the assumption that
individuals' beliefs about their abilities are shaped in relation to in-group standards
(Rosenberg, 1979, ch. 6-9), and it was found that same-gender classmate beliefs more
strongly aﬀect students' academic decisions than opposite-gender classmate beliefs (Cor-
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rell, 2001). For this reason, a higher negative BFLPE of same-gender classmate achieve-
ment than of opposite-gender classmate achievement on students' self-concept can be
reconstructed as a concatenation of an opportunity- and a belief-mediated social mech-
anism. Similarly, teachers might hold diﬀerent beliefs of their students depending on
particular combinations of their own gender, students' gender, the gender composition
in the classroom, and possibly even teachers' gender composition in school. Therefore,
future studies should analyze if reference-group eﬀects on teachers' evaluations vary with
diﬀerent gender contexts.88
Although a speciﬁcation of the opportunity structure shaping students' utility consid-
erations would certainly be an important issue for the theoretical model of self-fulﬁlling
prophecies in terms of a teacher treatment eﬀect, the more serious limitation of pa-
per three can be seen in its hiatus between the theoretical and the empirical model.
As outlined above, the identiﬁcation assumption of the theoretical model is that self-
fulﬁlling prophecies operate via both an indirect (in terms of student grades) and a direct
unobserved teacher treatment eﬀect on students' subjective expected probability of ed-
ucational success  while all other cost-beneﬁt parameters are assumed to be constant.
I do not have to lay much emphasis on the fact that this assumption may be violated
for a couple of reasons. Sensitivity analyses as performed in paper three try to address
the objection that teachers dispose of private information on unobserved student char-
acteristics that either enter their utility function or directly aﬀect transition decisions 
but that surely are only an imperfect approximation of potentially intervening variables.
Hence, future studies should try to measure a larger set of indicators of teachers' evalua-
tions in order to minimize measurement error and thereby the risk of neglecting teachers'
private information about their students' academic aptitude. Empirically, this could be
performed in well-known latent-variable frameworks such as conﬁrmatory factor analysis
and structural equation modeling, or also item response theory (Rasch, 1960; Embreston
and Reise, 2000; Bond and Fox, 2001). A useful property of the latter approach  apart
from separate estimation of person and item parameters  is that it also allows to test
for the optimal treatment of empty categories such as students who never obtained a
positive nor a negative evaluation by their teacher (i.e. whether they should be modeled
in terms of an ordinal variable, or if they should rather be set to missing; cf. Drasgow
and Hulin, 1990, p. 579).
Ideally, the theoretical model of self-fulﬁlling prophecies in terms of teacher-treatment
eﬀects operating via student diﬀerences in subjective expected probabilities of educa-
tional success should also be tested empirically. Hence, indicators for this crucial variable
should be measured at diﬀerent points in time to assess changes in subjective expected
probabilities. If these either positive (in case of overestimations) or negative (in case of
underestimations) changes were able to mediate the eﬀect of the residual terms here used
for empirical identiﬁcation of self-fulﬁlling prophecies, a strong hint for the theoretical
88Another recommendation addressed in the paper but less interesting in the context of a theoretical
résumé is that teachers' evaluations could be analyzed more comprehensively as a trivariate outcome
by means of an ordered categorical multilevel model (Johnson, 1996, 1997; Gelman and Hill, 2007).
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model's empirical validity would have been arrived at.
Moreover, as one limitation of conventional Pygmalion and self-fulﬁlling prophecy
studies concerns an insuﬃcient consideration of potential moderators (especially with
regard to students' social backgrounds), future studies should also test for interaction
eﬀects of its respective measure of self-fulﬁlling prophecies with student (or parent) cost-
beneﬁt considerations. The latter, in turn, could be important intervening variables in
terms of belief-mediated mechanisms that aﬀect to what extent self-fulﬁlling prophecies
actually take eﬀect  resulting in another concatenation of social mechanisms.
And ﬁnally, although the theoretical framework used to explain self-fulﬁlling prophe-
cies throughout this volume is one grounding on SEU theory, the social mechanisms that
have been carved out for the ﬁrst paper may have illustrated that rational comparisons
of the alternatives at hand, as taken for granted in SEU theory, are only one very special
case of actors' variable rationality (Kroneberg, 2006). To be precise, students' rather un-
conscious, automatic-spontaneous (as-mode) type of information processing should also
be modeled in IEO research in general, and in self-fulﬁlling prophecy studies  that ex-
plicitly argue in favor of subtle and unconscious teacher treatment eﬀects  in particular.
A mechanism-related limitation can also be identiﬁed in paper four. In its theoreti-
cal section, an explanation of Bayesian updating is proposed to account for decreasing
self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects over students' educational transitions. However, these
illustrations are, admittedly, a far cry from what will conventionally be understood
as Bayesian modeling. Hence, to obtain a comprehensive belief-mediated account of
decreasing self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects, social scientists should invest more eﬀort in
Bayesian models of belief updating. In my view, also sociologists' research about de-
creasing student background eﬀects in their educational life course would beneﬁt from
this theoretical advancement.
But this limitation is certainly a more important issue regarding the consequences of
multiple over- and underestimations for student belief updating. Madon et al. (2006)
found that self-fulﬁlling prophecies can accumulate rather than dissipate over time if
a whole series of over- and underestimations is considered. Unsurprisingly, Bayesian
explanations of belief updating to explain accumulation of self-fulﬁlling prophecies still
have to be developed.
In this context, also two opportunity-mediated mechanisms are worthwhile to be con-
sidered: First, it would be interesting to broaden the perspective on an analysis of
whether the observed phenomenon of decreasing self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects over stu-
dents' educational transition is in turn sensitive to temporal (i.e. period and cohort)
or institutional eﬀects. This is what Maximally Maintained Inequality (Raftery and
Hout, 1993) postulated regarding the volatility of student background eﬀects, and this
could equally hold for self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects: Understanding the latter as teacher
treatment eﬀects on students' subjective expected probability of educational success, this
concept could be a function of the variance in students' social composition, the student
body's average ability in diﬀerent grades due to diﬀerences in enrollment rates between
student cohorts, periods or educational systems. Hence, future studies should pursue a
more comparative perspective in order to be able to generalize the result of decreasing
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self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects.
Finally, another institutional (and thus opportunity-mediated) issue directly eﬀects
one measure of teachers' expectations used in paper four. In the primary-school sam-
ple (Parental Home and Educational Opportunities; PHEO) that is merged with the
secondary-school sample (the Cologne High School Panel; CHiSP) via statistical match-
ing (D'Orazio et al., 2006), primary school teachers' transition recommendations are
used to operationalize teachers' expectations. However, German Federal states (Bun-
desländer) diﬀer in the binding character of these recommendations as regards parental
actual transitions: While at the moment, in Hessia, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania,
North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate and the three German
city states Hamburg, Berlin and Bremen, the ﬁnal transition decision is left to the par-
ents, in all other Länder, the educational system is permitted to correct parental decisions
when diﬀering from teachers' recommendations. Notably, these institutional diﬀerences
have been observed to aﬀect students' transition odds: A recent study by Gresch (2009)
notes that diﬀerences in predicted transition probabilities to German highest-track sec-
ondary school (Gymnasium) between students of diﬀerent social strata are lower in case
of binding transition recommendations than in case of non-binding ones. At least two
mechanism-based explanations could account for these diﬀerences: On the one hand,
institutional constraints surely restrict parental opportunities to opt against a particu-
lar transition recommendation. On the other hand, institutional constraints could also
alter teachers' beliefs about the extent to which their recommendation aﬀects students'
educational careers. In case of non-binding recommendations, teachers' and parents' be-
liefs about students' educational success show a partial interdependency in that teachers
might try to anticipate how parents might decide in case of a particular recommenda-
tion. In case of binding recommendations, this anticipatory character is lessened since
teachers know that parents may always be overruled. In consequence, diﬀerences in insti-
tutional constraints therefore aﬀect the social selectivity of particular secondary school
tracks in particular states. This might in turn inﬂuence students' subjective expected
probability of educational success of the given secondary-school track; and hence, self-
fulﬁlling prophecies could no longer be convincingly identiﬁed by means of that concept
when, as in the case at hand, two samples from diﬀerent Federal states with transition
recommendations potentially diﬀering in their binding character are used.89
To tell a long story short, future studies should ﬁrst use an alternative measure of
primary-school teachers' evaluations which is not aﬀected by institutional constraints;
and second, if future studies would still have to rely on evidence from statistically-
matched ﬁles, ideally, two ﬁles from the same state should be used to exclude possible
diﬀerences in students' cost-beneﬁt considerations arising from diﬀerences in the social
selectivity of a given state and thereby challenging theoretical identiﬁcation of self-
fulﬁlling prophecies as proposed in papers three and four.
89In order to compare the legal status of primary school teachers' transition recommendations from
two diﬀerent Federal states, access to their respective Education Act would be required  which has
not been possible yet due to time constraints.
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Concluding theoretical and methodological remarks In sum, research on teach-
ers' evaluations (and, to a certain extent, also IEO research in general) would certainly
beneﬁt from a more thorough theoretical and methodological undergirding. Regarding
theory, IEO research recently discovered the relevance of the framework of counterfac-
tuals for the analysis of educational transitions (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996b; Erikson
et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2007). Furthermore, econometric theoretical models such as
identiﬁcation of a causal treatment eﬀect have been adopted (for a review see Gangl,
2010). However, from my point of view, social scientists tend to use both concepts in
a rather sloppy manner  completely ignoring the ontological and epistemological pre-
requisites involved. I do not have to lay much emphasis on the fact that the notion
of causality is one of the philosophical problems discussed most intensely since ancient
Greek philosophy (see e.g. Gotthelf, 1976). For statisticians such as Holland (1986) or
Rubin (1986), manipulability theories of causation are particularly attractive for their
general assumption that manipulation of a cause will result in the manipulation of an
eﬀect (Woodward, 2008). But even these largely pragmatic theories of causation are not
without problems: For instance, von Wright's (1971) account relates p's bringing about
q to an agency concept that would have diﬃculties to incorporate environmental eﬀects
 that might also aﬀect human interaction.90 And even the more recent and elaborated
structural theory by Judea Pearl (2000) is not immune against the objection of circu-
larity (Woodward, 2008).91 Hence, more eﬀort should be invested into the speciﬁcation
of the underlying causal framework of the social sciences.
Similarly, counterfactuals are much more than a methodological tool-box easily at
hand for educational transition analysts. As Menzies (2009) points out, a notion of
causality that would be interpreted as counterfactual from today's point of view was
already held by David Hume92, and as indicated above, this notion culminated in David
Lewis' very elaborated theory of counterfactual causality (Lewis, 1973, 1977, 1979, 1981).
However, it is important to note that Lewis' condition If it were the case that A, then it
would be the case that C  (Lewis, 1973, p. 418) is more and more relaxed throughout his
paper to be true also when some A-world where C holds is closer to the actual world than
is any A-world where C does not hold (Menzies, 2009). This means that Lewis holds
a realism also about non-actual possible worlds close to ours that does not necessarily
coincide with social scientists' pragmatic usage of methodological counterfactualism as
a tool for decomposing primary and secondary eﬀects of social inequality.
I do not say that methodological counterfactualism  given its ontological foundation
 is not suited for mechanism-based explanations that also strive to ensure a deeper
90An illustrative example for an environmental eﬀect considerably constraining individual interaction
is the war in Dafur: A progressive desertiﬁcation and soil erosion for the last 30 years caused a
decrease in both cultivable areas and grasslands. This made members of several ethnic groups to
leave their ancestral regions and to move to the higher-precipitation areas in the south of Sudan 
where they came into conﬂict with local ethnic groups (University for Peace, 2004).
91For an application of Pearl's theory of causation on educational inequality see Morgan and Winship
(2012).
92We may deﬁne a cause to be an object followed by another [...] where, if the ﬁrst object had not
been, the second never had existed (Hume, 1913, section VII).
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understanding.93 Quite contrarily, the founding father of a uniﬁed approach in this
respect, Max Weber, holds a notion of causation that is notably close to contemporary
counterfactualism:
The judgement that if a single historical fact is conceived of as absent from
or modiﬁed in a complex of historical conditions, it would condition a course of
historical events in such a way which would be diﬀerent in certain historically
important respects, seems to be of considerable value for the determination of the
'historical signiﬁcance' of those facts (Weber, 1948, p. 166; orig. emph.).94
Thus, in sum, social scientists should avoid overhasty usage of concepts fraught with
meaning that is not entirely grasped, and they should devote more work in the theoretical
underpinnings of those concepts that are considered to be useful from a pragmatic point
of view.
Another issue quite relevant for rational-choice or subjective-expected-utility-based
explanations of social inequality in educational opportunities in general aﬀects the un-
derlying decision heuristics. As outlined above, current theoretical accounts assume that
the underlying decision heuristic reads Maximize the expected value! equally for all
social strata (Esser, 1999, p. 274). However, social psychologists have revealed that
individuals not always act according to this admittedly eﬃcient strategy  but may in
particular situations have good reasons to follow alternative heuristics that are mediocre
from a strict point of view (Simon, 1955, 1957; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; also see
Coombs et al., 1970, ch. 5; Lave and March, 1975, pp. 140-143). For instance, inequali-
ties in educational opportunities would probably increase if parents from the lower strata
would act according to the comparably conservative maximin principle  maximizing the
minimum possible value while completely ignoring subjective probabilities even if they
may be relatively high  while middle- and higher-class parents still maximize their ex-
pected value.95 Hence, IEO theory should, possibly by means of agent-based modeling
(Hedström, 2005, ch. 6), evaluate the consequences of diﬀerent constellations of class-
variant decision heuristics when all other parameters are held constant. This, of course,
would amount to soften Occam's razor in introducing additional auxiliary assumptions.
Regarding methods, in particular realist generative process theorists as referred to in
the theoretical section would admittedly insist (or at least recommend) that causal forces
could best be approximated by means of small or medium N studies (Gerring, 2007).
This advice intuitively makes sense since the more ﬁne-grained the mechanism-based
explanation (i.e. the smaller the entities the observed factorial regularity is decom-
posed into), the harder it is to get closer to the actual causal structure by observable
93Once the above-noted issues have been resolved, counterfactual thinking as a decision heuristic might
prove helpful in both clarifying the eﬃcacy of contrast eﬀects in reference-group eﬀect research
(Roese, 1994) and mediating individuals' expectancies of success through subjective perceptions of
control (Roese, 1994; Nasco and Marsh, 1999).
94See Ringer (2002) for a more elaborate discussion of Weber's notion of causation.
95See Jæ ger and Holm (2012) for a ﬁrst attempt of distinguishing between 'conformists' and 'rebels'
in the framework of Breen and Goldthorpe's (1997) relative risk aversion theory.
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quantitative indicators. Hence, the set of social mechanisms providing an understand-
ing explanation of the causes and eﬀects of teachers' evaluations as reconstructed in
this introduction should idealiter be evaluated by means of process tracing in small or
medium N studies (Mahoney, 2000; Bennett and Elman, 2006; Bennett, 2010; Collier,
2011; Beach and Pedersen, 2012; Rohlﬁng, 2012, ch. 6).
Sticking to the quantitative framework as applied here, recent evidence would suggest
that listwise deletion of missing values as applied in the four papers at hand is usually
inferior in precision compared to methods of imputation (Schafer, 1997; Schafer and
Graham, 2002; Graham, 2009). To be precise, statisticians distinguish between three
scenarios of missing data: missing at random (MAR), missing completely at random
(MCAR), and missing not at random (MNAR). MAR allows the probabilities of miss-
ingness to depend on the observed data but not on the missing data. MCAR is a special
case of MAR where the probability of missingness does not depend on the observed data
either. Consequently, MNAR already occurs when the MAR condition is violated.
Unless designs of planned missingness such as cohort-sequential longitudinal designs or
administration of multiple questionnaires with varying subsets of items occur, violation
of MCAR or MAR can be expected to be likely (Schafer, 1997, ch. 2); and results
of statistical analyses obtained after listwise deletion may be biased if the data is not
MCAR or at least MAR (Schafer and Graham, 2002).
In contrast, Graham and Donaldson (1993) as well as Collins et al. (2001) found
that in many realistic scenarios violating MAR, the bias potentially resulting by falsely
assuming MAR will actually be negligible. Graham (2009, p. 554) adds that especially
in case of multiple regression models, the most undesirable property of listwise deletion
is its loss of power. To be sure, listwise deletion is superior to pairwise deletion since
as in contrast to the latter, a common set of cases for all analyses is used (cf. Schafer,
1997, p. 39).96 Single imputation methods such as arithmetic mean imputation (Wilks,
1932), conditional mean imputation (Buck, 1960) or stochastic regression imputation
 augmenting each score predicted by conditional mean imputation with a normally
distributed residual term (cf. Enders, 2010, ch. 2.8.)  are known to underestimate
standard error in regression analyses (Enders, 2010, p. 48).
Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) that uses the whole set of available cases
in order to obtain ML estimates of the aspired values is known to behave well under
MAR, but not under MNAR conditions (Enders, 2010, p. 87). As one crucial point
of arguing of papers three and four is to tackle the objection of potential unobserved
heterogeneity, one might arrive at the conclusion that there is no well-thought reason
to reject the assumption of MNAR a priori. Furthermore, paper one used an input
matrix of polychoric correlations (Olsson, 1979; Muthén, 1984; Aish and Jöreskog, 1990;
Jöreskog, 1994) in order to account for categorical outcomes in the structural model. In
contrast, using the FIML approach to impute missing values would require the use of
raw data (Enders, 2010, p. 123).
96The problem of inconsistent sets of cases is particularly an issue for statistical approaches relying
on a variance-covariance matrix as data input such as structural equation modeling (Little, 1992;
Marsh, 1998; Wothke, 1993)  which is the method of analysis of paper 1 in the volume at hand.
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The only imputation technique that is approximately stable under MNAR conditions
is multiple imputation (MI). Basically, MI starts from stochastic regression imputation
but then generates multiple copies of the underlying data set, each ﬁlled with diﬀerent
missing values. The analyses of interest are then performed simultaneously with all dif-
ferent data, and these results are pooled  typically by means of the data augmentation
algorithm (Schafer, 1997; Tanner and Wong, 1987)  in order to arrive at one ﬁnal es-
timate. The stochastic regression imputation step predicts the values for a variable to
be imputed by regressing it on various predictors and then adds a normalized residual
term obtained from this regression equation.97 Now recall that papers three and four
use the residuals estimated from a logistic regression of teachers' expectations on stu-
dents' educational performance and motivation to arrive at an empirical identiﬁcation
of self-fulﬁlling prophecies. In my view, it has to be evaluated ﬁrst whether the stochas-
tic regression part of multiple imputation does neither upwardly nor downwardly bias
estimation strategies that also make use of residualized variables.98 Furthermore, there
is no option to estimate the polychoric correlation matrix that has been used as input
matrix for the conﬁrmatory factor analysis and structural equation models as performed
in paper 1 in an MI framework.99 Finally, I see the risk of generally augmenting bias
in the data when missing variables are ﬁrst imputed and then used for data fusion via
statistical matching. Therefore, I stick to the conventional approach of listwise deletion
since it is unsettled whether the more sophisticated techniques would not rather lower
the precision of the estimates.
Apart from potential concerns with missing data handling that I see rejected by the
above-speciﬁed arguments, a general objection against particular methodological strate-
gies such as statistical matching (D'Orazio et al., 2006) could be their peril. However,
on the one hand, from an epistemological point of view, I follow Popper (1963) in his
opinion that researchers should always formulate hypotheses as falsiﬁable as possible in
order to enable empirical research to reduce complexity in that only those hypotheses
unrejected so far are corroborated for the time being.100
On the other hand, from a more pragmatic point of view, when the alternatives
comprise doing something risky (maybe even transcending the Popperian sense of it),
97I above said that MI is only approximately stable under MNAR conditions since the imputation
process has to be corrected as proposed by Rubin (1987): Generate multiple imputations under an
MAR mechanism, then add a constant to the imputed values to compensate for the possibility that
the MAR-based imputations may be too high or too low (Enders, 2010, p. 289).
98A more practical reason against the feasibility of multiple imputation throughout paper 3 is that
the Inverse Mill's Ratios for each SEU predictor and residual term to control for heterogeneity bias
had to be computed by hand. Hence, it wouldn't have been possible to estimate a Heckman model
simultaneously on several imputed data sets. In fact, the selection model applied in paper 3 can be
regarded as a (admittedly imperfect) method to account for missingness under MNAR conditions
(cf. Enders, 2010, pp. 291-298).
99Asparouhov and Muthén (2010) showed that given a suﬃciently high number of imputed data sets
(5 and more), Weighted Least Squares may yield consistent results in both single-level and two-level
structural equation models with categorical variables.
100A serious empirical test always consists in the attempt to ﬁnd a refutation, a counter example (sic!).
In the search for a counter example, we have to use our background knowledge; for we always try
to refute ﬁrst the most risky predictions (...) (Popper, 1963, p. 240; orig. emph.).
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or discarding analyses completely, I take the liberty to opt for the former. As Boudon
(1976, p. 1185) prominently remarks: But I always thought that 'try, and see what
happens' was a better though less secure line of behavior as far as research was concerned
than following a well-explored trail  for instance, applying to data statistical techniques
which are mechanically well-known and which always 'work'. Pursuant to the title of
an essay by Giuliani (2003), the attempt of the volume at hand is to follow a sociological
methodology that does not attempt to understand more than it can explain, and that does
only explain what has been understood  with an associated demand of being on the safe
side theoretically wherever daring methodologically.
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II. Teachers' Evaluations and the
Deﬁnition of the Situation in the
Classroom
(with Klaus Birkelbach)
While a multitude of American, Swiss and German studies analyzed the predic-
tors of kindergarten and primary school teachers' evaluations or transition recom-
mendations, respectively, we did not ﬁnd comparable evidence regarding teachers'
evaluations measured mid of secondary school. In the theoretical section, we regard
German 10th class teachers' evaluations with a prognostic claim about students'
future academic ability as a result of a special social situation in the classroom;
and we synthesize existing meritocratic and habitus-related explanations to a more
general theory of action according to the M odel of F rame Selection (MFS). In the
empirical section, we test both meritocratic and habitus-related hypotheses in a set
of structural equation models. Using data from the Cologne H igh School Panel
(CHiSP) we ﬁnd that even when controlling for the model's path structure, indi-
cators for both kinds of concepts are statistically signiﬁcant. However, notwith-
standing the underlying type of information processing, the predictive power of
indicators operationalizing the meritocratic explanation is comparatively higher.
1 Introduction
The literature in educational sociology tends to agree in that teachers' expectations,
judgments or evaluations can be an important dimension of social inequality in educa-
tional research. Regarding teachers' evaluations as a treatment variable, at least since
the Wisconsin model of status attainment (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970), teachers' eval-
uations are acknowledged to play a decisive role in individuals' both educational and
occupational status attainment process.
Regarding teachers' evaluations as an outcome, in the American context, a number
of studies has shown that teachers' evaluations vary by students' social backgrounds,
their ethnic group, and both social and racial student-teacher matches and mismatches
(Alexander et al., 1987; Page, 1987; Farkas et al., 1990; Farkas, 2003; Ferguson, 2003;
111
1 Introduction
Downey and Pribesh, 2004; Hughes et al., 2005; Ready and Wright, 2011).1 In the
German context, a great deal of literature has focused on the determinants of primary
school teachers' transition recommendations regarding the secondary school track choice
suggested to their students (Ingenkamp, 1971; Becker, 2003; Bos and Pietsch, 2004;
Jürges and Schneider, 2006; Arnold et al., 2007; Ditton, 2007; Pietsch and Stubbe,
2007).
In both the German and the American case, researchers mainly focused on teachers'
evaluations at students' early ages  being it in kindergarten or in primary school. Thus,
little is known whether the determinants of teachers' evaluations found in these studies
apply to teachers' evaluations at secondary school to the same extent. In particular,
we aim to analyze German 10th class Gymnasium teachers' evaluations regarding their
students' prospective aptitude for academic studies, and regarding the latter transitions,
the current state of the art is quite puzzling.
On the one hand, various theories propose that the eﬀect of students' social back-
grounds on their educational opportunities should decline both over time and in the
course of students' educational transitions (Müller and Karle, 1993; Raftery and Hout,
1993; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Lucas, 2001, 2009). On the other hand, several more
recent studies also found social background eﬀects to increase from upper secondary
to tertiary education (Selz and Vallet, 2006; Erikson, 2007; Mayer et al., 2007; Müller
and Pollak, 2007; Lörz and Schindler, 2009; ?). Hence, even seemingly trivial questions
such as whether students' social background eﬀects on secondary school teachers' evalu-
ations are still present after having controlled for student achievement indicators  which
is observable for primary school teachers' recommendations  remain unanswered yet.
As a second contradiction to the waning coeﬃcients hypothesis, Andersen and Hansen
(2012) deduced from Bourdieu's theory of cultural capital that the impact of its stylistic
or symbolic components should increase with higher educational levels; and concerning
students' educational performance, the authors ﬁnd signiﬁcant support for this claim.
Therefore, we see need to test whether similar mechanisms are still present regarding
secondary school teachers' evaluations.
A theoretical shortcoming of the literature about teachers' evaluations in general is
that although proponents of rational-choice explanations of educational inequality have
invested a great deal of eﬀort in modeling expectations and cost-beneﬁt evaluations of
both students and their parents (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Esser, 1999; Goldthorpe,
1996), action theories of teachers' assessments have not progressed with similar pace
(Ditton, 2007). Therefore, as an additional, more conceptual aim, we intend to synthesize
common hypotheses about how teachers' evaluations are shaped to a more abstract
theory of action.
Our indicator of 10th class teachers' evaluations is taken from the Cologne High School
Panel (CHiSP), a German Panel dataset initially surveyed in 1969. In line with postu-
lates by both early status attainment theorists (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970) and Pygmalion
or self-fulﬁlling prophecy studies (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Madon et al., 1997;
1For a review of older (and in part less elaborate) studies analyzing the correlation between teachers'
achievement judgments and students' actual achievement see Hoge and Coladarci (1989).
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Jussim and Harber, 2005), it has been shown that these kind of evaluations actually
have a direct impact on students' educational transitions (Becker, 2010)  which, in
turn, aﬀect long-term occupational positions via path dependencies (Birkelbach, 2011).
Thus, another contribution of our paper lies in analyzing the conditions which shape
evaluations of the signiﬁcant others (Sewell et al., 1969) that directly or indirectly
inﬂuence long-term educational and occupational status attainment processes.
This is carried out by regarding teachers' evaluations about students' future aca-
demic ability as a result of a speciﬁc social situation in the classroom. In the following
theoretical section (section 2), we will ﬁrst replicate the general model of sociological
explanations as it has been introduced by Coleman (1990). Thereafter, in a brief refer-
ence to the M odel of F rame Selection (MFS), we will discuss how existing meritocratic
and habitus-related explanations of teachers' evaluations can be synthesized into the as-
sumption of action scripts of a more automatic (as-mode) and a more rational (rc-mode)
type of information processing, respectively (section 2.1).
After that we will summarize the state of the art in German and Swiss educational
research about predictors of teachers' recommendations  supplemented by a review
of several international studies regarding teachers' evaluations , and we will deduce
corresponding hypotheses for the speciﬁc kind of evaluations in our data (section 2.2).
In section 3, we will brieﬂy describe our data, indicators, and research design. Since
we hypothesize a more complex path structure for some of our theoretical concepts,
we will test our hypotheses via structural equation modeling (SEM). In section 4, we
will discuss our main ﬁndings from our structural equation models. Most important,
students' average grade is the strongest predictor in our models while intelligence comes
second. This leads us to the conclusion (section 5) that the meritocracy explanation
of teachers' evaluations  regardless of the underlying type of information processing 
is empirically more pronounced than the explanation based on criteria conventionally
associated with the eﬃcacy of students' habitus. However, since we recognized several
additional path coeﬃcients for manifest variables that may be related to unconscious
and automatic status-related mental processes often referred to as eﬀects of habitus, we
demand from further studies to develop a more elaborate measurement model of the
underlying processes both on the teacher and on the student side than we were able
to analyze with our data. Considering also teachers' backgrounds would then lead to a
multilevel structural equation model with teachers' evaluations nested in both student-
and teacher-level contexts.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
A general model of sociological explanations was given in Coleman's (1990) seminal
monograph wherein he diﬀerentiates between macro-level and micro-level propositions
as a general form of modeling individual behavior in speciﬁc social contexts. The three-
step procedure from the macro-level to the micro-level and back to the macro-level was
extended by Esser (1993, 1996, 1999) who labeled the steps as the logic of the situation,
the logic of selection, and the logic of aggregation.
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The logic of the situation describes the top-down link from the macro-level to the
micro-level entailing assumptions about both the conditions of the social situation and
the alternatives of individual actors. Actors' expectations and evaluations are linked to
the conditions and alternatives of the social situation via bridge hypotheses.2 The logic of
selection aims to explain individual decisions on the micro-level based on an underlying
theory of action. If the latter is described explicitly, scholars conventionally make use of
rational choice (RC ) or subjective expected utility (SEU ) theory, or, as explicated below,
of the M odel of F rame Selection (MFS).
The logic of aggregation 'simply' embodies the bottom-up link between individual
behavior on the micro-level and a collective explanandum on the macro-level via trans-
formation rules that may vary depending on the respective context. Figure 1 displays
this general scheme of sociological explanations.
MACRO-LEVEL
MICRO-LEVEL
Social 
Situation 1
Social 
Situation 2
Individual Actor Individual Action
Figure 1: A general model of sociological explanations. Source: Esser (1993, p. 98).
Subject matter of our investigation is a speciﬁc form of teachers' evaluations concern-
ing their students' ability for academic studies. In concrete terms, we refer to teachers'
nominations whom of their students they consider to be able to start academic studies
and, likewise, whom they consider to lack these prerequisites.3 For an explanation of the
emergence of these particular evaluations, a more detailed description of the social situ-
ation in the classroom is fruitful. Since teachers' evaluations will surely depend on their
respective expectations of students' prospective achievement, our aim is to specify the
2Some authors also use the term 'bridge hypotheses' to refer to speciﬁcations of the degree of actors'
rationality (e.g. Kelle and Lüdemann, 1995). We follow Kroneberg and Kalter (2012) in that we
would these latter statements as auxiliary assumptions in order to distinguish them from the bridge
assumptions associated with the logic of the situation.
3A more detailed description of our data and our dependent variable is given in section 3.
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relevant bridge hypotheses that are necessary to link these expectations and evaluations
to the conditions of the underlying social situation.
2.1 The Social Situation in the Classroom
In the literature on teachers' recommendations, it is assumed that the latter are actually
based on rational decisions and a 'correct' deﬁnition of the situation in order to ensure
these recommendations to be somehow optimal for the students (Ditton, 2007).4 In this
sense, a 'correct' deﬁnition of the situation should be shaped by the idea of meritocracy,
and it should consider both students' actual achievement and their future development
possibilities. In the words of David Bell (1972, p. 41f.), meritocracy is (...) the dis-
placement of one principle of stratiﬁcation by another, of ascription by achievement,
and it is this idea that is supposed to legitimize for the selective function of the educa-
tional system (Solga, 2005).5 Hence, we should keep in mind that when talking about
'rational' recommendations of the teachers, we always imply a kind of Weberian ideal
type (Weber, 1968, p. 19-22) of objectivity and rationality that might (and idealiter also
should) thoroughly serve as a frame for teachers' recommendations. However, all actual
recommendations will never be more than a subjective and thus more or less imperfect
realization of this ideal type of rationality.
In many  not all  German federal states ('Bundesländer'), teachers' recommen-
dations concerning the transition from primary to the three-tiered secondary school
(Hauptschule, Realschule, and Gymnasium) are legally binding.6 Because of the minor
permeability between lower and higher education within the stratiﬁed German school
system, there are only small chances to adjust an inaccurate (but nonetheless binding)
recommendation of the teacher or an inadequate parental transition decision during
students' future educational life course (see e.g. Glaesser and Cooper, 2011). Actu-
ally, teachers' recommendations are more or less accurate forecasts of students' future
achievement. One can expect them to be grounded on an evaluation of their actual
4Apart from Germany, we only know of the Netherlands and Switzerland as countries wherein students
receive an explicit recommendation by their primary school teachers with regard to secondary school
choice. In the Dutch case, teachers' recommendations are strongly inﬂuenced by students' results
in a (compulsory) national achievement test (Tolsma et al., 2010). Both criteria were introduced
in 1968 (in course of the Mammoth Law) in order to achieve a more meritocratic school system
(Dronkers, 1993). Several studies noted that, possibly due to a success of all integrative ambitions,
the eﬀect of students' social backgrounds on teachers' recommendations decreased over time (for a
review see Dronkers, 1983). In the Swiss canton Fribourg, transition recommendations at the end of
primary school (i.e. in 6th grade) have been introduced in the course of broader educational reforms
mid of the 1990s in order to foster transparency and to even out educational inequalities (Baeriswyl
et al., 2006, p. 378f.). Analyses based on student data from Fribourg indicate that in contrast to
Germany, the eﬀect of students' social backgrounds is partialed out when controls for achievement
go into the model (Baeriswyl et al., 2006; Trautwein and Baeriswyl, 2007).
5For theoretical and empirical critiques of the meritocratic argument see Kaplan and Kaplan (1997);
Breen and Goldthorpe (1999); Goldthorpe (2003); Goldthorpe and Jackson (2008) as well as Becker
and Hadjar (2011).
6For a more detailed description of the German educational system see Hillmert and Jacob (2010);
Jürges and Schneider (2006) as well as Pietsch and Stubbe (2007).
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performance, and on additional information about familial endorsement even spanning
students' prospective educational transitions. Thus, teachers' recommendations have far
reaching consequences for students' further life course.
However, with regard to teachers' evaluations in our data, which are  in contrast to
teachers' recommendations  neither made public to the students nor have a binding
character for them, an explanation based on a too narrow notion of rationality may fall
too short. One major reason is that these subjective evaluations lack any dependence
on structural necessities of the school system  meaning that teachers' subjective assess-
ments of students' academic ability will neither be inﬂuenced by assumptions about their
direct impact on students' transition decisions nor by outright norms of the respective
school environment.
In the American context, several studies argued that although even non-binding eval-
uations are relatively unbiased regarding students' actual performance (Hoge and Co-
ladarci, 1989; Ready and Wright, 2011), nonetheless, cultural diﬀerences between stu-
dents and their teachers might be an important factor in explaining teachers' evalua-
tions apart from achievement-related criteria (Alexander et al., 1987; Farkas et al., 1990;
Farkas, 2003; Ferguson, 2003; Downey and Pribesh, 2004; Morris, 2005). While in the
latter studies, these cultural diﬀerences were largely related to ethnic group membership,
in case of our data (German Gymnasium students surveyed in 1969), ethnic or racial
issues are unlikely to be a dominant factor. Yet there are arguments that even for the
speciﬁc kind of evaluations surveyed in our data, both achievement-related criteria and
students' social backgrounds might shape teachers' judgments. In particular, we strive
to provide a reconstruction of teachers' reasoning when evaluating their students by
referring to Esser's and Kroneberg's enhancement of Kahneman and Tversky's (1984)
early proposition of the framing approach towards a general theory of action (Esser,
1996, 2010; Esser and Kroneberg, 2010; Kroneberg, 2006; Kroneberg et al., 2008, 2010;
Kroneberg, 2011; Kroneberg and Kalter, 2012).
Concretely, a particular frame deﬁning an actor's social situation is usually given in
terms of an automatic-spontaneous mode (as-mode), but within each such frame, certain
scripts of action (and also actions themselves) may vary between a more habitual as-
mode and a more rational rc-mode depending on the deﬁnitional complexity of the
social situation.7 In the Cologne High School Panel (CHiSP), for the teachers, the
given frame of a survey-based assessment of students' prospective aptitude for academic
studies should be relatively doubtless (as-mode).
Regarding the more concrete scripts of action, one the one hand, the most obvious
(i.e. as-mode) script would be one that is consistent with the demand for professional
pedagogic diagnostics according to meritocratic criteria such as students' academic per-
formance. But in addition, several authors have argued that teachers can also be uncon-
sciously inﬂuenced by students' habitus (Bourdieu, 1986; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990)
in terms of schemes of perception as well as of communication and self-control strate-
7More precisely, the probability of an as-mode script to be activated is positively associated with its
general availability, its accessibility given the selection of a particular frame, and the match of that
frame to the social situation at hand (Kroneberg, 2006, p. 18; also see Kroneberg, 2011, p. 132).
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gies (De Graaf and De Graaf, 2002; De Graaf et al., 2000; De Graaf, 1986; DiMaggio,
1982; Dumais, 2006; Jaeger, 2009). Depending on each script's availability (Kroneberg,
2006, p. 18), a dominant as-mode script will approximate more to one of either types
of meritocracy and habitus. While taking up the general assumption of actors' vari-
able rationality (Kroneberg, 2005, 2006, 2011, 104-108), and in that case the idea of
unconscious status-related mental processes, we would refrain from adhering to all ide-
ological implications the concept of habitus has been revealed to comprise (cf. Lareau
and Weininger, 2003 and Goldthorpe, 2007).
On the other hand, for both meritocracy- and habitus-related scripts, teachers might
also ﬁnd entirely rational justiﬁcations why they ground their evaluations on certain cri-
teria (rc-mode). Concerning meritocracy, teachers could reﬂect that a student's current
school performance does only imperfectly correspond to her actual cognitive capabil-
ity and/or motivation that might nonetheless enable her to start academic studies at
university. Regarding students' social backgrounds, though of course not being in line
with the paradigm of meritocratic pedagogic diagnostics, teachers might hold the view
that service-class students might be more successful at university than working-class stu-
dents in that their parents, say having an academic background themselves, would be
more able to support them, or that they better match to the habitus of their university
teachers.8
In sum, we assume that in most cases, teachers ground their evaluations on meri-
tocratic criteria according to a relatively automatic as-mode processing type  which
can be distorted by unconscious status-related mental processes conventionally denoted
as habitus eﬀects. But the other hand, teachers may also refer to additional rational
justiﬁcations in terms of both meritocracy- and status-related characteristics.9
2.2 Determinants of Teachers' Evaluations
Academic performance Being perhaps the most visible criterion, the predictive va-
lidity of school grades as the most common indicator of students' academic performance
is, as several meta-analyses suggest, well-corroborated (Burton and Ramist, 2001; Kun-
cel et al., 2001; Morgan, 1989; Robbins et al., 2004). Although in Germany the value
of school grades for long-term recommendations has been discussed since the 1920s (cf.
Ingenkamp, 1971; Ziegenspeck and Lehmann, 1999), the average grades given by diﬀer-
8Elster (1983, pp. 69-71, 101-108) and Hedström (2005, p. 4) are quite critical about the analytic
precision of Bourdieu's notion of habitus. Collet (2009) and Yaish and Katz-Gerro (2012) are dissat-
isﬁed with a reduction of habitus on a merely unconscious, stimulus-response type of behavior. In
line with the idea of variable rationality, we assume that teachers may also rationally reﬂect about
status-related mental processes (habitus-rc-mode).
9Note that with the current data at hand, we are not able to test whether a given action script
of either theoretical concept is actually more close to the as-mode or more close to the rc-mode
of information processing. This is why the theoretical remarks above should be read more as a
theoretical elucidation than in terms of 'rigor' groundwork whereof testable hypotheses would be
deduced. However, in the conclusion section we will provide practical advice how empirical analyses
might further proceed to test the prevalence of either action script reliant on teacher background
variables and/or in a more comparative framework.
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ent teachers over a longer time span are at least a good predictor of students' future
academic success (Trapmann et al., 2007). Moreover, Arnold et al. (2007, p. 283) found
that students' grades in mathematics and German language taken together can account
for about two thirds of the total variance of teachers' recommendations. For both Ger-
many (Tiedemann and Billmann-Mahecha, 2007; Gröhlich and Guill, 2009; Milek et al.,
2009) and Switzerland (Trautwein and Baeriswyl, 2007), primary school teachers' tran-
sition recommendations were observed to be signiﬁcantly predicted by students' grades
even after controlling for class-level reference-group eﬀects. Since the former ﬁndings
are supported by American studies analyzing teachers' evaluations (Hughes et al., 2005;
Ready and Wright, 2011)10, and teachers' consideration of students' academic perfor-
mance can be expected to be their probably most dominant (as-mode) script of action,
we hypothesize:
H1: The better students' school grades, the higher their probability of obtaining a better
evaluation.
Cognitive ability According to Ingenkamp (1971), in the ﬁeld of transition from pri-
mary to secondary school, test results have always been used to compensate for the
fallibility of teachers' assessments.11 In terms of predictive validity, also more recent
studies highlight that standardized test scores would be more valid indicators than stu-
dents' school grades (Camara, 1998; Camara and Echternacht, 2000; Camara et al.,
2003).
Admittedly, cognitive capabilities can be regarded as the most important predictor of
school achievement, but a considerable empirical gap between test results and teachers'
evaluations can be detected notwithstanding: In their investigation of German primary
school teachers' transition recommendations, Arnold et al. (2007, p. 281) found that
students' reading literacy could account for only 31% of the variance of the teachers'
recommendations.
Nevertheless, a linear relationship between intelligence and the probability of obtaining
a particular teacher's recommendation to attend Gymnasium still holds  especially for
the verbal component of intelligence (Ditton, 2007). Moreover, both Tiedemann and
Billmann-Mahecha (2007) as well as Trautwein and Baeriswyl (2007) showed that apart
from grades, test results still aﬀect teachers' transition recommendations in Germany and
Switzerland  even when the models are controlled for class-level reference-group eﬀects.
While in the American context, most studies used students' test results as a measure of
their academic performance (see previous paragraph), Farkas et al. (1990) indeed found
teachers' evaluations to be considerably correlated with students' test results (while
10Alexander et al. (1987) and Farkas et al. (1990) analyzed how teachers' evaluations serve as a me-
diating variable between students' social backgrounds, their cognitive abilities, and their school
grades.
11Moede et al. (1919) and Bobertag and Hylla (1926) can be quoted as very early references for attempt-
ing to ground teachers' recommendations about school transition on the ground of standardized test
results.
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teacher-assigned grades were measured separately).12 As we argued in the theoretical
section, apart from students' academic performance, teachers might additionally try to
estimate students' cognitive ability in order to rationally (rc-mode) increase the validity
of their forecasts with regard to students' potential academic success at university. Thus
we hypothesize:
H2: The higher students' intelligence, the higher their probability of obtaining a better
evaluation.
Social backgrounds Although the impact of students' social background variables on
their school achievement is basically undoubted, both strength and importance of this
relationship is still discussed broadly (Becker, 2003; Becker and Hecken, 2009; Shavit
and Blossfeld, 1993; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Breen and Jonsson, 2000; Breen et al.,
2009, 2010; Erikson et al., 2005; Goldthorpe, 2003; Hillmert and Jacob, 2010; Schneider,
2008; Schubert and Becker, 2010; Stocké, 2007; Tolsma et al., 2010).
In general, the literature distinguishes between primary eﬀects of social inequality
which denote the impact of parental socioeconomic status (SES) on diﬀerences in stu-
dents' academic abilities, and secondary eﬀects of social inequality that capture diﬀer-
ences  primarily in educational aspirations  apart from actual diﬀerences in academic
abilities (Boudon, 1974).
As regards primary eﬀects, Arnold et al. (2007, p. 287) also observed that the odds to
attend Gymnasium is almost four times higher for higher service class children com-
pared to working class children. Having controlled for students' cognitive abilities and
reading literacy, these odds ratio reduces to 2.6. Hence, the diﬀerence between the two
values can be interpreted as the result of primary eﬀects of social inequality regard-
ing teachers' formation of their evaluations due to students' actual ability diﬀerences
(for similar results see Bos and Pietsch, 2004; Jürges and Schneider, 2006; Pietsch and
Stubbe, 2007; Tiedemann and Billmann-Mahecha, 2007 and Gröhlich and Guill, 2009).13
In American studies, signiﬁcant eﬀects of parental SES on teachers' evaluations are re-
ported by Alexander et al. (1987); Farkas et al. (1990); Downey and Pribesh (2004);
Hughes et al. (2005) and Ready and Wright (2011). These ﬁndings and the mechanisms
discussed in our theoretical section provide us with good reasons to test for the suppo-
sition that parental SES might also inﬂuence teachers' evaluations as measured in our
data:
H3: The higher the socioeconomic status (SES) of students' parents, the higher their
12However, although Farkas et al. (1990) provided a variety of regression models, no regression model
of the eﬀect of test results on teachers' evaluations net of other predictors was reported. Also note
that Farkas et al. (1990) used teachers' evaluations to operationalize students' habits and styles
according to Bourdieu's (1986) notion of cultural capital  which does not allow to estimate the
eﬀect of habitus-related processes on teachers' evaluations (if not measured in terms of grades).
13As mentioned above, in the Swiss study by Trautwein and Baeriswyl (2007), the eﬀect of parental
SES on teachers' transition recommendations is canceled out when analyses control for students'
grades, their motivation and their cognitive capabilities.
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probability of obtaining a better evaluation.
As regards secondary eﬀects, the the inadequacy of uni-factorial theories has been
prominently criticized (Boudon, 1974, p. 101). The crucial point of this critique about
merely one-factorial theories is that secondary eﬀects of social inequality are still present
after having controlled for all primary eﬀects. That is, regardless of diﬀerences in cog-
nitive abilities, working class children will still do less successfully in school because of
lower educational expectations and aspirations.14
Our assumption is that students' aspirations not only impact their educational tran-
sitions  but also, previously, their teachers' evaluations that might thoroughly have an
inﬂuence on the later transition decisions. The claim that this eﬀect takes place inde-
pendently of academic performance, cognitive abilities and even parental SES implies
that students' aspirations somehow aﬀect teachers' internalized norms and habits.
Several authors made use of students' aspirations to measure habitus-related compo-
nents (McClelland, 1990; Dumais, 2002, 2006; Andres, 2009)15, and also Morgan (2002,
p. 423) argues in favor of using aspirations in terms of an anticipation, based upon
the unconscious estimation of the objective probabilities of success (Bourdieu, 1973, p.
83). As outlined in section 2.1, if teachers have internalized certain norms and habits
quite strongly, the latter might automatically enter teachers' dominant script of action
in terms of an as-mode type of processing.
However, maintaining the idea of variable rationality as proposed by the MFS, teachers
could also ﬁnd rather rational arguments why students with certain social backgrounds
in general and certain aspirations in particular might do better (rc-mode).
In sum, on a conceptual level, eﬀects of students' aspirations on their educational
transitions are explained as a form of secondary eﬀects of social inequality in educational
opportunities. Regarding teachers' evaluations as an outcome, on a processual level, we
broaden the limited focus of the literature on merely habitual explanations by allowing
for teachers' rational reﬂections on students' aspirations as well.16
14Given education as an investment good (Goldthorpe, 1996, p. 494), the chief concern for each family
will be to achieve some kind of inter-generational stability of class positions. Hence, service-class
parents will be more likely than others to encourage their children to attain some kind of higher
education (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997). Reversely, for families in less advantaged positions, not
only less ambitious and less costly educational options would be adequate for the goal of maintaining
class stability  but also each failed attempt in obtaining higher educational levels is likely to be more
serious in its consequences (e.g. in terms of further opportunity costs which have to be shouldered).
Thus, a higher level of education will be aspired if the educational motivation to continue somehow
exceeds the underlying investment risk (also see Esser, 1999, pp. 265-275).
15Contrarily, van de Werfhorst and Hofstede (2007) are quite skeptic about the relation of students'
habitus to their aspirations, and the authors did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect in their regression
models. However, van de Werfhorst and Hofstede (2007) merely operationalized habitus in terms of
parental 'high brow' culture participation, and following a recent critique by Andersen and Hansen
(2012), this is a too narrow understanding of the concept since students' working habits and their
visible educational eﬀort would be excluded (also see Farkas et al., 1990).
16Once more we have to stress that when we make use of 'habitual' explanations, we do not buy all
implications associated with Bourdieu's concept of habitus. For instance, rational action theories
on social inequality in educational opportunities dissect the latter into stratum-speciﬁc diﬀerences
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Hence, our last hypothesis reads ass follows:
H4: The higher students' aspirations, the higher their probability of obtaining a better
evaluation.
3 Research Design
3.1 Data
All analyses will rely on a dataset which is known as the Cologne High School Panel
(CHiSP). The CHiSP consists of an initial survey from 1969 with N=3385 10th grade
high school (Gymnasium) students in North Rhine-Westphalia and three re-surveys in
1985 (N=1987), 1996/97 (N=1596), and 2010 (N=1301). In the initial survey, students
have been asked about issues like their performance, interests and plans in school, about
their social origin and their relationship to their parents. Simultaneously to the initial
survey, the students took part in an Intelligence S tructure T est (IST) which consists
of four sub-scales developed by Amthauer (1957). At the same time, also the students'
teachers (N=1701) and parents (N=2646) have been surveyed. The main items of the
parent questionnaire covered issues such as their social background, their child-raising
practices, and their educational and occupational aspirations for their children.17
3.2 Variables
Dependent variable In the CHiSP, teachers have been asked to evaluate by a dichoto-
mous decision whom of their students they suppose to be able for academic studies, and
whom of them not. Since this was an open-ended question, teachers could classify stu-
dents as being able, as being not able  or not at all.
This data structure causes two problems. First, each student could be evaluated by
more than one teacher, and each teacher could evaluate more than one student. An
concerning parents' or students' underlying cost-beneﬁt considerations (Boudon, 1974, p. 29ﬀ.;
Goldthorpe, 1996; Erikson and Jonsson, 1996; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997; Esser, 1999, p. 265-
275). While both in the latter studies as well as in the paper at hand, the less parsimonious
assumption of variation in the absolute value of education per se is abandoned, exactly this is what
cultural capital theorists in the tradition of Bourdieu (1986) maintain (McClelland, 1990; Dumais,
2002, 2006; Andres, 2009).
17In the ﬁrst re-survey in 1985, the former students  at that time about 30 years old  provided detailed
information about their private backgrounds and occupational careers beginning at the age of 15
until the age of 30. In the second re-survey in 1996/97, the time segment from the age of 30 until the
age of 43 was added to the data, and in the third re-survey in 2010, the time segment until the age of
55 followed. Apart from the former students' life courses, common focus of the questionnaires were
items about their biographical self-deﬁnition and -reﬂection, causal attribution, about the essential
role of particular areas of life, and about their attitudes towards family, work and politics. For a
general overview on the existing literature with the CHiSP data hitherto see Birkelbach (1998) and
Meulemann et al. (2001).
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analysis of the intra-class correlations (ICC) revealed a considerable variance of multiple
teachers' evaluations for each student (see Becker and Birkelbach, 2010). Second, the
question's openness might induce additional complication, because it has to be clariﬁed
whether the 'missing' category should really be considered as a missing value in statistical
terms  or if we were to lose substantial information when proceeding on this assumption.
To overcome the ﬁrst problem, our analyses will focus on evaluations only of class
teachers.18 To overcome the second problem, as a preliminary analysis we have estimated
two logistic regressions of the chance of getting a positive evaluation vs. getting a
negative one, or none at all, respectively, on the same independent variables which we
will use in our structural equation models. These results are displayed in the appendix
(tables B and C). We can note that for the analysis of the chance of getting a positive
evaluation vs. getting none at all (table C), the eﬀect sizes of all independent variables
are of the same sign, but notably lower than for the analysis of the chance of getting
a positive evaluation vs. getting a negative one (table B). This is also reﬂected in the
explained variances of the two models, which are notably higher for the models in table
B than for those in table C. Thus, we can conclude that students who have not been
mentioned at all rank lower in their teachers' perceptions than students with a positive
teacher evaluation, but higher than students with a negative teacher evaluation. To
get to the point: When teachers do not receive clear evidence for their decision, they
will shape only vague expectations for their students. Thus, in the subsequent structural
equation models we will treat the 'missing' category not as missing  but as being located
between teachers' positive and negative evaluations. Hence, our outcome will be coded
as follows: 1 'not able'; 2 'not mentioned'; 3 'able'.
Independent variables First, students' intelligence was measured by their scores in
an Intelligence S tructure T est (Amthauer, 1957) consisting of four sub-scales each re-
ﬂecting a distinct cognitive dimension (analogy, selection of words, series of numbers,
cube test). For the structural equation models we will use the z-transformed scores of
these sub-scales as a measure for the latent variable of students' intelligence (reﬂective
indicators; see Bollen and Lennox, 1991; MacCallum and Browne, 1993; Diamantopoulos
and Winklhofer, 2001).
Second, we control for students' academic performance in terms of their average
grades.19 Third, parental socioeconomic status (SES) will be operationalized as the max-
imum value of both mother's and father's education and occupational prestige (which
equals the dominance approach suggested by Erikson, 1984). Education was mea-
18We expect that the intra-individual variance of teachers' evaluations partially depends on the quality
of teacher-student relationships. We assume that class teachers have a more intense relationship to
and a better knowledge of their students than other teachers  which is why their evaluations should
be less error-prone (Raudenbush, 1984, p. 91). Thus, regarding only class teachers' evaluations
will both simplify the data structure and provide a lower-bound estimate in particular of the 'less
legitimate' predictors of teachers' evaluations.
19Note that according to the German grade system, an average grade below the median displays rela-
tively better marks and an average grade above the median relatively worse marks. To ensure that
higher variable values are associated with better marks, we inverted the variable.
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sured in twelve categories ranking from 1 'without graduation' to 12 'university degree'.
We categorized this variable into four dimensions (1 'lower'; 2 'middle'; 3 'higher'; 4
'degree'). Concerning occupational prestige, the data already contains the respective
Treiman prestige scores (Treiman, 1977).20
Finally, students' aspirations are measured by their appraisement whether 'Abitur' is
necessary to reach their aim in life  if any (1 'necessary'; 2 'not necessary, but useful';
3 'not necessary'). We dichotomized this variable into 0 'no aim in life / Abitur not
necessary'; 1 'Abitur useful or necessary'.21
3.3 Preliminary Path Structure and Plan of Analysis
Since we expect the independent variables to be correlated with each other consider-
ably, we intend to model these intercorrelations directly in our estimations. We expect,
ﬁrst, that students' intelligence will be able to explain part of the variance of their school
grades. Second, our considerations about the primary eﬀect of social inequality (Boudon,
1974) imply that parental SES will inﬂuence both students' intelligence and their school
grades. Third, to consider also the secondary eﬀect of social inequality, we assume an
impact of parental SES on students' aspirations. Fourth, it seems reasonable that higher
grades will foster students' aspirations  and reversely. Therefore, we will allow for a
covariance between those two variables. And ﬁnally, research about both Pygmalion
and self-fulﬁlling prophecies22 has shown that understanding teachers' evaluations as an
entirely endogenous variables would fall too short. This is why we will model the rela-
tionship between school grades and teachers' evaluations and the one between students'
aspirations and teachers' evaluations as covariances rather than as regression weights.
The preliminary path model is presented in ﬁgure 2.
20See Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996) for a general overview about classiﬁcation of occupations. An-
other possibility of dealing with parental SES would be to model all available information, i.e. all
four variables, as formative indicators of a latent variable 'SES' (Bollen and Lennox, 1991; MacCal-
lum and Browne, 1993; Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer, 2001). However, since the initial survey
of the CHiSP took place in 1969, we have to expect that a considerable amount of mothers would
not have been employed; hence, the variance of this variable would be rather low. Indeed, a brief
glance at the distribution of occupational prestige by gender revealed that an amount of 78% of all
mothers had not been in labour when they have been surveyed (not shown, available upon request).
As a consequence, the factor loadings of a conﬁrmatory factor analysis wherein we treated the four
SES variables as formative indicators were rather low (not shown, available upon request). Thus, we
consider introducing the maximum value of both mothers' and fathers' education and occupational
prestige as two single indicators to be a better strategy and to lead to more consistent estimates.
21Table A (appendix) lists minimum/maximum, mean and standard deviation of all variables.
22For the initial study of Pygmalion in the Classroom see Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968). For early
meta-analyses of existing studies about Pygmalion up to that point see Smith (1980) and Rau-
denbush (1984). For a more recent summary of implications and open questions in self-fulﬁlling
prophecy research see Jussim and Harber (2005).
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Figure 2: Preliminary path model.
3.4 Statistical Approach: Structural Equation Modeling
In order to take the complex path structure of the independent variables into account,
we ran a set of structural equation models.23 Since our dependent variable is categori-
cal, conventional maximum likelihood estimation based on a usual variance-covariance
matrix will be biased (Bollen, 1989, p. 433ﬀ). Instead, it has been suggested to use a
matrix of polychoric correlations (Olsson, 1979; Muthén, 1984; Aish and Jöreskog, 1990;
Jöreskog, 1994) as input matrix.24 The basic idea of polychoric correlations of cate-
gorical variables is to compute the thresholds of an hypothesized underlying continuous
variable. To get a comparable metric for all variables, we also categorized the ratio-
scaled variables in the data.25 For our model, we have dichotomized the IST sub-scores,
students' average grade and parental occupational prestige based on their respective
median. The polychoric correlation matrix is displayed in table D (appendix). We used
the SEM package in R (Fox, 2006) for our analyses.
23The SEM approach is also known as a LISREL model (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989; Jöreskog, 1993),
named after the ﬁrst statistical package which could deal with SEMs. Bollen (1989) is still the
classical textbook for structure equation models.
24Maximum-Likelihood estimation of SEM models based on polychoric correlations may lead to consis-
tent estimates, but the standard errors, z-values and signiﬁcance parameters will be biased (Bollen,
1989, p. 443). Therefore, we use bootstrapping techniques to correct the latter parameters (Zhang
and Browne, 2006; Fox, 2006).
25See Babakus et al. (1987) and Rigdon and Ferguson Jr (1991) for issues of convergence rates and ﬁt
statistics of polychoric correlations depending on diﬀerent types of categorization.
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4 Results
4.1 Measurement Part
Following the Jöreskog tradition (Byrne, 2004) in structural equation modeling, ﬁrst
of all the measurement model for the intelligence sub-scores was ﬁtted (ﬁgure 3).26
The reﬂective measurement model for the intelligence scores (IST) achieved a good ﬁt
with respect to the Adjusted General F it Index (AGFI = .996), the Comparative F it
Index (CFI = .992), the Root M ean Square E rror of Approximation (RMSEA =
0.018) and the S tandardized Root M ean Square Residual (SRMR = 0.008).27
The insigniﬁcant χ2-value of 4.226 (df=2) suggests that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence between the variance-covariance matrix of the observed variables and the model we
have estimated. Looking at the standardized estimates, we can observe that all except
one IST sub-dimensions show factor loadings around .45  .50. Only the cube test seems
to perform slightly worse in explaining the latent variable "intelligence".
intelligence
word test
analogy test
number test
cube test
.35
.52
.42
.45
Figure 3: IST measurement model.
26All regression weights and covariances that are displayed in this and the subsequent structural equa-
tion ﬁgures (ﬁgures 3-6) show corresponding z-values that fulﬁll a signiﬁcance value of p < .05 or
lower (two-tailed).
27The following cut-oﬀ values for the goodness-of-ﬁt criteria are convenient (Hu and Bentler, 1999; but
also see Chen et al., 2008): AGFI > .95, CFI > .90, and both RMSEA and SRMR < .08 (better
< .05).
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4.2 Structural Part
In the structural part, we will proceed in three subsequent steps that mainly follow
the order of our hypotheses in section 2.2: First, teachers' evaluations are regressed on
students' average grade. We label this model performance model 1. Second, this single-
arrow model is amended by the latent intelligence variable as it has been estimated in the
IST measurement model. This model is labeled performance model 2. Third, the SES
indicators are introduced in order to model the primary eﬀects of social inequality (SES
model). And ﬁnally, also students' aspirations are included also to model the secondary
eﬀects of social inequality (aspiration model). According to our theoretical consider-
ations, the indicators for both models may take eﬀect via both modes of information
processing.
Performance models The performance model 1 simply regresses teachers' evaluations
(1 = 'not able'; 2 = 'not mentioned'; 3 = 'able') on students' average grade. The
standardized covariance of these two variables is about .30; and since the model is
saturated, the ﬁt measures of PERF1 are perfect (table 1). Due to the simplicity of the
model, we see no need for graphical illustration.
Performance model 2 extends performance model 1 in adding students' latent intelli-
gence variable as a second exogenous variable (table 1, model PERF2a). In our theoret-
ical section, we expected that we might ﬁnd stronger or additional eﬀects for the verbal
part of our intelligence test. And indeed, modiﬁcation indices (Sörbom, 1989) suggested
to allow for a direct covariance between the IST sub-score measuring the analogy-based
dimension of intelligence and teachers' evaluations. Since it does not make much sense
to assume a cross-sectional impact of teacher evaluations on students' intelligence28, we
only allowed for a one-way relationship in terms of an impact of intelligence on teachers'
evaluations.29 Table 1 indicates that this step clearly improves the ﬁt of our model.
Moreover, ﬁrst we did not allow for a covariance between intelligence and average
grade  although, according to our theoretical considerations, we surely expected it to
exist. The ﬁt of the constrained model PERF2b was not very satisfactory, and thus we
followed our theoretical assumptions and allowed for a one-way coeﬃcient of intelligence
on average grade. The ﬁt of this model was a bit better (model PERF2c), but could still
be improved: Interestingly, modiﬁcation indices also suggested another direct eﬀect of
the analogy sub-score on students' average grade (which seems to conﬁrm our hypothesis
28In contrast, several studies modeled the Pygmalion eﬀect as a longitudinal impact of teachers' evalu-
ations on intelligence (e.g. Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968 and all studies analyzed in Smith, 1980).
Others focused on changes in school grades while controlling for intelligence (e.g. Smith et al., 1999).
Although we are not directly testing the self-fulﬁlling prophecy hypothesis, we will yet consider its
basic idea in terms of a covariance between teacher evaluations and school grades.
29Jöreskog (1993, p. 312) strongly recommends only to relax parameters which can be interpreted
substantively. In our case, two arguments seem to make sense. Possibly, the competence of a
student to draw analogy-based inferences is more applicable (and thus also more visible to teachers)
in school lessons than the other sub-dimensions of intelligence. Another explanation would be
that teachers rate students' competence in drawing analogy-based inferences particularly high with
respect to successfully completing academic studies.
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about the particular visibility of this sub-dimension of intelligence at school). This
model, PERF2d, is presented in ﬁgure 4. The numbers next to the arrows show the
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Figure 4: Performance model.
standardized path coeﬃcients, the factor loadings, and the covariances of the model,
respectively. Similar to our logistic regressions (cf. appendix, tables B and C), the
covariance between average grade and teachers' evaluations seems to be much larger than
the impact of students' intelligence scores (.40 vs. .20). Controlling also for intelligence,
we note that the relationship between intelligence and teachers' evaluations is mediated
by the intervening variable average grade (.15). It also seems noteworthy that the distinct
eﬀect of the IST sub-score measuring the analogy dimension of intelligence on average
grade (.10) is again not much smaller than the respective overall regression weight of the
latent variable intelligence (.15)  which is due to a drop-down of the latter from .43 in
the restricted model (not shown). The ﬁt of this model is convincing (cf. table 1, model
PERF2d).
SES model Now we introduce the maximum value of both highest parental educational
degree and occupational prestige as two single indicators in order to model the primary
eﬀects of social inequality explicitly. The initial ﬁt of this model is already acceptable
(see table 2, model SES1), and it could be improved slightly when the covariance be-
tween the two SES indicators was relaxed (model SES2). Another improvement could
be achieved when we allowed for the regression weights of the two SES indicators on the
latent intelligence variable (model SES3)  meaning an operationalization of primary
eﬀects of social inequality. Yet, in contrast to our theoretical model (ﬁgure 2), two co-
eﬃcients in the SES model turned out to lack statistical signiﬁcance: the coeﬃcient of
education on the overall latent intelligence variable, and the coeﬃcient of occupational
prestige on teachers' evaluations. Therefore, we subsequently dropped these regression
weights (models SES4 and SES5). Moreover, modiﬁcation indices suggested to intro-
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Table 1: Performance models: Fit measures
PERF1 PERF2a PERF2b PERF2c PERF2d
χ2 <.001 172.03 138.02 28.015 8.85
df 1 10 9 7 6
p(> χ2) 1 <.001 <.001 <.001 0.182
AGFI 1 0.966 0.97 0.992 0.997
RMSEA 0 0.069 0.065 0.03 0.012
CFI 1 0.912 0.93 0.989 0.998
SRMR 0 0.061 0.058 0.018 0.009
duce a direct eﬀect of parental education on the analogy sub-score of intelligence. Since
we already found direct eﬀects of this dimension on both average grade and teachers'
evaluations (see ﬁgure 4), which was in line with our theoretical considerations, we al-
lowed for this regression weight (model SES6). While models SES5 and SES6 still
contain occupational prestige as a covariate of education, we ﬁnally tested a model that
completely passed the former variable (model SES7). This model could achieve a better
ﬁt than SES6, and, according to Occam's razor's maxim of parsimoniousness, it is the
preferred model up to now (see ﬁgure 5).30 The direct eﬀect of parental education on
teachers' evaluations is about .10  which is the second smallest coeﬃcient in the model
up to now. Yet, we also have to keep in mind the indirect eﬀect in terms of the rela-
tionship between education, the IST analogy dimension and teachers' evaluations.31 The
covariance between students' average grade and teachers' evaluations is still the strongest
eﬀect in the model (.40), while  at least up to now  the impact of intelligence on teach-
ers' evaluations comes second (.26). Again, the eﬀect of the latent intelligence variable
on teachers' evaluations slightly increases when controlling for direct and indirect eﬀects
of parental education. Apparently, the predictive power of intelligence on teachers' eval-
uations becomes even stronger among students with the same social background. This
model yielded an entirely satisfactory ﬁt (table 2, model SES7 ).
Aspiration model In order to model also the secondary eﬀects of social inequality as
well as teachers' more or less conscious reﬂections on them, we ﬁnally included students'
aspirations measured by their dummy-coded appraisement if 'Abitur' is necessary to
30We tested three additional variants of models SES6 and SES7 (not shown, available upon request):
one with a regression weight of occupational prestige on average grade (not signiﬁcant), one with a
direct eﬀect of education on the latent IST variable rather than on the sub-score merely measuring
its analogy dimension (signiﬁcant, but worse model ﬁt), and one with regression weights of parental
education on both the latent IST variable and the analogy sub-score (which is signiﬁcant, but suﬀers
from multicollinearity). Because of these respective drawbacks we still prefer model SES7.
31The total eﬀect of parental education on teachers' evaluations is computed as .10 + (.11 · .08 · .4) +
(.11 · .13) ≈ .118.
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Figure 5: SES model.
Table 2: SES models: Fit measures
SES1 SES2 SES3 SES4 SES5 SES6 SES7
χ2 1563.100 78.170 69.152 69.394 75.486 38.477 22.746
df 19 18 16 17 18 17 11
p(> χ2) <.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 0.019
AGFI 0.835 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.994 0.995
RMSEA 0.155 0.031 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.019 0.018
CFI 0.556 0.983 0.985 0.985 0.983 0.994 0.994
SRMR 0.103 0.026 0.022 0.022 0.023 0.015 0.013
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reach their aim in life. The ﬁt of the initial model without allowing any additional
covariances or regression weights except the direct eﬀect of students' aspirations on
teachers' evaluations (table 3, model ASP1) could be improved when we allowed for a
regression weight of education on students' aspirations (model ASP2). Furthermore, we
postulated a direct eﬀect of intelligence on aspirations  which once more upgraded the
ﬁt of our model (model ASP3). Next to these additional arrows, we also hypothesized
a covariance between students' aspirations and their average grade. However, in the
model including this covariance, it turned out to lack statistical signiﬁcance (not shown,
available on request). Therefore, ASP3 is already our ﬁnal model (ﬁgure 6).
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Figure 6: Aspiration model.
The largest eﬀect in our model is still the covariance between average grade and teach-
ers' evaluations (.39) while the regression weight of the latent intelligence variable comes
second (.28). The covariance between students' aspirations and teachers' evaluations,
however, is far lower (.08). Aspirations, in turn, are signiﬁcantly predicted by parental
education (.10) and students' intelligence (.14). Given the size of the ﬁnal model, its ﬁt
is very satisfactory (table 3, model ASP3 ).
5 Summary and Outlook
In this paper, we analyzed the emergence of 10th class teachers' evaluations with regard
to students' prospective aptitude for academic studies.
In the theoretical section, we ﬁrst tried to locate teachers' evaluations within the un-
derlying social situation in the classroom (Coleman, 1990; Esser, 1993, 1996, 1999), and
we then synthesized available meritocratic and habitus-related explanations of teachers'
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Table 3: Aspiration models: Fit measures
ASP1 ASP2 ASP3
χ2 102.11 70.197 33.417
df 28 28 28
p(> χ2) <.001 <.001 .007
AGFI .985 .989 .995
RMSEA .037 .030 .018
CFI .959 .974 .992
SRMR .033 .028 .016
evaluations to a more general theory of action in terms of the M odel of F rame Selection
(MFS; Esser, 1996, 2010; Esser and Kroneberg, 2010; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984;
Kroneberg, 2006; Kroneberg et al., 2008, 2010; Kroneberg, 2011; Kroneberg and Kalter,
2012).
Subsequent to that endeavor, in a short literature review we derived four hypothe-
ses postulating that teachers' evaluations would be inﬂuenced by students' intelligence,
average grade, social backgrounds, and aspirations, respectively. Furthermore, we ex-
pected that some of these independent variables would show a path structure in terms
of additional regression weights or covariances between them (Figure 2).
This model was tested by means of the Cologne High School Panel (CHiSP, 1969).
From logistic regression analyses (tables B and C), we could already observe that stu-
dents' average grade has the strongest impact on (positive or negative) teachers' evalu-
ations  while their aspirations come second. Another result logistic regression pointed
to was that the category of receiving no evaluation at all apparently is located between
the category of obtaining a positive evaluation and the one of getting a negative one.
Therefore, for the subsequent structural equation models as our main analyses, we mod-
eled teachers' evaluations of their students' ability for academic studies as our dependent
variable in the following way: 1 'not able'; 2 'not mentioned'; 3 'able'.
In the structural equation models our main hypotheses were corroborated. Even when
controlling for the expected path structure, all of our (formally) independent variables
showed signiﬁcant eﬀects on teachers' evaluations. Average grade is still the strongest
predictor, but in contrast to preceding logistic regression analyses, now students' intel-
ligence comes second, and their aspirations come third.
In addition to our main hypothesisH2, we already found evidence in the literature that
the verbal dimension of intelligence might be more important for teachers' evaluations
than the numeric dimension. Indeed, we could observe independent eﬀects of the analogy
sub-score of intelligence on both average grade and teachers' evaluations. If one would
try to link that ﬁnding back to our theoretical considerations rooted in the MFS, this
dimension could at least partially reﬂect either a meritocracy-based rc-mode or even a
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habitus-based as-mode of processing.32
But compared to the initial path model, we also had to drop several arrows due to lack
of signiﬁcance: First, we did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant regression weight of parental education
on the overall latent intelligence variable. However, we could note a signiﬁcant impact of
parental education on the analogy sub-score of intelligence. Since this variable showed
independent eﬀects on both average grade and teachers' evaluations, we conclude that
the primary eﬀect of social inequality is mainly passed on via this predictor. Second, we
could not ﬁnd any direct eﬀects of parental occupational prestige on students' average
grade. Apparently, in our socially selective sample  recall that our observations are
(predominantly upper-class) Gymnasium students  the primary eﬀect of social inequal-
ity is exhaustively modeled when we control for the indirect eﬀect of parental SES via
intelligence on average grade. The third arrow we had to drop concerned the regression
weight of parental occupational prestige on students' aspirations. This indicates that by
controlling for parental education, all social background eﬀects on students' aspirations
are already modeled.
In sum, we can conclude that although indicators for all four types of theoretical con-
cepts showed statistical signiﬁcance, results conﬁrmed our expectations that the meri-
tocracy explanation  be it based on rc-mode or as-mode scripts  shows more predictive
power than the explanation based on habitus-related criteria. Yet, both the empirical
dominance of students' average grade in our models and the fact that the verbal di-
mension of intelligence showed additional path coeﬃcients on both average grade and
teachers' evaluations might underline the particular importance of the as-mode type of
meritocratic reasoning.
These results suggest the following implications for further studies: First, the under-
lying social mechanisms of the emergence of teachers' evaluations have to be further
examined. Future studies should try to sharpen the distinction between rc-mode and
as-mode processing type explanations as we have transferred it on the social situation
in the classroom.
Clearly, this approach needs the consideration of more background variables. On the
one hand, the set of student variables in our analyses might be no exhaustive operational-
ization of the student side of the social situation in the classroom. Thus, it would make
sense to include additional information such as students' grades in diﬀerent subjects or
their academic self-concept in order to specify the social situation in the classroom more
concretely.
Moreover, we already indicated that although at ﬁrst sight, it appears reasonable
to interpret the additional path coeﬃcient of the analogy sub-score on both students'
academic performance and teachers' evaluations in line with an automatically-driven
meritocratic form of reasoning, at a second glance, these arrows might also emerge by
virtue of unconscious, symbolic communication among teachers and students usually
referred to as eﬀects of habitus : Recapitulating our theoretical considerations strictly in
the latent variable framework, only one of our lower-level concepts intelligence, academic
32Below we discuss why we see arguments for either mode of processing, and we propose a method how
to decide which mode of processing may be the actual drive for this arrow.
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performance, parental SES and students aspirations was actually measured as a latent
variable, namely students' intelligence. Thus, both students' academic performance and
their social backgrounds  more or less consciously observed by their teachers  were
operationalized by single manifest indicators that probably did not control suﬃciently for
measurement error. In other words, students' objective academic performance should be
understood as a latent variable which is only approximately measured by their average
grades. The latter, in turn, are nothing but the result of a speciﬁc form of teachers'
evaluations which may themselves be distorted by unconscious, habitus-related criteria
that operate in addition to teachers' meritocratic considerations. We expect that we
probably would ﬁnd supplemental eﬀects of both the verbal dimension of intelligence and
our measure of academic performance on our indicators of students' social backgrounds
 currently only in part reﬂecting teachers' unconscious mental processes  if we could
provide a more detailed operationalization of the eﬃcacy of habitus (e.g. in terms of
students' cultural capital, their cultural practices, etc.) than we were able to measure
with our data at hand.33 In concrete terms, we demand from further studies to test
for a second-order factor model (Chen et al., 2005; Rindskopf and Rose, 1988) with
students' habitus as the higher-level factor, and parental SES, students' aspirations and
their cultural capital as lower-level factors that should be operationalized by appropriate
indicators, respectively.34
On the other hand, if one would really want to disentangle the conditions determining
in which situations teachers' scripts of action tend to follow either a more automatic or
a more rational mode of information processing  which we solely sketched for theoret-
ical elucidation purposes , it will be inevitable also to control for teacher background
variables. Future studies should try to ﬁnd variables such as teachers' pedagogic con-
cepts, their attitudes towards educational inequality or measures of teachers' success
attribution that explain why a particular teacher follows a certain dominant script of
action. Furthermore, teachers' backgrounds should ideally cover indicators of the sym-
bolic processes usually referred to as eﬀects of habitus as well: Only if both students'
and teachers' habitus are measured adequately, a ﬁnal decision about habitus match or
mismatch will be possible. Methodologically, controlling also for teachers' backgrounds
33See Kingston (2001), Lareau and Weininger (2003), and, recently, Andersen and Hansen (2012) for a
critical assessment of cultural capital usage in educational research.
34DiMaggio (1982) and De Graaf (1986) used exploratory factor analysis to measure families' cultural
capital, but to the best of our knowledge, a conﬁrmatory factor model of the notion of habitus
in a broader sense is still missing. McClelland (1990), Dumais (2002, 2006) and Andres (2009)
operationalized habitus by students' aspirations, but as Dumais (2002, p. 51) herself acknowledged,
single-indicator measures for habitus are far from perfect (also see Reay, 2004, p. 440f.). Andres
(2009) made use of a path model to test the interrelations between social backgrounds, diﬀerent
forms of capital and dispositions; but although claimed in his theoretical section, no analytical
operationalization of habitus was given in his measurement part. In this attempt, further studies may
also refer to the theoretical concepts used by social psychology that oﬀer a whole bunch of literature
about the prediction of behavior by attitudes (for meta-analyses see Glasman and Albarracín, 2006;
Kim and Hunter, 1993a,b; Kraus, 1995; Wallace et al., 2005). However, although Acock and Scott
(1980) already modeled attitudes as being aﬀected by social class, more recent psychological studies
apparently neglected this endogeneity.
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would equal a multilevel structural equation model (Bauer, 2003; Heck, 2001; Muthén,
1994; Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004, 2007) wherein both students and teachers' evaluations
are nested in teacher contexts.
And ﬁnally, the theoretical and methodological propositions oﬀered here would cer-
tainly gain from a more comparative framework.35 Provided that reliable indicators
allowing to disentangle both modes of processing from each other can be found, it would
be illuminating to see whether the potential prevalence of either one is contingent upon
diﬀerences in social selectivity between educational systems, or upon changes in social se-
lectivity and/or saturation within a given one (for an overview see Shavit and Blossfeld,
1993).
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Table A: Descriptive results
valid mean stdev min max
teachers' evaluations 2427 2.06 0.75 1 3
1 'not able'
2 'not mentioned'
3 'able'
sex 3385 1.47 0.5 1 2
1 'male'
2 'female'
intelligence scores (overall in-
dex)
3230 110.45 11.35 76 151
analogy test 3230 111.66 11.66 77 152
analogy test (dichotomized) 3230 0.5 0.5 0 1
0 'below median'
1 'above median'
word test 3230 106.39 10.53 70 138
word test (dichotomized) 3230 0.48 0.5 0 1
0 'below median'
1 'above median'
number test 3230 106.82 10.93 80 147
number test (dichotomized) 3230 0.45 0.5 0 1
0 'below median'
1 'above median'
cube test 3230 103.21 10.76 73 140
cube test (dichotomized) 3230 0.47 0.5 0 1
0 'below median'
1 'above median'
average grade 3227 499.98 69.22 221 703
average grade (dichotomized) 3227 0.5 0.5 0 1
0 'above median'
1 'below median'
parental education (highest) 3374 2.14 1.23 1 4
1 'lower'
2 'middle'
3 'Abitur'
4 'degree'
occ. prestige (highest) 2687 49.37 12.63 18 78
occ. prestige (highest, di-
chotomized)
2687 0.47 0.5 0 1
0 'below median'
1 'above median'
aspirations 2543 2.43 0.71 1 3
0 'no aim in life / Abitur
not necessary'
1 'Abitur useful or neces-
sary'
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Table B: Logistic regression: Able vs. not able
Performance Model 1 Performance Model 2 SES Model Aspiration Model
eb/z eb/z eb/z eb/z
constant 1.06 0.57* 0.30*** 0.19***
(0.29) (-2.41) (-4.08) (-5.18)
sex 0.77* 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.58***
(-2.21) (-4.51) (-3.79) (-3.31)
intelligence 3.04*** 2.33*** 2.84*** 2.79***
(9.52) (6.13) (6.60) (6.43)
average grade 12.35*** 13.20*** 12.93***
(17.75) (15.82) (15.55)
parental education 1.19* 1.16
(2.29) (1.93)
parental occ. prestige 1.56* 1.59*
(2.44) (2.52)
aspirations 1.90***
(3.78)
Nagelkerke's R2 0.10 0.42 0.46 0.47
N 1314 1309 1067 1063
All coeﬃcients are odds ratios. Z-values in parentheses. Signiﬁcance values: * (p < .05); ** (p <
.01); *** (p < .001).
Table C: Logistic regression: Able vs. not mentioned
Performance Model 1 Performance Model 2 SES Model Aspiration Model
eb/z eb/z eb/z eb/z
constant 0.58*** 0.28*** 0.15*** 0.12***
(-3.30) (-6.83) (-8.15) (-8.20)
sex 0.95 0.84 1.00 1.02
(-0.56) (-1.60) (-0.02) (0.16)
intelligence 1.77*** 1.56*** 1.79*** 1.76***
(5.71) (4.17) (4.93) (4.73)
average grade 4.56*** 4.72*** 4.63***
(13.41) (12.27) (12.10)
parental education 1.15* 1.13*
(2.41) (2.19)
parental occ. prestige 1.07 1.08
(0.46) (0.54)
aspirations 1.27
(1.79)
Nagelkerke's R2 0.03 0.17 0.19 0.19
N 1720 1716 1412 1406
All coeﬃcients are odds ratios. Z-values in parentheses. Signiﬁcance values: * (p < .05); ** (p <
.01); *** (p < .001).
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III. Intelligence and Academic
Achievement as Contextual-Level
Predictors of Teachers' Evaluations:
Big Fish Little Pond or Reﬂected Glory Eﬀect?
(with Klaus Birkelbach)
The Big Fish Little Pond eﬀect (BFLPE) suggests that regardless of their in-
dividual ability, students show lower self-conﬁdence in classes with a high average
ability  which in turn causes a signiﬁcant decrease in individuals' school perfor-
mance. Conversely, the Reﬂected Glory eﬀect (RGE) hypothesis postulates that
upward comparisons lead to a more critical self-evaluation, an enhancement of
motivation and thus to an increase in school performance. Our theoretical contri-
bution is that we ﬁrst test whether comparable reference-group eﬀects on teachers'
evaluations vary by both student-level achievement and teachers' frames of refer-
ence in terms of their grading concepts. Our methodological contribution is that we
use a cross-classiﬁed design where, ﬁrst, teachers' evaluations are the lowest unit
of analysis which is nested in both student- and teacher-level contexts. We then
introduce class-level indicators as an additional higher-level unit. Results based on
the initial survey of the Cologne High School Panel (1969/70) indicate that i) both
class-level socioeconomic status and achievement increase students' probability of
obtaining a positive evaluation; ii) this positive eﬀect signiﬁcantly interacts with
student-level achievement; iii) but not with teachers' grading concepts.
1 Introduction
Although there is a non-negligible controversy in educational psychology whether 'grade
point average' (GPA) or 'intelligence' has a higher predictive validity for students' later
educational course of life, the fact that both theoretical concepts are signiﬁcant is essen-
tially undisputed (Burton and Ramist, 2001; Camara, 1998; Camara and Echternacht,
2000; Camara et al., 2003; Kuncel et al., 2001; Morgan, 1989; Robbins et al., 2004).
However, teachers also ground the evaluations of their students on factors other than
students' actual achievement1  and they may even communicate this to the students
1In this paper, the term 'achievement' covers both students' intelligence and their GPA, which we will
introduce as two diﬀerent achievement indicators in the operationalization section.
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and their parents. In this study, we aim to shed light on how the emergence of a speciﬁc
kind of evaluation  i.e. teachers' assessment whom of their 10th class students they
believe to be able for academic studies, and whom of them not  might be aﬀected by
reference-group eﬀects and their cross-level interactions with both student- and teacher-
level variables.
Although the evaluations that have been surveyed in our data, the Cologne H igh
School Panel (CHiSP), were never explicitly communicated either to the students or
their parents, several studies suggest that even rather implicit teacher assessments may
be insinuated in day-to-day school life and thus could aﬀect students' self-concept as well
(Brophy and Good, 1974; Brattesani et al., 1984; Good and Brophy, 2003). Therefore,
in the long run, even unjustiﬁed evaluations by teachers may prove themselves to be
true in terms of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy (Merton, 1948; Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968;
Jussim and Harber, 2005; Becker, 2010; Birkelbach, 2011).
While the analysis of student-level predictors of teachers' evaluations has been of
interest in educational sociology at least since Alexander et al. (1987), applying the
framework of reference-group eﬀects on teachers' evaluations started with Tiedemann
and Billmann-Mahecha (2007) and Trautwein and Baeriswyl (2007). In line with these
research traditions, the crucial questions in our study are i) to what extent do teachers'
evaluations in our data actually depend on reference-group eﬀects apart from student-
level predictors, and ii) how strongly do potential sizes of suchlike eﬀects vary with both
student- and teacher-level variables.
Research analyzing the impact of class- or school-level predictors on students' self-
concept and/or achievement usually trades under the name of Big-Fish-Little-Pond ef-
fects (BFLPE ; in case of a negative contrast process) or Reﬂected Glory eﬀect (RGE ; in
case of a positive assimilation process) studies. While the initial study of Davis (1966),
The Campus as a Frog Pond2, and several sociological follow-ups (Meyer, 1970; Alexan-
der and Eckland, 1975) analyzed contextual-level eﬀects on educational outcomes such as
high school attainment or college aspirations, beginning with Marsh and Parker (1984),
students' self-concept became the main dependent variable.
In spite of Marsh's (1991) intention to broaden this interimly narrowed focus again by
applying the logic of reference-group eﬀects to an extended range of outcome variables3,
there were only few attempts to replicate Marsh's (1991) framework. Thus, more recent
studies (Plucker et al., 2004; Rindermann and Heller, 2005) still criticize the focus of
most BFLPE studies on students' self-concept as being too narrow.
A second disregard in BFLPE -alike studies is that although already Davis (1966)
stressed the need for an analysis of the underlying educational climates that may con-
tribute to observable diﬀerences between schools (or classes; also see Marsh, 1991; Marsh
and O'Mara, 2010), only Lüdtke et al. (2005) included an indicator for teachers' frames
2While Davis (1966) called the observed reference-group eﬀect 'Frog Pond' eﬀect, we will refer to it as
the 'Big-Fish-Little-Pond eﬀect'  which is the established term nowadays (Marsh, 1987; Trautwein
and Lüdtke, 2005; Dai and Rinn, 2008; Marsh et al., 2008).
3These outcomes included students' academic and general self-concept, course-work selection, academic
eﬀort, educational and occupational aspirations, school grades, standardized test scores, college
attendance, and students' aspirations two years after high school.
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of reference (TFR).
Recently, several Swiss and German studies tested how reference-group eﬀects inﬂu-
ence the emergence of primary school teachers' transition recommendations (Tiedemann
and Billmann-Mahecha, 2007; Trautwein and Baeriswyl, 2007; Gröhlich and Guill, 2009;
Milek et al., 2009). However, none of these analyses tested for potential moderating
eﬀects of TFRs (which is even more surprising than in the case of the classical BFLPE
studies in the tradition of Marsh and Parker, 1984). Furthermore, in contrast to existing
BFLPE research with students' self-concept as an outcome (Marsh et al., 1995; Marsh
and Rowe, 1996; Marsh et al., 2001; Marsh and Hau, 2003), the above-mentioned studies
lack consideration of cross-level interaction terms testing whether class-level achievement
generalizes across student ability levels.
Hence, our theoretical contribution is that we extend existing research i) by shedding
light on potential reference-group eﬀects concerning the emergence of teachers' 10th
class evaluations of their students' expected success at university; and ii) by including
measures for TFRs and their interaction with our class-level achievement predictors as
well as iii) cross-level achievement interaction terms.
Our methodological contribution is that we test this model by means of a more complex
multilevel framework where teachers' evaluations are nested in both student and teacher
contexts, which are in turn nested in school classes.
In the following sections, we ﬁrst discuss the main ﬁndings from BFLPE research,
and related evidence about reference-group eﬀects concerning primary school teachers'
transition recommendations whereupon we ground our hypotheses regarding 10th class
teachers' evaluations.4 In this context, we especially emphasize the hypothesized coun-
terbalancing eﬀect of BFLPE and RGE which are supposed to operate simultaneously
(Marsh et al., 2000)5, and we deduce hypotheses about both student-level and teacher-
level moderators of class-average achievement eﬀects on teachers' evaluations. In a short
paragraph, we provide a brief review of potential student-level predictors of teachers'
transition recommendations which we aim to include in terms of covariates. Next, we
present our empirical models that result in cross-classiﬁed multilevel analyses with three
diﬀerent predictor levels. After the discussion of our ﬁndings, we conclude with a brief
summary and several recommendations for future analyses.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
In the US context, the analysis of teachers' evaluations has mainly focused on cultural
diﬀerences due to racial matching or mismatching between students and their teachers
(Alexander et al., 1987; Farkas et al., 1990; Downey and Pribesh, 2004). In Germany,
there is a great deal of literature on the formation of primary-school teachers' transition
4Given that these kind of partly binding evaluations at the end of primary school are most prominent in
Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germany, we will primarily refer to ﬁndings from these countries.
5Our sample consists of German highest-track students only, and in the original BFLPE framework
with students' self-concept as an outcome, the latter was found to be positively aﬀected by attendance
of higher-status schools.
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recommendations to their students (see e.g. Arnold et al., 2007; Baumert et al., 2007; Bos
and Pietsch, 2004; Ingenkamp, 1977, 1993; Lehmann et al., 1997; Jürges and Schneider,
2006; Pietsch and Stubbe, 2007). These recommendations describe the appropriate
secondary school track choice for each student at the end of primary school. Drawing
on ﬁndings from BFLPE research, more recently, reference-group eﬀects on primary-
school teachers' transition recommendations have also been analyzed (Trautwein and
Baeriswyl, 2007; Tiedemann and Billmann-Mahecha, 2007; Gröhlich and Guill, 2009;
Milek et al., 2009). Before we will use results from these studies to deduce reference-
group hypotheses regarding 10th class teachers' evaluations in our data, a more extensive
discussion of BFLPE research in general appears to be reasonable.
2.1 Class-Level Predictors
The well-known study by Davis (1966) is usually referred to as being the ﬁrst anal-
ysis which revealed that students' educational outcomes may be inﬂuenced not only
by individual-level predictors but by school-level variables as well.6 Applying the the-
ory of relative deprivation by Samuel A. Stouﬀer, Davis (1966) found evidence for his
hypothesis that there is a negative relationship between school quality  measured by
school-average test scores  and both students' grade point average and their college
aspirations once students' individual-level ability is controlled for. Shortly after, Meyer
(1970) provided a joint analysis of both the positive eﬀect of school-level socioeconomic
status (SES) and the negative eﬀect of school-level ability on students' college inten-
tions  whereas Alexander and Eckland (1975) observed that school-level eﬀects on both
mid- and long-term educational outcomes are particularly mediated by direct eﬀects on
students' educational performance (also see Alwin and Otto, 1977).
Given these more sociological analyses, starting with Marsh and Parker (1984), how-
ever, primarily scholars in the ﬁeld of social psychology became interested in the eﬀect
of school-level predictors  which might explain why students' self-concept emerged
to be the crucial outcome in reference-group eﬀect research. While negative school-
average ability eﬀects on students' self-concept were labeled as Big-Fish-Little-Pond
eﬀects (BFLPE), positive eﬀects of school-average social status are denoted as Reﬂected-
Glory eﬀects (RGE).
In the following, we will discuss the main ﬁndings from empirical tests of both (compet-
ing and/or counterbalancing) hypotheses, and how these may be related to our outcome,
teachers' evaluations of students' prospective university success.
2.1.1 Big-Fish-Little-Pond (Or Contrast) Hypothesis
The crucial idea of BFLPE is that students may still diﬀer in their academic self-concept
even when controlling for their own cognitive abilities due to varying average class-level
achievement: A student with given cognitive ability in a low-level learning environment
may consider herself to be kind of a big ﬁsh, i.e. comparably well-positioned, while in
6However, Meyer (1970) provides a review of even earlier studies.
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a high-level learning environment, she might be equipped with a more negative self-
concept. This leads to the paradoxical implication that talented students may develop a
lower self-concept when sent to gifted schools, which might in turn have a negative impact
on their school achievement due to the reciprocal relationship between self-concept and
academic performance (Marsh et al., 2005; Marsh and Craven, 2006).
This basic idea is empirically well-founded (e.g. Marsh and Parker, 1984; Marsh, 1987;
McFarland and Buehler, 1995; Zeidner and Schleyer, 1998; Lüdtke et al., 2005; Rinder-
mann and Heller, 2005; Trautwein et al., 2006; Seaton et al., 2010; Thijs et al., 2010)7,
long-lasting (Marsh et al., 2000, 2001, 2007; Marsh and O'Mara, 2010), and generalizable
i) across countries (Marsh and Hau, 2003; Seaton et al., 2009), ii) across students' ability
levels (Marsh et al., 1995; Marsh and Rowe, 1996; Marsh et al., 2001; Marsh and Hau,
2003), and iii) also to other outcomes apart from self-concept both in education (Marsh,
1991; Marsh and O'Mara, 2010) and beyond (e.g. Chanal et al., 2005; Trautwein et al.,
2008).
It is often argued that teachers are inﬂuenced by reference-group eﬀects as well
(Reuman, 1989; Pallas et al., 1994; Lüdtke et al., 2005). Consequently, regarding the
generalizability of BFLPE in educational settings, several studies found that students'
school grades are indeed aﬀected in this manner (Alwin and Otto, 1977; Marsh, 1991;
Trautwein et al., 2006). Several more recent German and Swiss studies applied the idea
of reference-group eﬀects on primary school teachers' transition recommendations re-
garding students' secondary school choice. Trautwein and Baeriswyl (2007) observed a
negative eﬀect of school-class ability on teachers' transition recommendations even when
controlling for class-level SES (which itself did not reach statistical signiﬁcance) based on
a sample of N = 7416th grade students in the Swiss canton Fribourg. However, this eﬀect
was mediated by teachers' evaluations of both students' academic performance and some
motivation-related covariates. Drawing on the Hanover Elementary School Study 2000
(N = 620 students), Tiedemann and Billmann-Mahecha (2007) also found that teachers'
transition recommendations were negatively aﬀected by class-mean spelling achievement
and class-mean cognitive abilities. In their analysis of the German KESS (Kompetenzen
und E instellungen von Schülerinnen und Schülern) data (N = 11.356), Gröhlich and
Guill (2009) only observed negative eﬀects of students' 4th grade class-mean math abil-
ity, but not of class-mean reading ability on teachers' transition recommendations at the
end of primary school. However, the former eﬀect was completely mediated by students'
individual academic performance. And ﬁnally, exactly the same pattern  a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect of class-level ability that was mediated by students' school grades  was
corroborated by Milek et al. (2009) in their analysis of the German PIRLS-E sub-sample.
Hence, aside from potential mediators, we assume that a similar reference group eﬀect
might aﬀect teachers' evaluations of their students' future academic aptitude, moving
teachers to lower their standards in classes with a lower average achievement:
H1: In low-achievement classes, students have a higher probability of obtaining a better
7For further research overviews and related discussions see Trautwein and Lüdtke (2005); Dai and
Rinn (2008); Dijkstra et al. (2008) and Marsh et al. (2008).
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evaluation by their teachers than in high-achievement classes (and vice versa).
2.1.2 Reﬂected-Glory (Or Assimilation) Hypothesis
Despite strong empirical support for the BFLPE (see references above), already Marsh
(1987) highlighted that the negative eﬀect of school- or class-level achievement on stu-
dents' academic self-concept is actually a net eﬀect of both counterbalancing (negative)
BFLPE and a (positive) Reﬂected Glory eﬀect (RGE) at the same time. While the
former usually assumes a mechanism of deprivation (Davis, 1966) or a contrast eﬀect
(Marsh and Parker, 1984, and ensuing studies), RGE expects a mechanism of assimila-
tion.
In the eponymous study by Cialdini et al. (1976), the authors demonstrated that
students were more likely to identify with their university's football team when the
latter was playing successfully. Similarly, it is not unlikely that attending high ability
and/or high status classes or schools could also positively aﬀect students' self-concept.
This is why Marsh (1987) argued that the observed negative BFLPE is in fact an eﬀect
net of RGE.
While the early sociological studies already found positive eﬀects of a school's status
on students' educational aspirations (Meyer, 1970; Alexander and Eckland, 1975; Alwin
and Otto, 1977), and although Marsh and Parker (1984) and Marsh (1987) controlled for
school-level SES8, later BFLPE studies usually disregarded this important contextual-
level predictor until it was reintroduced by Marsh et al. (2000). The latter authors were
able to juxtapose BFLPE and RGE by demonstrating that while the eﬀect of school
status itself was positive, the eﬀect of school-average achievement on students' academic
self-concept turned out to be more negative when school status was controlled for.9
Regarding teachers' recommendations as an outcome, only two of the above-cited stud-
ies explicitly considered contextual-level SES: First, Tiedemann and Billmann-Mahecha
(2007) found that class-level parental educational background  suboptimally measured
by teachers' estimates of parental educational aspirations  aﬀect primary school teach-
ers' transition recommendations only at the .10 signiﬁcance level. However, no expla-
nation about the particular mechanism (which can be assumed to diﬀer from the one
implied in conventional BFLPE studies with students' self-concept as an outcome) was
speciﬁed. Second, Gröhlich and Guill (2009) observed that class-level SES only positively
aﬀected teachers' transition recommendations in a signiﬁcant way when class-average
8Note that the results of Marsh and Parker (1984) and Marsh (1987) are not really consistent with the
above-cited sociological studies and later ﬁndings by Marsh et al. (2000), though. Marsh and Parker
(1984) observed a negative eﬀect of school-level SES on students' self-concept; and also Marsh (1987)
reported a (weak) negative eﬀect in their path models. However, the raw bivariate correlation noted
in Marsh (1987) was positive. Other notable inconsistencies relate to modeling school classes vs.
entire schools as the unit of analysis, and to the usage of objective (Marsh and Parker, 1984) vs.
subjective (Marsh et al., 2000; Trautwein et al., 2009) contextual status measures.
9Other attempts of juxtaposing BFLPE and RGE referred to potentially intervening learning envi-
ronments (McFarland and Buehler, 1995; Marsh et al., 2001) which will be discussed in the context
of potential teacher-level moderators.
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ability was controlled for. The fact that the eﬀect of class-level SES was signiﬁcant even
though it considerably correlated with class-level student achievement was interpreted
as a hint that parents particularly strive for higher track transition recommendations in
high-SES classes  which they do in such a way that even low-SES students beneﬁt from
it (Gröhlich and Guill, 2009, p. 167).
With regard to the kind of evaluations in our data that were neither made public nor
were binding for the students, neither a mechanism of true 'reﬂected glory' nor the one
indicated by Gröhlich and Guill (2009) appears to be plausible. Instead, we suppose that
in our case, the mechanism behind the RGE hypothesis could be described more precisely
as a particular form of a halo eﬀect (Thorndike, 1920): In high-SES classes, teachers
might project higher parental educational aspirations  independently of whether they
are true or just implied by the teachers  on the students from lower strata as well,
which induces them to assigning more positive evaluations on average. The opposite
relationship should also hold: In low-SES classes, teachers' evaluations might likewise
be downwardly biased with regard to higher-SES students as well. Therefore, for our
measure of teachers' evaluations we hypothesize:
H2: In high-SES classes, students have a higher probability of obtaining a better eval-
uation by their teachers than in low-SES classes (and vice versa).
Although conventional BFLPE research explaining students' academic self-concept as
an outcome always found negative average achievement eﬀects even when controlling
for contextual-level SES  thus regarding the relation between BFLPE and RGE as
counterbalancing , we have good reason to assume that in our case, even a competing
RGE hypothesis could be warranted:
Similar to the mechanism of a Halo eﬀect regarding the hypothesized positive class-
level SES eﬀect as outlined above, teachers in high-achievement classes may have a more
positive attitude towards the whole class which they project onto the weaker students
as well. We particularly assume that since our sample consists of highest-track (i.e.
Gymnasium) students only, teachers could be upwardly biased a priori  which is why
the gross eﬀect of academic achievement on teachers' evaluations could also be positive:
H3: In high-achievement classes, students have a higher probability of obtaining a
better evaluation by their teachers than in low-achievement classes (vice versa).
2.2 Interaction Eﬀects
While the preceding hypotheses regarded teachers' evaluations as an outcome, we addi-
tionally test for cross-level interaction eﬀects (Hox, 2010, pp. 31-36, 63-69; also called
slopes-as-outcome approach; see Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992, p. 21), i.e. whether the
eﬀect of class-average achievement on teachers' evaluations varies by levels of variables
on a diﬀerent unit of analysis. To be precise, we will look at this potential variance by
both student and teacher level predictors.
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Student-level moderator As a ﬁrst theoretical advancement to the existing literature
on teachers' evaluations, we postulate that the eﬀect of class-mean achievement on teach-
ers' evaluations varies by students' individual ability. Regarding the classical BFLPE,
most studies found that the eﬀect of class mean achievement was generalizable across
diﬀerent student ability levels. For instance, Marsh et al. (1995) were not able to detect
a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect, while Marsh and Rowe (1996) did ﬁnd a signiﬁcant, but
rather small interaction eﬀect. In contrast, Marsh et al. (2001) and Marsh and Hau
(2003) found no signiﬁcant interaction term.
However, none of the above-cited reference-group eﬀect studies of teachers' recommen-
dations tested for cross-level interactions. Just as Coleman and Fults (1985) report that
students in the upper level of a class' ability distribution are less aﬀected by BFLPE,
we assume that the higher a student's achievement, the less pronounced reference-group
eﬀects on teachers' evaluations will be: High achievers might be more visible in the
classroom than low achievers  which is why students' individual achievement will be a
more important criterion for teachers in the case of high achievers than in the case of
low achievers.10
An alternative interpretation (or underlying mechanism) of this negative interaction
eﬀect would be that the impact of student-level achievement on teachers' evaluations is
weaker in high-achievement classes, since each student would have to be equipped with
a comparatively higher aptitude to stand out from her classmates, or a teacher might
(unconsciously) refer to alternative criteria (e.g. parental backgrounds) to a greater
extent when evaluating her students. We choose to adhere to the convenient framework
of a moderation of class-level predictor eﬀects by student-level covariates. Therefore,
our hypothesis nonetheless reads:
H4: The eﬀect of class-level achievement on teachers' evaluations decreases with stu-
dents' individual achievement.
Teacher-level moderator Apart from the above-mentioned studies on student achieve-
ment, there is little evidence regarding moderators of reference-group eﬀects.11 Thus, in
the study at hand, we ﬁrst test for the variance of reference-group eﬀects on teachers'
evaluations by teachers' grading concepts.
Drawing on Rheinberg (1980) and his distinction between more social and more in-
dividualist reference standards of teachers, Lüdtke et al. (2005) interacted indicators of
those two concepts with the eﬀect of class-average math achievement on students' math
self-concept.12 Although none of these interaction terms were statistically signiﬁcant,
10The Halo eﬀect was observed to vary with the ratee's relative visibility (see Kozlowski and Kirsch,
1987).
11Dai and Rinn (2008) make the point that previous research has lacked a speciﬁcation of contexts
where the BFLPE is more or less likely to occur (p. 297). A recent exception is the study by Thijs
et al. (2010) that found students' perceived relative class position and both a school's class size and
gender composition to moderate the BFLPE.
12Concerning self-concept as an outcome, McFarland and Buehler (1995) observed that the BFLPE
is stronger for students with a more individualist cultural heritage than for those with a more
156
III. Intelligence and Academic Achievement as Contextual-Level Predictors of Teachers' Evaluations
there are good reasons to assume that the underlying mechanism is actually more likely
to aﬀect the impact of reference-group eﬀects on teachers' evaluations rather than on
students' self-concept: Teachers with a more individualist reference standard might be
less prone to upward or downward movements of their evaluations depending on class-
level achievement than teachers who reported a more relational reference standard. This
is why we hypothesize:
H5: The relationship between class-level achievement and teachers' evaluations (BFLPE/
RGE) varies with teachers` reported grade concepts (relational vs. individualist).
2.3 Student-Level Covariates
We include indicators for students' achievement, their social backgrounds, and their as-
pirations as student-level covariates. Regarding individual achievement, in the US, stan-
dardized tests such as ACT or SAT are a broadly used  albeit critically debated  tool
in order to select college students after high school (Burton and Ramist, 2001; Kuncel
et al., 2001; Morgan, 1989; Robbins et al., 2004). In spite of the fact that German peda-
gogic researchers also acknowledge students' intelligence to be the most important single
predictor for their educational success (e.g. Ingenkamp, 1993, p. 73), in the German ed-
ucational system, there are still no serious attempts to ground students' educational
tracking on test results. Although more recent studies such as Progress in International
Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) 2001 and 2006 (Bos et al., 2004; Arnold et al., 2007) as
well as the German studies LAU: Aspekte der Lernausgangslage und der Lernentwicklung
(Lehmann et al., 1997) and KESS 4: Kompetenzen und Einstellungen von Schülerinnen
und Schülern  Jahrgangsstufe 4 (Bos and Pietsch, 2004) showed that teachers' transi-
tion recommendations and students' test results only partly overlap, a virtually linear
positive relationship between students' language comprehension, their reading abilities,
their ability to extract information, and their math scores as independent variables, and
teachers' recommendations as the outcome nonetheless holds (Lehmann et al., 1997).
This is what we would also expect concerning teachers' evaluations.
Being a more visible achievement criterion to teachers (see e.g. Alexander et al., 1987,
p. 667), students' grades have a higher predictive power in explaining teachers' tran-
sition recommendations than students' intelligence (Ingenkamp, 1993; Kristen, 2006).
In PIRLS 2006, about 69% of the total variance in teachers' recommendations can be
explained by both students' language and math grades (while the eﬀect of grades in lan-
guage was a bit more pronounced than in math; see Arnold et al., 2007, p. 283). Since
school grades, though distorted by well-known deﬁciencies, are empirically well-tried
predictors of teachers' recommendations, we consider them to be a relevant predictor of
teachers' evaluations as well.
collectivist one. Similarly, Marsh et al. (2001) found that BFLPE was more negative for West
German students than for East German students shortly after the reuniﬁcation. This result could
be replicated by Seaton et al. (2009) based on the PISA data with 41 countries showing that BFLPE
signiﬁcantly interacts with countries' degree of individualism.
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With regard to students' social backgrounds, once more research based on PIRLS
demonstrated that even when controlling for students' (general) cognitive and (more
speciﬁc) reading abilities, students from service-class parents have a 2.6 times higher
probability of obtaining a recommendation for Gymnasium compared to working-class
oﬀsprings (Bos et al., 2004, p. 213; Arnold et al., 2007, p. 289). Apart from primary
social class gross eﬀects on teachers' evaluations due to actual achievement diﬀerences,
following Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), service-class students would still obtain better
evaluations by their teachers since they dispose of the symbolic codes which are implicitly
demanded in classroom communication.
An additional secondary eﬀect of social inequality may occur via the variation of
students' aspirations by their parents' social class due to social downward mobility
avoidance (also known as the mechanism of relative risk aversion; see Boudon, 1974;
Goldthorpe, 1996; Erikson et al., 2005; Müller-Benedict, 2007). We assume that sec-
ondary eﬀects of social inequality in terms of diﬀering educational aspirations not only
inﬂuence actual transition decisions (Meulemann, 1979; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997;
Esser, 1999; Erikson et al., 2005; Maaz et al., 2006; Stocké, 2007)  but also the preceding
teachers' recommendations since they can be thought to be part of the communication
between students (or their parents) and teachers. Apart from verbal communication,
higher aspirations might also inﬂuence certain forms of students' behavior as what is
typically referred to as the habitus of higher-class students can be supposed to match to
particular norms and expectations of the teachers (Bourdieu, 1986).
Finally, analyses control for students' gender. Figure 1 summarizes all theoretical
concepts on diﬀerent levels of analysis.
Figure 1: Summary of hypotheses.
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3 Data & Methods
3.1 Data
For our analysis, we use the initial survey of the Cologne High School Panel (CHiSP)
from 1969/1970. Funded by the Federal State of North-Rhine Westphalia, the Research
Institute of Sociology at the University of Cologne surveyed N = 3.38510th class students
(nested in N = 120 school classes) at the highest German school track  Gymnasium  in
North-Rhine Westphalia. Part of the student questionnaire (Gesis-No. ZA600) covered
issues such as students' interest in school (and in certain subjects), their achievement,
their future educational and occupational plans, their social backgrounds and their at-
titudes towards school. Remarkably, students also took part in an intelligence structure
test (IST; Amthauer, 1957). In addition to the student questionnaires, students' parents
(Gesis-No. ZA639; N = 2646) and their teachers (Gesis-No. ZA640; N = 1701) were
surveyed as well.13
3.2 Variables
3.2.1 Dependent Variable
In two questions, teachers were asked to assess whom of their students they consider to be
able to make the transition to university, and whom of them not. In a recent study based
on the same data, Becker and Birkelbach (2010) analyzed the impact of reference-group
eﬀects on the evaluations of class-teachers only. Here, 751 students were considered
by their class teachers as being 'able', and 616 students as being 'not able', while 1060
students did not receive any evaluation at all. Becker and Birkelbach (2010) provided the
argument that overall, teachers feel certain enough in their evaluations for high and low
achieving students to give an explicit prognosis, while they would rather abstain from
that for 'average' students. This claim was supported by an analysis of students' mean
intelligence scores in all three categories: For students without an explicit evaluation,
the arithmetic mean of their intelligence is about IST TE0 = 109.6, for students with
a positive evaluation IST TE+ = 114.7, and for students with a negative evaluation
IST TE− = 107.8.
14 We aim to apply a similar logic here, but in contrast to Becker
and Birkelbach (2010), we do not restrict our analyses to class teachers' evaluations.
Instead, we take into account that each student potentially received an evaluation by
several teachers, and each teacher potentially evaluated several students. In total, there
are N = 17.626 evaluations in our data, of which 4.363 evaluations are positive, and
3.607 evaluations are negative. Due to space constraints, and to facilitate computations,
our dependent variable is dichotomized into a positive vs. a negative evaluation.
13As a further amendment of the initial survey, an additional survey was administered to the school
principals (Gesis-No. ZA996; N = 68). Later, the former students were re-surveyed in 1984/85
(Gesis-No. ZA1441, N = 1987), in 1996/97 (Gesis-No. ZA4228; N = 1596) and 2010 (N = 1301,
no Gesis-No. available yet).
14This trend is similar for students' school grades, and also holds in a multinomial logistic regression
analysis with additional covariates (see Becker and Birkelbach, 2011, appendix, Tables B and C).
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3.2.2 Independent Variables
Student-level Students' intelligence was measured along four sub-scales of the intel-
ligence structure test (ist) that the students took part in. We used the group-mean-
centered15 total score of all four dimensions. Students' school achievement was oper-
ationalized by their group-mean-centered grade point average (gpa). For their social
backgrounds, we draw on a three-dimensional index of parental social class (ses) based
on parents' occupational status and situs that has already been added to the data (1
'lower working class'; 2 'upper working class'; 3 'lower middle class'; 4 'middle class';
5 'upper middle class'; 6 'upper class'; see Meulemann, 1979, p. 49). And ﬁnally, stu-
dents' aspirations (aspir) were measured by students' answer to the question if they
considered 'Abitur' to be necessary to reach their aim in life (0 'not necessary / no aim
in life'; 1 'useful or necessary'). Apart from these indicators, analyses also control for
students' gender (sex; 0 'female'; 1 'male').
Class-level To test for BFLPE (contrast eﬀects) and RGE (assimilation / halo eﬀects),
respectively, we ﬁrst computed two measures of class-level achievement and controlled
for class-level SES. Additional to the grand-mean-centered class-level means of students'
intelligence (IST), we computed grand-mean-centered class-average grades (GPA).16
Second, we also computed grand-mean-centered class-level SES to measure potential
RGE s that might counterbalance BFLPE s. For school classes with missing values on the
student level, we computed the grand-mean-centered class-level means of all non-missing
observations.
Teacher-level As mentioned before, teachers were asked which criteria they ordinarily
use for their grading decisions. Apart from a list of predeﬁned categories such as written
test scores or pedagogic incentives, teachers could also name additional criteria as a ﬁrst
or a second choice. 21 (=̂3.92%) out of 536 teachers named an individualist grading
concept as a second choice, and 47 (=̂8.77%) considered it to be their ﬁrst choice.
Contrarily, 7 teachers (=̂1.31%) mentioned a relational grading concept as a second
choice, and 26 teachers (=̂4.85%) considered it to be their ﬁrst choice. We created two
ordinal variables (TFR(ind) and TFR(rel)) which were assigned a 1 if teachers explicitly
15Hox strongly recommends to use group-mean centering techniques only if they are supposed to repre-
sent a speciﬁc hypothesis since the entire model is changed and cannot be re-transformed to the raw
scores by means of simple algebraic transformations unlike with grand-mean centering (Hox, 2010,
p. 68f.). Note that the analysis of frog-pond eﬀects entails suchlike hypotheses where group-mean
centering is an appropriate speciﬁcation (Kreft et al., 1995; Hox, 2010, p. 68f.).
16Although not an objective measure of student ability as Marsh et al. (2008) consider it to be one of the
three minimal conditions for 'true' BFLPE studies, we have good reasons also to include class-level
grade point average as a contextual-level predictor. A simple empirical reason is that Tiedemann
and Billmann-Mahecha (2007) observed signiﬁcant eﬀects of class mean spelling performance on
teachers' transition recommendations, and we want to ensure that our study is as comparable as
possible with preceding analyses. A more substantive theoretical reason is that teachers can be
assumed to exchange views about student aptitudes in the faculty room (Mechtenberg, 2009), and
thus a teacher evaluating a certain student might be inﬂuenced by opinions of other teachers.
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named one of the respective motives as a second choice, a 2 if teachers named it as a
ﬁrst choice, and 0 otherwise. Table A lists the summary statistics of all independent
variables and table B their inter-correlations.17
3.3 Method and Models
Since our hypotheses cover diﬀerent levels of analysis, we have to bear in mind the nest-
edness of our data by multilevel or hierarchical modeling (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992;
Goldstein, 1995; Hox, 2010; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). Figure 2 illustrates our approach
to account for this hierarchy: We consider teachers' evaluations to be the lowest unit of
analysis, and to be simultaneously nested in both teacher and student contexts. Thus,
for teachers and students we estimate a cross-classiﬁed multilevel model. The reason
why we do so is that unlike an existing study based on the same data (Becker and Birkel-
bach, 2010), we do not use evaluations of class teachers only  but of all teachers that
completed the underlying questionnaire. Hence, each student potentially obtained eval-
uations by multiple teachers; but reversely, each teacher potentially evaluated multiple
students, and so we nested teachers' evaluations in both student and teacher contexts.
Furthermore, we assume teachers and students to be nested in school classes.
Figure 2: Data structure.
Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate a logistic multilevel
model. We use the lme4 package in R (Bates and Maechler, 2009)18 to estimate the
following models: First, we discuss the null model without any predictors to give an in-
tuition about the variance parameters at diﬀerent levels of analysis. Second, we present
the minimum BFLPE model including each indicator of class-level achievement and
both its corresponding and its complementary individual-level term (models 1a-1f ). As
17Although the distribution of our TFR indicators is quite skewed, we favor an analysis of imperfectly-
distributed variables over abstaining from the corresponding models completely.
18The lme4 package has the advantage that it uses Laplace approximation which has been shown to be
better than penalized quasi-likelihood methods (which result in downwardly-biased estimates) and at
least as precise as Gauss-Hermite quadrature methods but computationally faster (see Raudenbush
et al., 2000, for a simulation study). Another pleasant feature of lme4 is that it will automatically
choose the correct nesting structure given each cluster unit has its unique identiﬁcation number as
is the case in our data.
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the potential variance of contextual-level eﬀects by student-level covariates has always
been an issue in frog-pond research  though, to the best of our knowledge, was never
analyzed in the context of reference-group eﬀect research on teachers' evaluations ,
we then test whether potential contextual-level achievement eﬀects vary by students'
individual achievement level. Therefore, in models 2a-2d, we add cross-level interaction
terms between class-level and student-level achievement, and we test whether observed
class-level achievement eﬀects and cross-level interaction eﬀects remain stable with ad-
ditional student-level controls (models 3a-3f ).
To test for moderation eﬀects of teachers' frames of reference, we start again with the
minimum BFLPE model (ﬁrst without cross-level achievement interaction terms) and
add two dummy indicators for teachers' more individualistic or more relational grading
concepts, respectively, as well as their cross-level interaction terms with both class-level
intelligence and GPA (models 4a-4h). We then test whether the observed eﬀects remain
stable with controls for cross-level achievement interaction eﬀects (models 5a-5h) and
individual-level student covariates (models 6a-6l).
In a ﬁnal step, we analyze whether estimated reference-group eﬀect sizes change when
class-average SES is added to the equation. In models 7a-7g, we subsequently introduce
class-mean SES, both class-mean achievement and student-level achievement indicators
and their cross-level interaction terms. And in models 8a-8h we control for student-level
covariates.
4 Results
Null model The null model is a one way ANOVA with random-eﬀects (Bryk and
Raudenbush, 1992, p. 17) and as such, in multilevel models it disentangles the variance
components on diﬀerent level of analyses. Moreover, it is crucial to determine the Intra-
class Correlation Coeﬃcient (ICC) in order to assess the amount of variance on a given
cluster level compared to the total outcome variance. In our case, students' probability of
obtaining either a positive or a negative evaluation may vary according to student-level,
teacher-level, and class-level factors, while a residual term would point to the amount of
(lowest-level) variance of teachers' evaluations that cannot be explained on the speciﬁed
cluster levels. Since we are ﬁtting logistic multilevel models, this lowest-level variance
has to be ﬁxed to the known variance of the logistic distribution of pi2/3 ≈ 3.29 (Hox,
2010, p. 135).
Looking at the variance components in the empty model, we can compute the following
ICCs:
ICCstudent =
13.1029
13.1029 + 1.6602 + 2.5673 + pi2/3
≈ .635 (1)
ICCteacher =
1.6602
13.1029 + 1.6602 + 2.5673 + pi2/3
≈ .081 (2)
ICCclass =
2.5673
13.1029 + 1.6602 + 2.5673 + pi2/3
≈ .125 (3)
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As can be seen, most of the variance of teachers' evaluations can be expected to
be explained by student-level predictors, while class-level predictors come in second.
The crucial question for the following analyses is whether we will be able to make a
substantive contribution by including teacher-level predictors, since on this level, the
lowest part of outcome variance can be expected. However, since both a likelihood ratio
test (Vuong, 1989) and AIC as well as BIC comparisons19 suggest that the null model
including a random intercept for the teacher level ﬁts the data signiﬁcantly better than
a corresponding null model (χ2 = 246.98, P r(> Chisq) < 2.2e−16, df = 1), we still see
good reasons to allow for a suchlike eﬀect.
Another measure for the prospective explanatory power of a multilevel model is the
design eﬀect d proposed by Muthen and Satorra (1995), which considers the average
cluster-unit group size.20 In our case, we have three separate measures for the design
eﬀect, i.e. one for each ICC:
dstudent = 1 + (3.572− 1) · .635 ≈ 2.633 (4)
dteacher = 1 + (19.109− 1) · .081 ≈ 2.467 (5)
dclass = 1 + (90.289− 1) · .125 ≈ 12.161 (6)
If d > 2 at a given cluster level, a multilevel model is supposed to be justiﬁed (Muthen
and Satorra, 1995; Maas and Hox, 2005)  which is the case on each level of analysis in
our data.
Class-level model: achievement In line with the methodological paradigm of BFLPE
research, we ﬁrst ﬁt models including only class-level intelligence and GPA. As can be
seen from model 1a (table 1), the higher the grand-mean centered class-level intelligence,
the higher students' probability of obtaining a positive evaluation by their teachers;
and, similarly, the higher the grand-mean centered class-level GPA, the higher students'
probability of obtaining a positive evaluation by their teachers (model 1b).
This is in line with our interpretation of the RGE hypothesis in terms of a Halo
eﬀect (H3) in that teachers tend to project their comparably higher expectations in
high-achievement classes onto lower-achieving students as well (or simply higher their
reference standards). Contrarily, the BFLPE - or contrast hypothesis H1 has to be
rejected. This ﬁnding contrasts the majority of BFLPE studies with self-concept as
an outcome (cf. reviews by Trautwein and Lüdtke, 2005; Dai and Rinn, 2008; Dijkstra
et al., 2008; Marsh et al., 2008) as well as reference-group eﬀect research with primary
19Akaike's Information C riterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) judges the ﬁt of a given model by relating
its maximized value of the likelihood function L to the number of parameters k in the model:
AIC = 2k − 2ln(L). The Bayesian Information C riterion (BIC) Schwarz (1978) is related to the
AIC but introduces a penalty for the number of parameters in the model. The formula for the BIC
reads −2 · ln · p(x | k) ≈ BIC = −2 · ln ·L+ k · ln(n). For further information see DeLeeuw (1992);
Raftery (1995); Burnham and Anderson (2002) as well as Burnham and Anderson (2004).
20The formula for the design eﬀect reads d = 1 + (average group size− 1) · ICC.
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school teachers' transition recommendations as an outcome (Tiedemann and Billmann-
Mahecha, 2007; Trautwein and Baeriswyl, 2007; Gröhlich and Guill, 2009).
Though student-level intelligence signiﬁcantly predicts teachers' evaluations, it neither
alters the estimate nor the z-value of class-level intelligence. For class level GPA, both
estimate and z-value tend to decrease a bit when student-level GPA is controlled, but
both size and signiﬁcance level of the class-level coeﬃcient remain relatively stable.
Thus, the Halo eﬀect we found persists in that students in high-achievement classes still
obtain better evaluations by their teachers even when their individual achievement is
controlled for.
The models controlling for the complementary achievement indicator also allow the
conclusion that student-level GPA is a more powerful predictor of teachers' evaluations
than student-level intelligence, as introducing the former leads to a downsize of class-
level intelligence, while introducing the latter does not have the same eﬀect on class-level
GPA.
All tables report the conditional ICC s of the ﬁtted models as well as Nagelkerke's R2,
which is deﬁned as follows for logistic multilevel models (cf. Hox, 2010, p.135):21
R2 = R2CS
1− exp(−DevianceNull/n) (7)
with R2CS as Cox and Snell R-square deﬁned as
R2CS = 1− exp(Deviancemodel −Deviancenull)
n
(8)
Regarding the R-square in table 1, we can see that including only class-level achieve-
ment does not substantively improve the model ﬁt. By adding the corresponding student-
level term, an R2 of .13 can be achieved for the class-level intelligence model, and an R2
of .35 for the class-level GPA model. And with controls for both student-level intelligence
and GPA, the model ﬁt improves towards an R2 of around .37 for both sub-models.
Thus, although both contextual-level achievement predictors are positively signiﬁcant
even when controlling for their respective student-level counterparts, teachers still more
strongly rely on student-level achievement as a criterion for their evaluations than they
fall prey to a Halo eﬀect.
Also note that a visible reduction in student-level variance is only achieved when
student-level GPA is added to the model, which once again indicates the prevalence of
this particular achievement indicator.
In table 2, we add cross-level interaction eﬀects between both indicators of class-level
achievement and their respective student-level indicators. For each of the models, we
estimate both a random slope and a ﬁxed slope model for the student-level variable
whereupon a cross-level interaction is performed, and since these two models are nested,
21Although Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) warn that these pseudo R-square statistics should not be
interpreted as 'explained variance' in its true sense (p. 446f.), according to Hox (2010), they can
still be used to assess the basic ﬁt of the underlying model (p. 135). However, note that the pseudo
R-squares tend to underestimate the actual model ﬁt compared to the OLS R-square (Long, 1997,
pp. 102ﬀ.).
164
III. Intelligence and Academic Achievement as Contextual-Level Predictors of Teachers' Evaluations
T
ab
le
1:
M
ul
ti
le
ve
l
an
al
ys
is
of
te
ac
he
rs
'
ev
al
ua
ti
on
s:
M
in
im
um
B
F
L
P
E
m
od
el
M
od
el
1
a
M
od
el
1
b
M
od
el
1
c
M
od
el
1
d
M
od
el
1
e
M
od
el
1
f
L
o
g
-
o
d
d
s
z
-
va
lu
e
L
o
g
-
o
d
d
s
z
-
va
lu
e
L
o
g
-
o
d
d
s
z
-
va
lu
e
L
o
g
-
o
d
d
s
z
-
va
lu
e
L
o
g
-
o
d
d
s
z
-
va
lu
e
L
o
g
-
o
d
d
s
z
-
va
lu
e
in
te
rc
ep
t
0
.6
3
*
*
*
3
.8
2
0
.5
9
*
*
*
3
.3
9
0
.7
1
*
*
*
3
.8
0
.5
6
*
*
3
.1
1
0
.5
9
*
*
*
3
.4
6
0
.5
6
**
3
.1
2
st
u
d
en
t
is
t
0
.1
7
*
*
*
1
8
.0
1
0
.0
6
*
*
*
8
.4
9
0
.0
6
*
*
*
8
.4
6
le
ve
l
g
p
a
7
.3
5
**
*
3
0
.9
2
6
.9
6
*
*
*
2
9
.7
4
6
.9
5
*
*
*
2
9
.7
3
cl
a
ss
IS
T
0
.2
*
*
*
5
.4
2
0
.2
1
*
*
*
5
.0
3
0
.1
7
*
*
*
4
.6
1
le
ve
l
G
P
A
3
.6
4
*
*
3
.2
3
.2
8
*
*
2
.8
2
3
.2
3
*
*
2
.7
7
st
u
d
en
t-
le
ve
l
0
.6
6
3
0
.6
4
7
0
.6
5
4
0
.4
5
5
0
.4
4
9
0
.4
3
8
IC
C
cl
a
ss
-l
ev
el
0.
0
9
1
0
.1
0
8
0
.1
0
5
0
.1
5
0
.1
3
9
0
.1
5
8
te
a
ch
er
-l
ev
el
0
.0
8
4
0
.0
8
3
0
.0
9
4
0
.1
7
3
0
.1
7
9
0
.1
7
5
to
ta
l
7
9
6
8
7
9
6
8
7
6
2
7
7
6
2
6
7
6
0
2
7
6
0
2
st
u
d
en
t
2
9
0
3
2
9
0
3
2
7
7
4
2
7
7
4
2
7
6
4
2
7
6
4
N
cl
a
ss
1
1
9
1
1
9
1
1
9
1
1
9
1
1
9
1
1
9
te
a
ch
er
5
2
0
5
2
0
5
2
0
5
2
0
5
2
0
5
2
0
A
IC
7
8
1
7
7
8
3
3
7
1
7
3
5
8
9
0
5
7
6
9
5
7
8
1
ﬁ
t
B
IC
7
8
5
2
78
6
8
7
2
1
5
5
9
3
2
5
8
1
7
5
8
3
0
m
ea
su
re
s
N
a
g
el
ke
rk
e'
s
R
2
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
2
0
.1
3
1
0
.3
5
2
0
.3
7
2
0
.3
7
A
ll
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
a
re
u
n
st
a
n
d
a
rd
iz
ed
lo
g
o
d
d
s.
S
ig
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
va
lu
es
:
*
(p
<
.0
5
);
*
*
(p
<
.0
1
);
*
*
*
(p
<
.0
0
1
).
165
4 Results
we can evaluate by means of a likelihood-ratio test (Vuong, 1989) whether the random-
slope model ﬁts the data signiﬁcantly better than a ﬁxed-slope model. In none of the
cases does the underlying χ2 value get close to a conventional level of statistical sig-
niﬁcance, which is why the estimates of table 2 are consistently based on ﬁxed slope
models.
In model 2a and model 2b, the cross-level interaction eﬀect is not signiﬁcant regardless
of whether student-level GPA is controlled for (as in model 2b) or not. Contrarily, model
2c reveals a signiﬁcant cross-level interaction between class-level and student-level GPA
 indicating that the eﬀect of student-level GPA on teachers' evaluations increases in
classes with higher mean GPA (or that the positive eﬀect of class level GPA on teachers'
evaluations is stronger for students with a higher GPA). Controlling for student-level
intelligence does aﬀect the signiﬁcance value of the cross-level interaction term (model
2d); however, note that the underlying z-value of model 2d is still very close to the
critical value of 1.96.22
Since even an insigniﬁcant interaction term  as in the case of class-mean average IST
 does not indicate that both estimate and signiﬁcance level of a given coeﬃcient do not
vary by the categories of another one (see Brambor et al., 2006, p. 70), we computed
the marginal eﬀects of our interaction terms as well as their corresponding conditional
z-values.23
However, also according to these statistics, no notable variance of the class-mean
ability eﬀect on teachers' evaluations by student ability levels can be detected. Figure
3 illustrates the diﬀerence between the two cross-level ability interaction terms for the
minimum, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile, as well as the maximum for the respective
student-level variable.24 While for the IST*ist interaction, marginal diﬀerences in the
slope variance without controls for student-level GPA are canceled out when this control
goes into the model (upper line of the ﬁgure), there is still a considerable variance
regarding the GPA*gpa interaction even with controls for student-level intelligence (lower
line of the ﬁgure). To be precise, the marginal eﬀect of class-average intelligence on the
probability of obtaining a positive teacher evaluation varies between .11 and .31 for
the plotted percentiles of student intelligence before controlling student-level GPA, and
22The signiﬁcant cross-level interaction between student-level and class-level GPA remained stable even
when controlling for class-level intelligence and its interaction with student-level intelligence (not
shown, available upon request). However, in order to avoid convergence problems in the more
complex models following in the next paragraphs, we always included only one class-level predictor
at a time.
23The marginal eﬀect of an interaction term is computed by the ﬁrst partial derivative of one of
the variables involved, which for a simple two-level case yields:
∆Ŷij
∆X̂1ij
= γ10 + γ11Z1j with the
corresponding standard error s.e.(γ10 + γ11z1j) =
√
var(γ10) + z21j · var(γ11) + 2 · z1j · cov(γ10, γ11)
(with z1j being a speciﬁc value of Z1j ; see Friedrich, 1982; Brambor et al., 2006).
24We used the lmer.PlotInt.fnc in the languageR package to plot the interaction eﬀects ﬁtted by
lme4. Note that the percentiles for which the marginal eﬀects are plotted refer to the distribution of
the student-level covariate from the ﬁtted models (net of missing values) and not to its distribution
in the raw data. This is why the actual values of the percentiles diﬀer within the plots and compared
to the summary statistics in table A (appendix).
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between .13 and .21 when the latter variable goes into the model (without any diﬀerences
in signiﬁcance regarding the conditional z-values in both cases). Contrarily, the marginal
eﬀect of class-average GPA on the probability of obtaining a positive teacher evaluation
varies between -.84 and 8.66 for the plotted percentiles of student-level GPA before
controlling student-level intelligence, and between -.72 and 8.39 when the latter variable
goes into the model. In both cases, the marginal eﬀect of class-average GPA is not
signiﬁcant for the minimum of student-level GPA of -1.35 (z ≈ 1.55) but signiﬁcant for
the other percentiles (with proportionally increasing conditional z-values).
Hence, while in our hypothesis H4 we postulated that the eﬀect of class-average
achievement should decrease with higher levels of individual student achievement, it
is just the other way round: The better a student's grade point average, the more she
beneﬁts from a Halo eﬀect in terms of teachers' 'upgrading' their evaluations in classes
with a high mean value of GPA. This is in contrast to the study by Marsh and Rowe
(1996) who found a small negative interaction eﬀect (though with students' self-concept
as an outcome). However, as mentioned, we cannot ﬁnd a suchlike eﬀect for both student
and class-level intelligence  which is in line with Marsh et al. (1995, 2001) and Marsh
and Hau (2003) who also failed to observe a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect.
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Figure 3: Marginal eﬀects of cross-level ability interaction terms.
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Although the cross-level interaction eﬀect between class-level and student-level GPA
on teachers' evaluations is statistically signiﬁcant, regarding the R-square terms, these
models do not ﬁt the data remarkably better than models 1d and 1f (table 1) without
such an eﬀect.
In a third step, we tested whether the class-level eﬀects obtained in table 1 as well
as the cross-level interaction eﬀect observed in table 2 remained stable with additional
student-level controls. Since in this series of models cross-level interactions are involved
as well, regarding the appropriateness of random-slope models we proceed similarly to
our approach in table 2. Again, the estimates in table 3 are ﬁxed-slope models since
their random-slope counterparts did not ﬁt the data signiﬁcantly better.
In model 3a, we add parental social class in the equation, which is positively associated
with teachers' evaluations, but does neither alter the signiﬁcant eﬀect of class-level in-
telligence nor its insigniﬁcant cross-level interaction term with student-level intelligence
(more precisely, the z-statistic of the interaction term decreases with controls for social
class). Similar trends hold for an additional term of students' aspirations (model 3b),
whereas we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect for male students (model 3c).
By content, these results indicate that the higher the social class of students' parents,
and the higher students' aspirations, the higher the probability of obtaining a positive
evaluation  which is in line with both analyses of primary school teachers' transition
recommendations as an outcome (Bos et al., 2004; Arnold et al., 2007; Tiedemann and
Billmann-Mahecha, 2007; Trautwein and Baeriswyl, 2007; Gröhlich and Guill, 2009)
and a structural equation model based on the same data (Becker and Birkelbach, 2011).
Similarly, male students have a higher probability of obtaining a positive evaluation than
female students  which contradicts a recent study based on primary school teachers'
transition recommendations that found the opposite gender eﬀect (Gröhlich and Guill,
2009).
Models 3d-3e repeated the stepwise procedures from models 3a-3c but included class-
level GPA and its interaction with student-level GPA instead of class-level intelligence.
Regarding the student-level covariates and the 'main eﬀect' of class-level GPA, no sub-
stantive diﬀerence compared to models 3a-3c can be observed. Contrarily, the interac-
tion term between student-level and class-level GPA is only signiﬁcant with controls for
parental social class but not with additional controls for students' aspiration and their
gender.
Apparently, a substantive part of the variance of the class-level GPA eﬀect on teachers'
evaluations that could be explained by diﬀerences in student ability is partly due to
diﬀerences in students' aspirations. However, since the z-statistics are again not that
far from the threshold of 1.96, there is still evidence that the relationship between class-
level GPA on teachers' evaluations is not completely insensitive to students' individual
achievement in terms of GPA.
Another result from table 3 is that in both models 3c and 3f, the eﬀect of class-level
achievement tends to diminish slightly when students' gender is controlled for. We will
come back to this ﬁnding in our discussion section. Though all of them signiﬁcant,
only minor gains in model ﬁt can be yielded by including the additional student-level
covariates.
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Teacher-level model As a further advancement to the existing literature about re-
ference-group eﬀects on teachers' evaluations, we test whether our two indicators for
teachers' frames of reference (which are dummy variables for teachers' more individualist
and their more relational grade concepts, respectively) signiﬁcantly interact with class-
level predictors. Once again, we present separate models for class-level intelligence and
class-level grades. We begin with the minimal BFLPE model including only class-level
intelligence and class-level GPA (as well as the corresponding student-level predictor),
respectively, to which we subsequently add each indicator of TFR plus its interaction
with class-level achievement (tables 4 and 5). In several additional models, we add cross-
level interactions between class- and student-level achievement as well as our student-
level covariates (appendix, tables C to F).
As one can see, neither is one of the TFR indicators signiﬁcantly associated with
teachers' evaluations, nor does it signiﬁcantly interact with class-level intelligence or
GPA. Again, we test in terms of marginal eﬀects and corresponding conditional z-values
whether an insigniﬁcant interaction term was associated with signiﬁcance diﬀerences
in subgroups. Although these analyses also reveal that there are no diﬀerences in sig-
niﬁcance for both class-level intelligence and GPA by diﬀerent categories of our two
indicators of TFR, two observations appear to be worth mentioning:
First, apart from signiﬁcance issues, students' eﬀect of class-level intelligence on the
probability of obtaining a positive teacher evaluation is slightly weaker for teachers who
hold a more individualist grading concept, and slightly stronger for teachers who hold a
more relational grading concept. Contrarily, the eﬀect of class-average GPA is slightly
stronger for teachers who hold a more individualist grading concept and slightly weaker
for teachers who hold a more relational grading concept. To be sure, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that this ﬁnding is merely due to random error, which is why we are
not able to maintain our hypothesis H5.
Second, for one of the four interaction eﬀects, the variance of the slopes by student-
level subgroups appears to be a bit higher than for the three other one, namely for the
eﬀect of class-level GPA by teachers' relational grading concepts. These patterns are
also illustrated by ﬁgure 4.
In several additional multilevel models, we repeat the analysis steps from the preceding
tables in subsequently adding cross-level achievement interaction eﬀects (models 5a - 5h)
as well as student-level covariates (models 6a - 6i). Neither do we encounter remarkable
diﬀerences compared to the models without TFR indicators, nor do the interactions
of the latter terms with class-level achievement become signiﬁcant or oﬀer new insights
regarding their marginal eﬀects. Furthermore, no visible improvement in model ﬁt could
be gained. Therefore, these models are listed in the appendix (tables C  F).
Class-level model: SES In a last series of multilevel models, we tried to juxtapose
potentially counterbalancing BFLPE and RGE patterns by including class-average SES
in the model. In particular, we ﬁrst estimated a reduced model containing only class-
level SES and then added class-level achievement, their cross-level interaction terms with
the corresponding student-level counterparts and additional student-level covariates. In
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Figure 4: Marginal eﬀects of cross-level interaction terms achievement * TFR.
model 7a, grand-mean centered class-average parental SES has a positive eﬀect on the
probability of obtaining a positive teacher evaluation. Also note that the model ﬁt of
this average-SES-only model is not worse than the ﬁt of the pure achievement models of
table 1. This could be a hint that a similar mechanism of reﬂected glory is at work when
teachers 'upgrade' their evaluations in high-SES classes. In any case, our hypothesis H2
is conﬁrmed.
Adding class-level intelligence to the model (model 7a) does downsize the coeﬃcient
of class-level parental SES more than adding class-level GPA to the model (model 7b)
 which could indicate that part of the class-average SES eﬀect can be explained by
a primary eﬀect of social inequality (Boudon, 1974; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) that
operates via intelligence diﬀerences between classrooms.25 On the other hand, also when
student-level intelligence goes into the model, class-average SES remains signiﬁcant (to
be precise, the eﬀect even becomes a bit stronger), and it continues to exert its signiﬁcant
impact also when the models control for student-level GPA (which is  as in all other
tables  by far the strongest predictor of teachers' evaluations). Concerning the cross-
25A mechanism that could account for this fact would be one of selective student-to-classroom sorting
by both student intelligence and SES (Rothstein, 2009; Koedel and Betts, 2011).
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level achievement interaction terms, neither do these coeﬃcients alter the other model
estimates, nor do we gain new evidence compared to the preceding tables.
In models 8a-8h (appendix, tables G and H), we add the remaining student-level co-
variates to the models from models 7a-7g. While the eﬀect of class-average parental
SES on teachers' evaluations remains signiﬁcant in all of these models26, regarding the
student-level covariates, we do not ﬁnd remarkable ﬁndings compared to the models with-
out a class-level SES term. Whereas the cross-level interaction term between class-level
intelligence and student-level intelligence remains insigniﬁcant, the cross-level interac-
tion term between class-level and student level GPA is signiﬁcant throughout the models
except in model 8h. However, in the latter model, the marginal eﬀects as well as the
conditional signiﬁcances for the GPA*gpa interaction term behave similar to the ﬁndings
reported for table 2.
5 Discussion
Aim of study The objective of the paper at hand was to extend existing research about
reference-group eﬀects on teachers' evaluations. While previous studies based on Swiss
and German data only analyzed primary school teachers' transition recommendations
as an outcome (Trautwein and Baeriswyl, 2007; Tiedemann and Billmann-Mahecha,
2007; Gröhlich and Guill, 2009; Milek et al., 2009), we aimed to shed light on poten-
tial reference-group eﬀects regarding the emergence of German 10th class Gymnasium
(i.e. highest track) teachers' evaluations of their students' prospective aptitude for aca-
demic studies at university. Dai and Rinn (2008) noted for classical Big-Fish-Little-Pond
Eﬀect (BFLPE) studies analyzing the eﬀect of class-average achievement on students'
self-concept that previous research has lacked a speciﬁcation of contexts where the
BFLPE is more or less likely to occur (p. 297). This is even more valid with regard to
other outcomes such as teachers' recommendations or evaluations. Whereas in BFLPE
research, at least moderator eﬀects of student achievement (Marsh et al., 1995; Marsh
and Rowe, 1996; Marsh et al., 2001; Marsh and Hau, 2003) and of teachers' frames of
reference (TFR; Lüdtke et al., 2005) have been tested, similar analyses regarding teach-
ers' evaluations as an outcome are lacking. Hence, we ﬁrst tested whether potential
reference-group eﬀects in terms of class-average achievement on teachers' evaluations
vary by students' achievement levels or TFRs in terms of teachers' more individualist
or relational grading concepts, respectively.
Apart from these theoretical issues, our methodological contribution to the advance-
ment of reference-group research was that we applied a more complex multilevel design
wherein we regarded multiple teachers' evaluations of multiple students to be the lowest
unit nested in both teacher and student contexts with school classes as an additional
higher-level unit of analysis.
26Note that the eﬀect of class-mean SES tends to increase when students' gender is controlled for. We
will come back to this point in the discussion section.
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Interpretation of ﬁndings Based on the initial survey of the Cologne High School
Panel (CHiSP ; 1968/69), we found that in contrast to conventional BFLPE research
with students' self-concept as an outcome (see research overviews by Trautwein and
Lüdtke, 2005; Dai and Rinn, 2008; Dijkstra et al., 2008; and Marsh et al., 2008), but
also in contrast to more recent reference-group eﬀect studies of primary-school teachers'
transition recommendations (Tiedemann and Billmann-Mahecha, 2007; Trautwein and
Baeriswyl, 2007; Gröhlich and Guill, 2009), 10th class Gymnasium teachers' evaluations
of students' prospective aptitude for university studies (able vs. not able) are positively
aﬀected by both students' class-mean intelligence scores and class-mean grade point
average (GPA). Hence, teachers are inﬂuenced by a kind of Halo eﬀect (Thorndike, 1920)
when evaluating their students; that is, regardless of a student's individual achievement,
she gets a better evaluation in a higher-achieving class  and vice versa. This ﬁnding can
be interpreted in a sense that teachers' beliefs about their students are positively aﬀected
by a higher-achieving learning environment  a result that contradicts our BFLPE or
contrast hypothesis H1 and supports our RGE hypothesis H3 in its competing line of
reasoning.
Although analyses have also shown that given a positive eﬀect of class-level achieve-
ment on teachers' evaluations, student-level achievement is a far more important criterion
for teachers in shaping their evaluations  indicated by remarkably higher Pseudo-R2
values  we nonetheless owe the explanation why our results diﬀer from reference-group
eﬀect research on primary-school teachers' transition recommendations that ﬁnds a neg-
ative class-average achievement eﬀect. As a starting point, note that our analyses diﬀers
in three important respects from the latter studies: First, as already outlined in the
hypotheses section, our data comprises a remarkably selective sample of Gymnasium
(i.e. highest secondary track) students only, and possibly teachers are already primed
beforehand in supposing their students to be relatively bright; and if they teach in a
high-achievement class, the Halo eﬀect is fostered by teachers' positive prejudices, and
thus it is completely overshadowing negative contrast eﬀects. Second, as opposed to
more or less binding primary school teachers' transition recommendations, our outcome
is a non-binding and even anonymous assessment without any direct consequences for
students' educational life course. Perhaps, teachers more consciously consider the rela-
tive academic standing of a student compared to her classmates  which is an implication
of the BFLPE hypothesis  when they know that their decision has a consequential
(some would even say irreversible) impact on students' educational course of life. And
third, our 10th class teachers' evaluations are evidently measured at a later point in
time than primary school teachers' transition recommendations. Although conventional
BFLPE research has shown that the latter eﬀect tends to be long-lasting (Marsh et al.,
2000, 2001, 2007; Marsh and O'Mara, 2010), it is unknown whether the time of mea-
surement of teachers' evaluations as an outcome makes a diﬀerence. Maybe as time
goes by, teachers become more sure in their estimate of student-level ability, and so each
student is judged more based on her own achievement than on her relative standing in
class; and thus, the BFLPE is no longer powerful enough to overshadow its conceptual
counterpart.
In any way, despite our positive class-level achievement eﬀect that stands in contrast
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to existing studies up to now, results have also shown in terms of a much higher explained
variance that student-level achievement is a much more important criterion for teachers
in shaping their evaluations.
Regarding cross-level interaction eﬀects, we found that the eﬀect of class-average in-
telligence does not vary by student-level intelligence, but the eﬀect of class-average GPA
does become stronger for students with better marks  which stands in contrast to our
expectations as outlined in interaction eﬀect hypothesis H4. Since the high achievers
gain more from teachers' Halo eﬀect than the low achievers, and teachers' expectations
may aﬀect students' later achievement (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Jussim and Har-
ber, 2005; Becker, 2010; Birkelbach, 2011), this could result in cumulative educational
inequality in sense of Merton's Matthew eﬀect (Merton, 1968).
Although, as outlined in our hypotheses section, the alternative interpretation of this
interaction term in that the eﬀect of student-level GPA on teachers' evaluations varies
by class-level GPA is also possible  which would mean that students' individual achieve-
ment becomes more distinct in high achievement contexts , the marginal eﬀects of this
(and also of the ist*IST) interaction term show less variance compared to the speciﬁ-
cation in our models (cf. ﬁgure A, appendix).
Contrarily, we did not ﬁnd evidence for reference-group eﬀects to vary by teachers'
grading concepts according to conventional signiﬁcance thresholds. A graphical inspec-
tion revealed that there is an (admittedly insigniﬁcant) tendency in that the eﬀect of
class-level intelligence on the probability of obtaining a positive teacher evaluation is
slightly weaker for teachers who hold a more individualist grading concept, and slightly
stronger for teachers who hold a more relational grading concept; while the eﬀect of
class-average GPA is slightly stronger for teachers who hold a more individualist grad-
ing concept and slightly weaker for teachers who hold a more relational grading concept.
Although apart from signiﬁcance issues, we would not consider it to be implausible that
for individualist teachers, class-average intelligence becomes a less important criterion
in forming their evaluations, we would have diﬃculties to explain the latter case, and
therefore simply concede that we are not able to maintain our underlying interaction
eﬀect hypothesis H5.
In contrast to Marsh et al. (2000), we were not able to juxtapose potentially coun-
terbalancing negative class-level achievement eﬀects and positive class-level SES eﬀects.
Apart from the aforementioned positive class-average achievement eﬀects we found, we
additionally encountered a similarly positive class-average SES eﬀect which remains sig-
niﬁcant throughout all models. This ﬁnding could be due to the fact that the students
in our sample have been surveyed in 10th class of Gymnasium, and according to relative
risk aversion theory (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997), the higher a student went on the ed-
ucational ladder, the less likely social class diﬀerences will be able to explain diﬀerences
in achievement since selection eﬀects based on social class have already taken place;
and only the most able (or motivated) lower-class students remain in the higher school
tracks. On the other hand, the eﬀect of class-level SES becomes even stronger when
additionally to class-average intelligence, also student-level intelligence is controlled for;
and a similar trend can be observed when students' gender is added to the model. Ap-
parently, if diﬀerences within classes with regard to these two student characteristics are
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ruled out, the 'true' between-class SES eﬀect is unmasked.
Another issue is worthy of discussion, too: In contrast to both Gröhlich and Guill
(2009) and Milek et al. (2009), we did not ﬁnd contextual-level achievement eﬀects
to be mediated by students' individual achievement. But these two studies analyzed
reference-group eﬀects on explicit (and more binding) primary-school teachers' transi-
tion recommendations, and in our case of implicit and non-binding 10th class teachers'
evaluations regarding their students' prospective aptitude for academic studies at univer-
sity, teachers might be more error-prone in terms of being inﬂuenced by contextual-level
eﬀects. Another possible explanation would be that only negative reference-group ef-
fects are mediated by student-level achievement but not positive ones, since Halo eﬀects
possibly evoke other (e.g. more motivation-related) teacher expectancies than cannot
be explained by student grades.
In sum, our result of positive class-level achievement eﬀects on teachers' evaluations
indicate to reject our BFLPE hypothesis H1 and to maintain its competitor, the RGE
hypothesis in terms of a Halo eﬀect (H3). Similarly, we also found a positive eﬀect of
class-average socioeconomic status (SES)  which conﬁrmed our hypothesis H2,  but
we were not able to juxtapose a potentially still present BFLPE from our RGE when
controlling for both class-level achievement and SES. Regarding interaction eﬀects, we
found that the eﬀect of class-level GPA gets stronger with increasing student-level GPA,
which contradicts our hypothesis H4. Moreover, we found quite puzzling results for
the variance of class-level IST and GPA by teachers' frames of reference; but as both
marginal eﬀects were not signiﬁcant, we simply reject our underlying hypothesis H5.
Advice for further studies Taken together, our ﬁndings lead to a couple of new ques-
tions that could be answered in further studies. First, taking Dai and Rinn's (2008)
remark for serious, further tests of both student and teacher-level moderators are highly
recommended. On the one hand, more precise evidence on the mechanisms behind the
variance of reference-group eﬀects on teachers' evaluations by student-level achievement
has to be collected. Remarkably, this eﬀect only concerned school grades  deﬁnitely
comprising an evaluative component as well. On the other hand, we noted a quite puz-
zling (though insigniﬁcant) pattern regarding the interaction between class-level achieve-
ment and teachers' frames of reference. Further studies should try to operationalize these
frames by survey items that are speciﬁed more explicitly in order to collect richer data
on teachers' grading concepts that allows to arrive at conclusions fulﬁlling conventional
signiﬁcance thresholds.
Since we observed that the eﬀect of class-average achievement is not completely in-
sensitive against controls for students' gender27, prospective research on reference-group
eﬀects regarding teachers' evaluations should also include gender composition at the
classroom level in the analysis. Thijs et al. (2010) have shown that the gender compo-
27While based on more recent data, Gröhlich and Guill (2009) found male students to obtain worse
evaluations by their teachers (in terms of transition recommendations), in our study, it was just
vice versa (controlled for achievement, respectively). A possible explanation could be that teachers'
frames of gender-related educational inequality changed over time.
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sition of the classroom is a promising moderator of conventional BFLPE research with
students' self-concept as an outcome. Although, at least in Germany, two recent studies
observed students' school grades to be inﬂuenced neither by same-gender eﬀects nor by
teachers' gender composition (Neugebauer et al., 2011; Helbig, 2010), an analysis of how
teachers' evaluations might be aﬀected by particular combinations of a student's gender,
a teacher's gender, student-gender composition eﬀects in the classroom and maybe even
teacher-gender composition eﬀects at school is still missing.
In methodological terms, this question could also be answered in the framework of
a cross-classiﬁed hierarchical model. While our study simpliﬁed analyses by looking at
the dichotomy of students with a positive vs. those with a negative evaluation, other
analyses with an ordinal factor variable as an outcome could apply an ordered categorical
multilevel model (Johnson, 1996, 1997; Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 331f.) in order to use
all available information. However, note that these models would have to be employed
in a Bayesian framework.
References
Akaike H (1974) A new look at the statistical model identiﬁcation. IEEE Transactions
on Automatic Control 19(6): 716723.
Alexander K and Eckland BK (1975) Contextual eﬀects in the high school attainment
process. American Sociological Review 40(3): 402416.
Alexander KL; Entwisle DR and Thompson MS (1987) School performance, status re-
lations, and the structure of sentiment: bringing the teacher back in. American Soci-
ological Review 52(5): 665682.
Alwin DF and Otto LB (1977) High school context eﬀects on aspirations. Sociology of
Education 50(4): 259273.
Amthauer R (1957) Intelligenz-Struktur-Test. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Arnold KH; Bos W; Richert P et al. (2007) Schullaufbahnpräferenzen am Ende der
vierten Klassenstufe. In: Bos W; Hornberg S; Arnold KH et al. (eds.) IGLU
2006 - Schullaufbahnempfehlungen von Lehrkräften für Kinder am Ende der vierten
Jahrgangsstufe, 271297. Münster / New York: Waxmann.
Bates D and Maechler M (2009) lme4 - Linear mixed-eﬀects models using S4 classes. R
package version 0.999375-31.
URL: http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html
Baumert J; Brunner M; Lüdtke O et al. (2007) Was messen internationale Schulleis-
tungsstudien? Resultate kumulativer Wissenserwerbsprozesse. Psychologische Rund-
schau 58(2): 118128.
180
III. Intelligence and Academic Achievement as Contextual-Level Predictors of Teachers' Evaluations
Becker D (2010) The impact of teachers' expectations on students' educational oppor-
tunities in the life course. Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 1(7).
URL: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/cgrcgsser/01-07.htm
Becker D and Birkelbach K (2010) Intelligenz und Schulleistung als Kontextmerkmale:
Big-Fish-Little-Pond- oder Reﬂected-Glory-Eﬀekt? Eine Mehrebenen-Analyse von
Lehrerurteilen. In: Beckers T; Birkelbach K; Hagenah J et al. (eds.) Komparative
empirische Sozialforschung, 113141. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
Becker D and Birkelbach K (2011) Teachers' evaluations and the deﬁnition of the social
situation in the classroom. Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 2(4).
URL: http://ideas.repec.org/p/cgr/cgsser/02-04.html
Birkelbach K (2011) Teacher evaluations over the life course: valid prognosis or self-
fulﬁlling prophecy? In: Mica A; Peisert A and Winczorek J (eds.) Sociology and the
Unintended - Robert Merton Revisited, 133153. Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang.
Bos W and Pietsch M (2004) Erste Ergebnisse aus KESS 4. Kurzbericht. Hamburg:
Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg.
Bos W; Voss A; Lankes EM et al. (2004) Schullaufbahnempfehlungen von Lehrkräften
für Kinder am Ende der vierten Jahrgangsstufe. In: Bos W; Lankes EM; Prenzel M
et al. (eds.) IGLU. Einige Länder der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im nationalen und
internationalen Vergleich, 191228. Münster: Wachsmann.
Boudon R (1974) Education, Opportunity and Social Inequality: Changing Prospects in
Western Society. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Bourdieu P (1986) Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. London:
Routledge.
Bourdieu P and Passeron JC (1990) Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture.
London: Sage Publications Ltd.
Brambor T; Clark WR and Golder M (2006) Understanding interaction models: im-
proving empirical analyses. Political Analysis 14(1): 6382.
Brattesani KA; Weinstein RS and Marshall HH (1984) Student perceptions of diﬀerential
teacher treatment as moderators of teacher expectation eﬀects. Journal of Educational
Psychology 76(2): 236247.
Breen R and Goldthorpe JH (1997) Explaining educational diﬀerentials: towards a for-
mal rational action theory. Rationality and Society 9(3): 275305.
Brophy JE and Good TL (1974) Teacher - Student Relationships. Causes and Conse-
quences. New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston.
181
References
Bryk AS and Raudenbush SW (1992) Hierarchical Linear Models. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications.
Burnham KP and Anderson DR (2002) Model Selection and Multimodel Inference: A
Practical Information-Theoretical Approach. 2nd edn. New York: Springer.
Burnham KP and Anderson DR (2004) Multimodel inference. Understanding AIC and
BIC in model selection. Sociological Methods & Research 33(2): 261304.
Burton NW and Ramist L (2001) Predicting Success in College: SAT Studies of Classes
Graduating Since 1980. New York: College Board Research Report No. 2001-2.
Camara W (1998) High School Grading Policies. Tech. Rep. RN-04, College Board, New
York.
Camara W and Echternacht G (2000) The SAT I and high school grades: Utility in
predicting success in college. New York: The College Board.
Camara W; Kimmel E; Scheuneman J et al. (2003) Whose Grades Are Inﬂated? Tech.
Rep. RN-10, College Board, New York.
Chanal J; Marsh HW; Sarrazin P et al. (2005) Big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀects on gymnastics
self-concept: social comparison processes in a physical setting. Journal of Sport and
Exercise Psychology 27(1): 5370.
Cialdini RB; Borden RJ; Thorne A et al. (1976) Basking in reﬂected glory: three (foot-
ball) ﬁeld studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 34(3): 366375.
Coleman JM and Fults BA (1985) Special-class placement, level of intelligence, and the
self-concepts of gifted children: a social comparison perspective. Remedial and Special
Education 6(1): 810.
Dai DY and Rinn AN (2008) The big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect: What do we know and
where do we go from here? Educational Psychology Review 20(3): 283317.
Davis JA (1966) The campus as a frog pond: an application of the theory of relative
deprivation to career decisions of college men. The American Journal of Sociology
72(1): 1731.
DeLeeuw J (1992) Introduction to Akaike (1973) information theory and an extension of
the maximum likelihood principle. In: Kotz S and Johnson NL (eds.) Breakthroughs
in Statistics, vol. 1, 559609. London: Springer.
Dijkstra P; Kuyper H; van der Werf G et al. (2008) Social comparison in the classroom:
a review. Review of Educational Research 78(4): 828879.
Downey DB and Pribesh S (2004) When race matters: teachers' evaluations of students'
classroom behavior. Sociology of Education 77(4): 267282.
182
III. Intelligence and Academic Achievement as Contextual-Level Predictors of Teachers' Evaluations
Erikson RS; Goldthorpe JH; Jackson M et al. (2005) On class diﬀerentials in educational
attainment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America 102(27): 97309733.
Esser H (1999) Soziologie. Spezielle Grundlagen. Bd. 1: Situationslogik und Handeln.
Frankfurt / New York: Campus Verlag.
Farkas G; Grobe RP; Sheehan D et al. (1990) Cultural resources and school success:
gender, ethnicity, and poverty groups within an urban school district. American
Sociological Review 55(1): 127142.
Friedrich RJ (1982) In defense of multiplicative terms in multiple regression equations.
American Journal of Political Science 26(4): 797833.
Gelman A and Hill J (2007) Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical
Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldstein H (1995) Multilevel Statistical Methods. London: Hodder Arnold.
Goldthorpe JH (1996) Class analysis and the reorientation of class theory: the case of
persisting diﬀerentials in educational attainment. British Journal of Sociology 47(3):
481505.
Good TL and Brophy JE (2003) Looking in Classrooms. New York: Pearson Education.
Gröhlich C and Guill K (2009) How stable are reference group eﬀects of secondary
school track recommendations? Journal for Educational Research Online/Journal für
Bildungsforschung Online 1(1): 154171.
Helbig M (2010) Sind Lehrerinnen für den geringeren Schulerfolg von Jungen verant-
wortlich? Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 62(1): 93111.
Hox JJ (2010) Multilevel Analysis - Techniques and Applications. 2nd edn. New York
and Hove: Routledge.
Ingenkamp K (1977) Schüler- und Lehrerbeurteilung. Empirische Untersuchungen zur
pädagogischen Diagnostik. Weinheim: Beltz Verlag.
Ingenkamp KH (1993) Der Prognosewert von Zensuren, Lehrergutachten, Aufnahmeprü-
fungen und Tests während der Grundschulzeit für den Sekundarschulerfolg. In: Ole-
chowski R (ed.) Frühe Schulische Auslese, 6885. Frankfurt: Lang.
Johnson VE (1996) On Bayesian analysis of multirater ordinal data: an application to
automated essay grading. Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(433):
4251.
Johnson VE (1997) An alternative to traditional GPA for evaluating student perfor-
mance. Statistical Science 12(4): 251269.
183
References
Jürges H and Schneider K (2006) Age at school entry and teachers' recommendations for
secondary school track choice in Germany. Paper presented at the 20th annual ESPE
conference, 22 - 24 June, 2006, Verona .
Jussim L and Harber KD (2005) Teacher expectations and self-fulﬁlling prophecies:
knowns and unknowns, resolved and unresolved controversies. Personality and Social
Psychology Review 9(2): 131155.
Koedel C and Betts JR (2011) Does student sorting invalidate value-added models of
teacher eﬀectiveness? An extended analysis of the Rothstein critique. Education
Finance and Policy 6(1): 1842.
Kozlowski SW and Kirsch MP (1987) The systematic distortion hypothesis, halo, and
accuracy: an individual-level analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology 72(2): 252261.
Kreft IGG; De Leeuw J and Aiken LS (1995) The eﬀect of diﬀerent forms of centering
in hierarchical linear models. Multivariate Behavioral Research 30(1): 121.
Kristen C (2006) Ethnische Diskriminierung in der Grundschule? Kölner Zeitschrift für
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 58(1): 7997.
Kuncel NR; Hezlett SA and Ones DS (2001) A comprehensive meta-analysis of the
predictive validity of the Graduate Record Examinations: implications for graduate
student selection and performance. Psychological Bulletin 127(1): 162181.
Lehmann RH; Peek R and GänsfußR (1997) Aspekte der Lernausgangslage von Schü-
lerinnen und Schülern der fünften Klassen an Hamburger Schulen. Bericht über die
Untersuchung im September 1996.
Long JS (1997) Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Lüdtke O; Köller O; Marsh HW et al. (2005) Teacher frame of reference and the big-
ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect. Contemporary Educational Psychology 30(3): 263285.
Maas CJM and Hox JJ (2005) Suﬃcient sample sizes for multilevel modeling. Method-
ology 1(3): 8692.
Maaz K; Hausen C; Mcelvany N et al. (2006) Stichwort: Übergänge im Bildungssystem.
Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft 9(3): 299327.
Marsh HW (1987) The big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect on academic self-concept. Journal of
Educational Psychology 79(3): 280295.
Marsh HW (1991) The failure of high ability high schools to deliver academic bene-
ﬁts: the importance of academic self-concept and educational aspirations. American
Educational Research Journal 28(2): 445480.
184
III. Intelligence and Academic Achievement as Contextual-Level Predictors of Teachers' Evaluations
Marsh HW; Chessor D; Craven RG et al. (1995) The eﬀects of gifted and talented
programs on academic self-concept: The big ﬁsh strikes again. American Educational
Research Journal 32(2): 285319.
Marsh HW; Chit-Kwong K and Kit-Tai H (2000) Longitudinal multilevel models of
the big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect on academic self-concept: counterbalancing contrast and
reﬂected-glory eﬀects in Hong Kong schools. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology 78(2): 337349.
Marsh HW and Craven RG (2006) Reciprocal eﬀects of self-concept and performance
from a multidimensional perspective: beyond seductive pleasure and unidimensional
perspectives. Perspectives on Psychological Science 1(2): 133163.
Marsh HW and Hau KT (2003) Big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect on academic self-concept: a
cross-cultural (26-country) test of the negative eﬀects of academically selective schools.
American Psychologist 58(5): 364376.
Marsh HW; Köller O and Baumert J (2001) Reuniﬁcation of East and West German
school systems: longitudinal multilevel modeling study of the big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect
on academic self-concept. American Educational Research Journal 38(2): 321350.
Marsh HW and O'Mara AJ (2010) Long-term total negative eﬀects of school-average
ability on diverse educational outcomes. Zeitschrift für Pädagogische Psychologie
24(1): 5172.
Marsh HW and Parker JW (1984) Determinants of student self-concept: Is it better
to be a relatively large ﬁsh in a small pond even if you don't learn to swim as well?
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 47(1): 213231.
Marsh HW and Rowe KJ (1996) The negative eﬀects of school-average ability on aca-
demic self-concepts: an application of multilevel modelling. Australian Journal of
Education 40(1): 6587.
Marsh HW; Seaton M; Trautwein U et al. (2008) The big-ﬁshlittle-pond-eﬀect stands
up to critical scrutiny: implications for theory, methodology, and future research.
Educational Psychology Review 20(3): 319350.
Marsh HW; Trautwein U; Lüdtke O et al. (2005) Academic self-concept, interest, grades,
and standardized test scores: reciprocal eﬀects models of causal ordering. Child De-
velopment 76(2): 397416.
Marsh HW; Trautwein U; Lüdtke O et al. (2007) The big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect: persis-
tent negative eﬀects of selective high schools on self-concept after graduation. Amer-
ican Educational Research Journal 44(3): 631669.
McFarland C and Buehler R (1995) Collective self-esteem as a moderator of the frog-
pond eﬀect in reactions to performance feedback. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 68(6): 10551070.
185
References
Mechtenberg L (2009) Cheap talk in the classroom: How biased grading at school ex-
plains gender diﬀerences in achievements, career choices and wages. Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 76(4): 14311459.
Merton RK (1948) The self-fulﬁlling prophecy. Antioch Review 8(2): 193210.
Merton RK (1968) The Matthew eﬀect in science. Science 159(3810): 5663.
Meulemann H (1979) Soziale Herkunft und Schullaufbahn. Arbeitsbuch zur sozialwis-
senschaftlichen Methodenlehrer. Frankfurt / New York: Campus Verlag.
Meyer JW (1970) High school eﬀects on college intentions. The American Journal of
Sociology 76(1): 5970.
Milek A; Lüdtke O; Trautwein U et al. (2009) Wie konsistent sind Referenzgruppenef-
fekte bei der Vergabe von Schulformempfehlungen? Bundeslandspeziﬁsche Analysen
mit Daten der IGLU-Studie. Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft 12(12): 282301.
Morgan R (1989) Analyses of the Predictive Validity of the SAT and High School Grades
From 1976 to 1985. New York: College Board Research Report No. 89-7.
Müller-Benedict V (2007) Wodurch kann die soziale Ungleichheit des Schulerfolgs am
stärksten verringert werden? Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie
59(4): 615639.
Muthen BO and Satorra A (1995) Complex sample data in structural equation modeling.
Sociological Methodology 25: 267316.
Neugebauer M; Helbig M and Landmann A (2011) Unmasking the myth of the same-sex
teacher advantage. European Sociological Review 27(5): 669689.
Pallas AM; Entwisle DR; Alexander KL et al. (1994) Ability-group eﬀects: instructional,
social, or institutional? Sociology of Education 67(1): 2746.
Pietsch M and Stubbe TC (2007) Inequality in the transition from primary to secondary
school: school choices and educational disparities in Germany. European Educational
Research Journal 6(4): 424445.
Plucker JA; Robinson NM; Greenspon TS et al. (2004) It's not how the pond makes you
feel, but rather how high you can jump. American Psychologist 59(4): 268269.
Raftery AE (1995) Bayesian model selection in social research. Sociological Methodology
25: 111164.
Raudenbush SW; Yang ML and Yosef M (2000) Maximum likelihood for generalized
linear models with nested random eﬀects via high-order, multivariate Laplace approx-
imation. Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics 9(1): 141157.
186
III. Intelligence and Academic Achievement as Contextual-Level Predictors of Teachers' Evaluations
Reuman DA (1989) How social comparison mediates the relation between ability-
grouping practices and students' achievement expectancies in mathematics. Journal
of Educational Psychology 81(2): 178189.
Rheinberg F (1980) Leistungsbewertung und Lernmotivation. Göttingen: Hogrefe.
Rindermann H and Heller KA (2005) The beneﬁt of gifted classes and talent schools for
developing students' competences and enhancing academic self-concept. Zeitschrift
für Pädagogische Psychologie 19(3): 133136.
Robbins SB; Lauver K; Le H et al. (2004) Do psychosocial and study skill factors predict
college outcomes? a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin 130(2): 261288.
Rosenthal R and Jacobson L (1968) Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation
and Pupils' Intellectual Development. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Rothstein J (2009) Student sorting and bias in value-added estimation: Selection on
observables and unobservables. Education Finance and Policy 4(4): 537571.
Schwarz G (1978) Estimating the dimension of a model. The Annals of Statistics 6(2):
461464.
Seaton M; Marsh HW and Craven RG (2009) Earning its place as a pan-human theory:
universality of the big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect across 41 culturally and economically
diverse countries. Journal of Educational Psychology 101(2): 403419.
Seaton M; Marsh HW and Craven RG (2010) Big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect: generalizability
and moderation - two sides of the same coin. American Educational Research Journal
47(2): 390433.
Snijders TAB and Bosker RJ (1999) Multilevel Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and
Advanced Multilevel Modeling. London: Sage Publications Ltd.
Stocké V (2007) Explaining educational decision and eﬀects of families' social class
position: an empirical test of the Breen Goldthorpe model of educational attainment.
European Sociological Review 23(4): 505519.
Tabachnick BG and Fidell LS (2007) Using Multivariate Statistics. 5 edn. Boston, Mass:
Pearson Education.
Thijs J; Verkuyten M and Helmond P (2010) A further examination of the big-ﬁsh-little-
pond eﬀect. Sociology of Education 83(4): 333345.
Thorndike EL (1920) A constant error in psychological ratings. Journal of Applied
Psychology 4(1): 2529.
Tiedemann J and Billmann-Mahecha E (2007) Zum Einﬂuss von Migration und Schulk-
lassenzugehörigkeit auf die Übergangsempfehlung für die Sekundarstufe I. Zeitschrift
für Erziehungswissenschaft 10(1): 108120.
187
References
Trautwein U and Baeriswyl F (2007) Wenn leistungsstarke Klassenkameraden ein
Nachteil sind. Zeitschrift für Pädagogische Psychologie 21(2): 119133.
Trautwein U; Gerlach E and Lüdtke O (2008) Athletic classmates, physical self-concept,
and free-time physical activity: a longitudinal study of frame of reference eﬀects.
Journal of Educational Psychology 100(4): 9881001.
Trautwein U and Lüdtke O (2005) The big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect. Future research ques-
tions and educational implications. Zeitschrift für Pädagogische Psychologie 19(3):
137140.
Trautwein U; Lüdtke O; Marsh HW et al. (2006) Tracking, grading, and student mo-
tivation: using group composition and status to predict self-concept and interest in
ninth-grade mathematics. Journal of Educational Psychology 98(4): 788806.
Trautwein U; Lüdtke O; Marsh HW et al. (2009) Within-school social comparison: How
students perceive the standing of their class predicts academic self-concept. Journal
of Educational Psychology 101(4): 853866.
Vuong QH (1989) Likelihood ratio tests for model selection and non-nested hypotheses.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 57(2): 307333.
Zeidner M and Schleyer EJ (1998) The big-ﬁsh-little-pond eﬀect for academic self-
concept, test anxiety, and school grades in gifted children. Contemporary Educational
Psychology 24(4): 305329.
188
III. Intelligence and Academic Achievement as Contextual-Level Predictors of Teachers' Evaluations
6 Appendix
Table A: Descriptive statistics of independent variables
count mean sd min max
ist (student-level intelligence, group-mean centered) 16819 0.01 10.45 -35.59 37.17
gpa (student-level GPA, group-mean centered) 16820 0.00 0.45 -1.35 1.73
ses (student-level SES, group-mean centered) 16833 0.00 1.19 -3.52 3.19
aspir (student-level aspirations) 16796 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00
sex (student-level gender) 17689 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
IST (class-level intelligence, grand-mean centered) 17689 -0.12 4.45 -9.37 10.20
GPA (class-level GPA, grand-mean centered) 17689 -0.00 0.15 -0.43 0.40
SES (class-level SES, grand-mean centered) 17689 0.01 0.52 -1.27 1.46
TFR(ind) (Teachers' frame of reference: individualist) 17626 0.22 0.59 0.00 2.00
TFR(rel) (Teachers' frame of reference: relational) 17626 0.10 0.42 0.00 2.00
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(a) Model 1a.
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(c) Model 1c.
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(d) Model 1d.
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(e) Model 1e.
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(f) Model 1f.
Figure A: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level achievement predictors in models 1a - 1f.
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(a) Model 2a.
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(b) Model 2b.
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(c) Model 2c.
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(d) Model 2d.
Figure B: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level achievement predictors in models 2a - 2d.
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(a) Model 3a.
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(d) Model 3d.
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(b) Model 3b.
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(e) Model 3e.
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(c) Model 3c.
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(f) Model 3f.
Figure C: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level achievement predictors in models 3a - 3f.
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(a) Model 4a.
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(b) Model 4b.
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(c) Model 4c.
gmz.ist effect plot
Class−level intelligence (gmz.ist)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(te
ac
he
r e
va
lu
at
io
n 
= 
'a
bl
e'
)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 −5   0   5  10
(d) Model 4d.
Figure D: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level intelligence in models 4a - 4d.
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(a) Model 4e.
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(b) Model 4f.
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(c) Model 4g.
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(d) Model 4h.
Figure E: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level GPA in models 4e - 4h.
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(a) Model 5a.
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(b) Model 5b.
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(c) Model 5c.
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(d) Model 5d.
Figure F: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level intelligence in models 5a - 5d.
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(a) Model 5e.
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(b) Model 5f.
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gmz.dnote effect plot
Class−level GPA (gmz.gpa)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(te
ac
he
r e
va
lu
at
io
n 
= 
'a
bl
e'
)
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
−0.4 −0.2  0.0  0.2  0.4
(d) Model 5h.
Figure G: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level GPA in models 5e - 5h.
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(a) Model 6a.
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(b) Model 6b.
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(c) Model 6c.
gmz.ist effect plot
Class−level intelligence (gmz.ist)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(te
ac
he
r e
va
lu
at
io
n 
= 
'a
bl
e'
)
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
 −5   0   5  10
(d) Model 6d.
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(e) Model 6e.
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(f) Model 6f.
Figure H: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level intelligence in models 6a - gf.
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(a) Model 6g.
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(b) Model 6h.
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(c) Model 6i.
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(d) Model 6j.
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(f) Model 6l.
Figure I: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level GPA in models 6g - gl.
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(a) Model 7b.
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(b) Model 7c.
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(c) Model 7d.
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(d) Model 7e.
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(e) Model 7f.
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(f) Model 7g.
Figure J: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level achievement predictors in models 7b - 7g.
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(a) Model 7a.
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(c) Model 7c.
gmz.schicht.e effect plot
Class−level social composition (SES)
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
(te
ac
he
r e
va
lu
at
io
n 
= 
'a
bl
e'
)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
−1.0 −0.5  0.0  0.5  1.0  1.5
(d) Model 7d.
Figure K: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level social composition in models 7a - 7d.
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Figure L: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level social composition in models 7e - 7g.
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Figure M: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level intelligence in models 8a - 8d.
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Figure N: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level GPA in models 8e - 8h.
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(d) Model 8d.
Figure O: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level social composition in models 8a - 8d.
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Figure P: Average marginal eﬀects (black solid line) and conﬁdence intervals (red dashed
lines) for class-level social composition in models 8e - 8h.
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Figure Q: Marginal eﬀects of cross-level ability interaction terms (alternative speciﬁca-
tion).
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IV. The Impact of Teachers'
Expectations on Students'
Educational Opportunities in the
Life Course
An Empirical Test of A Subjective-Expected-Utility Explanation
The objective of this paper is to integrate the idea of Pygmalion or self-fulﬁlling
prophecy research (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Jussim and Harber, 2005) into
the subjective expected utility framework of inequality in educational opportuni-
ties (Esser, 1999). In the theoretical section, a formal model about the impact
of teachers' expectations on students' educational transitions in sense of a self-
fulﬁlling prophecy is developed. In the empirical section, I test this model to pre-
dict both students' educational success (in terms of high school graduation) and
their university transitions. Analyses control for both sample selection bias and
unobserved heterogeneity. I ﬁnd that in the underlying operationalization, teach-
ers' expectations show signiﬁcant eﬀects on both educational success and university
transitions. While the conditional decision problem of university transitions might
lead to a selection bias, unobserved heterogeneity would have to be disturbingly
high to aﬀect the stability of self-fulﬁlling prophecy estimates.
1 Introduction
School surely is the ﬁrst and by that way also the most important branching point
in everybody's life course at least in industrialized countries. According to structural
functionalists, the function of school is to internalize in its pupils both the commitments
and the capacities for successful performance of their future adult roles, and second
(...) to allocate these human resources within the role-structure of the adult society
(Parsons, 1959, p. 298; also see Davis and Moore, 1945). Economic literature provides
numerous examples for the relationship between schooling and labor market income (e.g.
Boissiere et al., 1985; Ashenfelter et al., 1999). Moreover, there is even evidence that in
the long run human capital  measured by labor-force quality  may inﬂuence nations'
productivity and economic growth (Bishop, 1989; Hanushek and Kimko, 2000). However,
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although the importance of schooling and its quality is undisputed, there is still room
to reﬁne social science theories on social inequality in educational opportunities (IEO).
On the one hand, powerful conclusions can be drawn from the theoretical framework
that has been provided by social inequality theory based on rational-choice or subjective
expected utility (SEU) assumptions. One of its main strengths lies in allowing us to
distinguish between primary and secondary eﬀects of social inequality, i.e. between
eﬀects of socialization and eﬀects of aspirations. Furthermore, SEU theory convention-
ally implies that research assumptions have to be formalized. This facilitates both the
comparison of diﬀerent hypotheses and their operationalization into empirical models.
On the other hand, social psychologists have impressively revealed how teachers' ex-
pectations can inﬂuence students' future performance beyond their (or their parents')
mere cost-beneﬁt considerations. This phenomenon has been labeled the Pygmalion
eﬀect of self-fulﬁlling underestimations and the Golem eﬀect of self-fulﬁlling overestima-
tions (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). Moreover, Pygmalion research showed that the
variance of this eﬀect can partially be explained by social background variables (Jussim
and Harber, 2005).
The substantial aim of this paper is to integrate the main idea of Pygmalion or self-
fulﬁlling prophecy research into the general subjective expected utility framework of
IEO. In particular, I will refer to Esser's (1999) SEU-IEO that has been proposed in
course of a concatenation of related theoretical accounts (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996;
Goldthorpe, 1996; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997). Furthermore, while many  not all 
applications of this model have considered educational transition decisions from primary
to secondary school, in this study I will focus on students' probability of achieving a
high school degree, and on their propensity of beginning academic studies, respectively.
The research design will follow the model proposed by Becker (2003) which includes
controls for selection bias (Heckman, 1979). Additionally, I will perform a sensitivity
analysis for all self-fulﬁlling prophecy indicators to test their robustness against a vector
of unobserved covariates (Buis, 2007, 2010, 2011).
This paper will be structured as follows: First, the basic assumptions of both the
SEU-IEO model and Pygmalion will be discussed. Then I will outline to what extent
Pygmalion's implications require us to rebuild the present SEU-IEO model in order
to specify the endogeneity of students' subjective expected probability of educational
success more adequately. After a short description of the dataset and the variables, a
series of stepwise logit models both without and with controls for selection bias will
be presented and discussed. These models are amended by sensitivity analyses for the
self-fulﬁlling prophecy indicators. The paper ends with a conclusion and provides an
outlook on potential extensions of the model.
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2 Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Inequality in Educational Opportunities: Educational
Transition Models
One of the most inﬂuential theoretical components of Boudon's (1974, p. 29ﬀ.) mono-
graph for contemporary quantitatively-oriented IEO research is its distinction between
primary and secondary eﬀects of social inequality.
The primary eﬀect of educational inequality states that the lower educational suc-
cess of lower-SES children may be due to their lower capabilities  be they deﬁned as
educational interests, intellectual skills, eﬀort, or motivation (Jackson et al., 2007; also
see Müller-Benedict, 2007). Part of the primary eﬀect may in fact be genetic, but an-
other, presumably greater part of the above-mentioned characteristics is acquired during
socialization (Erikson and Jonsson, 1996, p. 10f.).
The secondary eﬀect, contrarily, operates via stratum-speciﬁc diﬀerences in educa-
tional decision making due to diﬀerential opportunity-cost structures, and Boudon's
crucial assumption is that secondary eﬀects still take place once primary eﬀects have
been controlled for (Boudon, 1974, p. 29ﬀ.; for a critique see Nash, 2003).1 The idea
that utility considerations may shape students' (or their parents') educational decisions
was taken on in a series of consecutive theoretical models proposed by Goldthorpe (1996),
Erikson and Jonsson (1996), Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) as well as Esser (1999). A
common proposition of these models relates to the idea that it is simpler (i.e. more
parsimonious) to assume that there is no class-speciﬁc variation in either aspirations
towards education per se or in potentially underlying value systems. Instead, educa-
tion is regarded as an investment good the costs and beneﬁts of which vary by social
classes. Each family will strive to avoid downward mobility, but unsurprisingly, for lower-
educated parents, this goal will be reached already for lower educational qualiﬁcations
of their children  while for higher-educated parents, a far higher degree will have to
be obtained. Moreover, for the oﬀspring of parents in less advantageous positions, each
failed attempt of trying a higher educational alternative will be more serious in its con-
sequences concerning both monetary (earnings foregone; loss of ﬁnancial support) and
transactional costs (a loss in itself; the risk of dropping out of the educational system).
Erikson and Jonsson (1996) introduce a simple 3-parameter model postulating that
students' utility of continuing education (or opting for the comparably higher educational
track) can be regarded as a function of the product of educational beneﬁt B and the
expected probability of educational success P, minus expected costs of education C
(U = PB − C). Esser (1999, p. 165-175) takes up these crucial parameters in order to
develop a model according to the logic of subjective expected utility theory. This more
complex model is elaborated on in the next paragraph.2
1Some authors also subsume class-sensitive structural conditions at the school level  e.g. in terms of
the variance of teachers' school track recommendations by parental social class (Pietsch and Stubbe,
2007) among secondary eﬀects of social inequality as well (e.g. Müller-Benedict, 2007).
2While the model by Erikson and Jonsson (1996) shows the highest theoretical proximity to the Esser
(1999) model, also the theoretical accounts by Meulemann (1979) and Breen and Goldthorpe (1997)
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Esser's' Subjective-Expected-Utility model Esser (1999) uses a subjective-expected-
utility (henceforth referred to as SEU ) model to explain the mechanisms of parental
educational choices at the end of primary school education. The expected utility EU for
the alternatives at hand, to continue onto lower secondary school (An) or to continue
onto intermediate or upper secondary school tracks (Ab) will be as follows:
EU(An) = Psd(−SD) (1)
EU(Ab) = PepB + (1− Pep)Psd(−SD)− C. (2)
Here, SD is the value of status decline with Psd as its impact (in terms of a subjective
probability) on parental decisions; B is the beneﬁt of higher education (e.g. in terms of
labour market prospects); Pep is the subjective probability of successfully completing the
chosen school track; and C are the expected costs of education (also see Becker, 2003;
Pietsch and Stubbe, 2007). By simple linear transformations, Esser (1999) shows that
EU(Ab) > EU(An) ⇐⇒ B + PsdSD > C/Pep, (3)
while the term B + PsdSD can be denoted as the educational motivation and the term
C/Pep as the investment risk. Thus, a higher level of education will be aspired if the
educational motivation to continue somehow exceeds the underlying investment risk.
Since in case of low Pep, educational motivation has to be very high to exceed the critical
threshold of the investment risk, the model can also account for the fact of persisting
inequality in educational opportunities (Esser, 1999, p. 270).
Among educational transition models, both the Breen-Goldthorpe- and the Esser
model have been tested most comprehensively (Jonsson, 1999; Breen and Jonsson, 2000;
Becker, 2003; Stocké, 2007; Schneider, 2008). However, in terms of methodology, Becker's
(2003) operationalization controlling for selection bias via Heckit correction (Heckman,
1979) was referred to being the best available test of Esser's (1999) model (Stocké, 2007,
p. 508). In this model, ﬁrst the impact of parental social class on each of the indicators
B, −SD, Psd, Pep and C is used to correct for sample selection bias in the explanation of
the choice of upper secondary school. Second, these eﬀects are again used to control for
selection bias in the explanation of the transition to particular school tracks (see section
3.4 for a more formal description of the Heckit correction).
Becker (2003) justiﬁes his three-step method by the endogeneity of the causal struc-
ture. However, the next subsection will provide arguments for the presence of another
endogeneity that apparently has been neglected so far but is worth considering: the
impact of teachers' expectations on the students' probability of successfully completing
the chosen school track, Pep.
2.2 Pygmalion in the Classroom
The idea of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy was ﬁrst established by Robert Merton (1948). In
this seminal paper he showed how prejudices towards out-groups (e.g. African Ameri-
cans) or speciﬁc attitudes about a certain situation (e.g. the rumor of a bank's illiquidity)
evidently capture similar ideas.
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might become true simply as a consequence of the former judgments: "The prophecy of
collapse led to its own fulﬁllment" (Merton, 1948, p. 195). Following the well-known
study of Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968), the eﬀect of misled teacher expectations on
students future school achievement has been labeled as the Pygmalion eﬀect.3 The idea
behind the metaphor holds that teachers' too high or too low expectations can have an
impact on the teacher-student interaction, which, in turn, might inﬂuence the students
to adopt their motivations and aspirations according to their teachers' expectations. In
the words of Merton, teachers' expectations, which had originally been misled, would in
turn lead to their own fulﬁllment.
The classical Pygmalion In the original study, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) ad-
ministered a nonverbal intelligence test to elementary school children. However, they did
not tell the teachers that this was an intelligence test but claimed that it was a new tool
to identify 'late bloomers', i.e. children who were likely to show a sudden and dramatic
intellectual spurt over the upcoming school year. Although the 'late bloomers' were
actually selected randomly, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) observed that in an IQ test
which was administered one year later they gained signiﬁcantly better test scores than the
control-group students. Thus, the false expectations of the teachers (who had been led
to believe in the artiﬁcially created group of late bloomers) had become true.4 Whereas
many social psychologists took Pygmalion as a conﬁrmation of their thesis that social
reality is mainly created by one's own expectations, educational psychologists were much
more skeptical with regard to Pygmalion's methodological prerequisites and the possibil-
ity of alternative explanations which, according to them, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968)
have not suﬃciently controlled for (Jussim and Harber, 2005, 139).5
Trying to refute his critics, Rosenthal became one of the pioneers in meta-analyses.
His and Rubin's (Rosenthal and Rubin, 1978) meta-analysis of the ﬁrst 345 studies
from various research categories (reaction time, inkblot tests, animal learning, labora-
tory interviews, psycho-physical judgments, learning and ability, person perception, and
everyday life situations) concluded that self-fulﬁlling prophecies do exist and show ef-
fect sizes between d = .14 up to d = 1.73 and r = .07 up to r = .65 (Rosenthal and
Rubin, 1978, table 1).6 A second meta-analysis based on a more narrowly deﬁned set
3According to the Greek myth as it is narrated by Ovid (Metamorphoses, X ), the Cypriot sculptor
Pygmalion carved a woman out of ivory. This statue was so beautiful that he fell in love with it.
Due to his caress, the statue ﬁnally gets alive, they marry and have a son.
4While social psychology diﬀerentiates between the Pygmalion eﬀect of self-fulﬁlling over -estimations
and the Golem eﬀect of self-fulﬁlling under -estimations, I use the more common term of Pygmalion
to capture both types of self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
5Critics remarked that both groups of children  late bloomers and controls  showed IQ gains over
the next year. The diﬀerences between the gains of the two groups (four percentage points) are
signiﬁcant, but less 'dramatic' than the gross IQ gain of 12 percent of the experimental group
students would suggest. For this and other critiques with regard to the original Rosenthal and
Jacobson (1968) study see Thorndike (1968), Jensen (1969), Snow (1969), Elashoﬀ and Snow (1971),
Wineburg (1987), Roth (1995), and Jussim and Harber (2005).
6Both d and r are measures of meta-analytic eﬀect sizes. Eﬀect size r can be obtained from t, F , χ2,
and Z statistics. Eﬀect size d is a linear transformation of r. For a more elaborate discussion see
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of Pygmalion studies examined that the eﬀect of teachers' expectations on students' IQ
scores was .16 by average (Smith, 1980). Raudenbush (1984) found an eﬀect size of .11
by average and additionally revealed that the eﬀect of teachers' expectations at t0 on
later IQ scores at t1 highly depends on how long the teachers have already been teaching
a particular class.7
Although critics like Wineburg (1987) refused to accept an impact of teachers' expecta-
tions on students' intelligence scores, Raudenbush (1994) re-analyzed the 18 experiments
of his earlier study (Raudenbush, 1984) based on random eﬀect models and now found
an eﬀect size even of r=.20.
Need for mediators and moderators Given these results, one evident weakness of
Pygmalion regardless of its operationalization lies in an insuﬃcient control of both stu-
dent and teacher background variables as either mediators or moderators.8 In particular,
more research is obviously needed with regard to students' social backgrounds (Jussim
and Harber, 2005). Concretely, there are only three studies who explicitly considered
these eﬀects: First, Madon et al. (1997) found that self-fulﬁlling prophecies appear to be
stronger among students who had a 'prior history of low-achievement', which was opera-
tionalized as their standardized results in a test that had been administered prior to the
actual experiment. Basically, the authors' operationalization of self-fulﬁlling prophecies
as teachers' over- and underestimations appears to be very promising (and will thus also
be used in the study at hand): Whereas in experimental studies such as the original
Pygmalion study (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968), the researcher can expose a teacher
to false information in order to ensure that her expectations are really inaccurate, in
naturalistic (such as survey data) studies, this is not equally possible (Jussim, 1986). To
overcome this problem, Madon et al. (1997) ﬁrst regressed teachers' expectations (related
to students' performance, talent and eﬀort) on a set of student background variables. In
a second step, they used the residuals of these regressions  reﬂecting a student's over-
or underestimation by her teacher  as new variables to ensure that a teacher's expec-
tation is, to some extent, actually inaccurate. However, for their purpose of identifying
moderator variables their model unfortunately suﬀers from a methodological weakness.9
Second, Jussim et al. (1996) found evidence that self-fulﬁlling prophecies are moder-
Rosenthal and DiMatteo (2001).
7A duration of less than 5 weeks yielded an eﬀect size of up to .55, whereas a duration of 24 weeks
led to an eﬀect size of -.13 (Raudenbush, 1984, p. 91). Thus, the longer a teacher is teaching in a
particular class, the better she knows her students and the lesser are the consequences of possible
misjudgments.
8Among the few exceptions of empirical studies taking moderator eﬀects into account, the meta-
analysis by Raudenbush (1984) which found that the eﬀect size of self-fulﬁlling prophecies varies by
teachers' duration in class has already been mentioned. Moreover, in the same study Raudenbush
(1984) found that the eﬀect also varies by grade level. And ﬁnally, self-fulﬁlling prophecies appear
to be weaker in more 'diﬀerential' teacher treatment contexts (Brattesani et al., 1984).
9Concretely, among the set of background variables that was used to identify teachers' over- and
underestimations, we can ﬁnd students' 5th grade math test scores  which were also used to identify
low and high achievers (Madon et al., 1997, p. 798). Therefore, it is not surprising that the authors
ﬁnd a variation in the eﬀect size of self-fulﬁlling prophecies based on this variable.
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ated by both social class and ethnicity-related variables. In their study, the standardized
relationship between teachers' perceptions and students' future test scores was about .25
for students of parents with a lower education, and .03 for students of parents with a
higher education. In the United States, similar diﬀerences could be detected between
Caucasian students and African-American ones in terms of a standardized eﬀect size of
.14 and .37, respectively. Third, Madon et al. (1998) noted that teachers' perceptions
of students' performance and talent (but not of their ability) correlate bivariately with
students' social class (operationalized as an index of parental education and parental in-
come). However, these bivariate associations diminish when additional predictors such
as students' school grades, intelligence test scores and their motivation are introduced in
multivariate analyses. Hence, the largest share of the diﬀerences that teachers identify
between social groups corresponds closely to actual diﬀerences in previous grades and
achievement tests.
Implications What does this overall mixed evidence suggest? First, the phenomenon of
a self-fulﬁlling prophecy is hard to identify analytically. As we saw, not only experimental-
group students achieved a gain in their IQ test scores but also control-group students
(Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968). Second, one can note that one solution might be to
compute a 'net' eﬀect of self-fulﬁlling prophecies in the way of Madon et al. (1997).
Although those strategies evidently are not without pitfalls, they might be helpful in
separating self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects from other intervening mechanisms. Third, and
most important, we saw that self-fulﬁlling prophecy research lacks of a suﬃcient consid-
eration of student background variables. This is precisely where the SEU-IEO framework
comes back in: Just as self-fulﬁlling prophecy research depends on considering student
background variables, the SEU-IEO framework lacks the consideration of exactly that
endogeneity concerning students' probability of educational success which is the main
point of all Pygmalion studies. The task in the next section will be to integrate the
main idea of a 'net' eﬀect of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy into the SEU-IEO framework.
2.3 Development of an SEU Model of Self-Fulﬁlling Prophecies
Given the utility relations of the conventional SEU-IEO model as outlined in section
2.1, educational decisions would be a direct function of net utility. However, this seems
to be only half the truth, for it would neglect the idea of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy in the
classroom. In line with the main idea of Pygmalion, claiming that a teacher's expecta-
tions may have a distinct eﬀect on students' later school achievement implies that the
'real' transition rates are not only a result of 'subjective' parental utility comparisons,
but also of 'objective' interactions in the classroom: A shortcoming of the standard
economic approach to decision making is that it ignores the endogeneity of preferences
- that students' preferences are socially constructed through interaction with peers and
other signiﬁcant persons (Lauen, 2007, 183). The consequence of admitting an endo-
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geneity of preferences in the classroom is to also assume an endogeneity of pep
10, i.e. of
the subjective expected probability of successfully completing the chosen school track.
Following both Breen and Goldthorpe (1997, p. 285) as well as Esser (1999, p. 272f.),
the subjective probability of educational success depends on students' objective school
performance. In accordance with Esser's notation, this reads
pep = f(AP ), (4)
while AP denotes students' academic performance. Claiming that teachers' expectations
in terms of a 'net' eﬀect of self-fulﬁlling prophecies (Madon et al., 1997) at time t, TEt,
may inﬂuence students' academic outcomes at a later time t+ 1 can be formalized as
APt+1 = g(TEt). (5)
For pept+1 thus holds
pept+1 = f(g(TEt)) (6)
 meaning that subjective probability assumptions are a function of students' objective
school performance which is, in terms of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy, dependent on teachers'
earlier expectations. Notably, in self-fulﬁlling prophecy research, many studies stress
that the crucial mechanism of teacher expectancy eﬀects also operates via students' self-
concept and their aspirations (Jussim, 1989; Gill and Reynolds, 1999; Muller et al., 1999;
Mechtenberg, 2009; Mistry et al., 2009).11
Will APt+1 be the only variable that aﬀects pept+1? Certainly not. Concretely, I
assume that equation (6) can be decomposed into
pept+1 = h(pept , APt+1, ). (7)
Equation (7) expresses that students' subjective expected probability of educational
success is a function of her preceding subjective expected success probability, her ac-
tual academic performance and an unspeciﬁed teacher treatment eﬀect  that captures
classroom praise, bilateral encouragement, and similar mechanisms (without making any
assumptions about the functional form of this relation).
We should now apply this idea on Esser's (1999) formal model by tracking the logic of a
SFP in its appropriate survey-data framework of teachers' over- and underestimations.12
Let δ ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether a student has been underestimated (δ = 0) or overesti-
mated (δ = 1) by her teacher. Restricting the other SEU parameters to remain constant
over time, let further p˜ep• = pept + ∆pep to get rid of time indices (see Jaeger and Holm,
10To appreciate that this term and psd refer to subjective expected probabilities, I will use lowercase p
in the following.
11
? propose a formal model of Pygmalion eﬀects applied to management science which also highlights
the importance of subjective success probability assumptions; but since this model is neither tangent
to the ﬁeld of educational transitions nor to the respective rational action model, I do not discuss it
in more detail.
12In section 3.3, I will measure teachers' over- and underestimations by the residuals of a regression of
teachers' evaluations on both students' performance and their motivation, (see Madon et al., 1997).
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2011, for a similar analytic strategy)  that is, p˜ep• captures students' initial subjective
expected probability of educational success plus (or minus) the additional gain (or loss)
∆pep that is due to an over- (or under-)estimation as sketched in (7).
13 If ﬁnally p˜ep− and
p˜ep+ denote the under- and overestimated students' corresponding subjective expected
probability of successfully completing the chosen school track, respectively, then we can
rewrite equation (3) as follows:
EU(Ab) > EU(An) ⇐⇒ B + psdSD > C
[δ · p˜ep+ + (1− δ) · p˜ep− ]
(8)
As the argument goes, on average pept+1|δ=1 > pept+1|δ=0 since on the one hand, APt+1|δ=1 >
APt+1|δ=0, and on the other hand, δ=1 > δ=0. Holding constant for pept , it follows that
p˜ep+ > p˜ep− . Since the denominator of the right-hand side of equation (8) then is larger
for δ = 1 than for δ = 0, it follows that
EUδ=1(Ab) > EUδ=0(Ab), (9)
that is, other things being equal, students who had been overestimated by their teachers
should have a higher expected utility of choosing the next higher-level school-track than
students who had been underestimated.
Model identiﬁcation In the above-sketched model I assume that self-fulﬁlling prophe-
cies directly enter the students' utility function. However, it has to be clariﬁed which type
of rationality students' utility function relies on. A student who has been overestimated
by her teacher will dispose of a higher subjective expected probability of educational
success not only because of her better grades, but also because of more subtle teacher
treatment eﬀects (above referred to as ) that may be understood quite similarly to
the 'caress' eﬀect in Ovid's metamorphoses. As Morgan (1998, p. 136) writes, students
adopt the expectations that others have of them and add these to their own expectations
formed independently through their own rational self-reﬂection. Adding expectations
of teachers in their role as signiﬁcant others (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970; Morgan, 1998,
2002) may be an unconscious endeavor, but in altering a crucial parameter of the utility
function, they might also aﬀect quite rational utility considerations.
The question is now how the crucial parameters can be estimated in an empirical
model. My answer is that the current framework in social psychology of residualizing
teachers' expectations (Madon et al., 1997, 2006) is very helpful for identiﬁcation pur-
poses. The assumption is that when teachers' expectations are residualized for students'
achievement, their motivation and self-concept at t1, the relations that are addressed in
(7) can be approximated also in case of lacking empirical measures. While pept can be
measured from the data at hand (see section 3), I do not have indicators for APt+1 and
. But I assume that by regressing teachers' evaluations on a set of performance and
motivation variables, diﬀerences in students' academic performance between t and t+ 1
13To some extent, my theoretical model resembles the value-added approach in school eﬀectiveness
research (Ladd and Walsh, 2002; Rivkin et al., 2005).
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as well as unobserved teacher treatment factors that exceed (or undershoot) students'
motivation and their self-concept at t (and thereby take eﬀect as a causative factor for
∆pep) can, if admittedly not entirely isolated, at least be approximated.
Hence, I assume that residualizing teachers' expectations as proposed by Madon et al.
(1997, 2006) provides a useful tool for approximating the unobserved mechanisms that
enter students' rational utility function by both consciously and unconsciously inﬂuenc-
ing a crucial parameter thereof.
2.4 Hypotheses
After these theoretical considerations my main hypothesis is easily outlined: I postulate
that via their prognostic nature, teachers' expectations have distinct eﬀects on students'
educational transitions in terms of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy. By 'distinct eﬀects' I mean
that they will have a signiﬁcant impact apart from the convenient theoretical concepts
of the SEU-IEO model (Esser, 1999). Since a major claim of rational-action theories of
educational transitions is that secondary eﬀects of social inequality do not only aﬀect
the actual transition decisions but also the decision for or against continuing the chosen
school track (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997), as a ﬁrst step I aim to analyze the probability
of German 10th class Gymnasium students to achieve a high school degree ('Abitur').
This certiﬁcate all along used to be and still is the crucial prerequisite for access to
tertiary education. When surveyed mid of 10th grade, German Gymnasium students are
still facing a crucial decision: They could continue education in secondary school level II
('Gymnasiale Oberstufe') that would be successfully ﬁnished by obtaining Abitur after
(at that time consistently) three years  or they could quit secondary school immediately
at the end of 10th grade, or thereafter, without having passed Abitur. As Schneider (2008,
ﬁgure 2b) recently observed by using GSOEP data, even after 9 years of secondary-school
education, for students from the salariat, the survivor function modeling the probability
of not dropping out from Gymnasium lies remarkably above the corresponding survivor
function for students from working class. Hence, one can assume that secondary school
cost-beneﬁt considerations as postulated by Esser (1999), inter alia, are equally an issue
for passing Abitur.
In a second step, I will also model students' transition propensities to tertiary edu-
cation in terms of starting academic studies. Becker and Hecken (2009a,b) argue that
utility considerations as reﬂected in Esser's (1999) SEU model are also pivotal for uni-
versity transitions. One social mechanism that could account for transition diﬀerences
between the social strata at this comparably later point in students' educational life
course is that their respective time horizon might diﬀer, too. The impending costs of
higher education are accompanied by merely uncertain returns  which may be more
signiﬁcant for students from the lower social classes than for those from the salariat
(Becker and Hecken, 2009b, p. 235f.). Therefore, the former can be expected to make
that transition less frequently than the latter.
Due to the fact that rational-action theories on IEO in general have proven useful also
in predicting higher-level transitions (Jonsson, 1999; Need and De Jong, 2001; Becker
and Hecken, 2009a,b; Hillmert and Jacob, 2010), I take the SEU model as given in order
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to keep the number of hypotheses reasonably small for avoiding diﬃculties in causal
identiﬁcation of my models. Therefore, according to the formal model of self-fulﬁlling
prophecies I have proposed above, there remain only two (nonetheless important) hy-
potheses to test:
H1 : Apart from the SEU-model indicators, students' probability of achieving a high school
degree increases with (positive) self-fulﬁlling prophecies, SFP .
H2 : Apart from the SEU-model indicators, students' probability of starting academic studies
increases with (positive) self-fulﬁlling prophecies, SFP .
As indicated above, due to data restrictions, I am not able to test for a direct im-
pact of teacher expectations on students' future school performance (as Pygmalion in
its initial form would require). However, I assume that given the (in my view) adequate
operationalization of SFP in terms of over- and underestimations  approximating the
factors that aﬀect student diﬀerences in their subjective expected probability of educa-
tional success ∆pep, we can identify an estimate that gets quite close to the unobserved
mechanisms of the 'real' self-fulﬁlling prophecy.14 The next section will provide an in-
sight into which measures will be used concretely.
3 Operationalization
3.1 Data
All analyses will be based on a German panel dataset which is known as the 'Kölner
Gymnasiasten-Panel' (Engl. 'Cologne High School Panel', henceforth referred to as
CHiSP). The CHiSP consists of an initial (student-level) survey from 1969 (Gesis-No.:
ZA0600) with N = 3385 10th-grade Gymnasium15 students in North Rhine-Westphalia
with three re-surveys in 1985 (Gesis-No.: ZA1441; N = 1987), 1996/97 (Gesis-No.:
ZA4228; N=1596), and 2010 (N = 1301; no Gesis-No. available yet). In the initial
survey, students were asked about issues like their performance, interests and plans
in school and about their social background and their relationship to their parents.
Simultaneously to the initial survey, the students took part in an Intelligence S tructure
T est (IST) containing four sub-scales developed by Amthauer (1957). At the same time,
also the students' teachers (Gesis-No.: ZA0640; N=1701) and their parents (Gesis-No.:
ZA0639; N=2646) have been surveyed. The main items of the parent questionnaire were
14In this context, one could also refer to the distinction between substantive and empirical statistical
models (Cox, 1990), or between scientiﬁc models presented in statistical form and statistical models
per se (Rogosa, 1987; Sø rensen, 1998). The point is that the former are intended to represent
real processes that have causal force (whether or not directly observable) while the latter are
those which sociologists normally use and are concerned with relations among variables that may
be determined through techniques of rather general applicability (Goldthorpe, 2001, p. 14).
15For more detailed descriptions of the German educational system see Jürges and Schneider (2006),
Pietsch and Stubbe (2007), and Schneider (2008).
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about their social background, their style of raising children and their aspirations for
their children. Amongst others, teachers were asked about several evaluative and other
pedagogic issues. In an investigation of the Central Archive for Empirical Research in
Cologne (today known as Gesis - Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences), the 10th class
and Abitur grades (if passed) could be examined and were merged with the data. In the
two re-surveys, the former students provided detailed information on their educational
and occupational careers until the age of 43. I chose this admittedly older data, because
to the best of my knowledge, it is the only available longitudinal dataset that contains
appropriate measures of both indicators of the SEU model outlined by Esser (1999) and
of teachers' expectations that are required to construct over- and underestimations in
order to operationalize self-fulﬁlling prophecies adequately. The latter indicator will be
described in the next but one paragraph.
3.2 Variables
Dependent variables In the hypotheses section I identiﬁed two dependent variables.
The ﬁrst dependent variable is deﬁned by whether the students have achieved a high
school degree (Abitur) or not. While the CHiSP also includes information about whether
the former students have ever achieved Abitur in their later life, I will focus on those
students only who achieved Abitur during the regular schooling time. This appears to
be logically consistent since secondary eﬀects of social inequality can also be understood
as a decision for vs. against continuing higher education (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997;
Schneider, 2008). Hence, I want to focus on those students only who passed Abitur on
the ﬁrst try (event=1) using all observations that did not achieve Abitur within 3 years
after the 10th class survey in 1969 as a reference (event=0).16 The second dependent
variable is given by whether the former students have ever started academic studies.
Since my analyses will be based on panel data, I have to take into account that from a
theoretical point of view, it would be possible for the former students to start academic
studies at any later point in time  including data points set after the last survey of the
CHiSP (currently 2010). This problem will be solved empirically in section 4.1.
Independent variables The expected beneﬁt of education, B, is operationalized by
students' appraisement if Abitur were to be considered a necessity in order for them
to reach their aim in life. Students had the following reply options: 1 'yes, necessary';
2 'useful, but not necessary'; and 3 'not important'. I dichotomized this variable into
the two categories 0 'not important' and 1 'useful or necessary'. The value of status
decline, −SD, is measured by parents' disappointment if their child did not pass Abitur.
The categories of this variables are 1 'not much'; 2 'little'; 3 'very disappointed'; 4
'would be the worst'. I dichotomized this variable as follows: 0 'not much / little'; 1
'very disappointed / would be the worst'. I operationalize the expected status decline,
16Since the zero point of counting has been backdated to January 1967 and I do not want to exclude
students who had to participate in makeup exams, I set the cut-oﬀ value to 80 months beginning
from the starting point.
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psd by parents' assessments about the importance of good Abitur grades for students'
later occupational success. The original categories of this variable (1 'little'; 2 'not that
much'; 3 'big'; 4 'very big') were dichotomized into 0 'little / not much' and 1 'big /
very big'. Students' subjective educational performance pep is measured by a probability
assumption of the parents whether their oﬀspring is able to complete the chosen school
track. The original variable (1 'deﬁnitely'; 2 'probably'; 3 'don't know'; 4 'probably
not') is recoded as follows: 0 'probably not/don't know'; 1 'probably/deﬁnitely'. The
expected costs of education, C, are operationalized by parents' assessment if they had to
make ﬁnancial sacriﬁces in order to oﬀer higher education to their children. Again, the
original categories of the variable (1 'no', 2 'little' and 3 'yes') are recoded into a dummy
variable: 0 'no/little'; 1 'yes' (see Becker, 2003, for a comparable operationalization of
the SEU predictors).17 To keep results comparable with previous tests of the SEU model
(Becker, 2003; Becker and Hecken, 2009a,b), I follow these authors in presenting both an
additive SEU model as well as the interaction terms for students' educational motivation
and their investment risk as required by the Esser (1999) model.
Self-fulﬁlling prophecies, SFP , should adequately be operationalized based on teach-
ers' expectations. In the CHiSP the latter are measured by a speciﬁc form of teachers'
evaluations: Teachers were asked to evaluate by a dichotomous decision whom students
they suppose to be able for academic studies, and whom of them not. Since the question
was phrased openly, teachers could mention students as being able, being not able, or
not at all.
This data structure causes two problems. First, each student could be evaluated by
more than one teacher, and each teacher could evaluate more than one student. An
analysis of the intra-class correlations (ICC) revealed a considerable variance of multiple
evaluations for each student (not shown, available upon request). Second, the openness
of the question is not without problems, because it has to be clariﬁed whether the
'missing' category really can be treated technically as a missing value, or if we were to
loose substantive information when proceeding on this assumption.
To overcome the ﬁrst problem, analyses reported below will focus on class teachers'
evaluations only. I expect that the intra-individual variance of teachers' evaluations
partially depends on the quality of teacher-student relationships. I assume that class
teachers have a more intense relationship to and a better knowledge of their students
than 'ordinary' teachers. Thus, looking only at class teachers' evaluations will both
simplify the data structure and overcome the problem of inter-teacher variance.18 In
order to overcome the second problem, as a preliminary analysis, two logistic regressions
17Dichotomization of all SEU predictors follows both a theoretical and a methodological directive.
Regarding theory, the SEU model explicitly demands certain terms such as pep or psd to be 0-
1 coded (Esser, 1999, p. 269). Regarding methodology, the application of techniques correcting
for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979) requires to estimate a probit model in the ﬁrst step 
necessitating a dichotomous outcome.
18As regards social mechanisms, I further expect that class teachers' evaluations might very well be an
approximation of teachers' evaluations in general: There is good reason to presume a notable amount
of communication between teachers, e.g. in the teachers' lounge, and especially class teachers could
be agenda setters in terms of shaping other teachers' expectations in a grading continuation game
(Mechtenberg, 2009, p. 1437f.).
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of the chances of getting a positive evaluation vs. getting a negative one, or none at
all, on students' intelligence, average grade, social background, motivation and gender
were estimated (not shown, available upon request). These results indicate that for the
chances of getting a positive evaluation vs. not getting one at all, the eﬀect sizes of all
independent variables point to the same direction, but they are notably lower than for
the chances of getting a positive evaluation vs. getting a negative one. Thus, we can
conclude that students who are not mentioned at all rank lower in teachers' perceptions
than students with a good teacher evaluation but they score higher than students with a
bad teacher evaluation. However, in the analyses presented below I will only look at the
unambiguous values of this variable in terms of the opposition of positive vs. negative
teacher evaluations.
Based on this dichotomy SFP is measured as follows: Teachers' evaluations are re-
gressed on two sets of students' backgrounds: an ability component, and a motivational
component. The ability component consists of students' scores in the Intelligence Struc-
ture Test (Amthauer, 1957) and their average grade (both of them z-transformed). The
motivational component comprises students' subjective assessments of i) their homework
eﬀort, ii) their relative school performance, and iii) their self-conﬁdence (all of them 11-
point Likert scaled). Teachers' evaluations are subsequently regressed on these two sets
of student backgrounds, resulting in three diﬀerent logistic regression models: one for
each set, and a 'full' model with all predictors. The models read as follows:
logitperf (TE) = β0 + β1intell + β2av.grade (10)
logitmot(TE) = β0 + β3homew.eff + β4subj.rank + β5self.conf (11)
logitfull(TE) = β0 + β1intell + β2av.grade
+ β3homew.eff + β4subj.rank + β5self.conf,
(12)
where (10) denotes the performance model, (11) the motivation model, and (12) the
full model. The residuals of (10) to (12) are stored and will be used as predictors of
students' probability to pass Abitur and to start academic studies, respectively (see
Madon et al., 1997, for a similar operationalization of self-fulﬁlling prophecies). Follow-
ing Gelman and Hill (2007, p. 97), the residuals ri of logistic regressions are deﬁned as
ri = yi − logit−1(Xiβ)  where in our case, yi is the observed teacher evaluation and
logit−1(Xiβ) is the value of each teacher's evaluation that is predicted by equations (10)
to (12). In this design, positive residuals indicate relative overestimations and nega-
tive residuals relative underestimations compared to the respective set of predictors in
the logit models. For later analyses I will dichotomize each residual whether it takes
positive or negative values. By this procedure, it is possible to separate a 'net' eﬀect
of self-fulﬁlling prophecies from a varying set of background variables (Madon et al.,
1997).19
19An objection against this strategy may refer to the possibility of private information. More specif-
ically, apart from the variables in the three models, teachers could ground their decisions on two
diﬀerent types of unobservables: a component that is known to the teacher when she makes an
evaluation decision, but not to the analyst, and a component that might not even be known to the
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In terms of the distinction between primary and secondary eﬀects of social inequal-
ity, in both the performance model and the full model, diﬀerences in the distribution
of teachers' evaluations which are due to primary factors like their intelligence are ex-
plicitly ruled out. According to the assumptions in the theoretical model, the eﬀect of
the residuals from these models on students' actual transition propensities should only
exist due to a mechanism of secondary eﬀects in terms of diﬀerent subjective expected
transition probabilities  which, in turn, are hypothesized to be the outcome of diﬀerent
teacher treatments.
3.3 Covariates
To keep track of the unobserved heterogeneity of my predictors (also see section 4.3),
analyses control for parental social class and educational attainment. Social class is
measured by the occupational prestige (Treiman scores) of the head of household  while
the latter is based on a variable that takes the highest value of occupational prestige
from either mother or father.
Parental educational attainment was measured by 13 categories reaching from lower
secondary school without an apprenticeship up to a university degree. I categorized
this variable into 1 'lower education'; 2 'middle education'; 3 'higher education' and 4
'degree' (see table A, appendix, for all summary statistics).
3.4 Models
In the empirical models I will mainly follow the operationalization that has been provided
by Becker (2003). First, all predictors will be regressed on parental social class via probit
estimations. The estimates will be stored as Inverse Mill's Ratios (IMRs) and will be
introduced in the second-step logit estimation of students' probability of passing Abitur
to control for panel mortality (Heckman, 1979). This will be repeated for students'
propensity to start academic studies.
The general assumption of this statistical technique is that in many social situations,
the outcome of primary interest yi not only depends on a vector of covariates β  but
also on a variable zi that determines whether individual i will ever entry in the social
situation or not.20 Thus, the crucial assumption is that we will only observe yi if z
∗
i > 0,
and therefore, we ﬁrst have to ﬁnd the determinants of z∗i , w
′ (on which the former
should be regressed), before we can say anything about the relationship between β and
yi. In more formal terms, we can distinguish between a selection equation,
z∗i = w
′γi + ui,
teacher herself (Cunha et al., 2005; Cunha and Heckman, 2007). While it can be argued that the
latter case would be in line with the general idea of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy (although the particular
mechanism behind it would remain obscure), I tackle the implications of the former scenario in my
robustness analyses in section 4.3.
20I follow the notation provided by Greene (2003, p. 782ﬀ.).
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and the equation of primary interest,
yi = x
′
iβ + i.
A typical example (which is taken from Greene, 2003, p. 782) is a model of female
labor supply where the equation of primary interest is aimed to explain female respon-
dents' wage yi by a vector of predictors xi (such as respondents' education and their job
experience) with joint impact β on the outcome. However, a female respondent's wage
is only observed if she is part of the labor market, i.e., if her number of labor hours z∗i
is higher than zero. The latter, in turn, could be determined by her marital status and
home characteristics such as whether there are small children present.21 Since, as men-
tioned, yi is only observed if zi > 0, the error terms of both equations, ui and i, share
the correlation ρ. In consequence of this error correlation, conventional OLS regression
merely considering the equation of primary interest yields inconsistent and ineﬃcient
estimates (also see Wooldridge, 2006, ch. 17.5).22 This selection problem can be solved
by a two step estimate of both equations: First the selection equation is estimated via
probit regression:
Prob(zi = 1|wi) = Φ(w′iγ)
and
Prob(zi = 0|wi) = 1− Φ(w′iγ).
Then the estimates of γ
′
are stored as Inverse Mill's Ratios λi which are computed as
follows:
λi = φ(w
′
iγ)/Φ(w
′
iγ),
where φ is the probability density f unction (pdf ) of the normal distribution with φ(x) =
(2pi)−1/2 exp(−x2/2) for all real numbers x, and Φ is the cumulative d istribution f unction
(cdf ) with Φ(x) =
∫ x
− inf φ(t)d(t) (which means to integrate over φ (Wooldridge, 2002, p.
458; Greene, 2003, p. 666).
In a second step, λi is included as a covariate in the equation of primary interest. This
two-step procedure is intended to yield a more precise estimate of βi since by controlling
for λ as a metric instrumental variable for the exogenous determinants of the selection
equation, also the problematic error correlation ρ  i.e. between ui and i  is canceled
out.
This procedure can also be used if yi is not completely unobserved for speciﬁc values
of z∗i, but if x′i is supposed to be an endogenous treatment that is aﬀected by a vector of
unobserved variables which are correlated with another vector of unobserved variables
that inﬂuence yi (Vella, 1993). In this case, the term endogeneity bias is common (e.g.
Vella and Verbeek, 1999, p. 475). For instance, if students participate in a coaching
program to improve their Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) scores, and, apart from
observed variables such as previous SAT scores and social backgrounds, also unobserved
21Note that gender-related child-raising practices implied in some econometric textbook examples do
not necessarily correspond to the opinion maintained by the present study's author.
22In this case, OLS estimates are inconsistent due to the omitted variable wi and ineﬃcient due to the
heteroscedasticity in terms of ρ.
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factors are supposed to aﬀect their coaching program participation (e.g. 'grit'), and these
unobserved factors are supposed to correlate with other unobserved factors that aﬀect
future SAT scores (e.g. 'moxie'), then the error terms between the coaching equation
and the SAT equation would be correlated, and this endogeneity bias could be corrected
by using the above-sketched Heckman methods (Briggs, 2004, p. 399).
In the present case, there is evidence to assume both sources of bias in the data. First,
on the one hand, the distribution of the SEU indicators (x′i in the above notation) is
expected to vary strongly by parental social strata (w′ in the above notation; see Becker,
2000, 2003)  which is the core idea of both the SEU model of educational transitions
(Esser, 1999) and similar propositions since Boudon (1974). On the other hand, social
backgrounds might aﬀect both the deﬁnition and evaluation of the social situation, and
thus also unobserved variables that inﬂuence the decision for or against a higher track of
education. In econometric terminology, this is an example of endogeneity bias, and by
regressing all SEU predictors on parental social class (selection equation) and including
the IMRs of these estimates in the equation of interest, I should be able to control for
the causal impact of unobserved class-speciﬁc resources, conditions and constrains:
From the methodological point of view, the following aspects are considered sepa-
rately: (1) the unobserved heterogeneity based on the interrelation between social
class and social action; (2) the social selectivity of resources, educational prefer-
ences, and educational performance among social classes; (3) the social selectivity
of the evaluation of the costs and beneﬁts of continued education; and (4) the
problem of causal inference in the decision problem (Becker, 2003, p. 15).23
Regarding the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals, recall that one central shortcoming of
the empirical literature of Pygmalion is an insuﬃcient consideration of students' social
backgrounds. By applying the same Heckit model on the dichotomized SFP residuals, it
is possible to control for the variance of self-fulﬁlling prophecies by parental social class.
Moreover, and perhaps even more important, if unobserved variables aﬀecting whether
a student is over- or underestimated by her teacher are correlated with unobserved
variables that determine her future educational and academic success  other variables
that inﬂuence ∆pep , we should be able to reduce diﬀerences between the latter's 'real'
value and our approximation in terms of SFP by applying the corresponding correction
for endogeneity bias.
Second, evidently the propensities of the former students to start academic stud-
ies strongly depend on whether they successfully graduated from Gymnasium or not.
Although for some particular school subjects like music or art, a special qualifying ex-
amination can substitute a high school degree, in most cases, transitions to university
can only be observed if Abitur has been passed successfully. Thus, a solution to the
theoretical problem of conditional transition rates (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) should
also account for the methodological problem of selection bias.
Concretely, I will estimate the following models: First, as mentioned, parents' expected
beneﬁt of higher education B, their subjective value of status decline −SD, the expected
23In the case at hand, this problem might be even stronger since the data at hand only contain records
of Gymnasium students.
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status decline psd, students' probability of successfully completing the chosen school track
pep, the expected costs of education C, and the dichotomized indicator for self-fulﬁlling
prophecies SFP will be regressed on parental occupational prestige in bivariate probit
equations to compensate for social selection bias in the distribution of the independent
variables. The results of these probits will be stored as Inverse Mill's Ratios λij. By
subscripts i, j it is addressed that each individual i will get an own Inverse Mill's Ratio
for each selection equation j. In a second step, each λij is introduced in the ﬁrst equation
of primary interest which predicts the individual probabilities to pass Abitur:
logitABI = pepB + (1− pep)(−SD)− C + SFP + λij. (13)
Second, I will re-estimate (13) as a probit equation and equally store the resulting
estimates as IMRs in order to control for sample selection with regard to the transition
rates to university. In addition to (14), this model also includes direct controls for
parental social class and educational backgrounds: 24
logitUNI = pepB + (1− pep)(−SD)− C + SFP + λij + class+ educ. (14)
This procedure is summarized graphically in ﬁgure 2.
4 Results
4.1 Distribution of Variables
Dependent variables In ﬁgure 2a, the distribution of the time span until students
passed Abitur is displayed. Recall that the zero point of counting has been backdated to
January 1967. We can see that the distribution of passing Abitur over time corresponds
to the chosen cut-oﬀ value of 80 months. Most of the students passed Abitur on the
ﬁrst try, a quite small amount on the second try, and even less on the third try. Figure
2b captures the distribution of the time span until the former students began academic
studies. Most of the students took up academic studies immediately after having passed
Abitur, and a smaller number did so with a delay of one to two years. After 106 months
beginning from the starting point  which is equal to October two years after high
school graduation  the amount of students who began academic studies tremendously
drops down. Thus, I choose this value as the cut-oﬀ for dichotomization of the second
dependent variable.
24By introducing parental social class and education as additional covariates in (14), ﬁrst, it is possible
to test whether the parameters of the SEU-IEO model are an exhaustive speciﬁcation regarding
variation in parental cost-beneﬁt considerations by social classes (see Stocké, 2007, for a case of
remaining signiﬁcant social background eﬀects in the Breen-Goldthorpe model). Second, from the
viewpoint of self-fulﬁlling prophecy research, we get an intuition whether the teacher treatment eﬀect
is mainly passed on students' social backgrounds as well (apart from achievement diﬀerences that
have already been ruled out by residualizing teachers' expectations). In order to avoid identiﬁcation
problems of my Heckman model, I refrain from including parental social class and education also in
(13) as the predictors therein have already been regressed on social class in the ﬁrst-stage selection
equations.
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Expected benefit 
B
Vaule of status 
decline -SD
Expected status 
decline p
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performance pep
Expected costs C
Social 
class
Self-fulfilling 
prophecies SFP
Educational 
level of 
parentsstep 1
step 3
step 3
step 1
step 2
Academic 
studiesAbitur
step 3
Figure 1: A modiﬁed model of Inequality in Educational Opportunities (modiﬁcation of
Becker, 2003, p. 7).
This procedure is also in line with more theoretical arguments: As Morgan (2002, p.
287f.) writes, [t]he decision of whether or not to enter college immediately following
high school is perhaps the most crucial determinant of alternative lifecourse transitions
from adolescence to adulthood (...) since delayed college entry (...) yields diﬀerent
payoﬀs that result in alternative lifecourse outcomes. Hence, from panel data, it is of
course possible to investigate university transitions at later points in time (see Hillmert
and Jacob, 2010, for such an analysis based on the German Life History Study), but
both related utility considerations and subsequent path dependencies may diﬀer.
Main independent variable: teachers' evaluations Now I present the distribution
of teachers' evaluations both numerically (ﬁgure 3a) and graphically (ﬁgure 3b). It can
be noted that the amount of students who received a positive evaluation by their teacher
(30.9%) is higher than the amount of students who received a negative one (25.4%) 
but evidently most students did not obtain any evaluation at all (43.7%). As mentioned
in section 3.2, for the following operationalization of self-fulﬁlling prophecies I will only
focus on positive vs. negative teachers' evaluations.
Residuals of over- and underestimations Next I present the results of logit equations
(9) to (11) that I use to extract the 'net' eﬀects of self-fulﬁlling prophecies. Model 1
shows the performance model, model 2 the motivation model, and model 3 the full model
with all predictors from both models 1 and 2 (see table 1).25As regards the performance
25For these and all subsequent models, missing values have been deleted listwise (see Enders, 2010,
for an elaborate discussion of the pros and cons of various missing value techniques under diﬀerent
missing data patterns).
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Figure 2: Distribution of educational success and university transitions over time.
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model (model 1), we can observe that both students' intelligence and their school grades
signiﬁcantly predict teachers' evaluations. The R2 of this model is remarkably high.
However, except the measure of students' relative school performance, in the motivation
model, the z-values are much lower (self-conﬁdence) or do not even reach statistical
signiﬁcance (homework eﬀort). This also results in an R2 not much more than half as
high as for the performance model. Considering the predictors of both models together,
in the full model, except students' relative school performance, only performance-model
indicators remain signiﬁcant  while the explained variance of the full model is only
slightly higher than for the performance model. Thus, we can conclude that for their
teachers, students' performance is far more important than their motivation.
Table 1: Logistic regression of teachers' evaluations on students' performance and
motivation
Performance Model Motivation Model Full Model
eb∗sd/z -value eb∗sd/z -value eb∗sd/z -value
intelligence 1.76*** 1.79***
(7.00) (6.90)
average grade 0.15*** 0.20***
(-16.79) (-14.01)
homework eﬀort 1.03 1.08
(0.50) (0.88)
relative school performance 2.74*** 1.85***
(11.11) (5.65)
self-conﬁdence 1.22* 1.10
(2.46) (1.01)
Nagelkerke's R2 0.52 0.27 0.55
N 1309 1294 1287
All coeﬃcients are standardized odds ratios. Z-values in parentheses. Signiﬁcance values:
* (p < .05); ** (p < .01); *** (p < .001).
As mentioned, I now store the residuals in order to use them as indicators of a 'net'
eﬀect of self-fulﬁlling prophecies. Figure 4 displays the distribution of the residuals from
the three diﬀerent logit models. Positive residuals indicate an overestimation relative
to the predictors of the logit models, negative residuals a relative underestimation. In
accordance with the predictive power of the performance model, the residuals in ﬁgure 4a
mainly follow a normal distribution: Most students obtain an evaluation that is roughly
on par with their intelligence and school grades  leading to a residuum of zero. If
we compare this distribution with the one of the residuals from the motivation model
(ﬁgure 4b), we can note that students' motivation hardly suits to solely predict teachers'
evaluations: Two local maxima can be found at 0.5 and -0.5, respectively  indicating
that based on these background variables, the prediction of teachers' evaluations does not
become more precise than simply by guessing. Finally, when we look at the distribution
of the full-model residuals (ﬁgure 4c), we see that the curve gets slightly distorted, but
is still very close to the normal distribution. As mentioned above, I dichotomized each
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residual for the following analyses.
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Figure 4: Distribution of residuals of teachers' evaluations on students' performance and
motivation, and the combination of both.
As a validity check, I inspected the intercorrelations between the metric and di-
chotomized residuals and their predictors, respectively (table B, appendix), and I also
computed kind-of reduced-form regression models of both educational success and uni-
versity transitions wherein the residuals were joined by their predictors from table 1
(tables C and D, appendix). What follows from these results is that i) correlations
between metric residuals and their predictors are negligible; ii) correlations between
dichotomized residuals and their predictors are somewhat higher but remarkably low
for the full model; iii) part of the explanatory power of the dichotomized residuals on
students' educational success (cf. section 4.2) indeed is attributable to intelligence and
average grade; but iv) both metric and dichotomized residuals still signiﬁcantly predict
students' educational success when controlling for the former variables; and v) what has
been said for iii) and iv) also holds for the motivation model. In short, these validity
analyses allow the conclusion that the residuals that have been computed in this section
are not equal to their predictors whereby they had been estimated  but exert a distinct
impact on students' educational success.
Bivariate probit estimates In this section I brieﬂy discuss the results from the bivari-
ate probit regressions of the SEU predictors of primary interest, B, pep, SD, psd, and C
on parental social class, respectively (see ﬁgure 5a). Blue bars indicate signiﬁcantly pos-
itive coeﬃcients, red bars signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients, and grey bars insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients.
Among the SEU predictors, only the expected beneﬁt B is positively predicted by
parental social class  meaning that parents from higher social strata expect more ben-
eﬁt from higher education. Not surprisingly, social class is negatively related to the
subjective assessment of the costs of education. What might surprise, however, is that
social class is also negatively related to how parents judge the probability that their
oﬀspring might be impacted by status decline: While parents from lower social strata
seem to be more concerned about the potential harmfulness of a lack of Abitur for their
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Figure 5: Standardized bivariate probit estimates of SEU predictors and self-fulﬁlling
prophecy residuals on parental social class.
children's' later life, parents from the higher strata appear to be much more conﬁdent:
Due to their higher resources, they feel that they might still be able to ensure their
children getting ahead in life, even if the latter failed a ﬁnal exam. With regard to −SD
and pep, no signiﬁcant associations were found.
Figure 5b shows that all three types of residuals are positively predicted by parental
social class. Hence, students from the higher social strata are more likely to be overes-
timated by their teachers compared to their actual performance and motivation.
4.2 Multivariate Analyses
First I present the logistic regression estimates of students' probability of passing Abitur
for both Esser's (1999) SEU predictors and the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals. I sub-
sequently introduce the independent variables as well as the correction terms in the
equations, so that I will present the following models: Model 1a contains the predictors
for the additive interpretation of Esser's (1999) SEU model, B, −SD, psd, pep and C. In
model 2a to 4a, I separately introduce the performance residuals, the motivation residu-
als, and the full-model residuals in order to model the impact of self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
Models 1b to 4b contain the same variables as models 1a - 4a but additionally correct
for sample selection bias in terms of the Inverse Mill's Ratios that have been stored
from the bivariate probit models as shown in ﬁgure 6. Models 1c to 4c repeat the same
procedural method for the regressors that were constructed to measure Esser's (1999)
theoretical concepts of educational motivation, B + psd · SD, and investment risk,
C/pep. And models 1d to 4d additionally control for potential selection bias in models
2c to 4c. Since the regression models with separate IMR variables suﬀered seriously
from multicollinearity (the inter-correlations between the IMRs lie between an absolute
value of .97 and .99), I summed up the IMR scores for all SEU predictors to one single
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IMR score.26
Second, in models 5a to 8d I present the estimates of another series of logistic regres-
sions of students' transitions to university. The setup of these models is the same as
in models 1a to 4d, except that models 5b to 8b and 5d to 8d now include the Inverse
Mill's Ratios for the estimates of a probit version of models 1b-4b and 1d-4d, respectively.
Since the results for the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residual estimates do not substantively
diﬀer when the SEU interaction terms instead of the additive model interpretation are
introduced in the model, the tables with the interaction terms are not discussed in depth
here but are reported in the appendix (tables E and F).
Passing Abitur As table 2 shows, in the baseline model lacking both the self-fulﬁlling
prophecy indicators and controls for potential sample selection bias, all SEU parameters
except the perceived costs of education C have a signiﬁcant impact on students' educa-
tional success in terms of passing Abitur. It is possible that costs do not come into play
in this model because of mechanisms in line with the life course or selection hypothesis
(Blossfeld and Shavit, 1993; Mare, 1980, 1993; Müller and Karle, 1993) which postulates
that the eﬀects of social inequality decrease in the course of students' education. How-
ever, students' chance of high school graduation still varies by the expected beneﬁt of
graduation, the expected amount of status decline and its expected impact, and by the
subjective probability of educational success.
Interestingly, when introducing the SFP residuals from the performance model (model
2a), the latter are highly signiﬁcant while the eﬀects of B, −SD and psd are canceled
out, and the signiﬁcance level of the estimate of pep drops down from the 99.9% level
to the 95% level.27 In the theoretical section I have argued that pep = f(SFP ) (8), and
although, admittedly, I am not able to model this impact over time, the drop-down in
both eﬀect size and signiﬁcance of pep may strengthen this proposition. Moreover, for the
case of the operationalization of self-fulﬁlling prophecies according to the performance
model, we can conclude that they have a signiﬁcant impact on students' educational
success in terms of passing Abitur: With regard to content, the probability to graduate
immediately on the ﬁrst try and with no class repetition is almost 2.9 times as high for
students who have been overestimated by their teachers with regard to their 10th class
academic performance compared to students who have been underestimated.
In model 3a we can see that the residuals from the motivation model of table 1 also
signiﬁcantly predict students' educational success. However, and in line with the low
predictive power of the motivation model, both eﬀect size and t-value are lower compared
26The scale reliability of the IMR sum score is about Cronbach's α = .84. Because in all cases, the
inter-correlations between the single IMR scores are near to one, the assumption of equal weights as
it is always implied in simple sum scores is appropriate. For multicollinearity problems with lower
inter-correlations, a latent variable approach with free factor loadings for the IMR scores would be
more adequate (Cohen et al., 2003). However, in the present case, a conﬁrmatory factor analysis
with factor loadings around .99 (not shown; available upon request) also strengthens the assumption
of equal weights.
27A re-analysis of model 1a where observations with missing values on the self-fulﬁlling prophecy resid-
uals are excluded shows that this drop-down in signiﬁcance cannot be attributed to the reduced
sample size in models 2a  4a (cf. appendix, table G).
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to model 2a. Therefore, a teacher's evaluation nearly as a thing in itself, i.e. with
no signiﬁcant reduction in variation caused by its predictors, also signiﬁcantly aﬀects
students' educational success. Yet, this eﬀect increases when controlling for substantial
over- and underestimations. As opposed to model 2a, the subjective expected beneﬁt
and the expected amount of status decline remain signiﬁcant in model 3a.
Model 4a shows that the residuals of the full model containing both performance and
motivation predictors not only have a lower estimate and t-value compared to models
2a and 3a, but also lead to a decrease in model ﬁt. Thus, if a teacher's evaluation is
controlled for both students' performance and their motivation, over- and underestima-
tions explain less of the variance of students' academic success. Moreover, if students'
motivation is considered, diﬀerences in the SEU parameters in their additive empirical
form remain important.
When controls for sample selection are introduced inModels 1b-4d, the main diﬀerence
to the a-models is that in two models, pep loses its signiﬁcant impact on students'
educational success. However, it is important to note that none of the self-fulﬁlling
prophecy residuals are aﬀected by sample selection correction. Since I indexed the
Inverse Mills Ratios for the SEU predictors, I assume that this particular robustness
is not an artifact of multicollinearity. Hence, while at least the distribution of success
expectations may be explained by issues of social selectivity, it appears that for the case
of educational success, the impact of over- and underestimations remains stable against
social selectivity.
Starting academic studies In table 3, the regression of students' transition propen-
sities to university on both the SEU predictors and the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals
is presented. Additionally to table 2, and according to the model by Becker (2003), the
analyses also control for parental social class and education.
In contrast to table 2, in model 5a, only the expected beneﬁt, B, and the subjective
expected probability of successfully completing the chosen school track, pep, have a
positive impact on students' propensity to start academic studies. Both indicators for
the expected status decline as well as expected costs of education remain insigniﬁcant.
As in table 2, the eﬀects for B are partialed out when self-fulﬁlling prophecies are
introduced in models 6a - 8a  while the coeﬃcient of pep remains stable. Again, the
estimate for the performance-model residuals (model 6a) has the highest impact on the
dependent variable, and the estimate for the full-model residuals the lowest (model 8a).
However, compared to the estimates in models 1a-4a, the eﬀect sizes diminish between
11.5 (full model) and 13.8 (motivation model) percent, and also the R2 statistics are
notably lower now. Thus, the eﬀects of self-fulﬁlling prophecies seem to decrease within
students' educational life course.28 Neither parental social class nor education exert a
signiﬁcant eﬀect, and the results do not diﬀer when either one were removed from the
28Lucas (2001) suggests to rely on predicted probabilities rather than on regression coeﬃcients when
comparing changes of social background eﬀects in the educational life course. Table H (Appendix)
indicates that the above trend also holds for the predicted probabilities of high school graduations
and university transitions, respectively (see corrected model).
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4 Results
models (not shown, available upon request).
Finally, in models 5b - 8b, I replicated models 5a to 8a with controls for sample
selection. Therefore, I re-estimated the models from tables 2 in a probit equation (not
shown, available upon request), stored the estimates as Inverse Mill's Ratios and included
them in the models from tables 5. Although none of the Inverse Mill's Ratio coeﬃcients
in table 2 was signiﬁcant, controlling for them aﬀected the z-statistics of pep. Thus,
to achieve more conservative estimates in the second-stage selection equation, I also
controlled for the Inverse Mill's ratios from the ﬁrst-stage selection equation.
Note that in table 3, each model 5b-8b is associated its own IMR1a - IMR4a. The
results show that although the IMR scores themselves are not signiﬁcant, they do cancel
out the signiﬁcant eﬀects of both B and psd as well as those of the three residuals from
models 5a  8a. Hence, while in the case of the prediction of students' probability of
educational success only one of the 'conventional' SEU predictors suﬀered from sample
selection bias, if students' propensity of university transitions is controlled for the selec-
tivity of the sub-sample, also the estimates of teachers' over- and underestimations lack
statistical signiﬁcance.29
4.3 Sensitivity Analyses
One justiﬁable objection against the antecedent Heckit models (and, likewise, also
against the models of Becker, 2003) addresses the predictors in the selection equations.
In particular in the second-step selection equation (passing Abitur), the Inverse Mill's
Ratios that had been stored from the ﬁrst step might not perfectly suﬃce the exclusion
restriction (for a similar line of arguing cf. Jürges and Schneider, 2006) for the third-step
equation of interest (transition to university): Recall that in the third step, parental so-
cial class is again introduced as a covariate in the logit equation - while it had already
been used as an instrument to identify the ﬁrst-stage selection equation in the ﬁrst step.
Hence, the problem could arise that the third-step equation of interest might suﬀer from
an identiﬁcation problem because it includes a variable that also aﬀects the instrument,
i.e. the IMR control terms in the second-step selection equation.
To be precise, if exactly the same set of predictors is used in the selection equation as it
is in the equation of primary interest, the model is still identiﬁed but only by functional
form assumptions regarding the Inverse Mill's Ratios (Briggs, 2004). More concretely,
29Since the number of observations for the two model sets with and without sample selection equation
are not equal, I repeated the analyses for models 5a-8a without the observations that did not have
a valid value for the Inverse Mill's Ratios. The results of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals are
robust against these modiﬁcations (appendix, table I). Furthermore, the validity analysis for the
residuals indicated that the results might be sensitive against using metric residuals rather than
their dichotomized counterparts. When I re-estimated all (uncorrected) models by using metric
residuals, both the regression coeﬃcients and z-values tended to be a bit lower than in case of
using dichotomized residuals, but without losing signiﬁcance (not shown, available upon request). A
similar story holds when instead of the logit residuals, the generalized probit residuals (Gourieroux
et al., 1987) are used  which are by construction uncorrelated with the predictor variables (Vella,
1998, p. 136) ; and even when the latter residuals are used to estimate a bivariate probit model
(Holm and Jæ ger, 2011) rather than a 'manual' Heckit (not shown; available upon request).
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the error term of the selection equation has to be normally distributed in order to ensure
that the second equation is identiﬁed via the non-linearity of the Inverse Mill's Ratios
obtained from the ﬁrst-stage probit equation (Olsen, 1980; Duncan and Leigh, 1985).
This kind of identiﬁcation is sometimes referred to as weak identiﬁcation (Vella, 1998,
p. 135), because the linearity assumption could be violated (Winship and Mare, 1992,
p. 341f.). For instance, Gronau (1974) observed that sample selection correction via the
inclusion of Inverse Mill's Ratios does not work if a mutually exclusive and exhaustive
set of dummy variables is included in both the selection equation and the equation of
primary interest.
Therefore, it is recommended to over identify the model by including at least one ad-
ditional regressor in the selection equation that is not part of the equation of primary
interest (the exclusion restriction; also see Breen, 1996, p. 43f.). Ideally, the exclusion
restriction should also be ensured to be uncorrelated with the outcome in the equation
of primary interest in theoretical terms. Thus, even in the case of students' proba-
bility to pass Abitur as the equation of primary interest, parental social class as the
selection-equation exclusion restriction might not perfectly fulﬁll a strong identiﬁcation
assumption.30
A strategy for situations wherein issues such as selection and unobserved heterogeneity
might arise but good instruments that are not correlated with the outcome are not avail-
able31 has been proposed by Buis (2010, 2011). The basic idea behind his suggestion is
that unobserved variables u, which might aﬀect both the main independent variable and
the dependent variable over several transition points k, are captured by a weighted sum
of random variables νk = βuku that in turn is approximated by a normal distribution.
32
To reﬂect a variety of scenarios regarding the distribution of this random variable, dif-
ferent values for the standard deviation of ν are assumed. If sd(ν) = 0, the assumption
of unobserved heterogeneity is completely discarded  which is the standard case in
conventional OLS (or logit/probit) regressions. The higher the standard deviation of ν,
the stronger the eﬀect that is allowed for unobserved heterogeneity. In the present case,
I will examine how the eﬀects of all self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals obtained before
change with sd(ν) = 0, sd(ν) = 0.5, sd(ν) = 1, and sd(ν) = 2, respectively.
In more formal terms, the two-step Heckit estimates of section 4.2 are supplemented
by a sequential logit model wherein the probability of university transitions is conditional
30Sartori (2003) proposes a bivariate probit estimator identifying a model that uses the same predictors
for both the selection equation and the equation of primary interest by imposing the restriction that
the error terms for both equations are equal. However, since we have in total six diﬀerent selection
equations to estimate, we would need a multivariate probit estimator with an equal error constraint
for all six equations  which would involve extremely complex estimation procedures.
31While educational economists have proposed instruments such as students' birth quarter (Angrist and
Krueger, 1991) or the distance to university (Card, 2001) to control for unobserved heterogeneity
when measuring the returns of education, I believe that for the hypothesized eﬀect of teachers'
expectations on students' educational opportunities, it is considerably more challenging to ﬁnd a
good instrument that does aﬀect the former but not the latter due to the eﬃcacy of the self-fulﬁlling
prophecy.
32Note that the notations in Buis (2010) and Buis (2011) diﬀer. I here rely on the notation in Buis
(2011).
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on the sub-sample of those who have passed Abitur (Buis, 2010, 2011):
p1 =
exp(β01 + β11SEU + β21SFP )
1 + exp(β01 + β11SEU + β21SFP )
(15)
and
p2 =
exp(β02 + β12SEU + β22SFP )
1 + exp(β02 + β12SEU + β22SFP )
if pass1 = 1. (16)
Here β0k is the intercept, β1k is the regression coeﬃcient for the vector of SEU predictors,
and β2k is the regression coeﬃcient for the vector of self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals for
each transition equation. Note that equation (16) is only estimated for those 'at risk',
i.e. for students having passed the ﬁrst transition and successfully graduated from high
school by obtaining the degree of Abitur, which is captured by the term pass1 = 1.
Let Λ(·) = exp(·)
1+exp(·) denote the general functional form of the sequential logit model.
Let further A,B,C refer to the three possible educational outcomes in the data at hand:
leaving after high school without Abitur (A), passing Abitur but dropping out of the
educational system (B), and passing Abitur and making the transition to university as
deﬁned above (C). If now the weighted sum of unobserved covariates at each transition,
νk, is introduced, the expected probabilities of passing the two transitions averaged over
νk read:
Eν1(Pr[y ∈ {B,C}|SEU, SFP, ν1]) = E(Λ(β01 + β11 + β21 + βu1u︸︷︷︸
ν1
)) (17)
Eν2(Pr[y ∈ {C}|SEU, SFP, ν2, y ∈ {B,C}]) = E(Λ(β02 + β12 + β22 + βu2u︸︷︷︸
ν2
)) (18)
The left-hand side of both equations can be understood as follows: In (17), the prob-
ability of passing Abitur without any statement about whether or not to leave further
education thereafter is modeled for both SEU indicators and the SFP residuals. In
(18), the probability of making the transition to university conditional on having passed
Abitur is modeled for the same predictors as in (17).
In a second step, we can also relax the restriction that this unobserved covariate is
not a confounding variable  meaning that it is not correlated with the main predictor
of interest, i.e. the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals. Just as we can approximate the
potential impact of the unobserved covariate on the outcome by simulating diﬀerent
values for the standard deviation of the random variable, we can also approximate the
potential impact of the unobserved covariate on the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals by
assuming diﬀerent values for the correlation ρ between the two variables.
I assume that by this technique I not only control for selectivity issues that may
arise in a sequence of educational transitions, but I also tackle the objection of 'private
information' that may be part of the teachers' evaluation heuristic without being re-
ﬂected in the estimated self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals. Because the scenarios, which
are simulated for the weighted sum of unobserved covariates, also 'control' for a possible
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correlation with a speciﬁed independent variable, this may lead us to arrive at a better
understanding about the direction that this private information may take.
Equations (17) and (18) have to be solved by means of numerical integration using
maximum simulated likelihood (Train, 2003) which has already been implemented in the
seqlogit package (Buis, 2007) in Stata (StataCorp, 2009). Figure 7 presents the sen-
sitivity analyses for all three self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals at both transition points.
Each point on each single line represents a separate equation. For instance, the vertical
axis of the line plot on the upper left shows the parameter estimates and their 95%
conﬁdence intervals of the three residuals for students' probability of passing Abitur for
the scenario that the correlation between the unobserved covariate and each residual
would be zero. On the horizontal axis, however, these estimates are plotted against dif-
ferent hypothesized values for the standard deviation of the random variable that should
approximate the unobservables, namely sd = 0 (the case of no unobserved covariate),
sd = 0.5, sd = 1, and sd = 2. In the other three plots in the ﬁrst line of the graph, the
restriction of no correlation between the unobservable and the residuals is subsequently
relaxed unto a correlation of ρ = 0.5. In the plots in the second line of the graph, this
procedure is repeated for the estimates (and their 95% conﬁdence intervals) of students'
propensity of university transitions  conditional on previously having passed Abitur.
Hence, the plots in ﬁgure 7 are based on 3 * 4 * 4 * 2 = 96 equations in total: three for
each residual, four for each standard deviation, four for each value of ρ, and two for each
transition point.33 Starting with the ﬁrst set of equations predicting students' probabil-
ity of passing Abitur, we see that in case of a zero or low (0.1) correlation between the
unobservables and the residuals, an unobservable that aﬀects the outcome might lead
to an increase in the coeﬃcients of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals. Only if both
the impact of the unobservable on the outcome and its correlation with the residuals
are relatively strong, it might deﬂate the latter's estimates and likewise decrease their
signiﬁcance.
The same tendency holds for the parameter estimates of students' propensity of uni-
versity transitions. Just like in the selection model of table 3, the results lack statistical
signiﬁcance for the case of ρ = 0 and sd = 0. If the correlation between ν and the
residuals is not too large, an increase in its standard deviation could be associated with
an increase in the parameter estimates which may shift their conﬁdence intervals above
or next to the 95% signiﬁcance level. However, if both the impact of the unobservable on
the outcome and its correlation with the residuals are relatively strong again, it might
lead to a decrease in both the estimates and their signiﬁcance levels again. Yet, in that
case the model would surely be impaired by multicollinearity, which would forestall an
unambiguous interpretation (Farrar and Glauber, 1967).
In sum, we can conclude that in order to weaken the estimates and/or signiﬁcance
levels of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals, the prerequisites for an unobserved variable
have to be relatively strong. Neither the strength of its impact on the outcome, nor
its correlation with the variables of interest is a suﬃcient condition for deﬂating its
33The coeﬃcients and z-statistics of the variables of interest for these equations are listed in tables J
(passing Abitur) and K (university transitions) in the appendix.
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predictive power. Only if both conditions held up to a relatively large extent, the results
would not be robust. Since I would expect this to be an issue of multicollinearity, I do
not expect the latter phenomenon to thwart my main ﬁndings.
5 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to provide both theoretical and empirical evidence for the
distinct eﬀect of self-fulﬁlling prophecies, which goes beyond the conventional subjective-
expected-utility (SEU) model of inequality in educational opportunities (IEO). My aim
was ﬁrst to develop a formal model, and second to test this model in order to predict
students' probability to graduate from high school (Abitur) as well as their subsequent
university transitions.
In the theoretical section, I started with summarizing the basic assumptions of the
SEU-IEO model by Esser (1999, pp. 265-275). After a literature review of Pygmalion
and self-fulﬁlling prophecy research (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Madon et al., 1997;
Jussim and Harber, 2005), I brought in the argument that its main ﬁnding, i.e. that
teachers' expectations may inﬂuence students' academic performance, requires an ex-
tension of the present SEU-IEO model. I thus proposed an integration of self-fulﬁlling
prophecies in the formal SEU-IEO model by Esser (1999) in terms of a teacher treatment
eﬀect on students' subjective expected probability of educational success.
Methodologically, self-fulﬁlling prophecies were operationalized as the residuals of a
regression of a speciﬁc form of teachers' evaluations on a performative and a motivational
set of variables (also see Madon et al., 1997). However, in the empirical section it
turned out that the performance model was able to predict teachers' evaluations more
satisfactory than the motivation model.
In my multivariate analyses that were based on the Cologne High School Panel
(CHiSP), I found that the predictive power of the conventional SEU-IEO model is by
average weaker than in previous studies (e.g. Becker, 2003; Becker and Hecken, 2009a,b).
This could be a corroboration of the life-course hypothesis (Mare, 1980, 1993; Müller
and Karle, 1993) which indicates that the eﬀects of social inequality decrease during
students' educational career.
In contrast, at least in the baseline model, the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals were
able to signiﬁcantly predict both students' educational success in terms of passing Abitur
and their university transition propensities. Thus, the tentative conclusion from these
models would be that self-fulﬁlling prophecies have indeed distinct eﬀects apart from
the conventional SEU predictors. Moreover, since the eﬀect sizes of the residuals are
lower for students' university transitions than for their educational success, this could
be another demonstration of life course eﬀects.
As the variance of students' resources and preferences by social class, and the condi-
tionality of their transition decisions brought up a selectivity problem, I replicated all
models with corrections for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). It turned out that
in case of the prediction of students' educational success the results remain stable, while
with respect to the prediction of their university transitions all self-fulﬁlling prophecy
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residuals lost their signiﬁcance. This indicates that there is little evidence that the ef-
ﬁcacy of self-fulﬁlling prophecies could mainly be explained by students' social class.
Notwithstanding this particular stability, there is no reason to assume that self-fulﬁlling
prophecies might aﬀect students' propensity of university transitions conditional on hav-
ing passed Abitur. This suggests that the eﬀect of teachers' expectations is limited on
students' success in school, and that it does not inﬂuence their decision for or against
starting academic studies.
Because of several methodological objections that could be raised against the quality
of the instruments in the selection models, and in order to tackle the argument that
teachers might have private information at their disposal which is not captured by the
variables in the three residual models, a sensitivity analysis was performed. In partic-
ular, I additionally allowed for unobserved heterogeneity which was approximated by a
random variable that could take diﬀerent values on both its standard deviations and its
correlation with the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals. It became apparent that only if
relatively high values on both parameters are allowed for simultaneously, the residual
estimates might not be robust. However, since this would go in line with the problem
of multicollinearity, I do not expect my main ﬁndings to be challenged by this issue.
Nonetheless, further analyses should consider additional variables. Remember that
one major theoretical shortcoming of Pygmalion concerns an insuﬃcient consideration
of moderators such as students' grade level or teachers' duration of teaching in a par-
ticular class. Thus, future studies should also include potential covariates apart from
the standard SEU predictors to ensure a better understanding of the social mechanisms
behind the eﬃcacy of self-fulﬁlling prophecies. This holds in particular if the empirical
model per se is, as in the case of my data at hand, only an approximation of the theoret-
ical or substantive model. Considering both teacher- and student-level variables would
require to estimate a cross-classiﬁed hierarchical model (Snijders and Bosker, 1999; Hox,
2002) wherein teachers' evaluations as the lowest unit are nested in both teacher and
student contexts. To be sure, this might also necessitate a reﬁned operationalization of
self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
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6 Appendix
6 Appendix
Table A: Descriptive statistics
count mean sd min max
time of high school graduation 1415 81.90 14.66 46.00 228.00
graduation on ﬁrst try 1987 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
time of university transition 1987 154.57 108.17 44.00 367.00
university transition within 3 years after graduation 1987 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
teacher evaluation (dichotomized) 1367 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
intelligence 3230 110.45 11.35 76.00 151.00
average grade 3227 499.98 69.22 221.00 703.00
motivation 3224 5.71 2.08 1.00 11.00
self-concept 3208 6.65 1.91 1.00 11.00
self-conﬁdence 3213 8.13 1.51 1.00 11.00
residuals (performance model) 1309 0.00 0.38 -0.99 0.99
residuals (motivarion model) 1294 0.01 0.44 -0.91 0.95
residuals (full model) 1287 0.00 0.38 -1.20 1.05
residuals (performance model, dichotomized) 1309 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
residuals (motivarion model, dichotomized) 1294 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
residuals (full model, dichotomized) 1287 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
B 3225 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
-SD 2355 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
Psd 2674 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
Pep 2695 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00
C 2695 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
parental social class 2687 49.37 12.63 18.00 78.00
parental educational attainment 3374 2.14 1.23 1.00 4.00
educational motivation 2290 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
investment risk 2691 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
IMR_sum 926 4.22 0.45 3.44 5.33
IMR_perf_di 1070 0.69 0.10 0.47 0.94
IMR_mot_di 1058 0.68 0.10 0.47 0.92
IMR_full_di 1054 0.82 0.09 0.63 1.04
IMR_1a 1419 0.62 0.16 0.46 1.53
IMR_2a 585 0.62 0.44 0.24 1.79
IMR_3a 582 0.62 0.43 0.24 1.80
IMR_4a 580 0.60 0.32 0.24 1.82
IMR_1b 579 0.60 0.26 0.32 1.91
IMR_2b 579 0.62 0.43 0.21 1.81
IMR_3b 579 0.62 0.43 0.21 1.81
IMR_4b 579 0.60 0.32 0.22 1.89
IMR_1c 1419 0.61 0.06 0.58 0.75
IMR_2c 585 0.61 0.41 0.29 1.30
IMR_3c 582 0.61 0.40 0.29 1.30
IMR_4c 580 0.59 0.25 0.33 1.05
IMR_1d 579 0.59 0.12 0.40 0.94
IMR_2d 579 0.61 0.41 0.24 1.39
IMR_3d 579 0.61 0.41 0.24 1.39
IMR_4d 579 0.59 0.25 0.26 1.15
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Table J: A sensitivity analysis for self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals (transition: Abitur)
Performance model Motivation model Full model
rho0sd0a
b 2.184151 2.131192 1.195157
z 10.32542 10.10805 6.190385
rho0sd5a
b 2.300063 2.243347 1.253663
z 10.3838 10.15775 6.189155
rho0sd10a
b 2.604713 2.538721 1.409969
z 10.47301 10.23553 6.186296
rho0sd20a
b 3.520772 3.429911 1.890575
z 10.5664 10.31637 6.179325
rho1sd0a
b 2.184151 2.131192 1.195157
z 10.32542 10.10805 6.190385
rho1sd5a
b 2.194397 2.137723 1.153021
z 9.911121 9.683768 5.694879
rho1sd10a
b 2.391868 2.326 1.207879
z 9.63034 9.390714 5.30694
rho1sd20a
b 3.092165 3.001605 1.484773
z 9.307114 9.054466 4.867169
rho3sd0a
b 2.184151 2.131192 1.195157
z 10.32542 10.10805 6.190385
rho3sd5a
b 1.976348 1.919971 .9483301
z 8.95787 8.728262 4.70098
rho3sd10a
b 1.943463 1.878511 .7919539
z 7.912032 7.66861 3.518721
rho3sd20a
b 2.171271 2.082975 .6395354
z 6.693621 6.435879 2.147459
rho5sd0a
b 2.184151 2.131192 1.195157
z 10.32542 10.10805 6.190385
rho5sd5a
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Performance model Motivation model Full model
b 1.749196 1.693402 .7390304
z 7.985123 7.753716 3.690597
rho5sd10a
b 1.463371 1.400289 .3597174
z 6.096067 5.84949 1.635921
rho5sd20a
b 1.158377 1.074779 -.2541716
z 3.761082 3.497863 -.8991183
Table K: A sensitivity analysis for self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals (transition:
university)
Performance model Motivation model Full model
rho0sd0b
b .231838 .1909521 -.0108028
z .4816385 .3980592 -.0283692
rho0sd5b
b .3499028 .3060727 .0476244
z .7094946 .6228028 .1221588
rho0sd10b
b .6600259 .6073403 .2016426
z 1.254707 1.15886 .4853785
rho0sd20b
b 1.593731 1.511577 .6637602
z 2.577975 2.454781 1.351818
rho1sd0b
b .231838 .1909521 -.0108028
z .4816385 .3980592 -.0283692
rho1sd5b
b .2442164 .2004237 -.053016
z .4953126 .4079225 -.1360199
rho1sd10b
b .4471103 .3945533 -.0004007
z .8506118 .7534233 -.0009652
rho1sd20b
b 1.164963 1.083175 .2582188
z 1.887321 1.761783 .526771
rho3sd0b
b .231838 .1909521 -.0108028
z .4816385 .3980592 -.0283692
rho3sd5b
b .0260053 -.0175311 -.2576976
z .0528434 -.0357488 -.6623826
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Performance model Motivation model Full model
rho3sd10b
b -.0018588 -.053469 -.4159646
z -.0035585 -.1027417 -1.008306
rho3sd20b
b .24269 .1637122 -.5849299
z .3982183 .2696962 -1.20981
rho5sd0b
b .231838 .1909521 -.0108028
z .4816385 .3980592 -.0283692
rho5sd5b
b -.2014799 -.2445182 -.4669888
z -.410981 -.5005141 -1.204813
rho5sd10b
b -.483083 -.5328065 -.847538
z -.9369038 -1.037127 -2.081037
rho5sd20b
b -.7734081 -.8465689 -1.474437
z -1.304974 -1.434111 -3.141754
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V. Does The Eﬀect of Teachers'
Expectations On Students'
Educational Opportunities Decrease
Over Educational Transitions?
A statistical matching approach
Various theoretical propositions suggest that social inequalities in educa-
tional opportunities (IEO) would decrease over students' educational tran-
sitions ('cross-grade patterns'; Lucas, 2009), but empirical analyses usually
remain restricted to tests of student- or parent-level cost-beneﬁt assessments.
In this paper, I build on a subjective expected utility explanation of how
teachers' expectations towards their students should aﬀect the latter's tran-
sition propensities via their subjective expected probability of educational
success, and I deduce hypotheses about decreasing teacher expectancy ef-
fects over students' educational course of life by referring to a mechanism of
Bayesian updating.
Having outlined how my theoretical model suits the important conditional
independence assumption, I test my hypotheses by means of a sequential
logit model (with additional robustness analyses) based on an artiﬁcial stu-
dent cohort that has been created via the technique of statistical matching
(Rubin, 1986; D'Orazio et al., 2006). Results suggest that i) the predicted
probabilities of educational transitions onto higher-level tracks are higher
for students of whom their teachers hold more positive expectations, ii) the
size of short-time expectancy eﬀects decreases over educational transitions,
and iii) short-term expectancy eﬀects are larger than long-term expectancy
eﬀects.
1 Introduction
On the one hand, we ﬁnd a variety of theoretical explanations such as the Life Course
Perspective (LCP ; Müller and Karle, 1993), M aximally M aintained Inequality (MMI ;
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Raftery and Hout, 1993), Relative Risk Aversion (RRA; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) or
Eﬀectively M aintained Inequality (EMI ; Lucas, 2001) which all suggest that the eﬀect
of students' social backgrounds on their propensity to take the next higher node in the
educational decision tree should decrease over educational transitions. This phenomenon
which has been identiﬁed in many empirical studies (Mare, 1980, 1981; Smith and Che-
ung, 1986; Cobalti, 1990; Müller and Karle, 1993; Tolsma et al., 2007) was referred to
represent cross-grade patterns (Lucas, 2009)  in contrast to the cross-cohort patterns
(i.e. lower social background eﬀects for later birth cohorts) that some of these theories
either primarily or additionally aim to explain.
Although only one of the above-quoted theoretical propositions, namely RRA (Breen
and Goldthorpe, 1997), was originally written down in a formal way, re-formalization of
both MMI and EMI (Lucas, 2009) reveals that all three of them predominantly remain
restricted to student- or parent-level cost-beneﬁt analyses.
On the other hand, even in educational sociology it has already been criticized that
standard economic approaches ignore the endogeneity of students' preferences in terms of
an interaction with signiﬁcant persons in the classroom (Lauen, 2007, p. 183)  although
the latter circumstance had already been reﬂected in the early Wisconsin model of status
attainment (Sewell et al., 1969, 1970; also see Morgan, 2002).
In the social-psychological literature, over four decades of Pygmalion (Rosenthal and
Jacobson, 1968) and self-fulﬁlling prophecy research indicate that teachers' expecta-
tions can have considerable eﬀects on students' educational achievement (for research
overviews see Raudenbush, 1984; Jussim, 1986; Rosenthal, 1994; Jussim and Harber,
2005). This should, at least, result in path-dependency eﬀects regarding students' educa-
tional transitions. Most notably, a great number of studies predominantly found teacher
expectancy eﬀects also to decrease over students' educational course of life (Rosenthal
and Jacobson, 1968; Rist, 1970; West and Anderson, 1976; Frieze et al., 1991; Smith
et al., 1999; Madon et al., 2006; Mistry et al., 2009; Hinnant et al., 2009; de Boer et al.,
2010). These ﬁndings nicely coincide with the results for parental background eﬀects
obtained by educational sociologists.
Thus, the theoretical objective of this paper is ﬁrst to build on an existing subjective
expected utility (henceforth referred to as SEU ) explanation of how teachers' expec-
tations towards their students should aﬀect students' transition propensities via their
subjective expected probabilities of educational success. Second, to deduce hypothe-
ses about decreasing teacher expectancy eﬀects over students' educational transitions, I
point to a mechanism of Bayesian updating (Breen, 1999; Breen and García-Peñalosa,
2002; Morgan, 2005, ch. 5): Conditional on being over- or underestimated by their
teacher, and conditional on having passed an educational transition or not, students ei-
ther upwardly or downwardly update their beliefs according to the Bayesian rule. Based
on a simpliﬁed decision tree, I elaborate on three diﬀerent updating scenarios to clarify
the argument.
From the perspective of conventional SEU explanations, the teacher side of classroom
interaction is now explicitly considered. From the perspective of the current research
status in teacher expectancy studies, I make use of a repeated belief model (Madon et al.,
2006) that measures teachers' expectations at two distinct points in time; and I compute
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residualized indicators for teachers' expectations to construct over- and underestimations
with regard to students' backgrounds such as their academic performance and their
motivation (Madon et al., 1997, 2006; Hinnant et al., 2009; de Boer et al., 2010). The
justiﬁcation for this procedure is that unlike in experimental studies where perceivers'
expectations can be manipulated by exposing them to biased information, in naturalistic
(i.e. survey data) studies, only methodological techniques such as residualizing teachers'
expectations can ensure them to be actually inaccurate to some extent.
The empirical contribution of the paper at hand is to discuss how the technique of
statistical matching (Rubin, 1986) can be used to create artiﬁcial student cohorts for the
analysis of social inequalities in educational opportunities (IEO) when suitable data is
unavailable (also see Schubert and Becker, 2010). Since I do not dispose of one single
data ﬁle comprising convincing measures of both teachers' expectations at diﬀerent ed-
ucational transition points and conventional SEU indicators, I use the distance hot deck
matching method (D'Orazio et al., 2006) in order to combine one ﬁle containing teach-
ers' expectations in primary school (Gesis-No. ZA893) with another one that contains
teachers' expectations in 10th grade (Gesis-No. ZA640). In the methodological section,
I elaborate in more detail on what the important conditional independence assumption
(CIA) requires from the theoretical distribution of the data and how my theoretical
model can be assumed to suit this prerequisite.
The impact of teachers' expectations on students' IEO is then analyzed in the frame-
work of a sequential logit model with additional robustness checks such as controls for
unobserved heterogeneity (Buis, 2007, 2010, 2011), additional covariates and a com-
parison with analyses based on the British Cohort Study. Results suggest that i) the
predicted probabilities of educational transitions onto higher-level tracks are higher for
students of whom their teachers hold more positive expectations, and ii) that the strength
of this eﬀect decreases over students' educational life course.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
In the theoretical section, I ﬁrst give a brief overview on both rational-choice and subjec-
tive expected utility explanations of inequality in educational opportunities (2.1). I then
summarize the various theoretical propositions such as LCP, MMI, RRA and EMI that
make statements about the waning coeﬃcients pattern over students' educational tran-
sitions (2.2). Having described the general idea of Pygmalion or self-fulﬁlling prophecy
research (2.3), I sketch my theoretical model regarding the eﬀect of teachers' expecta-
tions on students' educational transitions (2.4). The theoretical section concludes by
formulating falsiﬁable hypotheses deduced from the theoretical model that address how
this eﬀect can be assumed to decrease over educational transitions (2.5).
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2.1 Inequality in Educational Opportunities: Rational Choice
Approaches
The distinction between primary and secondary eﬀects of social inequality (Boudon,
1974) is probably the most inﬂuential theoretical proposition to explain inequalities in
educational opportunities at least in quantitatively-oriented educational sociology. The
core idea is that primary eﬀects are related to the impact of parental social backgrounds
on their oﬀspring's academic ability, while secondary eﬀects refer to both structural and
organizational conditions of the school as well as to the lower educational aspirations
of the students themselves, or of their parents (also see Nash, 2003; Müller-Benedict,
2007). Diﬀerences in aspirations among social classes are then regarded to be the crucial
factor explaining diﬀerences in educational opportunities even if diﬀerences in academic
abilities were invariant among the social strata.
The Breen-Goldthorpe model Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) proposed a rational
choice model to explain diﬀerences in educational transitions among social classes. Con-
cretely, transitions are modeled as a function of subjective cost assessments c, the subjec-
tive likelihood of successfully completing the chosen school track pi, and the utility that
is attached to diﬀerent educational outcomes. When α, β and γ denote the respective
probabilities of having access to service class conditional on whether a student i) stayed
and succeeded in school; ii) stayed and failed in school; or iii) left school, the probability
of service-class children to remain in service class is given by
pis =
piiα + (1− pii)β1
piiα + (1− pii)β1 + γ1 (1)
 while the corresponding probability of working-class children is given by
piw =
pii + (1− pii)(β1 + β2)
pii + (1− pii)(β1 + β2) + (γ1 + γ2) . (2)
Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) show that pis > piw for any value of pi less than one
(p. 284). By content, this means that children from service class will be more willing to
continue a high level of education than children from working class.
Apart from diﬀerences in resources, Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) highlight the con-
ditional dependence of students' subjective probability of successfully completing the
chosen school track, pii, on their actual academic ability ai: pii = g(ai) (Breen and
Goldthorpe, 1997, p. 285). This assumption has already proven useful for developing
a formal model about the impact of self-fulﬁlling prophecies on students' educational
opportunities (Becker, 2010a).
However, while the previous equations merely relate to class entry probabilities de-
pending on a simple single-choice decision model, Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) ac-
knowledge reality to be more complex. To be more precise, in most  if not all  cases of
educational transition decisions, a multiple transition model approximates reality more
closely. In this latter model, the number of parameters increases as there are now two
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transition choices that lead to diﬀerent educational outcomes. First, we have two param-
eters of subjective expected educational success, pi1 and pi2, previous to each educational
choice. Second, we have more parameters for students' probabilities of entering one of
the three outcome classes: Let γ denote the probability of having access to service class
after having left education at choice 1, β the corresponding probability after choosing
to continue at choice 1 but failing thereafter, δ the probability after a successful way
through education after choice 1 but after then deciding to leave at choice 2,  the prob-
ability after a failure following the second transition, and Φ the probability of having
access to service class after two successful educational transitions. Breen and Goldthorpe
(1997) propose to set up the equation for the second transition decision ﬁrst:
pis2 =
pii2Φ + (1− pii2)
pii2Φ + (1− pii2)+ δ (3)
Then, under the assumption that at the time when the decision for transition choice 1 is
made the subjective expectations for transition 2 have already been shaped, Breen and
Goldthorpe (1997) suggest to solve for α in equation 1 via backward induction:1
αi = qi2(pii2Φ + (1− pii2)) + (1− qi2)δ, (4)
where qi2 is a function of the subjective probabilities for the second transition, pi2 (Breen
and Goldthorpe, 1997, p. 289). Thus, the expected probability of entering service class
conditional on succeeding in education after the ﬁrst transition choice is modeled as a
function of students' expected probabilities after choice 2.
Esser's subjective expected utility model Esser (1999) takes up various ideas of
both the Breen-Goldthorpe (1997) model and an earlier account by Erikson and Jonsson
(1996) in introducing two additional terms that diﬀerentiate more precisely between the
expected beneﬁt of education, the expected amount of status decline and its impact on
actual decisions. In this model, students' or parents' expected utility of continuing onto
lower secondary school (An) is determined by
EU(An) = Psd(−SD), (5)
while the expected utility of continuing onto higher secondary school is determined by
EU(Ab) = PepB + (1− Pep)Psd(−SD)− C. (6)
Here, SD is the expected amount of status decline with Psd as its impact on parental
decisions; B is the beneﬁt of higher education (e.g. in terms of labor market prospects);
Pep is the subjective probability of successfully completing the chosen school track; and
C are the expected costs of education (also see Becker, 2003; Pietsch and Stubbe, 2007).
1Note that the model of Bayesian belief updating proposed by Breen (1999) holds exactly the opposite
view in that students' beliefs are supposed to change conditional on passing an educational transition.
It is the latter position that I use to argue in favor of decreasing teacher expectancy eﬀects in section
2.4.
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By a series of linear transformations, Esser (1999) shows that EU(Ab) > EU(An) if
B + PsdSD > C/Pep. Adopting his terminology, this relation means by content that
a higher level of education will be aspired if the educational motivation to continue
somehow exceeds the underlying investment risk.
Although Esser's model doesn't make a statement about conditional educational tran-
sition decisions, its higher conceptual accuracy shall be adopted in the theoretical model
of self-fulﬁlling prophecies sketched below.
2.2 The 'Waning Coeﬃcients Pattern'
This section is aimed to give an overview of the theoretical approaches that try to explain
why in numerous studies (Mare, 1980, 1981; Smith and Cheung, 1986; Cobalti, 1990;
Müller and Karle, 1993; Tolsma et al., 2007), social background eﬀects were observed to
decrease in the course of students' educational transitions. Since most of these theories
primarily intend to explain the phenomenon of waning coeﬃcients over student cohorts
rather than over educational transitions, the following allusions are far from exhaustive.
Life course perspective (LCP) In their study of the nine European nations partici-
pating in the CASMIN (Comparative Analysis of SocialM obility in Industrial N ations)
project, Müller and Karle (1993) stressed that in order to explain the variance in social
inequality between countries, scholars are advised to consider also the diﬀerent class-
speciﬁc survival patterns across transitions and nations. While France was found to be
the most exclusive country, in Hungary the odds of completing secondary education are
better than in most other countries (Müller and Karle, 1993, p. 9). However, for the
purpose of the paper at hand, another one of their ﬁndings is much more important,
which leads us to ﬁgure 1.
In this graph, Müller and Karle (1993) plot the estimates of a conditional logistic
regression model of educational transitions on parental social class with varying suc-
cess rates across both transition points and nations. The reference category of all lines
are students from higher service-class families. Results show that at later transitions,
class diﬀerentials tend to become smaller  resulting in a decrease in the relative risk of
lower-class students not to pass the respective transition. This overall trend, inﬂections
such as stronger social origin eﬀects at transition T2 compared to T1 as well as other
peculiar patterns are explained by the relation between the importance of diﬀerent tran-
sition steps for the educational career and the variance of educational aspirations in the
educational life courses among social strata.
Maximally maintained inequality (MMI) The crucial idea of the proposition of
maximally maintained inequality (MMI ) can be summarized in the statement that
transition rates and inequality (as measured by odds ratios) remain constant unless
forced to change by increasing enrollments (Raftery and Hout, 1993, p. 42). By means
of a cohort analysis of both the Irish Mobility Study and the Drumcondra Study of
Educational Achievement, Raftery and Hout (1993) indeed ﬁnd by trend decreasing so-
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cial background eﬀects at later educational transitions  but they also observe that this
phenomenon is in turn sensitive to the progress of educational expansion: As enroll-
ment rates to school increase, less margin for class diﬀerentials in entering secondary
education is left (Raftery and Hout, 1993, 55f.). Thus, the diﬀerence between early and
late transition background eﬀects decreases for later cohorts as enrollment rates increase
(ﬁgure 2).2
Relative risk aversion (RRA) Breen and Goldthorpe's explanation of relative r isk
aversion (RRA) builds on their model of educational diﬀerentials due to varying aspira-
tions and resources among social classes. Coming back to equations (3) and (4), Breen
and Goldthorpe (1997) deduce that under the assumption that the parameters δ, , and
φ do not vary by social classes, transition choices at higher levels will be less aﬀected
by social class than transition choices at lower levels: First, the situation of consecutive
decisions will have reduced class diﬀerences in ability, and second, every higher-level
transition decision is less risky in terms of suspected status decline than the preceding
one. For instance, Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) assume that if secondary education
had already been successfully ﬁnished, for working-class parents, a higher-level decision,
say, for or against tertiary education would not be associated with the risk of demotion
to the underclass anymore. As a result, class diﬀerentials concerning this decision may
still persist but should be lessened compared to the preceding one(s) due to the lower
perceived risk of downward mobility.
Eﬀectively maintained inequality (EMI) The major advancement of Lucas' theo-
rem of eﬀectively maintained inequality is that it also considers that education may
be tracked, and that students' selection into diﬀerent school tracks may in turn vary
by parental social backgrounds. That is, while MMI claims that socioeconomic diﬀer-
ences will be canceled out when a certain level of schooling becomes universal, EMI
posits that the socioeconomically advantaged will strive to secure qualitative diﬀerences
(in terms of tracking) at the given quantitative level of schooling. In addition to this
theoretical contribution, Lucas (2001) promoted IEO research also methodologically by
demanding the analysis of predicted probabilities of educational transitions rather than
of regression coeﬃcients (or odds ratios) since the latter cannot reveal whether social
background moves people over thresholds.3 In an ordered probit model, Lucas (2001)
2The main diﬀerence between MMI and LCP is that (...) LCP emphasizes that as children age they
become more and more independent of parents, whereas MMI implies that adolescents' independence
itself depends on the sociopolitical context and the support for particular levels of education (Lucas,
2001, p. 1647).
3Apart from the statistical reason that distribution-insensitive predicted probabilities are robust
against the criticism that was brought in by Cameron and Heckman (1998) and posits that the
observed decline in odds ratios is only due to (unjustiﬁed) functional form assumptions of the un-
derlying logit equations, Lucas (2001, 2009) also sees a substantive reason that speaks in favor of
the analysis of predicted probabilities: Whereas odds ratios merely describe the association between
predictor variables and their outcomes, only predicted probabilities consider whether advantaged
persons exceed pivotal thresholds to enter categorical positions that provide advantages (Lucas,
2009, p. 490f.).
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ﬁnds that both the parameter estimates of parental social backgrounds and students'
predicted transition probabilities are lower in 12th grade than in 11th grade, but then
rise again for college entry  which provides more support for MMI than for LCP. As
regards EMI, Lucas observes that there are considerable diﬀerences between the social
strata in their predicted probabilities of i) dropping out of school; ii) taking no course;
iii) taking non-college preparation courses and iv) taking college preparation courses 
which is a far cry from the suggestion that social background eﬀects decline to zero
when a level of education becomes universal (Lucas, 2001, p. 1678). Thus, according
to this result, the data provides more support for EMI rather than for MMI.
Lucas' formal analysis of MMI, RRA and EMI Since LCP has already been rejected
by Lucas (2001), in his formal analysis, Lucas (2009) only compares the implications of
MMI, RRA and EMI. As he notes, only one of the three proposals, namely RRA, has
already been written down in formal terms. Thus, Lucas' objective is ﬁrst to provide a
formal notation of both MMI and EMI, and second, to test which of the three proposals
suﬀer from the logical threats tautology, self-contradiction and evaluative infeasibility.
In his formal analysis, Lucas (2009) shows that MMI is either contradictory or eval-
uatively infeasible. As regards RRA and EMI, both proposals stand the test of being
non-tautological, non-contradictory and evaluatively feasible. As both RRA and EMI
share a lot of common statements with yet a number of considerable diﬀerences, Lucas
(2009) is unable to get to a ﬁnal statement whether the two theories relate to each other
in a complementary (or even nested?) manner. For the objective of the present study,
the most important diﬀerence between RRA and EMI is that the former proposition
explicitly links students' ability to both their subjective success expectations and edu-
cational achievement  while the latter one is agnostic on this relationship (Lucas, 2009,
p. 502). As this is the crucial link the formal model of self-fulﬁlling prophecies presented
by Becker (2010a) points to, RRA might be more suitable for deducing waning-coeﬃcient
hypotheses in this regard.
2.3 Self-Fulﬁlling Prophecy Research
Stemming on the idea of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy by Robert Merton (1948), Rosenthal
and Jacobson (1968) showed in a (quasi-)experimental4 setting that teachers' expecta-
tions can lead to their own fulﬁllment. In their famous Pygmalion study, an intelligence
test was administered to elementary school children. Independently of children's actual
test results, teachers were told the names of some randomly-selected students with the
information that these students were likely to show a sudden intellectual spurt in the
upcoming term. Interestingly, the students who had been labeled as 'late bloomers'
scored signiﬁcantly higher in a retest that was administered to the students one year
after the initial test than the artiﬁcial control group. Thus, teachers' artiﬁcially-created
expectations had actually become true.
4See Elashoﬀ and Snow (1971) for a discussion of the experimental status of the initial Pygmalion
study.
276
V. Does the Eﬀect of Teachers' Expectations on Students' Educational Opportunities Decrease?
F
ig
ur
e
1:
P
ar
am
et
er
es
ti
m
at
es
fo
r
th
e
eﬀ
ec
ts
of
cl
as
s
or
ig
in
on
ed
uc
at
io
na
l
tr
an
si
ti
on
s
in
ni
ne
E
u-
ro
p
ea
n
co
un
tr
ie
s
(s
ou
rc
e:
M
ül
le
r
an
d
K
ar
le
,
19
93
,
p.
13
).
F
ig
ur
e
2:
Su
cc
es
sf
ul
tr
an
si
ti
on
to
th
e
ne
xt
le
ve
l
of
ed
u-
ca
ti
on
(p
er
ce
nt
ag
e)
,b
y
or
ig
in
an
d
co
ho
rt
:
R
e-
pu
bl
ic
of
Ir
el
an
d,
19
21
-7
5
(s
ou
rc
e:
R
af
te
ry
an
d
H
ou
t,
19
93
,
p.
54
).
277
2 Theory and Hypotheses
Due to fundamental critics brought in by educational psychologists, Rosenthal became
one of the pioneers in meta-analysis in order to defend his main idea of a self-fulﬁlling
prophecy in the classroom. In a ﬁrst meta-analytic review of the ﬁrst 345 Pygmalion
studies, Rosenthal and Rubin (1978) found an overall eﬀect size of teachers' expectations
on students' intelligence between d = .14 up to d = 1.73 and r = .07 up to r = .65. Later
meta-analyses observed eﬀect sizes between .11 (Raudenbush, 1984) and .16 (Smith,
1980).5 Compared to the loads of basic Pygmalion and self-fulﬁlling prophecy studies,
only few studies have bothered with searching for potential moderator eﬀects6 or with
testing if eﬀect sizes do accumulate, diminish, or remain stable over time. Concerning the
latter question, following the review by Smith et al. (1999), until 1993, only four studies
explicitly dealt with this question. First, Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) themselves
noted that the randomly-selected late bloomers gained more IQ points in the ﬁrst year
of the study than in the second year. Second, using table assignment as a criterion for
identifying self-fulﬁlling prophecies, Rist (1970) noticed that diﬀerences between initial
table assignment of the students in kindergarten and ability grouping by the teachers
declined from ﬁrst to second grade. Third, West and Anderson (1976) observed that the
path coeﬃcient relating teachers' expectations in students' freshman-year of high school
to student achievement was higher for students' sophomore-year achievement than for
students' senior-year achievement. Yet, fourth, Frieze et al. (1991) discovered that the
(positive) relationship between facial attractiveness of MBA graduates and their salaries
increased over time.7
Smith et al. (1999) themselves analyzed the eﬀect of teacher perceptions in 6th and
7th grade on both students' ﬁnal marks and standardized test scores in 7th, 10th and
12th grade. As an advancement over the existing literature, they distinguished between
single-perceiver models (comparing expectancy eﬀects of the same teacher) and multiple-
perceiver models (comparing expectancy eﬀects of diﬀerent teachers). Three out of
seven diﬀerent multiple-perceiver (i.e. teacher) analyses (all of them with marks as
an outcome) give support for the dissipation hypothesis, another three analyses (two
of them with marks, and one of them with standardized test scores as an outcome)
give support for the stability hypothesis8, and one analysis did not show self-fulﬁlling
prophecy eﬀects at all. The single-perceiver analysis also gave support for the dissipation
hypotheses. Yet, Smith et al. (1999) noted that teachers' perceptions were able to predict
student achievement up to seven years. Thus, although no support for the accumulation
hypothesis was observed, self-fulﬁlling prophecies were considered to be long lasting.
In the last decade, about as much studies tested for potential changes in the self-
fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀect sizes over time than during the preceding three decades of
5See Rosenthal and DiMatteo (2001) for an explanation of common meta-analytical measures.
6See Jussim and Harber (2005) for a summary of research about moderators of self-fulﬁlling prophecies.
7However, note that Madon et al. (2006) consider neither the study by Frieze et al. (1991) nor the
one by Rist (1970) to be 'real' self-fulﬁlling prophecy analyses since perceivers' beliefs have not been
measured explicitly.
8In fact, the three analyses that Smith et al. (1999) named to give support for the stability hypothesis
also showed declining coeﬃcients for later achievement measures (which is at least suggestive in terms
of the dissemination hypothesis), but the respective χ2 diﬀerence tests lacked statistical signiﬁcance.
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Pygmalion and self-fulﬁlling prophecy research. In this context, the perhaps most pro-
found study is the work by Madon et al. (2006). The main contribution of their paper
is to test a repeated belief model measuring mothers' expectations about their children's
alcohol consumption at diﬀerent time points, and to examine potential changes in eﬀect
sizes over time. Whereas all above-cited studies only used 'gross' expectations to test for
self-fulﬁlling prophecies, Madon et al. (2006) referred to the operationalization of Madon
et al. (1997) who used residualized perceivers' expectations to construct over- and un-
derestimations that are to a certain extent inaccurate.9 They noted an accumulation of
self-fulﬁlling prophecies for a combination of unfavorable expectations of mothers with
regard to their children's alcohol consumption. However, Madon et al. (2006) did not
treat the context of teachers' expectations on students' educational achievement.
Mistry et al. (2009) simultaneously tested the eﬀects of both parents' and teachers'
(unresidualized) expectations  both measured at two distinct time points  on students'
achievement in the early school years. In several auto-regressive cross-lagged path mod-
els, Mistry et al. (2009) found stability of both adults' expectations and youths' test
scores, but having controlled for teachers' expectations at t2, no signiﬁcant direct eﬀects
of teachers' expectations at t1 on student achievement were found.
Hinnant et al. (2009) tested for eﬀects of (residualized) ﬁrst and third grade teachers'
expectations on students' third and ﬁfth grade reading and math abilities. Whereas
they found no signiﬁcant eﬀect of teachers' expectations on students' reading abilities
in neither third nor ﬁfth grade, ﬁrst grade teachers' expectations showed signiﬁcant
results on students' third and ﬁfth grade math achievement, and third grade teachers'
expectations also signiﬁcantly predicted students' ﬁfth grade math achievement.10 As
regards longitudinal comparisons, Hinnant et al. (2009) discovered that the eﬀect of ﬁrst
grade teachers' expectations on students' third grade math achievement was larger than
the eﬀect of the former on students' ﬁfth grade math achievement. The latter eﬀect, in
turn, was larger than the eﬀect of third grade teachers' expectations on students' ﬁfth
grade math achievement.
And ﬁnally, de Boer et al. (2010) analyzed the eﬀect of primary-school teachers' (resid-
ualized) recommendations regarding their students' secondary school track choice on the
latter's performance up to ﬁve years later.11 They found that in the ﬁrst two years,
teachers' expectancy bias partly dissipated but after that remained quite stable over
9In contrast to experimental studies such as the one by Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) who directly
exposed teachers to biased information and thus aroused biased expectations, naturalistic (i.e. survey
data) studies have to ensure that perceivers' high or low expectations are actually inaccurate (also
see Jussim, 1986). Madon et al. (1997) proposed to identify inaccurate expectations by regressing
the respective indicator on a set of student achievement and motivation variables in order to use
the residuals of these regressions as a measure of over- and underestimations with regard to the
chosen set of predictor variables. Unfortunately, Madon et al. (1997) did not test for the stability
of self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects over time.
10However, these results have to be interpreted with caution because Hinnant et al. (2009) additionally
controlled for a teacher-based measure of students' social skills that could be correlated with teachers'
expectations of students' achievements.
11As a methodological innovation, de Boer et al. (2010) applied a multilevel analysis in the ﬁrst step
and summed up the residuals of both levels for second-step self-fulﬁlling prophecy analysis.
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time.
Overall, these results suggest that although self-fulﬁlling prophecies can be quite per-
sistent over time, the strength of their eﬀects tend to decrease over students' educational
life course.
2.4 Self-Fulﬁlling Prophecies Over Educational Transitions: A
Decision-Theoretic Approximation
Recently (Becker, 2010a), a proposition was presented of how self-fulﬁlling prophecies
could be integrated into Esser's (1999) SEU model of educational transitions. I want to
replicate the main idea of this model brieﬂy before I try to deduce hypotheses that refer
to potential changes of this relationship over time.
The main assumption of Becker (2010a) is that teachers' expectations aﬀect students'
future subjective expected probability of educational success via students' actual aca-
demic ability and a teacher treatment eﬀect in terms of classroom praise, bilateral encour-
agement, and so on, that remains unspeciﬁed. Note that many self-fulﬁlling prophecy
studies highlight that the crucial mechanism of self-fulﬁlling teacher expectations works
via students' self-concept (Jussim, 1989; Gill and Reynolds, 1999; Muller et al., 1999;
Mechtenberg, 2009; Mistry et al., 2009).
Becker (2010a) proposes to rewrite the Esser (1999) model as follows:
EU(Ab) > EU(An) ⇐⇒ B + psdSD > C
[δ · p˜ep+ + (1− δ) · p˜ep− ]
(7)
 while δ = 0 indicates that a student has been underestimated, and δ = 1 that she has
been overestimated by her teacher. p˜ep+ and p˜ep− refer to her corresponding subjective
expected probability of educational success, respectively, consisting of her initial value
plus the gain (or loss) due to an over- (or under-)estimation. Then the denominator of
the right-hand side of (7) should be larger on average for δ = 1 than for δ = 0, which
allows the conclusion that also
EUδ=1(Ab) > EUδ=0(Ab). (8)
This means that ceteris paribus, an overestimated student would expect a higher utility
from choosing a higher-level school track than an underestimated one due to her higher
subjective expected probability of educational success p˜ep+ .
However, what is not addressed in this theoretical model is how p˜ep+ and p˜ep− might
change after multiple transitions. This can be explained following a framework of
Bayesian learning as it has been proposed by Breen (1999), Breen and García-Peñalosa
(2002), and Morgan (2005, ch. 5) for educational transition research. The core idea
of this reasoning is that students update their beliefs while following the Bayesian rule
reading
p(A|B) = p(A,B)
p(B)
. (9)
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According to the Bayesian rule, the probability of A given that B is true equals the
joint probability of A and B divided by the probability of B (since we already know B
to be true).
Breen (1999) as well as Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002) proposed to model students'
belief updating mechanisms  having passed a given transition  in a way of Bayesian
learning that follows the above-shown rule. If θ′ denotes a state wherein eﬀort has a
stronger impact on the probability of success than ability, and θ refers to a state wherein
it would be just the opposite, and AH denotes a student's choice of a high educational
career path, then the posterior belief of a student about θ′ (i.e. the belief about θ′
conditional on having succeeded in the high educational career path AH) reads (Breen
and García-Peñalosa, 2002, p. 909):
Pr(θ′|AH) = Pr(AH|θ
′)Pr(θ′)
Pr(AH|θ′)Pr(θ′) + Pr(AH|θ)Pr(θ) . (10)
Hence, a student's posterior belief about θ′ is a function of her prior belief about θ′
times her prior belief about her success in the higher academic track given that θ′ is true
(i.e. that eﬀort is more important than ability)  divided by the term just described
plus the prior belief that θ is true (i.e. ability is more important than eﬀort) times the
prior belief about her success in the higher academic track given that θ is true.
My aim here is not to present an exhaustive Bayesian analysis of the decision structure
at hand  which might be worth a separate article , but to use its main argument of
updating for my line of reasoning. An important property of Bayesian updating is that
Bayesian learning processes converge to a stationary belief (Breen and García-Peñalosa,
2002, p. 910), and below I discuss a decision-theoretical approximation that tries to
capture this assumption for educational transitions and over- and underestimations,
respectively.
A simpliﬁed decision tree of multiple over- and underestimations before and after
multiple educational transitions is presented in ﬁgure 3. The tree is simpliﬁed as I
only elaborate on students' subjective expected probability of educational success while
holding all other SEU parameters constant. I assume that after each event  be it a
teacher's over- and underestimation δ, or a student's educational transition τ  a student
updates her subjective expected success probability according to Bayes' theorem.
While RRA (Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) assumes that in the course of their edu-
cational transitions, students get more homogeneous regarding their academic ability,
Breen (1999) postulates that due to Bayesian belief updating, students are not required
to diﬀer in their academic ability in order to produce diﬀerences in transition rates (e.g.
between the social classes). In our case, by subsequent Bayesian updating after both
obtaining a teacher's evaluation and making an educational transition, students may
adopt their beliefs in a way that goes beyond initial ability diﬀerences  which also suits
the model of self-fulﬁlling prophecies proposed by Becker (2010a).
How can we now deduce assumptions about the stability or volatility of self-fulﬁlling
prophecy eﬀects over time? First, from what was argued by Becker (2010a), pi1+ > pi1−
 that is, the subjective expected probability of educational success of an overestimated
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student is larger than the corresponding parameter for an underestimated student. Sec-
ond, following Breen (1999) and Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002), students who have
successfully passed the ﬁrst transition will update their subjective expected probability
of educational success upwardly. Hence, pi2+|δ1 = 1 > pi1+, and pi2+|δ1 = 0 > pi1−.12
Being over- and underestimated again, students will once more update their beliefs ac-
cording to this teacher treatment.
pi0
δ1 = 1
τ1 = 1
δ2 = 1
τ2 = 1
τ2 = 01− pi2+
pi2+
δ2 = 0
τ2 = 1
τ2 = 01− pi2−
pi2−
τ1 = 0
1−
pi
1+
pi1+
δ1 = 0
τ1 = 1
δ2 = 1
τ2 = 1
τ2 = 01− pi2+
pi2+
δ2 = 0
τ2 = 1
τ2 = 01− pi2−
pi2−
τ1 = 0
1−
pi
1−
pi1−
Figure 3: Decision tree.
As a starting point, let us assume that students have an initial subjective expected
success probability of pi0 = 0.5. Let us further assume that in case of an overestimation,
pi increases by .1, and likewise, in case of an underestimation, pi decreases also by .1.
Moreover, assume that after a successful transition τ1, the remaining students update
their beliefs by +.1. The resulting subjective expected probability estimates before the
second transition are listed in table 1 in the column that is labeled Scenario 1. Via
an implied mechanism of Bayesian updating, a student who has been overestimated
twice would ﬁnally show a subjective probability of .8; and a student who has been
underestimated twice but nonetheless made the ﬁrst transition would show a value of .4.
Looking only at the ﬁnal probabilities of students' who have been overestimated before
the ﬁrst transition (δ1 = 1) regardless of what happened later, we can average over
pi|(δ1 = 1) = pi2+|(δ1 = 1, δ2 = 1) + pi2−|(δ1 = 1, δ2 = 1)
2
=
0.8 + 0.6
2
= 0.7. (11)
12Note that with the data at hand, students having not passed the ﬁrst transition will drop out of the
sample  which is why there is no need to bother with the beliefs in case of τ1 = 0.
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Likewise, we can compute the average for students who have been underestimated before
the ﬁrst transition ([pi|δ1 = 0] = (0.6 + 0.4)/2 = 0.5), the average for students who
have been overestimated after the ﬁrst transition ([pi|δ2 = 1] = (0.8 + 0.6)/2 = 0.7)
and the average for students who have been underestimated after the ﬁrst transition
([pi|δ2 = 0] = (0.6 + 0.4)/2 = 0.5).
If we now compute the diﬀerence between the average subjective probabilities of the
over- and the underestimated students before the ﬁrst transition, we can write
∆pi(δ1) = pi|(δ1 = 1)− pi|(δ1 = 0) = 0.7− 0.5 = 0.2; (12)
while for the diﬀerence between average subjective probabilities of the over- and the
underestimated students after the ﬁrst transition similarly holds
∆pi(δ2) = pi|(δ2 = 1)− pi|(δ2 = 0) = 0.7− 0.5 = 0.2. (13)
What becomes evident is that under the foregoing assumptions, diﬀerences in subjective
probability estimates are equal for over- and underestimated students at both δ1 and δ2.
Thus, if changes in subjective probability updating are equal after both a teacher's over-
and underestimation and a student's educational transition, diﬀerences in subjective
expected probabilities of educational success after having been over- and underestimated,
respectively, are the same for the two possible time points of teachers' evaluations.
A similar phenomenon can be noted if we let the increase after educational transition
τ = 1 be .1, but let the change in pi after being over- and underestimated constantly
increase by only .05 (scenario 2 ): In that case, both ∆pi(δ1) and ∆pi(δ2) = .1. Hence,
diﬀerences in subjective expected probabilities after being over- and underestimated are
not aﬀected by diﬀerences in belief updating between an educational transition and
teachers' evaluations.
However, let us ﬁnally take on the ﬁndings of self-fulﬁlling prophecy studies that
teacher expectancy eﬀects decrease over time. I argue that these decreasing eﬀects
are due to a mechanism of changes in belief updating; that is, the fact of being over- or
underestimated aﬀects a student's subjective expected educational success more strongly
to an earlier point in time than to a later one. Scenario 3 illustrates this assumption
by setting the change in belief updating after the ﬁrst teacher's evaluation δ1 to .1,
and after the second teacher's evaluation δ2 to .05. Remarkably, under this scenario,
∆pi(δ2) = 0.1 < ∆pi(δ1) = 0.2  which means that if teachers' evaluations aﬀect students'
subjective probability of educational success to a lesser extent at a later point in time
than at an earlier one, then diﬀerences in students' ﬁnal probability estimates are higher
between the over- and underestimated ones at an earlier point in time than between the
over- and underestimated at a later point in time.13
2.5 Hypotheses
Although Becker (2010a) already found self-fulﬁlling prophecy eﬀects of teachers' ex-
pectations on students' educational success (in terms of Abitur) and their university
13For illustration purposes, the decision tree with the concrete values for scenario 3 is displayed in ﬁgure
A (Appendix).
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Table 1: Decision tree analysis under three scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
∆(pi|δ1) = 0.1; ∆(pi|δ1) = 0.05; ∆(pi|δ1) = 0.1;
∆(pi|τ1) = 0.1; ∆(pi|τ1) = 0.1; ∆(pi|τ1) = 0.1;
∆(pi|δ2) = 0.1 ∆(pi|δ2) = 0.05 ∆(pi|δ2) = 0.05
pi0 0.5 0.5 0.5
pi1+ 0.6 0.55 0.6
pi1− 0.4 0.45 0.4
pi2+|(δ1 = 1, τ1 = 1) 0.8 0.7 0.75
pi2−|(δ1 = 1, τ1 = 1) 0.6 0.6 0.65
pi2+|(δ1 = 0, τ1 = 1) 0.6 0.6 0.55
pi2−|(δ1 = 0, τ1 = 1) 0.4 0.5 0.45
pi|δ1 = 1 0.7 0.65 0.7
pi|δ1 = 0 0.5 0.55 0.5
pi|δ2 = 1 0.7 0.65 0.65
pi|δ2 = 0 0.5 0.55 0.55
∆pi(δ1) 0.2 0.2 0.2
∆pi(δ2) 0.2 0.2 0.1
transitions based on analyses with the Cologne High School Panel (CHiSP), one objec-
tive of the present study is to replicate these results with the synthetic data at hand by
testing whether self-fulﬁlling teacher expectancy eﬀects also generalize with regard to the
transition from primary to secondary school. Thus, the ﬁrst hypothesis is that teachers'
expectations aﬀect students' educational transitions independently of conventional SEU
predictors (H1).
Second, as recent self-fulﬁlling prophecy research suggests, one can expect that al-
though teachers' expectations might have enduring eﬀects on students' educational life
course, the magnitude of this relationship  in terms of predicted probabilities; see Lucas
(2001, 2009)  should decrease over educational transitions (H2). If we let ∆P (δi, τj)
denote the diﬀerence in predicted probabilities P that is invoked by a teacher's over- or
underestimation δi at a particular transition point τj (for a more illuminative descrip-
tion about the social mechanisms that are supposed to be captured in this parameter
see Becker, 2010a), we could split up H2 into two separately-falsiﬁable statements: On
the one hand, it should simply hold that
∆P (δ1, τ1) > ∆P (δ2, τ2) > ∆P (δ3, τ3) (H2a)
 which means that the eﬀect of a teacher's expectation at t1 on a student's ﬁrst transition
is larger than the eﬀect of a teacher's expectation at t2 on a student's second transition
(and so forth). This is what I assume to follow from the mechanism of Bayesian up-
dating, in that the eﬀect of an over- or underestimation on the change in a student's
subjective expected probability of educational success decreases between two time points
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of evaluations. On the other hand, one could expect that
∆P (δ1, τ2) < ∆P (δ2, τ2); ∆P (δ1, τ3) < ∆P (δ2, τ2) (H2b)
 which means that long-term eﬀects of teachers' expectation are smaller than short-
term eﬀects. According to table 1, this is what follows from the previously-described
mechanism for the ﬁnal average probability diﬀerences between over- and underestimated
students at two evaluation points.
In both cases, I assume that diﬀerences in subjective expected probabilities in educa-
tional success aﬀect students' utility function as argued by Esser (1999) and thus also
inﬂuence their actual transition decisions.
3 Operationalization
To the best of my knowledge, there exist no data that simultaneously collected both
convincing measures of teachers' expectations at two diﬀerent time points as well as
tolerably accurate indicators for the SEU terms. Therefore, two diﬀerent data sets have
to be combined. The present paper will make use of the method of statistical matching
(Rubin, 1986; D'Orazio et al., 2006) to create an artiﬁcial student cohort based on the
statistical twins from two distinct data sources.14 Before I elaborate on this method in
more detail, a short description of the data and indicators available so far appears to be
fruitful.
3.1 Data
The only data set known to me containing a measure of teachers' expectations in sec-
ondary school as well as reliable SEU indicators is the Cologne High School Panel
(CHiSP ; Gesis-No. ZA640). In the initial survey from 1969/70, N=3385 10th-grade
Gymnasium students in North Rhine-Westphalia were asked about issues such as their
performance, interests and plans in school and about their social origin and their rela-
tionship to their parents. At about the same time, students' teachers (N=1701) and
parents (N=2646) have also been surveyed.15
Taking this data set as a reference, we have to look for adequate primary-school data
that were surveyed before CHiSP and provide the required information. A promising
candidate is a data set named Elternhaus und Bildungschancen (Parental H ome and
Educational Opportunities, henceforth abbreviated as PHEO ; Gesis-No. ZA893). In
1968, a population of N=1729 parents of 5th grade students from Baden-Wuerttemberg
whose children passed from primary to secondary school were surveyed. An additional
14In the empirical section, I will carry out additional robustness analyses based on the British Cohort
Study data. But since some of the indicators therein are measured less precisely, I still see need for
performing statistical matching of two ﬁles with better measures.
15Three re-surveys of the former students in 1984/85 (N=1987) 1996/97 (N=1596) and 2010 (N=1301)
added private backgrounds and occupational careers of the former students' until age 30, age 43,
and age 56, respectively.
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questionnaire collected rich information of primary school teachers (N=1426) including
transition recommendations and other evaluations.
3.2 Variables
Dependent variables: educational transitions In line with the Mare (1980, 1981)
model, the dependent variables of interest are students' educational transitions. From
PHEO, we observe students' school choice after primary school. From CHiSP, we get
information on the educational careers of a cohort of Gymnasium students. For the
following analyses, a variable was constructed that takes 0 if a student did not pass to
Gymnasium; 1 if a Gymnasium student quitted after 10th class or later without passing
Abitur; 2 if a Gymnasium student successfully passed Abitur but did not make the
transition to university; and 3 if a Gymnasium student successfully passed Abitur and
also made the transition to university. Since the re-surveys of the CHiSP asked if the
former students ever passed the transition in question, I follow the approach proposed by
Becker (2010a) in setting an ad-hoc cut-oﬀ value of 80 months after survey time in case
of passing Abitur and of 106 months in case of transitions into tertiary education.16 The
distribution of high school graduations and university transitions over time are shown
in ﬁgures 4a and 4b.
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Figure 4: Distribution of students' educational success and university transitions over
time (original CHiSP data).
16For the CHiSP data, the zero point of counting has been backdated to January 1967. Thus, a cut-oﬀ
value of 80 months includes all students who passed Abitur on the ﬁrst try, but it does not exclude
those who had to participate in immediate makeup exams. A cut-oﬀ value of 106 months includes
all students who started academic studies within two years after high school graduation.
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Independent variables The main independent variables of interest are primary school
teachers' transition recommendations concerning their students' secondary school track
choice (taken from PHEO), and secondary school teachers' 10th class assessments whom
of their students they consider to be able to complete academic studies successfully
(taken from CHiSP). In PHEO, teachers could give a recommendation for Hauptschule
(the lowest German secondary school track), for Realschule (the mid-level track) and for
Gymnasium. I computed a new variable which was set to one if a teacher recommended
Gymnasium and zero otherwise. In CHiSP, teachers could explicitly name students
whom they considered to be able for academic studies, and of whom they considered to
lack this prerequisite. I formed a new variable which was set to one if a student obtained
a positive evaluation, and zero if she obtained a negative one. Students without an ex-
plicit evaluation were set to missing.17 Leaning on the work by Madon et al. (1997, 2006),
Hinnant et al. (2009) and de Boer et al. (2010), the appropriate setup for naturalistic,
i.e. survey data self-fulﬁlling prophecy studies is to construct a measure of perceivers'
over- and underestimations to ensure that their expectations are actually inaccurate.
While the CHiSP data provides a great deal of promising regressors for teachers' expec-
tations, the PHEO data is, unfortunately, less rich. For instance, in contrast to CHiSP,
PHEO did not measure students' intelligence, which makes it more diﬃcult to iden-
tify inaccurate teacher expectations. Instead, we have to rely on parents' assessments
of students' school performance and motivation. To measure primary school students'
performance in PHEO, I took the average of parents' statements about their children's
grades in arithmetic, spelling, and literature (the only available grade information in
that data). As a measure of their motivation, I controlled for parents' assessments of
whether their children generally liked learning in school and of their children's estimated
TV consumption time.
In CHiSP, we have more accurate measures of both students' school achievement
and their motivation  but to keep the degree of 'accuracy' of the resulting over- and
underestimations in both data sets comparable, I tried to use similar indicators also
in CHiSP.18 Concerning students' achievement, I also computed the average19 of their
grades in math and German classes; and with regard to their motivation, I controlled
for their reported homework eﬀort as well as for their self-conﬁdence.
To construct inaccurate over- and underestimations, teachers' expectations at both
time points were regressed on students' achievement20 and their motivation. The resid-
uals of these models were then stored as a new variable in order to use them as a
predictor of students' educational transitions in the subsequent analyses. In total, I
computed three diﬀerent models that regressed teachers' expectations i) on performance
17For both a multinomial logistic regression and an ordinal structural equation model with teachers'
evaluations as measured in CHiSP as an outcome that considers this 'missing' category, see Becker
and Birkelbach (2011).
18For an operationalization of teachers' over- and underestimations based on a more precise set of
students' achievement and motivation indicators taken from CHiSP data see Becker (2010a).
19If one of the grade variables was missing for a student, I computed the average of the remaining ones.
20Since in the German school system, lower grade points refer to a higher achievement, I have inverted
the grades before computing the average.
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indicators only; ii) on motivation indicators only; and iii) on both performance and mo-
tivation indicators together. For each of these three models, a separate residual variable
was computed.21
Covariates According to my hypotheses, appropriate indicators of the SEU terms have
to be controlled for. Once again, the precision of measurement is higher in the CHiSP
data; hence, we should begin with a description of the respective variables therein in
terms of an 'ideal state of aﬀairs' to which the PHEO indicators have to measure up.
In CHiSP, students' expected beneﬁt of eduction, B, was measured by the question
if Abitur would be necessary for students to reach their aim in life ( 1 'yes, necessary';
2 'useful, but not necessary'; and 3 'not important'). I recoded this variable into 0 'not
important'; 1 'useful, but not necessary'; and 2 'yes, necessary'. The value of status
decline, −SD, can be operationalized as parents' disappointment if their child would
not pass Abitur (1 'not much'; 2 'little'; 3 'very disappointed'; 4 'would be the worst'). I
categorized this variable into 0 'very disappointed/would be the worst'; and 1 'little/not
much'. Concerning the expected probability of status decline, psd, parents' should assess
the importance of good Abitur grades for their oﬀspring's occupational success (1 'little';
2 'not that much'; 3 'big'; 4 'very big'). This indicator was dichotomized into 0 'little/not
that much' and 1 'big/very big'. The subjective probability of educational success, pep,
was measured by parents' response if their child was able to complete Gymnasium (0
'probably not/don't know'; 1 'probably/deﬁnitely'). The expected costs of education,
C, can be operationalized by parents' answer if they had to make ﬁnancial sacriﬁces in
order to oﬀer higher education to their children (1 'no', 2 'little' and 3 'yes'). Once again
I dichotomized the variable into 0 'no/little' and 1 'yes'.
In the PHEO data, the situation is a bit more diﬃcult. A measure of the expected
beneﬁt of eduction, B, can be taken from several questions about the importance of the
chosen school track and the aspired certiﬁcate for the intended occupational position
and/or potential academic studies (0 'low'; 1 'average'; 2 'high').22
Instead of using Becker's (2003) operationalization of the value of status decline −SD
in terms of the diﬀerence between parental occupational prestige and the occupation
anticipated for the oﬀspring  which I consider not to suﬃce the prerequisite of measuring
parental expectations in terms of subjective probabilities (Manski, 2004; also see Becker
21Tables A and B (appendix) show the estimates of the underlying logistic regressions.
22A low expected beneﬁt was assigned to i) Hauptschule students whose parents had no idea about
the utility of a General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education (Realschulabschluss) or Abitur at all;
ii) Hauptschule students whose parents wanted their child to take a job for which manual skills are
most important; iii) Realschule students whose parents explicitly stated that Abitur would not be
important for their oﬀspring's future job; and iv) Gymnasium students whose parents only strove
for a General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education (Realschulabschluss). A high expected beneﬁt
was assigned to i) Realschule students whose parents aspired to move up to Gymnasium later on
(surveyed by two diﬀerent questions); ii) Gymnasium students whose parents said that Abitur is
necessary for the occupation aspired for their oﬀspring, or iii) in general improves her odds on the job
market. Unfortunately, from the PHEO data it is not possible to generate a high estimated beneﬁt
for parents of Hauptschule students. Thus, the coeﬃcient of B on the actual transition decisions
may be slightly overestimated.
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and Hecken, 2007, 2009a,b) , I use two variables which indicate parents' concern that
the chosen school track might be valueless. Students of both Haupt- and Realschule
whose parents suspected that a General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education might be
useless were assigned a high amount of concern (1), while all others were assigned a low
one (0). Similarly, Gymnasium students whose parents worried that Abitur might be
useful only in the case of subsequent academic studies were assigned a high amount of
concern (1), while all others were assigned a low one (0).
The expected impact of status decline, psd, can be measured more precisely, since
there are questions about the general importance of school for achieving something in
life in general and for occupational success in particular (0 'low'; 1 'high').23
The operationalization of the subjective expected probability of educational success,
pep, is more problematic: While Becker (2010b) (and as far as I can see, this measure
was also applied in Becker, 2003) speciﬁed to have used students' average grades in
literature, spelling, and math  these indicators have to be discarded for this purpose
in the present study since they have already been used for the identiﬁcation of over-
and underestimations. Instead, I use a combination of parents' indication whether their
child had diﬃculties in primary school (0 'none'; 1 'a bit'; 2 'pretty') and their certainty
about their decision of sending their oﬀspring either to Realschule or Gymnasium. For
parents who sent their children to Hauptschule, I additionally draw on an a question
which asked whether this decision was due to low achievement of their oﬀspring in some
subjects.24
Fortunately, the expected costs of education C can be measured more straightfor-
wardly: All parents were asked about the frequency of thoughts about getting along with
their disposable money. Additionally, all parents of students who went to Hauptschule
were asked about the expected costs of upper secondary school tracks as well as about
the expected amount of these costs. Parents who said that they often worry if they
had enough money until a month's end or how they should portion their money for the
forthcoming week were assigned to experience high ﬁnancial burdens (1), and zero oth-
erwise. Furthermore, students of Hauptschule whose parents indicated that they would
have expected much higher costs of education at a higher school track were also assigned
a value of one.
According to Becker (2003), I additionally control for parental social class in terms of
their occupational prestige and for parental educational attainment in order to capture
potential social background eﬀects on educational transitions that are not exhaustively
modeled by the SEU indicators. In the CHiSP data, parental social class was measured
23I assume that the chosen indicators for psd capture more general attitudes towards the signiﬁcance of
school for success in life, while the selected variables for −SD refer more to parental status concerns.
24I believe that this operationalization of pep in PHEO has two advantages: First, it ensures to use
subjective measures of students' expected success that are not at conﬂict with the (more objective)
indicators intended to be used for the identiﬁcation of over- and underestimations. Second, although
parents were surveyed at the beginning of secondary school, the temporal scope of the given questions
aims at parents' expectations at primary school. Thus, potential diﬃculties in causality that could
arise if one used secondary-school expectations to explain transitions from primary to secondary
school should be attenuated.
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by the Treiman occupational prestige scores of the head of each household; and parental
educational attainment was measured by 13 categories reaching from lower secondary
school without an apprenticeship up to a university degree. For harmonization purposes,
I recoded this variable into four categories (0 'no General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Ed-
ucation'; 1 'General Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education but not more'; 2 'vocational or
high school diploma'; 3 'ﬁnished tertiary education').
In the PHEO data, comparable scales of the head of household's occupation and
education were formed.25
3.3 Method: Statistical Matching
Since I do not dispose of a single data ﬁle with convincing indicators for teachers' ex-
pectations measured before two distinct transition points, I use the method of statistical
matching of the above-sketched PHEO and CHiSP data in order to create an artiﬁ-
cial student cohort that suﬃces this prerequisite. In this subsection, I ﬁrst allude to
the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) as the crucial condition for performing
statistical matching, and I defend how my theoretical model suits this condition. After
that, I describe the matching algorithm that I used in practice.26
The Conditional Independence Assumption Let (X,Y,Z) be a random variable
with density f(x,y, z),x ∈ X ,y ∈ Y , z ∈ Z. Assume that A and B are two samples
consisting of nA and nB independent and identically distributed observations generated
from f(x,y, z). Let the units in A have Z missing, and the units in B have Y missing.
Then the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) would mean an independence of
Y and Z given X.
For ease of understanding, start with the conditional distribution of Y given X and
Z:
f(Y | X,Z) (14)
Then the CIA just postulates that
f(Y | X,Z) = f(Y | X) (15)
(cf D'Orazio et al., 2006, p. 13).
By content, this means that the distribution of Y given X and Z equals the distribu-
tion of Y given only X if f(Y | X,Z) does not depend on Z. In that case, we can say
25While parental education as measured in PHEO could easily be harmonized to the variable that was
computed in CHiSP, I had to assign Treiman scores (Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996) to parents'
answers about their ﬁeld of occupation and their position therein by myself. Table C (appendix)
lists the observed combinations of occupational situs and status in PHEO and with the assigned
prestige scores.
26For all following formal issues concerning statistical matching see D'Orazio et al. (2006). Also cf.
Rässler (2002).
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Figure 5: The Conditional Independence Assumption: An everyday-life example.
that Y is conditionally independent of Z given X. To provide a more illustrative exam-
ple27, consider the following situation: Imagine that two men, Norman and Martin, are
inhabitants of the same city but live in two distant districts. Furthermore, they choose
diﬀerent traﬃc means to get to work (say Norman takes the train while Martin comes
by car). Now X could denote the event Norman comes late to work, and Z could
refer to Martin comes late to work. It might now appear that X and Z are completely
independent from each other since the two actors are assumed to live on opposite sides
of the city and do not use the same traﬃc means. However, there could be situations
such as a train strike which accounts for both Norman coming late and also for heavy
traﬃc volume on the streets leading also to Martin coming late (see ﬁgure 5).
A well-known problem is that the CIA can never be tested (let alone be proved).
Thus, a cautious application of the CIA on the given research question has to reveal
if the underlying theoretical model is in line with it.28 In our case, Y and Z would
be teachers' expectations in primary school and in 10th class, respectively, as well as
students' actual transition decisions. X would be the vector of SEU predictors and
additional covariates. Do we ﬁnd good reasons to defend the assumption that teachers'
expectations at several points in time and students' transition decisions at several points
in time do not inﬂuence each other, respectively, once the vector of SEU predictors is
known? I hold the view that we do:
First, the crucial assumption of the SEU model (Esser, 1999) is that students' transi-
tion decisions can be explained by the vector of SEU predictors in the respective data set.
27I found this example on http://www.eecs.qmul.ac.uk/~norman/BBNs/Independence_and_
conditional_independence.htm.
28Although the CIA is not less crucial for the application of propensity score matching when analyzing
so-called treatment eﬀects, it is often merely presupposed rather than justiﬁed on solid theoretical
considerations (for instance in Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, p. 32).
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That is, once we have controlled for parental utility considerations, two given educational
transitions should be independent from each other according to theory.
Second, following the theoretical model outlined by Becker (2010a), and according
to the above extension onto multiple evaluations that are separated from each other
by a student's educational transition, a teacher's evaluation at t1 should aﬀect another
teacher's evaluation at t2 only via its impact on a student's subsequent subjective ex-
pected probability of successfully completing the chosen school track. The latter pa-
rameter is supposed to be a function of the student's preceding subjective expected
probability of educational success, her actual academic performance, and an unspeciﬁed
teacher treatment eﬀect capturing classroom praise, bilateral encouragement, and so
forth (Becker, 2010a, p. 10). Once we control for a suitable indicator of pep at both time
points, intercorrelations between both teacher expectancy indicators should be substan-
tively reduced.29 This is why I would defend the assumption that for the given research
question, the CIA should hold.30
Matching algorithms Basically, statisticians distinguish between parametric and non-
parametric matching algorithms. Regarding parametric approaches, the most common
one is conditional mean matching  though only working for normally distributed contin-
uous variables. The idea of conditional mean matching is the prediction of two regression
equations:
z¯Aa = αˆZ + βˆZXx
A
a (16)
y¯Bb = αˆY + βˆyXx
B
b (17)
Then each missing item in A is substituted with its expected value given the observed
variables in B  and vice versa. For instance, assume that in ﬁle A, we observe respon-
dents' education and their income, and in ﬁle B respondents' education and their work
experience measured in years. Then we would regress work experience on education, and
we would plug in the estimated mean value for a given value of education as obtained
from B for all respondents with the same value of education in ﬁle A. However, as Little
and Rubin (2002) note, this approach suﬀers from two serious drawbacks: First, some of
the values of z¯Aa and y¯
B
b may never be observed; and second, the variance estimators are
not consistent. Therefore, I will directly turn to the explanation of the non-parametric
approaches.
29Note that statistical matching researchers consider moderate relations between Y and Z, given X
not as being consequential for statistical matching purposes (see e.g. Ingram et al., 2000, p. 5).
30Admittedly, in the present case, the validity of the CIA strongly hinges on the question if the SEU
predictors in both data sets are reliable matching indicators. The demonstration of some measure-
ment diﬀerences in both data sets might have led some readers to the conclusion that they are
not. However, note that one elementary intention of the SEU model is to unveil the social mecha-
nism providing an understanding explanation of how diﬀerences in educational transitions by social
strata arise (Esser, 1999, p. 263). In other words, if the measurement of some SEU indicators in the
PHEO data were too imprecise to predict students' transition decisions, then the predictive power
of both parental education and their occupational prestige would disproportionally increase. Thus,
by matching on the latter indicators, the CIA could still be maintained. Also see footnote 29.
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Non-parametric matching approaches usually rely on some kind of hot deck method. In
random hot deck matching, the idea is to randomly choose a donor record for each record
in the recipient ﬁle after having grouped both ﬁles into homogeneous subsets (donation
classes). For example, records in ﬁles A and B could ﬁrst be grouped according to
respondents' gender in order to ensure that women are always assigned to women, and
men to men, after which they could be randomly matched.
Rank hot deck matching presumes that the units in both ﬁles are ranked separately
according to the values of an ordinal matching variable (e.g. age categories). Then the
youngest respondent of ﬁle B is assigned to the youngest respondent in ﬁle A, the second
youngest observation in ﬁle B to the second youngest observation in ﬁle A, and so on.
And ﬁnally, the distance hot deck method matches each record in the recipient ﬁle with
the closest record in the donor ﬁle according to a distance measure based on matching
variables X. The basic decision rule is that
dab = |xaa − xBb | = min|xAa − xBb |; (18)
that is, each observation in ﬁle B is matched to her closest mate in ﬁle A according
to the chosen set of matching variables and a predeﬁned distance function. Depending
on the measurement level of the matching variables, the concrete distance function will
be one of the corresponding measures such as the Euclidean metric, the Mahalanobis
distance, the Gower dissimilarity coeﬃcient, etc.
Another important distinction in this respect is the diﬀerence between constrained
and unconstrained matching which touches the question whether a donor record shall
be used more than once. Similar to an urn problem as it is well-known in elementary
combinatorics, when performing statistical matching, each observation could either 'drop
out' after it has been used once, or it can go back into the pool of records.
Furthermore, if the number of matching variables is large, additional donation classes
can be predeﬁned to decrease computational eﬀort. That means that also when hot
deck distance matching gets the researcher's vote, she can predeﬁne 'ﬁxed' classes such
as respondents' gender or their education wherein distances between all observations of
the two ﬁles are minimized separately.
Data harmonization and matching variables For the following analyses, PHEO and
CHiSP shall be matched using an unconstrained distance hot deck technique with dona-
tion classes. Distance hot deck matching is an approach that is superior to parametric
methods for the reason that
(1) imputations tend to be realistic since they are based on values observed
elsewhere; (2) imputations will not be outside the range of possible values;
and (3) it is not necessary to deﬁne an explicit model for the distribution of
the missing values (Siddique and Belin, 2008, p. 84).
As D'Orazio et al. (2006) note, several issues have to be considered when preparing
data in order to perform statistical matching. In particular, the two data sources can be
biased or inconsistent (also see van der Laan, 2000). Sources are biased if their samples
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are characterized by diﬀerent reference periods or drawn from diﬀerent populations. In
our case, the given research question demands that the data refer to diﬀerent periods
since the aim is to construct an artiﬁcial student cohort. However, the reader may
have noted that the respective survey times do not exactly correspond to the requested
years. An additional problem arises with respect to the two samples' population: While
PHEO consists of primary school parents in Baden-Wuerttemberg, CHiSP is composed
of secondary school parents in North Rhine-Westphalia. Institutional factors in the
two German Federal Lands may lead to diﬃculties in comparability, thus the following
analyses have to be interpreted cautiously.
The issue of inconsistency refers to the harmonization of matching variables. As
mentioned before, at least for some variables, measurement diﬀerences between the two
sources are undeniable. Therefore, it has to be resolved if this does not result in loss in
predictive power.
As D'Orazio et al. (2006) suggest, it has to be clariﬁed that the matching variables X
are associated with the variables of interest, Y and Z. In case of categorical outcomes,
this can be accomplished by means of a classiﬁcation tree (Breiman et al., 1984). The
idea of a classiﬁcation tree  and of its metric counterpart, the regression tree  is to
explain the variation in the response variable by repeatedly splitting the data into more
homogeneous subgroups. A deviance measure based on χ2 statistics is used to ﬁnd the
split that maximizes the dissimilarity among the resulting subjects (also see Hansen
et al., 1996; De'ath and Fabricius, 2000). In contrast to conventional discriminant anal-
ysis, classiﬁcation and regression trees do not follow a simultaneous partitioning logic
but pursue a hierarchical approach, wherein each subgroup  graphically represented
by a tree node  will be split up according to a distinct criterion (for a review of more
elaborate classiﬁcation techniques see Prasad et al., 2006).
Figures 6 shows the categorization trees for students educational transitions.31 We can
see that in case of the decision for or against the transition to Gymnasium, the expected
beneﬁt of education B is the most dominant predictor, while the value of status decline
−SD comes second, followed by highest parental educational degree and the subjective
expected probability of successfully completing the chosen school track, pep.32
Contrarily, in the case of passing Abitur, pep is most prevalent while B comes second.
Hence, as a preliminary result we can note that at a later educational transition i) less
predictors suﬃce to explain its variance (which corresponds to the waning coeﬃcients
pattern); ii) subjective probability expectations are more important than considerations
of educational beneﬁt or status decline; and iii) the impact of parental social backgrounds
dissipates (at least in a categorization tree model). However, since all of the selected
indicators in the classiﬁcation tree of the PHEO data are still bivariately associated
with passing Abitur in the underlying χ2 tests (not shown, available upon request), I
31I used the tree package in R (Ripley, 2010) for both computation and graphical display of the
categorization tree. The minimum number of observations to be included in either child node was
set to 5 (which is also the default for the tree package).
32As mentioned before, the explanatory power of parental education in PHEO could be a hint that
some of its SEU indicators might suﬀer from a loss in precision due to measurement diﬃculties.
Therefore, it appears fruitful to ground the matching procedure also on parental education.
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|pheo_b < 1.5
pheo_sd < 0.5
pheo_school_m < 2.5
pheo_pep < 0.5
pheo_pep < 0.5
0.2680 0.1037
0.8333
0.6306 0.3418
0.6681
PHEO Data
|chisp_pep < 0.5
chisp_b < 1.5
0.2656
0.5754 0.6970
CHiSP Data
Figure 6: Classiﬁcation trees of matching variables (outcome: educational transitions).
nonetheless consider these indicators to be reliable matching variables.
Usually, it is recommended to choose the smaller ﬁle as the recipient in order to avoid
problems in aﬀecting the distribution of the imputed variables in the ﬁnal synthetic
ﬁle (D'Orazio et al., 2006, p. 35). However, in our case, starting with the N = 1729
observations of PHEO would equal a considerable loss of the N = 3385 observations in
CHiSP  which would then lead to a worrisome attrition in cell frequencies at the higher
nodes of the transition tree. Therefore, I choose the unorthodox way of matching the
smaller ﬁle, PHEO, to the larger ﬁle, CHiSP, to prevent loss in statistical power due to
small cell frequencies.
From the categorization tree analysis, we identiﬁed B, −SD and pep as the most
promising matching indicators. To decrease computational eﬀort, and in line with both
theoretical considerations and the results from the classiﬁcation tree, I use parental
educational attainment as donation classes. Since the matching variables showed both
binary and ordered categorical levels of measurement, the Gower distance function was
applied.33 I used the StatMatch package in R (D'Orazio, 2009) to create the synthetic
ﬁle.
Table 2 shows the distribution of the relevant variables in PHEO data that were
matched to CHiSP before and after the matching procedure. We can see that there
are only minor diﬀerences between the two sets of variables except the distribution of
parental education. The latter case is a result from matching PHEO to CHiSP (and not
33The general formula for the Gower distance function is dab =
1
P
∑P
p=1 cpdabp where a and b are sets of
records with dimension P , and cp is a scaling factor for the p
th variable. The idea is to use suitable
distances for variables with diﬀerent measurement levels, such as cp = 1 for binary variables and
cp = 1/Rp (i.e. the range) for continuous and categorical variables (D'Orazio et al., 2006, p. 216).
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the other way round) since CHiSP  surveyed in the highest German secondary school
track  is more selective in parental composition than PHEO. But since the crucial SEU
indicators are quite comparable between the two ﬁles, this allows the conclusion that
the matching procedure led to reasonably consistent results.34
3.4 Models: Sequential Logit Analyses With Unobserved
Heterogeneity
As a ﬁrst step, I apply conventional logistic regression analysis to estimate the log-
odds of primary school children to move on to Gymnasium. For this step, all variables
stem from PHEO. As a second step, I use sequential logit modeling (Buis, 2007, 2010,
2011) to estimate the conditional log-odds of passing Abitur and university transitions,
respectively. These ﬁrst two steps cannot be uniﬁed to a comprehensive sequential logit
model since in the ﬁrst case, I need explanatory variables from primary school, and in
the second case, secondary-school predictors are required.
Yet, to test H2b, in a third step I analyze changes of primary-school predictors over
all subsequent educational transitions. Here, I can thoroughly analyze a comprehensive
sequential transition model starting with the transition from primary to secondary school
and ending with the transition to university.
The implied process of this artiﬁcial but comprehensive transition model is illustrated
graphically in ﬁgure 7 (also see Buis, 2011, p. 3). Note that each capital letter does not
denote an educational transition but relates to a particular educational outcome.
A,B,C,D
B,C,D
CD
D
C1− p3
p3
B1− p2
p2
A
1− p1
p1
Figure 7: Educational transition process.
34A comparison of the regression coeﬃcients for secondary school choice as a binary outcome between
the variables of the original PHEO data and those that were matched to CHiSP will give further
insight in the reliability of the synthetic ﬁle. A complete list of summary statistics for all independent
variables in the synthetic ﬁle is given in table D (appendix).
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Table 2: Descriptive results of donor data (PHEO) variables
count mean sd min max
B 1729 1.05 0.51 0.00 2.00
-SD 1721 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
p(sd) 1652 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
C 1708 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
p(ep) 1723 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
par. occ. pres. 1650 45.31 12.68 18.00 72.00
par. occ. pres. (dichot.) 1729 0.63 0.48 0.00 1.00
par. educ. 1622 0.31 0.74 0.00 3.00
transition recommendation 1737 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
residual (perf.) 1549 0.00 0.44 -0.86 1.12
residual (mot.) 1453 0.00 0.48 -0.48 0.83
residual (full) 1393 -0.00 0.44 -0.86 1.13
residual (perf, dichot). 1549 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
residual (mot., dichot.) 1453 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00
residual (full, dichot.) 1393 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
(a) Before matching.
count mean sd min max
B 3374 1.13 0.52 0.00 2.00
-SD 3358 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
p(sd) 3244 0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00
C 3339 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
p(ep) 3367 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
par. occ. pres. 3213 49.34 14.12 18.00 72.00
par. occ. pres. (dichot.) 3374 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
par. educ. 3374 1.14 1.23 0.00 3.00
transition recommendation 3133 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
residual (perf.) 3001 0.09 0.43 -0.86 1.12
residual (mot.) 2748 0.10 0.49 -0.48 0.83
residual (full) 2634 0.07 0.43 -0.86 1.13
residual (perf, dichot.) 3001 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
residual (mot., dichot.) 2748 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
residual (full, dichot.) 2634 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
(b) After matching.
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Assume that A refers to the outcome of not making the transition from primary school
to Gymnasium, B to making the transition to Gymnasium without passing Abitur on the
ﬁrst try, C to passing Abitur on the ﬁrst try without starting academic studies after 106
months, and D to starting academic studies after 106 months after having successfully
passed Abitur on the ﬁrst try. The important assumption of the sequential logit model
is that the probability of each educational outcome is evaluated against the probability
of all other possible educational outcomes, conditional on preceding transitions. For
example, the probability of passing Abitur on the ﬁrst try, p2 (with the possible option
of a subsequent university transition within 106 months after high school graduation),
is evaluated against the probability of not passing Abitur on the ﬁrst try, 1− p2. But of
course, it is taken into account that this step is conditional on having made the transition
from primary school to Gymnasium.
Regarding modeling strategy, I ﬁrst introduce the SEU predictors (Esser, 1999) in
their additive interpretation and then subsequently add each residual term (from the
performance model, the motivation model, and the full model, respectively) separately.
I present the SEU terms in their additive interpretation since it might be of interest to
assess the temporal stability of each single indicator  which would not be possible in
the constructed terms for what Esser (1999) calls educational motivation and investment
risk. As Becker (2010a) observed, results for the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residual terms
obtained from the full CHiSP sample are stable for both the additive and the multi-
plicative reading of the SEU model. The same holds for analyses based on the synthetic
ﬁle (not shown, available upon request).
Hence, for the artiﬁcial student cohort, the following models will be estimated (also
see Buis, 2011, p. 3):
p1 = Pr(y1 = 1|SEU,SFPi ,SES) = exp(β01 + β11SEU+ β21SFPi + β31SES)
1 + exp(β01 + β11SEU+ β21SFPi + β31SES)
(19)
p2 = Pr(y2 = 1|SEU,SFPi ,SES, y1 = 1) = exp(β02 + β12SEU+ β22SFPi + β32SES)
1 + exp(β02 + β12SEU+ β22SFPi + β32SES)
(20)
p3 = Pr(y3 = 1|SEU,SFPi ,SES, y2 = 1) = exp(β03 + β13SEU+ β23SFPi + β33SES)
1 + exp(β03 + β13SEU+ β23SFPi + β33SES)
(21)
 where SEU refers to the vector of SEU parameters, SFPi to the three self-fulﬁlling
prophecy residuals (introduced separately), and SES to controls for parental education
and their occupational prestige. The conditions y1 = 1 in (20) and y2 = 1 in (21) state
that the respective equation is estimated only for the students at risk, i.e. those who
made the preceding educational transition.
4 Results
After showing the univariate distribution of students' educational transitions in the
synthetic ﬁle, I present the log-odds of the sequential logit models, and I also display the
respective predicted probabilities. The analysis section ends with a robustness analysis
of the current results.
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4.1 Distribution of Educational Transitions
Table 3 displays the distribution of students' educational transitions in the matched
data ﬁle. 1677 observations or an amount of 63.16 % of the synthetic sample of N=2655
observations did not move on to Gymnasium, and 444 observations or a share of 16.72 %
left Gymnasium without Abitur. 56 observations or an amount of 2.11 % passed Abitur
but did not make the transition to university, and 478 observations or a share of 18 %
both passed Abitur and moved on to university.
Table 3: Distribution of educational transitions (synthetic data)
n pct cumpct
no Gymnasium 1677 63.16 63.16
Gymnasium without Abitur 444 16.72 79.89
Abitur without university transition 56 2.11 82.00
Abitur with university transition 478 18.00 100.00
Total 2655 100.00
4.2 Multivariate Analyses: Sequential Logit Modeling
In this section, I ﬁrst discuss the results from sequential logistic regression analysis in
terms of conventional regression coeﬃcients (log-odds). Following Lucas (2001, 2009), I
then elaborate on the predicted probabilities.
Regression coeﬃcients Table 4 compares the logistic regression estimates of primary
school students' transitions to secondary school in both the original PHEO data and the
synthetic ﬁle. Diﬀerences in signiﬁcance can be noted for all three estimated coeﬃcients
for the expected impact of status decline psd with controls for the self-fulﬁlling prophecy
residuals, and for one coeﬃcient for perceived costs of education C. Thus, we have to
keep in mind that our synthetic ﬁle will potentially overestimate the eﬀect of psd on
students' educational transitions. The latter point might particularly be relevant for
C the t-statistic whereof (t = −1.80 in model 3a) is not far from the critical value of
-1.96.35 Notably, however, the coeﬃcients for the residuals that were used to identify
teachers' over- and underestimations are quite similar, and all of them signiﬁcant, which
gives support for H1.36
35To ensure that these diﬀerences are not due to diﬀerences in sample size between original PHEO and
the synthetic ﬁle, I took 100 random samples of size N=794 from the synthetic ﬁle and re-estimated
model 4b. The results were virtually identical to the ones reported in table 5b (not shown; available
upon request).
36A previous study (Becker, 2010a) found that the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals are insensitive
to both their measurement level (metric vs. dichotomized) and the link function of the underlying
generalized linear model wherefrom they are obtained (logistic vs. probit regression). The same holds
for the residuals generated from the synthetic data at hand (not shown, available upon request).
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Table 5 presents the results of a sequential logit model of students' educational tran-
sitions. Models 5a to 8a refer to students' probability of passing Abitur, and models 9a
to 12a to students' university transitions. In model 5a, only the SEU predictors went
into the equation. We can see that students' expected educational beneﬁt B and their
subjective expected probability of successfully completing Gymnasium pep are positively
associated with their probability of passing Abitur. These results dissipate in models
6a and 7a when the residuals from the performance model and the motivation model
are introduced, respectively. From both models we can learn that the more a teacher
overestimates her student compared to her actual performance or motivation, the higher
the probability that she successfully passes Abitur. This result still holds when teachers'
evaluations are regarded net of both students' performance and their motivation alto-
gether (model 8a). The only diﬀerences we encounter compared to the two preceding
models are that i) both eﬀect size and z-value are a bit lower, and ii) students' sub-
jective expected probability of successfully completing Gymnasium pep still signiﬁcantly
predicts their probability of passing Abitur. Thus, the results from these models still
provide support for H1.
Turning to models 9a to 12a that list the estimates for the prediction of students'
university transitions, we do not ﬁnd any parameter that would be signiﬁcantly associ-
ated with that outcome. Hence, the tentative conclusion up to now would be that both
the impact of the SEU predictors and the eﬀect of self-fulﬁlling prophecies decrease over
educational transitions.
In models 5b-8b (table 6), students' expected costs C is the only primary school SEU
indicator that signiﬁcantly predicts students' probability of passing Abitur (which only
holds if the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals are part of the equation). However, we
do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀect of either one of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals
that capture teachers' primary school over- and underestimations  which is in line with
hypothesis H2a.
Likewise, in models 9b-10b, neither one of the SEU predictors nor the self-fulﬁlling
prophecy residuals are signiﬁcantly associated with students' propensities of university
transitions. This result would give support to hypothesis H2b, but note that we still
have to compare the predicted probabilities before drawing ﬁnal conclusions.37
37For all self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals and all except two SEU terms, the results of tables 5a - 6 are
robust against controls for both parental education and occupational prestige (see Appendix, tables
Fa - G).
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Table 4: Logit model of secondary school transitions
Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a
log-
odds/z
log-
odds/z
log-
odds/z
log-
odds/z
B 2.43*** 2.32*** 2.02*** 2.37***
(10.70) (8.48) (6.13) (8.13)
-SD 1.37*** 1.48*** 1.40*** 1.52***
(6.93) (5.89) (4.65) (5.61)
p(sd) 0.02 0.07 -0.18 -0.02
(0.13) (0.33) (-0.68) (-0.11)
C -0.49** -0.53** -0.45 -0.50*
(-3.14) (-2.66) (-1.80) (-2.33)
p(ep) -1.58*** -1.40*** -0.98*** -1.57***
(-9.21) (-6.59) (-3.74) (-6.85)
residuals (perfor-
mance model)
2.67***
(12.90)
residuals (moti-
vation model)
4.09***
(14.63)
residuals (full
model)
2.68***
(12.10)
Nagelkerke's R2 0.41 0.60 0.74 0.61
N 995 889 830 794
All coeﬃcients are unstandardized log-odds. Z-values in parenthe-
ses. Signiﬁcance values: * (p <.05); ** (p <.01); *** (p <.001).
Variables: B: expected beneﬁt; −SD: expected status decline;
psd: expected impact of status decline; C: expected costs; pep:
subjective expected probability of educational success.
(a) Original PHEO data.
Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b
log-
odds/z
log-
odds/z
log-
odds/z
log-
odds/z
B 1.55*** 1.40*** 1.28*** 1.32***
(16.79) (12.00) (9.64) (10.77)
-SD 1.61*** 1.51*** 1.42*** 1.51***
(15.34) (10.79) (9.04) (10.06)
p(sd) -0.01 -0.24* -0.65*** -0.32**
(-0.08) (-2.07) (-4.81) (-2.66)
C -0.47*** -0.61*** -0.52*** -0.65***
(-5.83) (-5.67) (-4.25) (-5.65)
p(ep) -1.17*** -0.95*** -0.36* -1.02***
(-12.02) (-7.58) (-2.51) (-7.64)
residuals (perfor-
mance model)
3.10***
(27.42)
residuals (moti-
vation model)
3.77***
(28.08)
residuals (full
model)
3.06***
(25.72)
Nagelkerke's R2 0.31 0.60 0.67 0.59
N 3206 2866 2621 2512
All coeﬃcients are unstandardized log-odds. Z-values in parenthe-
ses. Signiﬁcance values: * (p <.05); ** (p <.01); *** (p <.001).
Variables: B: expected beneﬁt; −SD: expected status decline;
psd: expected impact of status decline; C: expected costs; pep:
subjective expected probability of educational success.
(b) Synthetic ﬁle.301
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Predicted probabilities Following the proposition made by Lucas (2001, 2009), for
the analysis of transition rate changes, predicted probabilities rather than regression
coeﬃcients should be compared. Figure 8 plots the predicted probabilities for students'
educational transitions conditional on their teachers' residualized expectations (with the
respective SEU indicators held constant at their mean). The solid lines show students'
predicted transition probabilities conditional on their primary school teachers' transi-
tion recommendations, the dashed lines show students' predicted transition probabilities
conditional on their secondary school teachers' evaluations. Apparently, diﬀerences in
transition probabilities between students with primary school over- and underestima-
tions, respectively, become smaller from transition 1 (+/- Gymnasium) to transition 2
(+/- Abitur). Likewise, diﬀerences between students with secondary school over- and
underestimations, respectively, become smaller from transition 2 to transition 3 (+/-
university transition). Both results provide support for hypothesis H2a.
What does not suit this general trend is the ﬁnding that diﬀerences between students
who had been over- and underestimated by their primary school teachers, respectively,
seem to become larger again from transition 2 to transition 3; and that students who
had been underestimated by their primary school teachers have a higher predicted uni-
versity transition probability on average than those who had been overestimated by
their primary school teachers. Yet, we have to keep in mind that the underlying logit
coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant  so this would still be weak evidence to reject both H1
and H2b in this respect.
On the other hand, the predicted university transition probabilities of students who
had been overestimated at secondary school are still higher than the predicted proba-
bilities of students who had been overestimated at primary school. This is well in line
with hypothesis H2b.
4.3 Robustness Analysis
In order to get an approximate intuition about the reliability of the results gained from
statistical matching, I intend to perform a couple of robustness analyses. The latter cover
i) a test for unobserved heterogeneity in terms of a potentially confounding variable;
ii) additional secondary-school controls for the analysis of long-term primary school
expectancy eﬀects; and iii) a comparison of the empirical patterns in the synthetic ﬁle
with results from a 'real' panel study with all required indicators in the same ﬁle (though
less perfectly measured).
Are results robust against unobserved heterogeneity? First, I want to keep a check
on the robustness of the results against an unobserved but potentially confounding vari-
able u. Following Buis (2010, 2011), this kind of unobserved heterogeneity can be sim-
ulated by introducing a weighted sum of random variables νk = βuku  while k denotes
several educational transition points  which is approximated by a normal distribution.
The researcher can now simulate diﬀerent values for both the standard deviation sd(ν)
of this random variable and its correlation ρ with the predictor of interest. I used the
seqlogit package (Buis, 2007) in Stata to simulate a scenario of sd(ν) = 0 (the case
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Figure 8: Predicted probabilities of students' educational transitions conditional on
teachers' over- and underestimations.
of no unobserved covariate), sd(ν) = 0.5, sd(ν) = 1, and sd(ν) = 2. In addition, ρ is
allowed to vary between 0 up to .5. Figures 9 and 10 plot the estimated logit coeﬃcients
for the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals over educational transitions.
With regard to primary school teachers' expectations (ﬁg. 9), the results indicate that
a normally-distributed unobserved random variable with standard deviations up to 2 and
correlations with the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals up to .5 would not be able to aﬀect
the conﬁdence intervals (and thus the signiﬁcance value) of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy
residuals for the ﬁrst transition. However, in the case of the second and the third
transition, an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient could become signiﬁcant if an unobserved variable
would be correlated strongly enough with both the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals and
the outcome of students' educational transitions: If the intercorrelations between the un-
observed random variable and the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals are low, a standard
deviation of sd(ν) = 2 might cause an insigniﬁcant estimate to become positively signif-
icant. If the aforementioned intercorrelations are high (e.g. ρ = .5), even lower standard
deviations would suﬃce an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient to become negatively signiﬁcant.
Concerning secondary school teachers' expectations (ﬁg. 10), in the case of high school
graduations, it might happen that the signiﬁcant estimate could become insigniﬁcant if
the intercorrelations between the self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals and the unobserved
random variable are at least moderate (ρ > .3), and at the same time, the standard
deviation of the latter is high (sd(ν) = 2). Contrarily, in the case of university tran-
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Figure 9: Sensitivity analysis, PHEO indicators.
sitions, it might happen that the insigniﬁcant self-fulﬁlling prophecy residuals could
become signiﬁcant again: Given a random variable with a comparably high standard
deviation (sd(ν) = 2), an insigniﬁcant estimate could become positively signiﬁcant if its
correlation ρ with ν is zero, and negatively signiﬁcant if this correlation is high (ρ = .5).
Taken together, if the time interval between a teacher's expectation and a student's
educational transition is short (such as in the case of primary school teachers' transi-
tion recommendations), a confounding variable is unlikely to aﬀect its signiﬁcant eﬀect.
The later an educational transition, and the larger the time span between a teacher's
expectation and a student's transition, the more unobserved heterogeneity might be a
problem.
Are results robust against additional secondary-school controls? One strategy to
deal with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is to introduce additional controls in
the sequential logit equations. Regarding the long-term eﬀects of primary school teach-
ers' expectations, both secondary-school SEU terms and secondary-school expectancy
eﬀects might be indicators potentially associated with either the predictors of interest,
the outcome, or both of them. Therefore, in ﬁgure 11, I present four diﬀerent plots of
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Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis, CHiSP indicators.
predicted probabilities of students' educational transitions depending on whether they
had been over- or underestimated by their primary school teacher: The predicted prob-
abilities in ﬁgure 11a do not depend on additional controls apart from the variables
from table 6, ﬁgure 11b adds controls for secondary-school SEU terms, 11c adds controls
for secondary-school teacher expectancy eﬀects, and ﬁgure 11d adds controls for both
secondary school SEU terms and teacher expectancy eﬀects.38
38The underlying logit models of ﬁgures 11b  11d are shown in tables H  J.
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Figure 11: A robustness analysis of predicted probabilities of educational transitions.
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We can observe that introducing the above-mentioned controls only marginally aﬀects
the predicted transition probabilities for over- and underestimated students, respectively.
A pleasing result is that the counter-intuitively positive (though insigniﬁcant) diﬀer-
ence in predicted probabilities between under- and overestimated students at t2 and t3
becomes smaller with controls for both secondary-school SEU terms and residualized
teacher expectations. On the other hand, also the hypothesized positive diﬀerence be-
tween later and earlier overestimations at a given transition point is reduced  though
not as strongly as that H2b would have to be rejected.39
Are results from statistical matching comparable to 'real' panel analysis? Fi-
nally, I compare the results from the synthetic ﬁle with analyses based on an actual,
non-matched student cohort. For this purpose, I draw on the British Cohort S tudy
(BCS ) that follows a birth cohort of children all born in the same week in April 1970.
For the robustness analyses to be conducted here, I formed SEU indicators from both
student- and parent-level re-surveys from 1980 and 1986. (As mentioned, I consider
these indicators to be less precise than in the synthetic ﬁle  which is why I still believe
statistical matching of PHEO and CHiSP to yield more convincing results.) Most im-
portantly, in the above-mentioned time span, students' current teachers were surveyed
as well, and they were asked various evaluative questions from which I could derive tol-
erably comparable teacher expectancy indicators. Moreover, from the (former) student
re-survey conducted in 2000, I could add information about students' educational tran-
sitions.40 A summary of the British cohort data variables used for the analyses at hand
as well as their distribution is given in tables K, L, and M (appendix).
Figure 12 graphs the predicted educational transition probabilities for those students
who had been over- and underestimated at age 10 and 16, respectively. Unlike in the
synthetic PHEO-CHiSP ﬁle, now we also observe the eﬀect of secondary-school teachers'
expectations on the ﬁrst transition since the ﬁrst possible transition to observe (O level
vs. no qualiﬁcation) lies temporarily behind the survey time of the second expectancy
indicator.41
For the BCS data, the picture is a bit more puzzling than for the synthetic ﬁle.
First, already at t1, diﬀerences in predicted transition probabilities between over- and
underestimated students are notably smaller than in the graphs based on the synthetic
ﬁle, and they appear to diminish entirely at t3. Second, diﬀerences between students
who had been overestimated by secondary school teachers and students who had been
overestimated by primary school teachers are also smaller and tend to disappear at
39Looking at the underlying logit models in table J (appendix), we can observe that when both pri-
mary and secondary school teachers' expectations are in the model, two out of three indicators still
signiﬁcantly predict students' propensity to pass Abitur.
40Note that the British educational system diﬀers remarkably from the German educational system since
in the former, students are not tracked after primary school. Therefore, the dependent variable of
the analyses at hand changes to the following transitions: 0 'no qualiﬁcation'; 1 '+/- O-level GCE'; 2
'+/- A-level GCE' and 3 '+/- university transition'. This, of course, might harden the comparability
between the two data sets. Furthermore, in the BCS, it is not possible to observe when students
started academic studies. Thus, I was not able to set a cut-oﬀ like in CHiSP.
41The underlying logit models are shown in tables N and O (appendix).
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t3. Although on the one hand, this could be in line with the dissipation hypothesis in
self-fulﬁlling prophecy research (due to the lacking possibility to specify a cutoﬀ as in
CHiSP), on the other hand, we cannot exclude that this result is due to institutional
or measurement diﬀerences between the BCS and the (German) synthetic ﬁle. But
since apart from the data points for t3, the general pattern of ﬁgure 12 is in line with
my expectations and the underlying self-fulﬁlling prophecy estimates lack statistical
signiﬁcance, one can conclude that the results from the synthetic ﬁle are suﬃciently
robust.
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Figure 12: Predicted probabilities of students' educational transitions conditional on
teachers' over- and underestimations (British Cohort Study).
5 Conclusion
Regarding theoretical advancement, the paper at hand is intended to unify ﬁndings from
rational-choice oriented educational sociology and Pygmalion as well as self-fulﬁlling
prophecy research (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968; Raudenbush, 1984; Jussim, 1986; Jus-
sim and Harber, 2005) about declining eﬀect sizes over students' educational transitions.
While conventional rational choice explanations such as the Life Course Perspective
(LCP ; Müller and Karle, 1993), M aximally M aintained Inequality (MMI ; Raftery and
Hout, 1993), Relative Risk Aversion (RRA; Breen and Goldthorpe, 1997) or Eﬀectively
M aintained Inequality (EMI ; Lucas, 2001) usually remain restricted to student- or
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parent-level utility considerations, a main advantage of social-psychological theories,
though less rich with respect to the former indicators, is their explicit consideration of
teacher expectancy eﬀects. In the theoretical section, I ﬁrst alluded to the main con-
tributions from both disciplines to explain decreasing background eﬀects over students'
educational life course.
Starting from a recent subjective expected utility (SEU) explanation of how teachers'
expectations of their students can be supposed to aﬀect the latter's transition propen-
sities via their subjective expected probabilities of educational success (Becker, 2010a;
also see Esser, 1999), I then argued that via a mechanism of Bayesian updating (Breen,
1999; Breen and García-Peñalosa, 2002; Morgan, 2005, ch. 5), students adjust their
beliefs after both a teacher's evaluation and an educational transition. By means of
a simpliﬁed decision tree, I endeavored to show how belief updating could explain the
empirically-observed phenomenon of decreasing teacher expectancy eﬀects over time 
after which I deduced corresponding hypotheses suiting the conventional framework of
educational transition analysis.
Regarding methodological advancement, teacher expectancy eﬀects were then oper-
ationalized as over- and underestimations (in terms of residualized expectations) in a
repeated belief model (i.e. with measures at two distinct time points). As it has been ar-
gued elsewhere (Becker, 2010a), these residuals can be understood as an approximation
of the unobserved mechanisms that account for teacher treatment eﬀects on students'
subjective expected probability of educational success.
Since I did not ﬁnd a single ﬁle that could have been used to test a repeated belief
model with convincing controls for conventional SEU terms, I used the distance hot
deck method (see D'Orazio et al., 2006) to create an artiﬁcial student cohort by means
of statistical matching (Rubin, 1986). Concretely, one source which measured teach-
ers' transition recommendations at the end of primary school (Gesis-No. ZA893) was
matched to a second source that surveyed teachers' secondary school evaluations of stu-
dents' prospective academic ability (Gesis-No. ZA640). Before this was performed, I
justiﬁed how my theoretical model can be supposed to fulﬁll the important conditional
independence assumption (CIA).
From several sequential logit models we could note that students who were overesti-
mated by their teachers in general have a signiﬁcantly higher propensity of taking the
next educational transition. This is well in line with conventional self-fulﬁlling prophecy
and Pygmalion research (for research overviews see Raudenbush, 1984; Jussim, 1986;
Rosenthal, 1994; Jussim and Harber, 2005) and its recent transformations on more so-
ciological questions (Becker, 2010a). Regarding changes in this eﬀect over time, I found
evidence that i) diﬀerences in predicted transition probabilities between students with
primary school over- and underestimations, respectively, become smaller from transition
1 (+/- Gymnasium) to transition 2 (+/- Abitur); ii) diﬀerences in predicted transition
probabilities between students with secondary school over- and underestimations, re-
spectively, become smaller from transition 2 to transition 3 (+/- university transition);
and iii) the predicted transition probabilities of students who had been overestimated at
secondary school to make the transition to university are still higher than the predicted
transition probabilities of students who had been overestimated at primary school. Re-
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garding the implied mechanism of Bayesian updating that was postulated in section 2.4,
it was illustrated that if diﬀerences in student beliefs after an over- or underestimation
tended to decrease over their educational life course, one would be justiﬁed to conclude
that long-term teacher expectancy eﬀects on student beliefs are smaller than short-term
eﬀects. Thus, by trend, the results at hand support my hypotheses.
In several robustness analyses, I ﬁrst noted that the later an educational transition,
and the more time falls between a teacher's expectation and a student's educational
transition, the more the residualized teacher expectancy eﬀects might stand at risk of
being aﬀected by an unobserved but confounding variable. What goes in line with
that observation is that the counter-intuitive (though insigniﬁcant) result that students
who had been underestimated at primary school show higher predicted probabilities of
university transitions than students who had been overestimated was in part canceled
out with additional controls for both secondary school teachers' expectations and student
SEU terms.
With respect to the assumption of Bayesian updating, this result could be a hint
that the simpliﬁed decision tree that was proposed in section 2.4 only provides a rough
sketch of the social situation; and apart from regarding only isolated over- and under-
estimations, the whole sequence of expectancy eﬀects including students' cost-beneﬁt
evaluations at all available measurement points should be considered.
A ﬁnal comparison with the British Cohort Study data (that I consider to entail
indicators less perfectly measured) showed that although teacher expectancy eﬀects were
generally lower than in the synthetic ﬁle, the general pattern of declining eﬀects over
time also undergirds the reliability of the results from the synthetic ﬁle.
Overall, these ﬁndings suggests the following improvements: From a theoretical point
of view, a comprehensive Bayesian analysis of the underlying educational decision tree
would certainly be insightful, but would have gone far beyond the present study's scope.
In my view, Breen (1999), Breen and García-Peñalosa (2002) and Morgan (2005, ch.
5) have initiated an important theoretical advancement in educational sociology that
should be generalized to include all relevant parameters aﬀecting students' utility func-
tion that may be subject to updating processes over their educational life course. Once
this has been performed for teacher expectancy eﬀects, the model could be ﬁtted in a
corresponding Bayesian probit model of choice making (Albert and Chib, 1993; Jackman,
2009, ch. 8).
Furthermore, as acknowledged in the operationalization section, all results have to
be evaluated cautiously. Concerning the statistical matching procedure, admittedly, the
two sources stem from diﬀerent populations since in the ﬁle Parental Home and Educa-
tional Opportunities (PHEO), primary school students in Baden-Wuerttemberg were
surveyed, while in the Cologne High School Panel (CHiSP), secondary school students
in North Rhine-Westphalia were interviewed. Thus, institutional factors in the two Ger-
man Federal Lands may lead to diﬃculties in comparability since, in technical terms,
the two sources are biased (van der Laan, 2000). A potential strategy to cope with this
problem could be to use another measure of primary school teachers' expectations such
as general ability assessments which do not suﬀer from institutional dependencies. A
second problem may arise due to measurement diﬀerences in the two data ﬁles. In partic-
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ular, it was not possible to compute a high estimated beneﬁt of education for parents in
PHEO  which may be an issue of inconsistency as admonished by van der Laan (2000)
, but a comparison of logistic regression estimates based on both original PHEO and
PHEO indicators in the synthetic ﬁle revealed diﬀerences in signiﬁcance also for other
coeﬃcients. Thus, I would still recommend to treat the present results with necessary
prudence  though the estimates obtained from the British Cohort study basically tend
into the same direction.
A more technical recommendation relates to the choice of the concrete matching al-
gorithm. In the study at hand, I chose an unconstrained distance hot deck algorithm
relying on the Gower distance function for both binary and ordered categorical levels
of measurement. However, future studies should test whether results are reproducible if
alternative matching algorithms as reviewed in section 3.3 are applied.
In the context of further improvements, a special situation could occur in terms of a
sequence of multiple underestimations: According to ﬁndings by Madon et al. (2006),
it is be possible that self-fulﬁlling prophecies could accumulate rather than dissipate
over time. Hence, in further analyses, it should also be tested if the predicted transition
probabilities of students who had been underestimated by their teachers at diﬀerent time
points are lower than they would be had only a single teacher expectation been consid-
ered. Moreover, as some self-fulﬁlling prophecy studies suggest (Jussim and Harber,
2005), additional interactions could also be formed with students' social backgrounds.
And ﬁnally, future studies should extend their analysis of changes in predicted probabil-
ities of teachers' expectations over educational transitions across cohorts. Since most of
the above-cited rational choice theories also address this issue, it would be an interesting
but neglected question also for self-fulﬁlling prophecy research. However, answering this
question would even more depend on data availability.
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6 Appendix
pi0 = .5
δ1 = 1
τ1 = 1
δ2 = 1
τ2 = 1
τ2 = 0.25
pi2+ =
.75
δ2 = 0
τ2 = 1
τ2 = 0.35
pi2− = .
65
τ1 = 0
.4
pi1+
=
.6
δ1 = 0
τ1 = 1
δ2 = 1
τ2 = 1
τ2 = 0.45
pi2+ =
.55
δ2 = 0
τ2 = 1
τ2 = 0.55
pi2− = .
45
τ1 = 0
.6
pi1−
=
.4
Figure A: Decision tree under scenario 3 (see table 1).
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Table A: Logistic regression model of primary school teachers' recommendations on stu-
dents' performance and motivation (original PHEO data)
Performance Model Motivation Model Full Model
eb∗sd/z -value eb∗sd/z -value eb∗sd/z -value
average grade 3.80*** 3.76***
(15.71) (14.41)
learning motivation 1.37*** 0.98
(5.54) (-0.37)
TV consumption 1.10 1.05
(1.80) (0.77)
Nagelkerke's R2 0.29 0.03 0.29
N 1549 1453 1393
All coeﬃcients are standardized odds ratios. Z-values in parentheses. Signiﬁcance values: * (p
<.05); ** (p <.01); *** (p <.001).
Table B: Logistic regression model of secondary school teachers' evaluations on students'
performance and motivation (original CHiSP data)
Performance Model Motivation Model Full Model
eb∗sd/z -value eb∗sd/z -value eb∗sd/z -value
average grade 8.40*** 7.45***
(17.63) (16.41)
learning motivation 1.14* 1.11
(2.21) (1.37)
self-concept 2.03*** 1.45***
(10.67) (4.52)
Nagelkerke's R2 0.51 0.15 0.52
N 1313 1304 1301
All coeﬃcients are standardized odds ratios. Z-values in parentheses. Signiﬁcance values: * (p
<.05); ** (p <.01); *** (p <.001).
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Table D: Summary statistics of all independent variables in the synthetic ﬁle
count mean sd min max
B [PHEO] 3374 1.13 0.52 0.00 2.00
-SD [PHEO] 3358 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00
p(sd) [PHEO] 3244 0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00
C [PHEO] 3339 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
p(ep) [PHEO] 3367 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
transition recommendation [PHEO] 3133 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
residual (perf.) [PHEO] 3001 0.09 0.43 -0.86 1.12
residual (mot.) [PHEO] 2748 0.10 0.49 -0.48 0.83
residual (full) [PHEO] 2634 0.07 0.43 -0.86 1.13
residual (perf, dichot.) [PHEO] 3001 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
residual (mot., dichot.) [PHEO] 2748 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
residual (full, dichot.) [PHEO] 2634 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
par. occ. pres. [PHEO] 3213 49.34 14.12 18.00 72.00
par. occ. pres. (dichot.) [PHEO] 3374 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00
par. educ. [PHEO] 3374 1.14 1.23 0.00 3.00
-SD [CHiSP] 2349 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00
C [CHiSP] 2688 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
p(sd) [CHiSP] 2667 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
p(ep) [CHiSP] 2688 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00
B [CHiSP] 3214 1.13 0.86 0.00 2.00
residual (perf.) [CHiSP] 1307 0.01 0.38 -0.99 0.99
residual (mot.) [CHiSP] 1298 0.00 0.47 -0.85 0.94
residual (full) [CHiSP] 1281 -0.00 0.38 -1.20 1.05
residual (perf, dichot.) [CHiSP] 1307 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
residual (mot., dichot.) [CHiSP] 1298 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
residual (full, dichot.) [CHiSP] 1281 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
par. educ. [CHiSP] 3374 1.14 1.23 0.00 3.00
par. occ. pres. [CHiSP] 2680 49.39 12.64 18.00 78.00
par. occ. pres. (dichot.) [CHiSP] 2680 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
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Table E: Logit model of secondary school transitions with controls for parental occupational prestige and education
Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c
log-odds/z log-odds/z log-odds/z log-odds/z
B 2.12*** 2.16*** 1.88*** 2.19***
(9.00) (7.33) (5.40) (7.04)
-SD 1.40*** 1.56*** 1.42*** 1.55***
(6.45) (5.68) (4.34) (5.33)
p(sd) 0.09 0.22 -0.08 0.09
(0.47) (0.96) (-0.27) (0.36)
C -0.47** -0.53* -0.46 -0.51*
(-2.75) (-2.45) (-1.66) (-2.22)
p(ep) -1.72*** -1.58*** -1.05*** -1.65***
(-8.96) (-6.70) (-3.67) (-6.65)
par. occ. pres. 0.02* 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(2.25) (0.74) (-0.05) (0.57)
par. educ. 0.64*** 0.74*** 0.79*** 0.66***
(4.64) (4.08) (3.92) (3.50)
residuals (perfor-
mance model)
2.74***
(11.97)
residuals (moti-
vation model)
4.10***
(13.67)
residuals (full
model)
2.67***
(11.13)
Nagelkerke's R2 0.45 0.63 0.76 0.63
N 876 783 727 694
All coeﬃcients are unstandardized log-odds. Z-values in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance values: * (p < .05); ** (p < .01); *** (p < .001).
Variables: B: expected beneﬁt; −SD: expected status decline; psd:
expected impact of status decline; C: expected costs; pep: subjective
expected probability of educational success.
(a) Original PHEO data.
Model 1d Model 2d Model 3d Model 4d
log-odds/z log-odds/z log-odds/z log-odds/z
B 1.07*** 0.92*** 0.75*** 0.87***
(10.47) (7.33) (5.23) (6.68)
-SD 1.60*** 1.46*** 1.49*** 1.47***
(13.35) (9.63) (8.58) (9.39)
p(sd) 0.05 -0.20 -0.58*** -0.28*
(0.49) (-1.54) (-3.89) (-2.17)
C -0.34*** -0.46*** -0.38** -0.48***
(-3.63) (-3.84) (-2.79) (-3.89)
p(ep) -1.29*** -1.09*** -0.57*** -1.06***
(-11.46) (-7.91) (-3.68) (-7.43)
par. occ. pres. 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(10.33) (5.68) (5.13) (4.87)
par. educ. 0.74*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.70***
(16.77) (12.63) (11.72) (11.30)
residuals (perfor-
mance model)
2.90***
(23.44)
residuals (moti-
vation model)
3.76***
(25.19)
residuals (full
model)
2.87***
(22.45)
Nagelkerke's R2 0.49 0.66 0.73 0.65
N 3050 2721 2511 2405
All coeﬃcients are unstandardized log-odds. Z-values in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance values: * (p < .05); ** (p < .01); *** (p < .001).
Variables: B: expected beneﬁt; −SD: expected status decline; psd:
expected impact of status decline; C: expected costs; pep: subjective
expected probability of educational success.
(b) Synthetic ﬁle.
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V. Does the Eﬀect of Teachers' Expectations on Students' Educational Opportunities Decrease?
Table K: Questions and categories of all variables taken from the 1980 British Cohort
Study
Concept Indicator
Initial categories
Students' Average of student estimate of ability 0 = not so well
performance in math, literature and spelling 1 = well
Feel shy in front of teacher; feel foolish in front 0 = yes
Students' motivation of peers; feel foolish with teacher 1 = don't know
(all student's answer) 2 = no
0 = no
Continue training after leaving school (mother's answer) 1 = cannot say
2 = yes
1 = further
2 = college
B Type of training/education after school (mother's answer) 3 = apprenticeship
4 = speciﬁc
5 = don't know
-SD Mother or father overconcerned? 0 = does not apply
(teacher's answer) 1 = yes applies
0 = yes
p(SD) Useless to try in school (student's answer) 1 = don't know
2 = no
0 = yes
Studying for tests is waste of time (student's answer) 1 = don't know
2 = no
0 = under 35pw
1 = 35 - 49pw
2 = 50 - 99pw
C Total gross family income (parents' answer) 3 = 100 - 149pw
4 = 150 - 199pw
5 = 200 - 249pw
6 = 250 or more
0 = yes
p(ep) Low marks even though study hard 1 = don't know
2 = no
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Table L: Questions and categories of all variables taken from the 1986 British Cohort
Study
0 = bottom 5%
1 = well below aver 10%
2 = below average 20%
Teachers' expectations Assessment of student's academic ability 3 = Average 30%
4 = above average 20%
5 = well above aver 10%
6 = top 5%
0 = fail
1 = CSE 4
2 = 'O'lev E/'A' E/CSE
3
Students' performance Average grade summer term exam (BCS1986) 3 = 'O'lev D/'A' D/CSE
2
4 = C/CSE 1
5 = 'O'lev C/'A' 
6 = 'O'lev B/'A' B
7 = 'O'lev A/'A' A
0 = very true
Quiet in classroom and get on with work 1 = partly true
2 = not true at all
0 = very true
Students' motivation Think homework is a bore 1 = partly true
2 = not true at all
0 = very true
I don't like school 1 = partly true
2 = not true at all
0 = might do it
Job aspiration: Career in a profession (need a degree) [student's an-
swer]
1 = "joint ﬁrst choice"
B 2 = ﬁrst choice
Leave reason: always taken for granted (student's answer) 0 = not stated
1 = yes
0 = not satisﬁed
-SD Satisfaction with child's school progress 1 = can't say
(mother's answer) 2 = fairly satisﬁed
3 = very satisﬁed
0 = many not useful
Any of your subjects useful in future? (student's answer) 1 = some are useful
2 = all are useful
p(SD) 0 = very true
Feel school is largely a waste of time (student's answer) 1 = partly true
2 = not true at all
0 = no
C Fam troubled by ﬁnance hardshp past year (parents' answer) 1 = uncertain / don't
know
2 = yes
Leave reason: might be not bright enough 0 = not stated
p(ep) (student's answer) 1 = yes
0 = very true
Find it diﬃcult to keep mind on work 1 = partly true
2 = not true at all
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V. Does the Eﬀect of Teachers' Expectations on Students' Educational Opportunities Decrease?
Table M: Summary statistics of all indicators generated from the British Cohort Study
count mean sd min max
Educational transitions (BCS combined) 11239 1.12 1.26 0.00 3.00
Teachers' expectations BCS 1980 dichotomized 16117 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Residuals perf. (BCS 1980) 12491 0.00 0.44 -0.51 0.93
Residuals mot. (BCS 1980) 12382 0.00 0.46 -0.37 0.80
Residuals full (BCS 1980) 12219 -0.00 0.44 -0.52 1.03
Residuals perf. dichot. (BCS 1980) 16117 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Residuals mot. dichot. (BCS 1980) 16117 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
Residuals full dichot. (BCS 1980) 16117 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
B (BCS 1980) 15571 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
-SD (BCS 1980) 12755 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
p(SD) (BCS 1980) 12510 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00
C (BCS 1980) 16117 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
p(ep) (BCS 1980) 12967 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Teachers' expectations BCS 1986 dichotomized 16117 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00
Average grade summer term exam (BCS 1986) 16117 0.62 0.00 0.62 0.62
Residuals perf. (BCS 1986) 16117 -0.00 0.32 -0.88 0.12
Residuals mot. (BCS 1986) 6179 -0.00 0.42 -0.87 0.34
Residuals full (BCS 1986) 6179 -0.00 0.42 -0.87 0.34
Residuals perf. dichot. (BCS 1986) 16117 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00
Residuals mot. dichot. (BCS 1986) 16117 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
Residuals full dichot. (BCS 1986) 16117 0.91 0.28 0.00 1.00
B (BCS 1986) 6417 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
SD (BCS 1986) 16117 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
p(SD) (BCS 1986) 6281 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
C (BCS 1986) 16117 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
p(ep) (BCS 1986) 6324 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
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